



HOW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS 








PUBLISHED JOINTLY BY 
CENTER FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 
PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
AND 





Funding for this project was made possible by a generous grant 






Hamilton, Daniel S. and Quinlan, Joseph P. (eds), Deep Integration: How 
Transatlantic Markets are Leading Globalization, Washington, DC and 
Brussels: Center for Transatlantic Relations and Centre for European 



















Center for Transatlantic Relations  Centre for European Policy Studies 
American Consortium on EU Studies  Place du Congrès 1 
EU Center Washington, DC  1000 Brussels 
The Paul H. Nitze School of  Tel: 32 2 229 39 11 
Advanced International Studies  Fax: 32 2 219 41 51 
The Johns Hopkins University  Email: info@ceps.be 
1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW. Suit 525  Website: http://www.ceps.be 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel: 202-663-5880 
Fax: 202-663-5879 
Email: transatlantic@jhu.edu  





Section I. Deep Integration and the Transatlantic Economy 
 
1.  The Transatlantic Economy: Mars? Venus? No, Mercury!......................3 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
 
2.  The Transatlantic Economy: Seven Ties that Bind................................11 
  Daniel Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
 
3.  The Transatlantic Economy: Remaining Barriers and Possibilities 
for Liberalization....................................................................................28 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
 
 
Section II. Deep Integration and the Transatlantic Economy: 
Sectoral Analyses 
 
4.  Services in the Transatlantic Economy ..................................................39 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
 
5.  Beyond Open Skies:  
  The Economic Impact of a U.S.-EU Open Aviation Area .....................50 
  Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes and Boaz Moselle 
 
6.  Commercial Aerospace and the Transatlantic Economy........................74 
 Richard  Aboulafia 
 
7.  The Transatlantic Outlook for the Biopharmaceutical Sector................91 
 Françoise  Simon 
 
8.  The Transatlantic Automotive Sector...................................................109 
 Garel  Rhys 
 
9.  A Transatlantic Financial Market?.......................................................122 
 Karel  Lannoo 
 
10. Transatlantic  Telecommunications: Markets, Policies, Issues.............132 
  Michael Tyler and Matthew Dixon 
 
11.  Telecom Services: A Transatlantic Perspective...................................156 
 Andrea  Renda Section III. Politics and Markets 
 
12.  Transatlantic Corporate Governance Reform:  
  Brussels Sprouts or Washington Soup?................................................193 
  Arman Khachaturyan and Joseph A. McCahery 
 
13.  Climate Change: Could a transatlantic greenhouse gas emissions 
market work?........................................................................................204 
 Christian  Egenhofer 
 
14.  REACH: Getting the Chemistry Right in Europe ................................221 
 Jacques  Pelkmans 
 
15.  All quiet on the transatlantic front?  
  Deficits and Imbalances in the Transatlantic Economy .......................236 
  Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer 
 
16.  Transatlantic and Global Dimensions of the Lisbon Agenda...............250 
 Fredrik  Erixon 
 
 
Section IV. Conclusion 
 
17. Deep  Integration: 
  Opportunities and Challenges for Transatlantic Relations...................277 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
 
 
About the Authors.......................................................................... 287 | i 
Preface 
lobalization is widening the scope and scale of interactions between 
continents to embrace more parts of the globe than ever before. Most 
punditry and analysis have focused on this ‘widening’ process, 
particularly its impact on developing countries. But globalization is also 
deepening the intensity of such interactions, and this deepening is most 
intense across the Atlantic.  
This volume examines the phenomenon we call ‘deep integration’ – the 
extensive ties that bind the US and European economies. We attempt to offer 
a clearer picture of the ‘deep integration’ forces shaping the transatlantic 
economy today; to show how these interdependencies have accelerated, not 
loosened, since the end of the Cold War; how they prevailed despite the 
transatlantic political disputes of the past few years; how specific sectors of 
the transatlantic economy are deeply integrated; how domestic policy 
decisions have important transatlantic consequences; and how decision-
makers on each side of the Atlantic can understand the challenges and seize 
the opportunities accompanying this phenomenon.  
While there has been no effort to force consensus among the authors in this 
volume, a basic theme does connect the various contributions: transatlantic 
markets are in many respects the cutting edge of globalization. Key sectors 
of the transatlantic economy are integrating as never before, driven primarily 
by investment flows and foreign affiliate sales, which are ‘deep’ forms of 
integration, as opposed to trade, which is a ‘shallow’ form of integration. 
Europeans and Americans have become so intertwined that we are literally in 
each other’s business. These linkages underpin a $3 trillion economy that 
provides up to 14 million ‘insourced’ jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Deep 
integration, however, can also generate frictions when two different systems 
rub up against each other. 
Many ‘top-down’ policy proposals for new transatlantic economic initiatives 
have been issued by business groups and think tanks, but there is little 
‘bottom-up’ analysis of specific cases that can provide a foundation of 
evidence for the phenomenon of deep integration. The case studies in this 
volume are intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive. Some 
examine specific sectors in which transatlantic cooperation to remove 
barriers or align standards has had positive results, and sectors in which 
cooperation has been less successful. Others investigate the interaction 
between domestic policy decisions and deep transatlantic integration. 
Wherever possible we have sought to quantify the economic benefits of 
success or the economic costs of failure, and to offer lessons to be drawn and 




  One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the 
past decade has been the increasing integration and cohesion of the 
transatlantic economy. Globalization is happening faster and reaching 
deeper between Europe and America than between any other two 
continents. 
  The European and American economies have not drifted apart since 
the end of the Cold War; they have become even more intertwined and 
interdependent. 
  Despite the perennial hype about the significance of NAFTA, the ‘rise 
of Asia’ or ‘big emerging markets’, the United States and Europe 
remain by far each other’s most important commercial partners. 
  The economic relationship between the United States and Europe is by 
a wide margin the deepest and broadest between any two continents in 
history – and those ties are accelerating.  
  The first five years of the 21
st century – a time of transatlantic political 
tension and sluggish economic growth – marked one of the most 
intense periods of transatlantic integration ever.  
  The transatlantic economy generates roughly $3 trillion in total 
commercial sales a year and employs up to 14 million workers in 
mutually ‘insourced’ jobs on both sides of the Atlantic who enjoy high 
wages, high labor and environmental standards, and open, largely 
nondiscriminatory access to each other’s markets. 
Investment First, Trade Second 
  Transatlantic trade squabbles steal the headlines but account for only 
1-2% of transatlantic commerce. In fact, trade itself accounts for less 
than 20% of transatlantic commerce. 
  Trade flows are a misleading benchmark of transatlantic economic 
interaction. Foreign investment, not trade, drives transatlantic 
commerce, and contrary to common wisdom, most US and European 
investments flow to each other, rather than to lower-wage developing 
nations. 
  When one adds investment and trade together to get a more complete 
picture, one sees that US economic engagement remains 
overwhelmingly focused on Europe. The transatlantic economy is 
where the markets are, where the jobs are and where the profits are.  iv | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
  In 2004, total transatlantic trade in goods rose to a record $482 billion, 
up 22% from 2003.  
  Despite the strength of the euro against the US dollar, US imports 
from the European Union jumped to a record $283 billion, helping to 
drive America’s trade deficit with the European Union to an all-time 
high – $110 billion. 
  In 2004, the US posted record imports from Germany ($77.2 billion), 
Italy ($28 billion), France ($31.8 billion), Italy ($28.1 billion) and a 
host of other European nations. Surging imports from Europe led to 
record US trade deficits with a number of European nations in 2004, 
including Germany ($46 billion). 
  Despite Washington’s war-related frustrations with Europe, corporate 
America ploughed nearly $100 billion into the European Union in 
2003 and another $92 billion in 2004.  
  US investment flows to the United Kingdom ($23 billion) in 2004 
accounted for roughly 25% of total US investments in the European 
Union as a whole. 
  US foreign investment to the rest of Europe approached $70 billion in 
2004, or near-record highs.  
  Despite the diplomatic ill-will between Washington and Paris; US 
investment flows to France soared to a record $6.8 billion in 2004, 
some 45% larger than US investments to China in the same year.  
  US investment flows to Italy in 2004 ($4.2 billion) were four times as 
large as US flows to India ($1 billion).  
  Europe remains the number one geographical location for US overseas 
investment. During the first half of this decade, Europe has accounted 
for nearly 56% of total US foreign direct investment. 
  Despite European squabbles with the Bush Administration, European 
firms invested nearly $53 billion in the United States in 2004, up from 
just $6.6 billion the year before. 
  French investment surged to nearly $9 billion in 2004, up from $5.1 
billion in 2003. German firms invested some $6.8 billion in the United 
States in 2004, up sharply from investment flows of just $407 million 
in 2003. 
  Corporate Europe has accounted for 75% of total foreign direct 
investment inflows into the US in the past five years. The UK 
accounted for 19.8% of total global investment flows into the United EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | v  
 
States, followed by France (13.1%), the Netherlands (10.8%) and 
Germany (9.2%).  
  Europeans invested over $100 billion in US securities in 2003-04. 
  US net purchases of European equities in 2004 reached nearly $52 
billion, an annual record. 
That’s where the profits are ... 
  US affiliates earned a record $100.8 billion in Europe in 2004. 
Earnings jumped 23% over record earnings of $82 billion in 2003. 
  US affiliates booked record profits in 17 European markets in 2004.  
  US earnings from Europe have nearly doubled in the past five years.  
  Despite the strength of the euro, European affiliate earnings in the US 
surged to a record $65.7 billion in 2004, a 38.5% jump from 2003. 
Affiliates from nine different European nations reported record US 
profits in 2004. 
  Earnings of European affiliates in the US have increased more than 
four times since the US recession in 2001.  
  US affiliate income in China continues to soar, but US affiliates 
earned almost three times as much in tiny Ireland and more than five 
times as much in such countries as the Netherlands or the UK as they 
did in China. 
  Europe is the most profitable region in the world for corporate 
America. In 2004, US affiliates posted record profits in 12 European 
countries. US companies continue to rely on Europe for half their total 
annual foreign profits. 
  Over the past five years US companies have registered their most 
robust earnings growth in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Switzerland, ahead of China or India. US affiliate profits in 
Switzerland alone were twice those earned in all of South America, 4 
times that of earnings in China and 23 times that of earnings in India.  
  The United Kingdom ranks as the most important single national 
market in the world for corporate America when it comes to global 
earnings, accounting for 11% of total affiliate income in the first half 
of this decade. Not far behind was the Netherlands, with a 10.3% share 
of global foreign affiliate earnings.  vi | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
That’s where the jobs are ... 
  Most foreigners working for US companies abroad are employed in 
Europe and most foreigners working for European companies abroad 
are employed in the United States. 
  The manufacturing workforce of US affiliates in Germany alone 
totaled 385,000 in 2002, more than 80% larger than the number of 
manufactured workers employed in China by US affiliates. 
  European firms employed over two-thirds of the 5.4 million US 
workers on the payrolls of majority-owned foreign affiliates in 2002.  
That’s where the research is … 
  61% of US corporate research and development conducted outside the 
US is conducted in Europe. R&D expenditures by US foreign affiliates 
are greatest in the UK, Germany, France and Switzerland, in that 
order. 
  European R&D expenditures in the US are substantial and dwarf 
expenditures by Japan or other nations.  
That’s where the markets are … 
  Europe accounted for half of the record $3 trillion in global US foreign 
affiliate sales in 2002, well in excess of US exports of $975 billion.  
  Europe accounted for half of total global sales, more than double 
comparable figures for the Asia/Pacific region.  
  US affiliate sales in Europe were more than double affiliate sales in 
the entire Asia/Pacific region.  
  US affiliate sales in the UK alone exceeded aggregate sales in Latin 
America.  
  While US foreign affiliate sales in China have skyrocketed, they have 
done so from a very low base, and still remain very far below 
comparable sales in Europe. Sales of $48 billion in China in 2002, for 
example, were lower than sales to Spain ($57 billion) and well below 
those in Germany ($242 billion) or France ($140 billion). 
  Affiliate sales, not trade, represent the primary means by which 
European firms deliver goods and services to US consumers. In 2002, 
European affiliate sales in the US ($1.2 trillion) were roughly three 
times larger than European exports to the US.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | vii  
 
  German affiliate sales in the US were roughly 3.3 times larger than 
German exports to the US British affiliate sales in the US were almost 
two and a half times larger than British exports to the US  
  The total output of US foreign affiliates in Europe and of European 
affiliates in the US is greater than the total gross domestic output of 
most nations.  
  Europe accounts for 56% of the total global output of US affiliates.  
  US affiliates in Ireland accounted for 19.4% of Ireland’s total GDP in 
2002, a jump of 3.4% from 2001. US affiliates accounted for 6.7% of 
the UK’s aggregate output and 5.5% of Belgium’s total output in 2002.  
  European affiliates account for 64% of the total output of all foreign 
affiliates operating in the United States.  
  60% of corporate America’s foreign assets are located in Europe.  
  US assets in Germany are greater than total US assets in all of South 
America. 
  America’s corporate assets in the United Kingdom exceed total US 
assets in the entire Asia/Pacific region.  
  European firms account for 75% of total foreign assets in the United 
States.  
  There is far more European investment in Texas alone as all US 
investment in Japan and China put together. In fact, European 
investment in many different US states, ranging from Georgia to 
Indiana to California, is greater, in any given year, than total US 
investment in Japan and China put together. 
Some barriers remain … 
  Despite the fact that transatlantic markets are among the most open in 
the world and are deeply integrated through dense flows of investment, 
affiliate sales and related-party trade, various barriers persist that 
prevent the emergence of a free transatlantic marketplace. 
  Transatlantic tariff barriers are generally low, averaging between 3-4% 
of the €500 billion in annual transatlantic trade. EU tariff levels are 
uneven, however, and both EU and US tariffs are higher on some 
sensitive products. 
  Because transatlantic tariffs are generally quite low and European and 
US industries are so deeply intertwined with each other, ‘behind the viii | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
border’ non-tariff barriers are more important impediments to a free 
transatlantic marketplace. 
But a free transatlantic market could bring great benefits … 
  The OECD estimates that further transatlantic liberalization could lead 
to permanent gains in GDP per capita on both sides of the Atlantic of 3 
to 3½%, and cause additional benefits to other commercial partners.  
Sectoral Opportunities and Challenges 
Services 
  Service activities are the sleeping giant of the transatlantic economy – 
an economic force that, if awoken and unbound, would further deepen 
the commercial stakes between the United States and Europe and 
enhance the global competitiveness of both parties.  
  The service economies of the United States and Europe have never 
been as intertwined as they are today – in such activities as financial 
services, telecommunications, utilities, insurance, advertising, 
computer services and other related functions.  
  Foreign affiliate sales of services on both sides of the Atlantic have 
exploded over the past decade. In fact, affiliate sales of services have 
not only become a viable second channel of delivery, they have 
become the overwhelming mode of delivery in a rather short period of 
time. Nothing better illustrates the ever-deepening integration of the 
transatlantic service economy.  
  Following in the footsteps of manufacturers, US and European service 
companies now deliver their services more through foreign affiliate 
sales than through trade. In the 1970s and 1980s, firms delivered 
services primarily via trade. In the 1990s, foreign affiliate sales 
became the chief mode of delivery.  
  Sales of services by US foreign affiliates in Europe soared from $85 
billion in 1994 to roughly $212 billion in 2002 – a 150% increase, well 
ahead of the roughly 65% rise in US service exports to Europe over 
the same period. 
  US foreign affiliate sales of services in Europe – after being roughly 
equal to US service exports to Europe in 1992 – were nearly double 
the value of US service exports in 2002.  
  Europe is the most important market in the world for US foreign 
affiliate sales of services, just as it is the most important market for US EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | ix  
 
foreign affiliate sales of goods. In 2002, Europe accounted for 53% of 
total US affiliate sales ($401 billion), with Asia (with 23% share) and 
Latin America (13%), a distant second and third, respectively.  
  US foreign affiliate service sales of $98.5 billion in the UK alone in 
2002 were greater than foreign affiliate service sales in all of Asia 
($97 billion) and Latin America ($52 billion). 
  Sales of services by US affiliates of European firms have also soared 
over the past decade. As Europe’s investment position in services has 
expanded in the US, so have foreign affiliate sales of services in the 
US. The latter totaled $269 billion in 2002 versus $86 billion in 1994, 
a jump of 213%, well ahead of the 85% rise in US service imports 
from Europe over the same period.  
  The full potential of the transatlantic service economy, however, 
remains hampered by internal barriers in the US and particularly in 
Europe. US barriers include maritime, legal, engineering, architectural 
and accounting services. EU15 barriers appear highest for domestic 
and foreign firms in accounting, maritime and legal services, and 
higher for foreign firms relative to domestic firms in distribution, 
maritime and architectural services. 
  The key issue, however, remains the continued existence of service 
barriers within the EU itself. Copenhagen Economics estimates that 
liberalization of inner-EU services could result in a total welfare gain 
of 0.6% of EU GDP, or €37 billion, create up to 600,000 jobs and 
boost foreign investment by up to 34%. 
  Such an initiative would be the single most important stimulus to the 
transatlantic services economy; lack of services reform represents a 
significant ‘opportunity cost’ to the US, the EU and the transatlantic 
economy.  
Civil Aviation 
  The EU and US have the largest and among the most deregulated 
domestic aviation markets in the world, but still limit transatlantic 
competition and investment. As a result, the aviation industry lags in 
adapting to globalization even as it drives other sectors to globalize. 
  A single, open transatlantic market for air transport services could 
increase annual passenger traffic by between 4.1 million and 11.0 
million passengers on transatlantic routes, and between 13.6 million 
and 35.7 million on intra-EU routes, for a total increase of 17.7-46.7 
million passengers per year – an increase of 9-24% in total 
transatlantic travel, and 5-14% in intra-EU travel. x | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
  Consumer welfare could increase by about €5.2 billion annually, with 
transatlantic traffic accounting for just over half of that increase. The 
lion’s share (up to €3.8 billion annually) would come from gains to 
consumers that would not involve any reduction in airline profits. 
  The increased airline revenue would lead to additional economic 
output in ‘directly related’ industries ranging from €3.6-8.1 billion a 
year. This excludes the potential impact on industries such as tourism 
and leisure and excludes the 10 new EU members, and is therefore a 
conservative estimate. 
Commercial Aerospace 
  Transatlantic trade in commercial aerospace is a healthy two-way 
street, with both sides importing and exporting $10-15 billion worth of 
equipment annually. 
  At the end of 2004, Airbus had built 18.2% of the active US passenger 
fleet, and Boeing had built 58.7% of the active EU passenger fleet.  
  The world’s jetliners are all powered by Rolls-Royce, General 
Electric, or Pratt & Whitney turbofans. 
  More US than EU airlines chose EU engines for their two main wide-
body jets over the past decade, which means that US engine 
companies enjoy a higher market share on these aircraft in the EU than 
they do in their domestic market.  
  Despite the open nature of transatlantic aerospace trade, a joint 
transatlantic jetliner industry does not now exist. Sadly, there is an 
increasing division between Boeing and Airbus, and between their 
national political backers in the US and the EU. 
  The transatlantic market is so open because of a very useful WTO 
component, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (ATCA). It also 
provides an ongoing test for politicians. Will they be able to resist the 
short-term rewards of intervening in commercial jetliner trade, or will 
they keep faith in a long-term institution that has served both sides 
admirably? 
Automotive Sector 
  Transatlantic automotive commerce – whether in the form of visible 
trade or capital transfers and invisibles such as R&D – is a major 
underpinning of the North American and European economies. 
  In Western Europe the automotive sector accounts for 10% of 
manufacturing output, employs 2.5 million people directly and EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xi  
 
accounts for about 3% of GDP. The situation is similar in North 
America, where the auto sector is the largest manufacturing industry; 
no other activity is linked to so much of US manufacturing or directly 
generates so much retail business or employment. The industry 
employs almost 3 million people directly, with the usual knock-on 
effects that some studies put as high as another 5 million people.  
  Transatlantic trade in automotive products remains significant, with a 
more than 4-to-1 imbalance in favor of Europe. From 2000 to 2005, 
trade from Europe to North America grew by 45.7% compared with 
10.4% from Asia to North America, and compared with -0.3% from 
Latin America to North America. North American exports to Europe 
grew by 44.1% over the period.  
  The North American and West European car and light truck markets 
are broadly equivalent, at around 15 million each, although the type of 
product, imports share of the market, structure of the industry and size 
of the leading firms are different. Whereas European companies 
service the North American market largely through trade, North 
American companies service the European market primarily through 
direct investment.  
  US-owned companies have around 20% of the West European market 
whereas Europeans have less than 6% of the North American car and 
light truck markets. Europe sells 1.1 million vehicles in North America 
annually; North Americans sell over 3 million cars and light 
commercial trucks in Europe. US firms account for 12% of the West 
European heavy truck market; West European firms have 60% of the 
North American heavy truck market.  
  The openness of the transatlantic commerce in automotive products 
provides a benchmark for other sectors. Transatlantic commerce in 
automotive products is largely free of market-distorting arrangements 
and market failure. Compared with many sectors, the auto industry is 
an example of best practice where market-opening is concerned. In the 
transatlantic auto sector, there is nowhere for the inefficient to hide. 
  There is very little tension in the transatlantic automotive sector. The 
tension tends to be with third parties, notably Japan. 
  Although the transatlantic automotive market is largely open, 
harmonization of regulations across the Atlantic could reduce unit 
costs by between 5% and 7% and allow the same products – be they 
components, accessories or sub-assemblies like engines – to be used in 
both markets. Given the scale of the automotive sector, harmonization 
of regulations could increase transatlantic commerce significantly. xii | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
Biopharmaceuticals 
  The impact of the health care sector on the transatlantic economy is 
substantial and expected to grow in the coming decades due to aging 
populations, consumer demand for innovative medical care and post-
genomic advances toward personalized medicine. 
  Since the biopharmaceutical sector has globalized through the entire 
value chain, from research to marketing, transatlantic integration in 
this sector is best tracked through investment rather than trade.  
  The key cross-regional investment driver is clearly the need to recover 
R&D costs on a worldwide basis. Major attractions of the US for 
European companies include its dominance in biotechnology 
innovation, the sheer size of the market and its relatively ‘free market’ 
pricing system – all of which are reinforced by the relocation of major 
research operations from Europe to the US. 
  Similarly, despite slower growth and some internal market barriers, the 
European market remains indispensable for US companies because of 
rising consumer demand due to aging populations and expectations of 
high-tech medicines, maturing of bioscience clusters in the UK, 
Germany and Scandinavia, centralization of the drug approval process, 
and rationalization of supply chains. 
  Each side faces various barriers to fuller integration, however. 
Bioscience is emerging as the innovation driver across many sectors 
ranging from health care to energy, food and bio-defense, and is 
deeply rooted in transatlantic interconnections, and yet public policies 
lag behind the private sector in spurring transatlantic integration.  
  Public policies on both sides of the Atlantic need to be more proactive 
and harmonized, in areas ranging from research funding to pricing and 
reimbursement, in order to provide appropriate support for this vibrant 
sector. 
Financial Markets 
  Europe’s capital markets accounted for 31% of the global financial 
stock in 2003, up from 28% in 1999. This compares to 37% for the 
US, whose share declined from 40% in 1999. 
  The exponential growth of transatlantic portfolio investment over the 
past decade, together with EU financial reforms, has led to a regular 
financial markets regulatory dialogue with the US that could be 
considered a model for other areas of deeper transatlantic economic 
cooperation.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xiii  
 
  Significant reductions in the cost of the capital and regulatory burdens, 
for example, may be expected from the April 2005 US-EU agreement 
on the equivalence of accounting standards, which will effectively 
allow companies to use one single accounting standard in the EU and 
US.  
  It would be difficult to measure the benefits of a fully integrated 
transatlantic financial market, however, particularly since such a 
market does not yet exist within the EU itself. One analysis suggests 
that full transatlantic integration of the securities markets could lead to 
a 9% reduction of the cost of capital for listed companies, 60% 
reduction in transaction costs and an almost 50% increase in trading 
volume. A fully integrated capital market could be expected to 
eliminate a variety of additional duplicate costs. 
  Closer transatlantic regulatory dialogue can be positive, but a high 
degree of international cooperation between regulators could also 
replicate the dangers of excessive or opaque regulatory intervention at 
the national level.  
Telecommunications 
  Over the past two decades, the information and communication 
technologies sector has become the most important engine of 
economic growth, productivity and welfare for developed and 
developing countries. The ICT industry is estimated to have reached 
€2.044 trillion in 2005, of which the US and the EU account for 29.3% 
and 32.1%, respectively. 
  Europe accounts for 30.7% and the US for 21.6% of the €1.126 trillion 
global telecommunications sector. Nine of the world’s top 10 
telecommunications firms are based either in the US or in the EU. 
  The transatlantic telecommunications sector is a success story of 
soaring productivity, plummeting prices, rapid innovation and 
increasingly open transatlantic competition with beneficial results on 
both continents. There are few remaining restrictions on foreign 
ownership and wide participation by foreign communications 
operations.  
  Transatlantic telephone calls today cost only 15 cents per minute, and 
there is more than 700,000 hours of daily calling across the Atlantic. 
Transatlantic capacity has increased from scores of channels to 
hundreds of thousands of channels, and traffic volume has expanded 
more than 20 times since 1980 level. xiv | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
  This sector is also an example of cutting-edge issues of globalization 
that are affecting the US and EU first but which neither side has 
adequately addressed, such as management of common resources, e.g. 
spectrum (perhaps leading to an international marketplace for 
spectrum rights), and emerging issues of interoperability and 
intellectual property rights.  
  The 1998 EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreement on communications 
equipment spurred various efforts to advance further transatlantic 
telecoms integration between the respective telecoms markets. Such a 
market is still hindered, however, by diverging regulatory frameworks, 
incompatible standards and non-tariff barriers. 
  The EU and US are converging in moving towards wireless access and 
mobile technologies, even though telecoms industries still differ in 
many respects. 3G platforms are reducing (but not eliminating) 
incompatible standards on the two sides of the Atlantic. The future 
shape of the telecoms industry depends on the convergence between 
fixed and mobile technologies and on the increasing convergence 
between telecoms, multimedia and broadcast industries. 
  If the US is to realize its goal of universal broadband coverage by 
2007, and if the EU is to realize its Lisbon goal of becoming a 
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy, each will need 
to work to create a more homogeneous and pro-competitive regulatory 
environment on the two sides of the Atlantic. Barriers exist, however, 
notably US federal and state regulatory obstacles to inward FDI and 
incomplete market liberalization in the EU. 
  The European Commission estimated that the liberalization of 
telecommunications and electricity markets would lead to a GDP 
increase of 0.4-0.6% and an employment boost of 0.6%  
  The Commission also calculated that increasing total EU R&D 
expenditure from 1.9% to 3% of GDP by 2010 would lead to a GDP 
level increase of 1.7% by 2010 (0.25% per year), increases of Total 
Factor Productivity (0.8%), employment (1.4%) and real income (3%) 
by 2010 and further GDP level increases of 4.2%, 7.5% and 12.1% in 
2015, 2020 and 2030, respectively. 
  In the US, a recent study calculated that “each year of delay will cost 
the US economy about $12 billion of investment spending and about 
$33 billion of GDP and will deter the creation of more than 212,000 
jobs”. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xv  
 
Domestic Policies and Deep Transatlantic Integration 
Deficits/Imbalances in the Transatlantic Economy 
  Even though the US has a large and growing trade deficit with the EU, 
which still remains one of the largest of its bilateral deficits, this has 
generated little political heat for two reasons. First, the EU and the US 
produce similar goods (not the case for China trade), avoiding issues 
of cheap labor and ‘social dumping’; and second, accumulated 
investments across the Atlantic are so large that more than one-half of 
all transatlantic trade is intra-firm trade, which means that even large 
shifts in exchange rates do not generate protectionist pressures. 
  The US current account deficit is also unlikely to generate transatlantic 
tensions, since it has largely resulted because emerging markets have 
massively increased their savings. This has one simple implication for 
transatlantic relations: the main mechanism to rein in the US current 
account deficit is not the bilateral exchange rate dollar/euro, but an 
increase in global interest rates, which would compress US excess 
demand for savings from the rest of the world. It is thus possible that 
all will remain quiet on the transatlantic front. 
Transatlantic Dimension to the Lisbon Agenda 
  There is a ‘missing link’ to the EU’s Lisbon Agenda to become a top, 
competitive, knowledge-based economy – harnessing transatlantic 
cooperation to leverage growth and innovation, rather than portraying 
the issue as ‘Europe vs. America’. 
  While the EU and US should advance liberalization together in key 
sectors included in the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
there are clear opportunities to complementary transatlantic market-
opening initiatives in such areas as agriculture, services, financial 
markets, telecommunications, non-tariff barriers and the movement of 
people, anti-dumping provisions, trade disputes and innovation 
policies.  
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Reform 
  High-profile corporate fallouts of recent years have underscored the 
interconnection and interdependency of the transatlantic economies 
and the need for regulators and legislators to work cooperatively to 
improve transatlantic auditing and governance policies. 
  The transatlantic dimension of corporate governance is a unique 
experiment in corporate law reform. The development of ‘transatlantic xvi | DEEP INTEGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS & GLOBALIZATION 
 
practice’ in corporate governance is underway – an uneven but 
palpable process leading to the adoption of some common standards 
and a certain degree of convergence in legal techniques to solve 
similar problems.  
  Impediments remain on both sides of the Atlantic, however, and 
regulatory diversity may actually facilitate the establishment of a truly 
transatlantic marketplace.  
Climate Change/Transatlantic Emissions Markets 
  The climate change challenge can only addressed as long as all 
emitters participate, including all industrialized countries and at least 
the major emitters from developing countries. 
  Although the US has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, US companies 
are already affected by the implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
EU emission trading scheme (ETS). Not only are their European 
affiliates directly subject to emission limits, they are indirectly 
affected by changes in energy prices. Most importantly, perhaps, 
companies will gain experience with carbon management.  
  Once it is up and properly running, the €45 billion EU carbon market 
should turn over at least four or five times more than the underlying 
physical stock of allowances. If Russia, Ukraine, Canada or Japan 
would join, let alone the US, the sums become gigantic. A global 
greenhouse gas emissions market would easily be worth $100 billion.  
  The deep integration of the transatlantic business community means 
that US and European businesses have much to gain by a transatlantic 
greenhouse gas emissions market, and much to lose by failure to 
achieve such a market. 
  Huge differences in carbon constraints on both sides of the Atlantic 
would make further transatlantic market integration almost impossible. 
On the other hand, a breakthrough in one of the most controversial 
transatlantic disputes could be a major boost to a more integrated 
transatlantic market.  
REACH – Chemicals Regulation 
  The European Commission’s REACH proposal to overhaul the entire 
EU chemicals regulation and replace it with a single system with very 
different rules and incentives will apply to the whole value chain of 
chemicals and their derivatives, including applications to millions of 
intermediate and final goods. Practically no industry escapes the reach 
of REACH. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xvii  
 
  US business has every interest in following REACH carefully. The 
chemical industry is of course directly affected. Potentially, the stakes 
could be high. In addition to $60 billion in chemicals trade and $4 
billion in US FDI to Europe in the chemicals industry (the first layer of 
the value chain), it is estimated that well over $400 billion of 
‘downstream products’ made by US firms with chemicals sold to the 
EU could be affected. 
Conclusion 
  The transatlantic economy is the freest in the world. But it is not free. 
A concerted effort to create a truly free transatlantic market could 
generate significant benefits in growth, jobs and consumer welfare on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
  The transatlantic economy is the laboratory of globalization. It is 
precisely because the United States and Europe have been at the 
forefront of a more integrated global economy that the possibilities – 
and potential limits – of globalization are likely to be defined first and 
foremost by the transatlantic relationship. Yet neither the framework 
for our relationship nor the ways our governments are currently 
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1.  The Transatlantic Economy Today: 
Neither Mars nor Venus – Mercury! 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
t is fashionable these days to proclaim the transatlantic partnership passé. 
Such loose talk, however, ignores two bottom-line economic facts. First, 
despite the perennial hype about ‘big emerging markets’, the economic 
relationship between the United States and Europe is by a wide margin the 
deepest and broadest between any two continents in history. Second, these 
ties that bind have become stronger, not weaker, since the end of the Cold 
War, tightened even further during George W. Bush's first term, and have 
remained robust despite troubling growth prospects for some key European 
economies.  
Robert Kagan’s quip that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus has been reinforced by transatlantic disputes over Iraq since 2003. 
However, a related tale of recent years is that both Mars and Venus should 
take greater heed of Mercury, the god of commerce. 
For the transatlantic partnership, the last few years have been characterized 
by political bust and economic boom. Even as diplomatic relations between 
the US and Europe reached new lows, and as each side of the Atlantic has 
encountered recessionary pressures, the economic ties that bind the two 
parties have only grown stronger. Indeed, in the past few years, transatlantic 
business has never been better.  
By our estimates, transatlantic commerce totaled roughly $3 trillion in 2004. 
That figure includes total two-way trade between the United States and 
Europe, plus total foreign affiliate sales, adjusted for potential double 
counting of affiliate sales and exports/imports. 
Transatlantic trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio flows and affiliate 
profits have all rebounded robustly from the US cyclical economic downturn 
of 2001-02, and continue strong even as some key European economies 
struggle with low growth now. In 2004, for instance, total transatlantic trade 
in goods rose to a record $482 billion, up 22% from the prior year. 
Notwithstanding the strength of the euro against the US dollar, US imports 
from the European Union jumped to a record $283 billion, helping to drive 
America’s trade deficit with the European Union to an all-time high of $110 
billion.  
In 2004, the US posted record imports from Germany ($77.2 billion), Italy 
($28 billion), France ($31.8 billion), Italy ($28.1 billion) and a host of other 
European nations. Surging imports from Europe led to record US trade 
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deficits with a number of European nations in 2004, including Germany ($46 
billion).  
Strong trade flows have been complemented by robust levels of foreign 
direct investment. Despite Washington’s war-related frustrations with 
Europe, corporate America ploughed nearly $100 billion into the European 
Union in 2003 and another $92 billion in 2004. As is customary, US 
investment flows to the United Kingdom ($23 billion) in 2004 accounted for 
roughly 25% of total US investments in the European Union as a whole.  
Even after adjusting for massive flows to the UK, however, US foreign 
investment to the rest of Europe approached $70 billion in 2004, or near-
record highs. Interestingly, despite the diplomatic ill will between 
Washington and Paris, US investment flows to France soared to a record $6.8 
billion in 2004, some 45% larger than US investments to China in the same 
year. US investment flows to Italy in 2004 ($4.2 billion) were four times as 
large as US flows to India ($1 billion). Greece, Russia and the Czech 
Republic all received record annual inflows of US foreign direct investment 
in 2004.  
Europe remains the number one geographic location for US overseas 
investment. In 2004, the region accounted for 41% of the global total. That is 
a rather low percentage given that during the first half of this decade, Europe 
accounted for nearly 56% of total US foreign direct investment. However, 
the figures for 2004 were skewed by a large one-off US investment in 
Australia, which lowered the global total destined for Europe.  
Table 1. 2004: Another Record-Setting Year for the Transatlantic Economy 
The following all-time highs were recorded in 2004: 
Transatlantic Investment 
European net purchases of US government agency bonds  $84.4 billion 
French net purchases of US corporate bonds  $7.4 billion 
German net purchases of US corporate bonds  $11.7 billion 
US net purchases of European equities  $51.7 billion 
   
US foreign direct investment flows to Czech Republic  $300 million 
US foreign direct investment flows to France  $6.8 billion 
US foreign direct investment flows to Greece  $274 million 
US foreign direct investment flows to Russia  $430 million 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce; US Depart-
ment of the Treasury. THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: NEITHER MARS NOR VENUS | 5 
Table 2. Transatlantic Profits (affiliate income) 
US profits in Europe   $100.8 billion 
US profits in Belgium   $2.8 billion 
US profits in Czech Republic   $437 million 
US profits in Finland:  $507 million 
US profits in France:  $6.3 billion 
US profits in Germany   $7.0 billion 
US profits in Greece  $270 million 
US profits in Hungary   $546 million 
US profits in Ireland  $10.2 billion 
US profits in Italy  $2.9 billion 
US profits in Luxemburg   $7.2 billion 
US profits in Netherlands   $18.2 billion 
US profits in Norway  $2.3 billion 
US profits in Poland   $635 million 
US profits in Portugal   $483 million 
US profits in Spain  $4.3 billion 
US profits in Switzerland   $12.2 billion 
US profits in United Kingdom   $19.7 billion 
European profits in the US  $65.7 billion 
Belgium profits in the US   $637 million 
Denmark profits in the US   $368 million 
Finland profits in the US  $390 million 
France profits in the US  $8.5 billion 
Germany profits in the US   $8.5 billion 
Ireland profits in the US  $1.2 billion 
Italy profits in the US   $520 million 
Netherlands profits in the US   $13.2 billion 
Norway profits in the US  $242 million 
Spain profits in the US  $287 million 
United Kingdom profits in the US   $19.5 billion 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
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Table 3. Transatlantic Trade 
Total transatlantic trade in goods   $482 billion 
US trade deficit with European Union   $110 billion 
US current account deficit with the European Union  $134.3 billion 
US imports from the European Union  $282.6 billion 
US exports to Germany  $31.4 billion 
US imports from Germany   $77.2 billion 
US trade deficit with Germany   $45.9 billion 
US imports from Austria   $5.8 billion 
US trade deficit with Austria   $3.8 billion 
US exports to Belgium  $16.9 billion 
US imports from Belgium   $12.4 billion 
US exports to Czech Republic   $822 million 
US imports from Czech Republic   $1.8 billion 
US trade deficit with Czech Republic   $939 million 
US exports to Denmark   $2.1 billion 
US imports from Denmark   $3.9 billion 
US imports from Finland   $3.9 billion 
US exports to France  $21.2 billion 
US imports from France   $31.8 billion 
US exports to Hungary  $1.1 billion 
US Imports from Ireland   $27.4 billion 
US trade deficit with Ireland   19.3 billion 
US imports from Italy   $28.1 billion 
US trade deficit with Italy   $17.4 billion 
US exports to Netherlands   $24.3 billion 
US imports from Netherlands   $12.6 billion 
US imports from Norway   $6.5 billion 
US trade deficit with Norway   $4.9 billion 
US imports from Poland  $1.8 billion 
US trade deficit with Poland   $901 million 
US imports from Portugal   $2.2 billion 
US trade deficit with Portugal   $1.2 billion 
US exports to Slovenia  $192 million 
US imports from Slovenia   $512 million 
US exports to Spain  $6.6 billion 
US imports from Spain   $7.5 billion 
US trade deficit with Spain   $835 million 
US imports from Sweden  $12.7 billion 
US trade deficit with Sweden   $9.4 billion 
US imports from Switzerland   $11.6 billion 
US trade deficit with Switzerland   $2.4 billion 
US imports from United Kingdom   $46.4 billion 
US trade deficit with United Kingdom   $10.4 billion 
Source: US Census Bureau. THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: NEITHER MARS NOR VENUS | 7 
The fact that many in Europe were staunchly opposed to the policies of the 
Bush Administration did not prevent European firms from investing nearly 
$53 billion in the United States in 2004, up from just $6.6 billion the year 
before. French investment surged to nearly $9 billion in 2004, up from $5.1 
billion the year before. German firms invested some $6.8 billion in the 
United States in 2004, up sharply from investment flows of just $407 million 
the year before. Corporate Europe remains a key source of foreign capital for 
the United States, accounting for 75% of total foreign direct investment 
inflows into the US over the 2000-04 timeframe. During this period, the 
United Kingdom accounted for 19.8% of total global investment flows into 
the United States, followed by France (13.1% of the total), the Netherlands 
(10.8%) and Germany (9.2%). 
Figure 1. Corporate America's Bias toward Europe (US foreign direct 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
European investors have also remained important foreign investors in US 
dollar-denominated securities over the past few years. European net 
purchases of US government agency bonds totaled a record $84.4 billion in 
2004. In the US corporate bond market, net purchases of US corporate bonds 
by French investors totaled $7.4 billion in 2004 – an all-time high. German 
net purchases of US corporate bonds in 2004 also hit a record $11.7 billion. 
In total, eurozone investors (which excludes the United Kingdom) in 2004 
were net purchasers of $55 billion in US securities. This capital infusion 
helped the debt-stretched United States cover its massive savings shortfall. 8 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
Over the two years 2003 and 2004, European investors sank over $100 
billion in US securities (US Treasury notes, government agency bonds, 
corporate bonds and US stocks).  

























Excludes purchases from the United Kingdom. 
Source: US Treasury Department. 
Portfolio flows from the US to Europe were also robust in 2004, with US net 
purchases of European equities reaching nearly $52 billion, an annual record. 
The past few years have also been record years for transatlantic profits as 
measured by foreign affiliate income. Despite all the talk of transatlantic 
boycotts and of a consumer backlash on both sides of the ocean, business has 
never been better for US and European multinationals.  THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: NEITHER MARS NOR VENUS | 9 
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* Income of affiliates. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Over the past two years, US foreign affiliates in Europe have booked record 
profits, courtesy of the steep decline of the US dollar against the euro. The 
weaker the dollar, the more inflated the dollar-based earnings of US foreign 
affiliates have become. The result: US affiliates earned a record $100.8 
billion in Europe in 2004, with strong gains across the board. Earnings 
jumped 23% over record earnings of $82 billion the year before, when US 
affiliate earnings in 12 European markets reached record highs. In 2004, US 
affiliates booked record profits in 17 European markets, with record earnings 
reported not only in such traditional markets as Germany, France and Italy, 
but also in the markets of new EU members Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. This broadly-based profits surge from Europe helped boost total 
US pretax corporate profits to record levels in 2004. Between 2001 and 2004, 
US affiliate income (earnings) from Europe nearly doubled.  
2004 was also a record profit year for European affiliates operating in the 
United States. Notwithstanding the strength of the euro – a significant drag 
on European earnings – European affiliate earnings surged to a record $65.7 
billion in 2004, a 38.5% jump from 2003. Affiliates from the following 
nations reported record US profits in 2004: France, Germany, Belgium, 
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Earnings of European affiliates in the US have increased more than four-fold 
since the US recession in 2001. The earnings recovery has been driven by 10 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
robust US demand, which has offset both the negative effect of the 
appreciation of the euro and the British pound, and weak European growth 
during the past few years. Much of the sharp rise in corporate profits in 
Europe in 2003 and 2004 was due to strong US demand.  
While US affiliate income in China continues to soar (rising to a record $3.5 
billion in 2004), US affiliates earned almost three times as much in tiny 
Ireland ($10.2 billion) and more than five times as much in such countries as 
the Netherlands ($18.2 billion) or the UK ($19.7 billion). In 2004 US 
affiliates posted record profits in France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, the Czech Republic 
and Greece. US companies continue to rely on Europe for half their total 
annual foreign profits. 
Europe also remains the most attractive overseas destination for US foreign 
direct investment. Despite all the talk about US firms decamping for China 
and India, more than 53% of total US capital outflows of $760 billion this 
decade – $405 billion – has been sunk in Europe. Over the past decade US 
firms have ploughed ten times as much capital into the Netherlands as into 
China, and twice as much into the Netherlands as into Mexico. There is far 
more European investment in Texas alone than US investment in Japan and 
China put together. In fact, European investment in many different US states, 
ranging from Georgia to Indiana to California, is greater, in any given year, 
than total US investment in Japan and China put together. 
In sum, Europe and the United States remain each other’s most important 
foreign commercial markets, a fact lost on opinion leaders on both sides of 
the Atlantic over the past few years. No other commercial artery in the world 
is as integrated and fused together by foreign investment. Some 12-14 
million workers on both sides of the Atlantic depend on the transatlantic 
economy for employment. Hundreds of European firms are intertwined in the 
US economy, just as hundreds of US firms are embedded in the European 
Union. Workers, employers and shareholders in various countries benefit 
tremendously from this relationship. | 11 
2.  The Transatlantic Economy Today: 
Seven Ties that Bind 
Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
t has long been our contention that one of the most dangerous deficits 
affecting the transatlantic partnership is not one of trade, values or 
military capabilities but rather a deficit in understanding among opinion 
leaders of the vital stakes Americans and Europeans have developed in the 
success of each other’s respective economies. 
Much has been written in recent years about transatlantic divisions and the 
widening gulf that separates the United States and Europe. There has been 
comparatively little analysis or recognition of the economic glue that 
continues to bind the two parties together. Policy-makers, politicians and 
pundits on both sides of the Atlantic fail to appreciate a critical fact: the 
transatlantic economy is tightly bound together by foreign investment, a deep 
form of cross-border integration – as opposed to trade, which is a rather 
shallow, underdeveloped form of integration. 
This is reflected in the massive capital investment of the United States in 
Europe and Europe’s outsized investment commitment in the United States. 
Exports and imports have become the most common measurement of cross-
border economic activity between nations, but trade alone is a misleading 
benchmark of international commerce. Foreign direct investment and the 
activities of foreign affiliates are the backbone of transatlantic commercial 
activity. 
The Ties that Bind – Quantifying the Transatlantic 
Economy 
The primacy of foreign direct investment in driving transatlantic commerce 
reflects the underlying commercial infrastructure that links the United States 
with Europe. This infrastructure has been under construction for over a 
century, but remains largely invisible to policy-makers on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Over the past few years we have suggested that seven key indices 
offer a clearer picture of the ‘deep integration’ forces shaping the 
transatlantic economy today. This chapter updates those indices with the 
latest available figures. The bottom-line story they tell: transatlantic 
commercial ties have never been stronger and never as important. Moreover, 
these transatlantic ties tightened considerably during George W. Bush’s first 
term in office. They continue to be strong despite sluggish growth in some 
key European markets.  
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1 Based on PPP estimates. 
2 Excluding intra-EU trade. 
Sources: UN, IMF, official government sources, figures for 2003. 
1. Gross Product of Foreign Affiliates 
The total output of US foreign affiliates in Europe ($342 billion in 2002) and 
of European affiliates in the United States ($290 billion) is greater than the 
total gross domestic output of most nations. On a global basis, the aggregate 
output of US affiliates topped $600 billion in 2002, with Europe accounting 
for 56% of the total.  
The presence of US affiliates in some European nations is particularly 
noteworthy. The gross output of US affiliates in Ireland, for instance, 
represented 19.4% of Ireland’s total GDP in 2002, a jump of 3.4% from 
2001. US affiliates accounted for 6.7% of the UK’s aggregate output in the 
same year and 5.5% of Belgium’s total output.  
In the United States, European affiliates are major economic producers in 
their own right. British firms are particularly important – their US output 
totaled nearly $90 billion in 2002. Output from German affiliates operating 
in the US totaled $57 billion, while output from French affiliates was nearly 
$41 billion in 2002. Overall, foreign affiliates contributed more than $453 
billion to US aggregate production in 2002; output from European affiliates 
totaled $291 billion, or 64% of the total attributable to foreign affiliates.  THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 13 
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Note: Foreign Affiliate Sales: Data for 2002; Total Trade: Data in goods & services, 2002. 
Source: US Department of Commerce. 
2. Overseas Assets of Foreign Affiliates 
America’s global commercial presence is unsurpassed, with total foreign 
assets of corporate America tallying roughly $6.9 trillion in 2002. The bulk 
of these assets – roughly 60% – were located in Europe, with the largest 
share in the United Kingdom, followed by the Netherlands and Germany. US 
assets in Germany alone ($351 billion) were greater than total US assets in 
all of South America. America’s corporate assets in the United Kingdom 
($1.6 trillion) exceeded total US assets in the entire Asia/Pacific region.  
Table 1. Global Engagement: US Foreign Affiliate Sales vs. Trade 
 $  billions,  2002 
Global Affiliate Sales of US  2973.2 
Total US Exports  975.9 
Total Affiliate Sales in US  2043.5 
US Imports  1397.7 
US Affiliate Sales in Europe  1479.5 
US Exports to Europe (G&S)  273.9 
European Affiliate Sales in US  1246.6 
US Imports from Europe (G&S)  363.6 14 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 15 
What about foreign-owned assets held in the US? European firms held some 
$3.4 trillion in US assets in 2002, roughly 75% of total foreign assets in the 
United States. The stock of Europe’s investment in the US is distributed 
widely across industrial sectors and geographic regions. Indeed, European 
companies were the top foreign investors in 44 states, and ranked second in 
the remaining six states in 2002. Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
ranked as the largest holders of US assets in 2002, with Swiss affiliates in 
possession of $878 billion worth of US assets and British firms holding $820 
billion in assets.  
3. Affiliate Employment 
The continuing debate about ‘outsourcing’ is generating more heat than light, 
often leading pundits and the public to the easy – but erroneous – conclusion 
that the bulk of corporate America’s overseas workforce toils in low-wage 
nations like Mexico and China. The real story is rather different. Most 
foreigners working for US companies abroad are employed in the 
industrialized nations, notably Europe.  
US firms employed 4.1 million workers in Europe in 2002. The European 
workforce of US majority-owned foreign affiliates was almost evenly split 
between manufacturing and service workers. The number of manufacturing 
workers in Europe has leveled off in recent years, although US firms still 
employed roughly 1.9 million manufactured workers in 2002. The 
manufacturing workforce of US affiliates in Germany alone totaled 385,000 
in 2002, more than 80% larger than the number of manufactured workers 
employed in China by US affiliates. The transportation equipment sector 
continued to be the largest source of manufacturing employment in Europe; 
wholesale employment was among the largest sources of service-related 
employment, and includes employment in such areas as logistics, trade, 
insurance and other service-enhancing activities. 
The same is true for European companies. Despite stories on the continent 
about home-grown European companies decamping for cheap labor markets 
in eastern Europe or Asia, most foreigners working for European companies 
outside the EU are American. European majority-owned foreign affiliates 
directly employed roughly 3.8 million American workers in 2002. The top 
five employers in the US were firms from the United Kingdom (995,000), 
Germany (676,000), the Netherlands (547,000), France (468,000) and 
Switzerland (430,000). European firms employed over two-thirds of the 5.4 
million US workers on the payrolls of majority-owned foreign affiliates in 
2002.  16 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
Table 2. Top Five European Employers of US Workers* 
1. United  Kingdom  995,000 
2. Germany    676,000 
3. The  Netherlands  547,000 
4. France  468,000 
5. Switzerland  430,000 
* Directly employed by majority-owned European affiliates, 2002. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
In short, the transatlantic workforce directly employed by US and European 
foreign affiliates is roughly 8 million people. That is nearly double the 
number of total workers employed by US firms in NAFTA partners Canada 
and Mexico.  
On a global basis, US companies directly employed 9.7 million workers in 
2002, with roughly 42% in Europe.  
As we have stressed in our last annual surveys, these figures understate the 
employment effects of mutual investment flows, since these numbers are 
limited to direct employment, and do not account for indirect employment 
effects of non-equity arrangements such as strategic alliances, joint ventures 
and other deals. Moreover, affiliate employment figures do not include jobs 
supported by transatlantic trade. Trade-related employment is substantial in 
many US states and many European regions.  
In total, and adding in indirect employment, we estimate that the transatlantic 
work force numbers some 12-14 million workers. Europe is by far the most 
important source of ‘insourced’ jobs in America, and the US is by far the 
most important source of ‘insourced’ jobs in Europe. 
4. Research and Development (R&D) of Foreign Affiliates 
While most firms still tend to center their R&D expenditures in their home 
country, foreign affiliate R&D has become more prominent over the past 
decade as firms seek to share development costs, spread risks and tap into the 
intellectual talent of other nations. Alliances, cross-licensing of intellectual 
property, mergers and acquisitions and other forms of cooperation have 
become more prevalent characteristics of the transatlantic economy in the 
past decade. The advent and speed of the internet on both sides of the 
Atlantic has powered greater transatlantic R&D.  THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 17 
Research and development among US foreign affiliates topped $21 billion in 
2002. The bulk of such activity was carried out in the developed nations, 
where the largest pool of skilled labor resides. In 2001, the last year of 
country information, Europe accounted for 61% of total US foreign affiliate 
R&D, with the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Switzerland 
representing markets where R&D expenditures by US affiliates were the 
greatest.  
No comparable country figures for Europe’s R&D investment in the United 
States are available, although on an aggregate basis, expenditures on R&D 
preformed by majority-owned US affiliates totaled $27.5 billion in 2002. A 
significant share emanated from world-class leaders from Europe, given their 
interest in America’s highly skilled labor force and the research intensity of 
many European sectors, including chemicals, telecommunications and 
automobiles. 
5. Intra-Firm Trade of Foreign Affiliates 
While cross-border trade is a secondary means of delivering goods and 
services across the Atlantic when compared to foreign investment, the modes 
of delivery – affiliate sales and trade – should not be viewed independently 
of each other. They are more complements than substitutes, since foreign 
investment and affiliate sales increasingly drive trade flows. Indeed, a 
substantial share of transatlantic trade is considered intra-firm trade or 
related-party trade, which is cross-border trade that stays within the ambit of 
the company – for instance when BMW of Germany sends parts to BMW of 
South Carolina, when LaFarge or Michelin sends intermediate components to 
their plants in the Greater Cincinnati area, or when 3M sends component 
parts for its office products or communications sectors from St. Paul to its 
affiliates in Germany or the UK. The tight linkages between European parent 
companies and their US affiliates is reflected in the fact that roughly 58% of 
US imports from the European Union consisted of related-party trade in 
2004. The percentage was even higher in the case of Ireland (89.3%) and 
Germany (62.1%). Meanwhile, roughly 30% of US exports to Europe in 
2003 represented-related party trade.  
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the three-year slide of the 
US dollar against the euro has done little to correct America’s trade deficit 
with Europe. Following such a large shift in prices or exchange rates, 
Economics 101 would have predicted a rebalancing of bilateral trade. 
Economic theory would have expected US export growth to outstrip US 
import growth, leading to an improvement in the overall trade balance. In 
fact, the opposite occurred: America’s trade deficit (in goods and services) 18 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
with the European Union actually widened by 17% in 2004, with the deficit 
jumping to a record $104.4 billion. 
In the end, what is missing from the debate over trade and missing from 
conventional analysis is the fact that an unusually large percentage of US 
imports from Europe is considered related-party trade, or trade between a 
parent and an affiliate. Parent-affiliate trade is less responsive to shifts in 
prices or exchange rates and more attuned to domestic demand. Accordingly, 
while a strong euro, in theory at least, would be associated with a decline in 
European competitiveness in the US, the fact that many European 
multinationals produce, market and distribute goods on both sides of the 
ocean gives firms a high degree of immunity to a dramatic shift in exchange 
rates.  




as % of Total 
US Exports: 
’Related-Party Trade’ 
as % of Total 
European Union  57.9  30.4 
France  48.9  31.8 
Germany  62.1  32.2 
Netherlands  53.3  35.9 
United Kingdom  58.5  27.7 
Other European Union  47.0  27.5 
Source: US Census Bureau. 
6. Foreign Affiliate Sales 
US foreign affiliate sales hit a record $3 trillion in 2002, the last year of 
available data, well in excess of US exports of $975 billion in the same year. 
Europe accounted for half of total global sales. Sales of US affiliates in 
Europe totaled $1.5 trillion, more than double the comparable figures for the 
Asia/Pacific region. Affiliate sales in the United Kingdom ($389 billion) 
exceeded aggregate sales in Latin America. While US foreign affiliate sales 
in China skyrocketed in the 1990s on account of surging US foreign direct 
investment, they did so from a very low base, and still remain very far below 
comparable sales in Europe. Sales of US affiliates in China in 2002 totaled 
just $48 billion, lower than sales to Spain ($57 billion) and well below those 
in Germany ($242 billion) or France ($140 billion). THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 19 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
Affiliate sales are also the primary means by which European firms deliver 
goods and services to US consumers. In 2002, for instance, majority-owned 
European affiliate sales in the US ($1.2 trillion) were more than three times 
larger than US imports from Europe. In the case of Germany, the gap 
between foreign affiliate sales and imports was even wider, with German 20 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
affiliate sales ($290 billion) roughly 3.3 times larger than US imports from 
Germany ($87 billion). British affiliate sales in the US of $315 billion were 
almost two and a half times larger than US imports from the UK in 2002.  
7. Foreign Affiliate Profits 
When it comes to the bottom line – the earnings of US multinationals – 
Europe remains by a relatively wide margin the most profitable region in the 
world for corporate America. In 2004, Europe accounted for 47% of total US 
foreign affiliate income, a proxy for global earnings. Corporate America’s 
earnings in Europe were double those in the Asia-Pacific region and triple 
those with NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada. US foreign affiliate income 
from Europe was a record $100.8 billion in 2004, up sharply from the record 
levels of 2003 ($82 billion). Behind the surge in profits is the steep slide of 
the dollar against the euro, pound and Swiss franc, which helped inflated 
dollar-based earnings of US affiliates in Europe. Over the first half of this 
decade Europe has accounted for 53% of total US affiliate income.  
Lavish media coverage tipping China or India as the hot growth markets of 
this decade obscures the fact that over the past five years, US companies 
have registered robust earnings growth in other places, like Poland, where 
cumulative affiliate earnings jumped 1,0ll% in the first half of this decade 
versus the second half of the 1990s. Over the same period, cumulative 
affiliate earnings soared by 940% in the Czech Republic, greater than the rise 
in earnings in either India (758% increase) and or China (286% increase). 
While these growth rates in earnings are remarkable, all proceed from a 
relatively low base – US corporate earnings in Poland and India were each 
roughly $1.85 billion over the 2000-04 period. What is perhaps most striking 
is the fact that Switzerland ranked third worldwide as a source of earnings 
growth for U.S companies over the past five years, and from a more sizable 
base. In 2000 Switzerland accounted for only 1.6% of US foreign affiliate 
earnings; by 2004 Switzerland accounted for 6.4% of earnings ($43.77 
billion) – twice that of Corporate America’s total earnings in South America, 
4 times that of earnings in China and 23 times that of earnings in India.  
The United Kingdom, however, ranks as the most important market in the 
world for corporate America when it comes to global earnings. On average, 
the UK represented nearly 11% of total affiliate income in the first half of 
this decade. Not far behind was the Netherlands, with a 10.3% share of 
global foreign affiliate earnings.  
US profits continued in other European markets as well. Over the past five 
years US companies have earned three times as much in tiny Ireland than in 
China, for example.  THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 21 
Table 4. Top Five Foreign Earners in the United States, 2004 ($ billions) 
1. United  Kingdom  19.532 
2. The  Netherlands  13.207 
3. Japan  12.080 
4. France  8.515 
5. Germany  8.494 
 
Similarly, the United States is the most important market in the world in 
terms of earnings for many European multinationals. Profits of European 
foreign affiliates in the United States totaled $65.7 billion in 2004, with the 
earnings driven by strong U.S demand, which offset the adverse price effect 
from the strength of the euro and the British pound. The sectors most 
exposed to the US market include telecoms, automobiles, media, technology, 
capital goods, utilities and pharmaceuticals. 
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Figure 7. US Foreign Affiliate Income Earned Abroad 












Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
In short, these seven indices convey a more complete and complex picture of 
international economic flows than simple tallies of exports and imports. 
Foreign direct investment, not trade, is the backbone of the transatlantic 
economy, with many other indicators of market growth derived from the 






Table 5. Total EU Exports to the US vs. EU Exports to the World 
    2000  2001 2002 2003  2004 








































Austr. 3.4  19.0% 5.0% 3.6 19.5% 5.1% 3.9 18.7% 4.9%  4.8 18.5% 4.9% 6.9 21.1% 6.0%
Belg. 10.9  25.6% 5.9% 10.6 25.7% 5.6% 16.8 31.5% 7.9%  16.9 29.2% 6.7% 20.0 28.6% 6.5%
Denm. 3.0  20.2% 5.9% 3.5 21.8% 6.9% 3.6 20.3% 6.4%  4.1 19.9% 6.2% 3.6 16.7% 5.4%
Finl. 3.4  19.8% 7.4% 4.2 24.3% 9.8% 4.0 22.7% 9.0%  4.3 20.4% 8.2% 3.9 15.2% 6.4%
Fran. 28.1  24.2% 8.7% 27.7 23.6% 8.6% 26.0 22.0% 7.8%  26.3 19.6% 6.7% 29.9 19.0% 6.7%
Germ. 56.4  28.7% 10.3% 60.3 28.6% 10.6% 62.9 27.7% 10.3%  69.0 25.9% 9.3% 78.5 24.3% 8.8%
Greece 0.6  11.1% 5.4% 0.5 11.6% 5.6% 0.5 9.9% 5.2%  0.9 14.3% 6.3% 0.8 11.8% 5.3%
Irel. 12.9  43.8% 17.0% 14.0 43.3% 16.8% 14.6 46.8% 16.7%  19.1 54.5% 20.5% 21.2 53.2% 20.2%
Italy 24.5  25.8% 10.4% 23.5 23.9% 9.7% 24.5 23.6% 9.8%  24.9 21.0% 8.3% 27.5 19.5% 8.0%
Lux. 0.3  30.6% 4.1% 0.3 18.8% 2.8% 0.3 20.9% 2.7%  0.3 16.0% 1.9% 0.3 16.7% 1.8%
Neth. 10.0  23.1% 4.4% 9.7 22.3% 4.2% 11.1 22.8% 4.6%  13.2 22.4% 4.5% 14.7 20.4% 4.2%
Norw. 4.6  36.1% 8.0% 4.6 37.6% 8.0% 5.2 37.2% 8.6%  5.9 38.5% 8.7% 6.9 38.7% 8.4%
Port. 1.4  31.2% 6.0% 1.4 30.2% 5.7% 1.5 30.5% 5.8%  1.8 29.6% 5.7% 2.2 30.3% 6.0%
Spain 5.5  17.7% 5.0% 5.1 16.6% 4.6% 5.4 16.8% 4.6%  6.4 16.2% 4.1% 7.0 14.6% 3.9%
Swed. 8.9  25.1% 10.2% 8.6 26.0% 11.1% 9.4 27.0% 11.4%  11.7 27.5% 11.5% 11.9 26.2% 10.7%
Switz. 10.6  33.9% 13.1% 9.6 31.2% 11.6% 10.5 31.3% 12.0%  11.4 30.0% 11.3% 10.9 23.0% 9.1%
UK 44.8  38.6% 15.8% 42.8 36.8% 15.9% 42.9 37.0% 15.5%  48.2 36.0% 15.7% 50.8 33.4% 15.0%
Europe
Total 
229.2       229.9     243.1      268.9     297.0    







  Table 6. Total EU Imports from the US vs. EU Imports from the World 
    2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 








































Austr. 2.9  20.0% 4.1% 2.9 19.0% 3.8% 2.7 17.3% 3.5%  2.2 11.6% 2.2% 2.3 10.6% 2.0%
Belg. 13.3  25.7% 7.6% 12.4 24.6% 7.0% 12.6 23.6% 6.4%  13.3 22.2% 5.9% 15.7 20.8% 5.5%
Denm. 1.9  15.3% 4.3% 2.0 17.0% 4.4% 1.9 16.2% 3.9%  1.8 12.8% 3.3% 2.3 13.5% 3.5%
Finl. 1.6  13.5% 4.8% 1.4 10.3% 4.2% 1.2 9.1% 3.7%  1.6 11.6% 3.7% 1.7 10.0% 3.3%
Fran. 24.6  22.0% 7.4% 24.2 22.3% 7.4% 22.3 21.2% 6.8%  21.0 17.4% 5.3% 23.7 16.2% 5.1%
Germ. 42.8  21.2% 8.6% 40.7 21.2% 8.3% 37.8 19.8% 7.7%  43.6 18.9% 7.3% 46.4 16.9% 6.5%
Greece 0.9  8.2% 3.2% 1.0 8.0% 3.5% 1.5 10.4% 4.7%  2.3 11.6% 5.1% 2.3 10.5% 4.4%
Irel. 8.2  37.7% 16.2% 7.6 39.0% 15.0% 7.9 42.9% 15.3%  8.4 40.1% 15.7% 8.2 36.9% 13.6%
Italy 12.5  13.0% 5.3% 11.5 12.3% 4.9% 11.8 12.3% 4.9%  11.6 10.1% 3.9% 12.1 8.7% 3.5%
Lux. 0.4  21.4% 3.4% 0.6 25.5% 4.9% 0.5 19.6% 3.9%  0.4 9.2% 2.1% 0.6 12.9% 3.0%
Neth. 21.9  21.6% 10.2% 20.7 20.6% 9.9% 19.8 19.5% 9.1%  21.1 17.5% 8.0% 24.7 16.6% 7.8%
Norw. 2.2  22.3% 6.9% 2.2 23.0% 6.9% 2.1 21.9% 6.1%  2.1 17.7% 5.1% 2.4 16.7% 4.9%
Port. 1.2  12.5% 3.1% 1.4 15.5% 3.7% 0.8 10.2% 2.2%  0.9 9.0% 1.9% 1.2 9.9% 2.2%
Spain 6.6  13.4% 4.6% 6.0 12.4% 4.2% 5.7 11.0% 3.7%  6.3 9.7% 3.0% 7.4 9.0% 2.9%
Swed. 4.9  22.5% 6.7% 3.5 18.9% 5.4% 3.2 17.2% 4.8%  3.3 14.4% 3.9% 3.6 15.0% 3.5%
Switz. 6.5  32.7% 7.8% 5.7 30.3% 6.7% 5.5 32.9% 6.6%  5.3 29.9% 5.5% 10.0 33.2% 7.6%
UK 45.0  27.7% 13.4% 45.1 27.5% 14.0% 39.9 24.9% 11.9%  39.2 22.3% 10.2% 41.9 19.3% 9.2%
Europe
Total 
197.4       188.6     177.3      184.3     206.4    
Source: IMF Department of Trade Statistics.THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 25 
Table 7. The Ties that Bind – Top Ten FDI Destinations and Investors 
US FDI by Country, Top Ten Destinations, 2003 
(% share in historic cost basis) 
Rank Country  %  Share 
1 United  Kingdom  15.2% 
2 Canada  10.8% 
3 Netherlands  10.0% 
4 Belgium/Luxembourg  5.1% 
5 Switzerland  4.8% 
6 Germany  4.5% 
7 Japan  4.1% 
8 Mexico  3.4% 
9 Singapore  3.2% 
10 Ireland  3.1% 
 Total  64.2% 
 
 
FDI Positions in US, Top Ten Investors, 2003 
(% share in historic cost basis) 
Rank Country  %  Share 
1 United  Kingdom  16.7% 
2 Japan  11.6% 
3 Germany  10.8% 
4 Netherlands  10.6% 
5 France  10.4% 
6 Belgium/Luxembourg  8.4% 
7 Switzerland  8.2% 
8 Canada  7.6% 
9 Ireland  1.9% 
10 Australia  1.8% 
 Total  88.0% 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 26 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
 
Table 8. America's FDI Roots in Europe 
$ billions  US FDI to Europe  % of US total 
European Total  963.1  53.8% 
Mining 20.8  21.1% 
Utilities 8.5  31.6% 
Manufacturing 177.9  47.1% 
Food Products  11.3  48.8% 
Chemicals 51.9  57.5% 
Primary Metals  10.5  45.7% 
Machinery 11.3  52.8% 
Other Manufacturing  46.6  41.4% 
Wholesale 89.5  63.7% 
Information 30.3  63.8% 
Banking 38.1  60.0% 
Finance (ex. banks)  116.4  38.8% 
Services 21.1  51.4% 
Other 460.5  66.4% 
Note: Historical-cost basis, 2003. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
Table 9. Europe's FDI Roots in the U.S. 
$ billions  European FDI to US  % of US total 
Total from Europe  1000.5  72.6% 
Manufacturing 376.6  79.2% 
Food Products  15.8  82.7% 
Chemicals 111.0  90.2% 
Primary Metals  14.3  73.7% 
Machinery 30.6  80.1% 
Other Manufacturing  105.5  69.4% 
Wholesale 106.7  58.6% 
Retail 18.8  74.7% 
Banking 61.6  69.8% 
Information 97.9  88.6% 
Finance & Insurance (ex. banks)  132.4  71.3% 
Real Estate  20.8  44.2% 
Services 24.8  87.6% 
Other 162.3  71.5% 
Note: Historical-cost basis, 2003. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY TODAY: SEVEN TIES THAT BIND | 27 
Figure 8. US and Europe Represent the Majority Stake in the Global Equity 










Note: Data as of May 31, 2005. 
Source: FactSet. | 28 
3.  The Transatlantic Economy Today: 
Remaining Barriers and Benefits from 
Further Liberalization 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
espite the fact that transatlantic markets are among the most open in 
the world and are deeply integrated through dense flows of 
investment, affiliate sales and related-party trade, various barriers 
persist that prevent the emergence of a free transatlantic marketplace. These 
include traditional tariff barriers, as well non-tariff barriers and regulations 
that restrict foreign ownership of domestic resources, assign monopoly status 
to government enterprises, pose significant regulatory hurdles for prospective 
foreign investors or discriminate between domestic and foreign bidders.
1  
Transatlantic Tariff Barriers 
Transatlantic tariff barriers are generally low, averaging between 3-4% of the 
€500 billion in annual transatlantic trade. Tariff levels in the European 
Union, however, are more widely dispersed than those in the US, and tariffs 
in both the EU and the US are higher on specific products in sensitive 
sectors, such as textiles, wearing apparel and leather products, or as a result 
of preferential trade agreements.
2 
The highest barriers to trade between Europe and the US are in agriculture, 
with particularly high rates of protection for rice, sugar and dairy products. 
CEPR has estimated the average MFN tariff on agricultural goods to be 
17.3% in the EU and 10.6% in the United States. Transatlantic agricultural 
                                                 
1 For an assessment of these barriers for certain industries, see the contributions 
to the 2004-2005 US-EU Stakeholder Dialogue (available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/World_Regions/Europe_Mediterranean/Transatlantic_Dialo
gue/Section_Index.html); see also OECD, The Benefits of Liberalising Product 
Markets and Reducing Barriers to International Trade and Investment: The Case 
of The United States and the European Union, Economics Department Working 
Paper 432, Paris, June 2005, pp. 7-10. 
2 Transatlantic Business Dialogue, “Report to the 2005 US-EU Summit: A 
Framework for Deepening Transatlantic Trade and Investment,” April 2005 
(http://128.121.145.19/tabd/media/TABD2005SummitReportFINAL051.pdf); 
and OECD, ibid. 
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liberalization would result in substantial benefits for developing countries in 
particular.
3  



































In manufactures, average transatlantic tariffs are low. CEPR estimated the 
average MFN tariff on manufactures to be 4.2% for the EU and 5% for the 
US. The high volume of transatlantic trade in manufactures, however, means 
that further reductions in these barriers would still yield significant benefits.
4 
Non-Tariff Barriers/Contingent Protection 
Because transatlantic tariffs are generally quite low and European and US 
industries are so deeply intertwined with each other, non-tariff barriers are 
more important impediments to a free transatlantic marketplace. Remaining 
non-tariff barriers consist largely of domestic regulations, including safety 
norms, different health, environmental or engineering standards, rules of 
origin or labeling requirements. Such measures are due in part to different 
societal preferences and priorities, but also to a significant degree to a lack of 
coordination or adequate information exchange between regulators and 
legislators on each side of the Atlantic, who are subject to different legal 
mandates or engage in different oversight procedures.  
                                                 
3 OECD, op. cit., p. 19; Hylke Vandenbussche, Ian Wooton and Anthony J. 
Venables,  Enhancing Cooperation between the EU and the Americas: An 
Economic Assessment, CEPR, London, 2002, p. 66. 
4 Vandenbussche et al., ibid. 30 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
Table 1. Ad-valorem Equivalent Measures of Applied Border Protection 
in the United States and the European Union, 2001  
 










Paddy rice  3.6  4.5  36.7  73.6 
Wheat 0.2  2.5  0.2  1.3 
Cereal grains  0.0  0.0  4.2  7.8 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts  0.6  2.7  7.0  4.4 
Oil seeds  2.9  6.5  0.0  0.0 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  0.2  0.2  5.6  0.0 
Other primary agriculture  1.7  1.9  1.1  8.9 
Bovine cattle, sheep,    
     goats, horses  0.0  0.0  3.5  0.7 
Natural resources  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Bovine cattle, sheep and  
     goat meat products   2.8  1.4  13.5  19.8 
Meat products  0.6  1.1  3.1  24.4 
Vegetable oils and fats  1.0  1.2  4.0  5.2 
Diary products   18.2  20.0  3.0  32.0 
Processed rice  4.4  6.5  51.5  93.8 
Sugar 25.4  23.4  62.9  23.2 
Other food products  2.5  5.3  3.0  15.3 
Beverages and tobacco  
     products   1.4  1.5  1.4  8.3 
        
Textiles 7.9  8.5  1.8  6.4 
Wearing apparel  9.9  10.1  3.2  10.1 
Leather products  12.2  7.4  2.8  4.5 
Other manufacturing  1.0  1.6  0.5  1.7 
        
Agriculture average
*  1.1 2.8  2.8  13.1 
Manufacturing average
*  1.9 1.9  0.7  2.1 
* Denotes trade-weighted average.  
Source: OECD, GTAP (version 6.05).  
Other forms of contingent protection include antidumping measures, 
countervailing duties and safeguard clauses. In 2002, CEPR estimated that 
contingent protection accounted for about 30% of the total cost of protection. 
While the OECD has cautioned that accurate quantification of both border 
and behind the border non-tariff measures is still not completely reliable REMAINING BARRIERS & BENEFITS FROM FURTHER LIBERALIZATION | 31 
today, CEPR estimated the welfare cost to the US alone of the active 
antidumping cases in one year to be $4 billion.
5  
A particularly challenging yet potentially significant area for liberalization is 
government procurement, which represents nearly 15% of the world’s GDP. 
Many governments on both shores of the Atlantic maintain restrictions in this 
area; more transparent and competitive procurement practices could open up 
potentially enormous market opportunities and deliver a broader choice of 
better quality goods and services to governments and citizens.  
Sectoral Barriers 
These barriers to transatlantic integration tend to be concentrated in certain 
sectors of the economy. In general, barriers in manufacturing tend to be low, 
while barriers in services and agriculture tend to be relatively high. Since 
agriculture comprises a relatively small and services a relatively high 
percentage of overall transatlantic economic output and employment, gains 
from liberalization in services relative to agriculture would be quite high. 
Two OECD charts paint a clearer picture of these barriers. Figure 2 outlines 
anti-competitive regulation in selected service sectors, while Figure 3 
presents more narrowly focused FDI controls across manufacturing and a 
range of service sectors.  
 
Figure 2. Product Market Regulations in Service Sectors in the EU, the US 
and OECD (OECD Indicator, 2003) 
 
  
                                                 
5 OECD, op. cit.; Vandenbussche et al., op. cit. 
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Figure 3. Sectoral Barriers to FDI in the EU, the US and OECD (2001) 
 
These charts underscore that competition-restraining regulations tend to be 
more extensive in the EU than in the US for six of the seven sectors, the 
exception being postal services.
6 FDI controls on manufacturing are low in 
both the US and the EU. In Europe, the OECD reports that sectoral barriers 
to FDI appear highest in transport services, telecommunications and 
particularly electricity. In the US FDI restrictions on transport services and 
telecommunications are higher than in the average EU country. While 
electricity restrictions are also high, they are lower than the levels of most 
European countries.
7 In chapter 4, we examine the extent of the transatlantic 
services market – the ‘sleeping giant’ of the transatlantic economy – and 
                                                 
6 Vandenbussche, et al., op. cit., p. 43. Another study by Patrick A. Messerlin 
compared the regulatory environment in the EU and North America in seven 
different sectors. He concluded that on a scale of 0 to 6, from least to most 
restrictive, the US rated 1.7, Mexico 2.7, Canada 2.8 and the EU 3.3. See P.A. 
Messerlin, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial 
Policy in the 2000s, September 2001, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC.  
 
7 OECD, op. cit., p. 19. 
Note: The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictive) to 1 (most restrictive).  
Source: Stephen S. Golub, Measures of Restrictiveness on Inward FDI in OECD Countries, OECD 











































































































EU  US OECDREMAINING BARRIERS & BENEFITS FROM FURTHER LIBERALIZATION | 33 
estimate the benefits that could result from further services liberalization 
within the EU Single Market as well as across the Atlantic.  
Potential Benefits of Further Transatlantic Liberalization 
In June 2005, an OECD report estimated that a package of structural reforms 
in the EU and the US that included reduction of competition-restraining 
regulations, tariff barriers and FDI restrictions could lead to permanent gains 
in GDP per capita on both sides of the Atlantic of up to 3 to 3 1/2%, and 
cause additional benefits to other OECD countries of up to 1 1/2% of GDP 
per capita. Over the course of an average 40-year working life of an 
individual, the OECD estimates that the cumulated addition to earnings 
would equal between one-half and more than a full year’s worth of earnings. 
Moreover, the implied reforms are relatively narrow and exclude labor 
market, financial market, agricultural or tax reforms, any of which could also 
strengthen transatlantic economic integration and performance. Thus the 
OECD study is conservative in its conclusions; gains from transatlantic 
liberalization could be significantly higher.
8  
The OECD study suggested that such output gains would require ambitious 
reforms in key sectors. Competition-restraining regulations in most EU15 
countries would have to be reduced considerably in domestic air, rail and 
road transportation, electricity and gas, and telecommunications. The United 
States would have to focus reforms on electricity and rail transportation. The 
greatest reduction of restrictions on foreign direct investment in the United 
States would need to come in transportation services, while in the European 
Union it would need to be most extensive in electricity generation. 
Reductions in tariff levels in the European Union would have to be 
concentrated on agricultural products; in the United States, tariff reductions 
would imply relatively more adjustment to rates of protection on textiles, 
apparel and other manufactured goods.
9 
A separate study by CEPR in 2002 came to similar conclusions, underscoring 
that the mutual benefits of further transatlantic economic cooperation could 
be very large. CEPR estimated that dismantling remaining tariff and non-
tariff barriers between the US and the EU could result in welfare gains for 
the EU ranging from 0.7%-2% of GDP. These gains reflect the annual 
income gain to the EU from transatlantic liberalization, accruing in 
perpetuity. In value terms, the lower range estimates correspond to an 
increase of between €39-€51 billion, with prices to EU consumers going 
down by 2.5% and an increase of 1 million EU jobs. The upper range 
                                                 
8 OECD, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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corresponded to the gains of the Single Market estimated by the Cecchini 
report. For the US, the lower range estimate of static welfare gains – 
reflecting only the dismantling of tariffs on goods trade – was 0.2% of US 
GDP (1990), the equivalent of some $15 billion, corresponding to an 
increase of 300,000 new US jobs. The upper range totaled 1% of US GDP.
10  
Table 2. Impact of Reforms on EU and US Export Levels, OECD Panel Data 
Studies 
 
In short, given the size and the deep inter-linkages between the US and 
European economies, the removal of remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
coupled with enhanced economic and regulatory cooperation between the US 
and the EU, could be the catalyst for a significant boost in economic growth, 
employment, investment and innovation across the transatlantic marketplace, 
and could further enhance the attractiveness of the transatlantic economy in a 
globalizing world. Lower barriers within the transatlantic economy, new 
economic dynamism, closer regulatory cooperation and greater transparency 
would also enhance market access and simplify the complex maze of 
regulations faced by third parties. Such efforts would also enable the US and 
                                                 









  impact of   
reforms 
Austria  0.6 1.5 29.0 31.0 
Belgium  1.0 2.2 24.9 28.1 
Denmark  0.8 3.1 21.3 25.3 
Finland  1.4 2.1 24.7 28.2 
France  1.2 2.3 28.5 32.0 
Germany  1.6 2.4 25.4 29.3 
Greece  0.6 6.5 35.0 42.1 
Ireland  2.7 2.1 21.0 25.7 
Italy  1.8 2.6 26.3 30.6 
The Netherlands  0.7 2.1 27.0 29.7 
Portugal  0.8 2.7 25.9 29.4 
Spain  0.8 2.7 26.4 29.8 
Sweden  1.5 2.1 21.0 24.7 
United Kingdom  2.1 2.8 23.7 28.6 
United States  3.5 1.0 17.5 22.0 
EU15 (excluding intra-EU trade) 4.7 2.9 23.0 30.7 
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the EU to act as pathfinders for regulatory policy cooperation and market 
opening beyond the transatlantic economy, acting as a motor for multilateral 
market-opening measures.  
Table 3. Impact of Reforms on GDP per Capita Levels, OECD Panel Data 
Studies (% increase in GDP per capita levels) 
 
 
It is worth noting that efforts to forge a truly free transatlantic market must 
be accompanied by parallel efforts to complete the EU’s Single Market, since 
internal EU commercial barriers are also barriers to truly open transatlantic 
commerce. Other parallel efforts include the Doha round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and global efforts to liberalize services. 
The following chapters investigate more closely the dynamics of transatlantic 
market integration. Our authors describe the barriers to and drivers of 
integration in the key markets of services, finance, commercial aerospace, 
civil aviation, biopharmaceuticals, telecommunications and automotive 
manufacturing. We then examine how domestic political decisions and 
regulatory mechanisms on each side of the Atlantic interact with deep 
transatlantic market integration in four illustrative cases: the potential 
transatlantic impact of the EU’s REACH Directive on chemicals; US-EU 







Total impact of  
reforms 
Austria  0.1 0.3 3.0 3.4 
Belgium  0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 
Denmark  0.2 0.3 2.2 2.8 
Finland  0.2 0.3 2.7 2.9 
France  0.2 0.4 3.4 4.0 
Germany  0.3 0.3 3.0 3.6 
Greece  0.2 0.5 2.7 3.3 
Ireland  0.1 0.0 0.6 0.7 
Italy  0.2 0.3 2.8 3.3 
The Netherlands  0.1 0.2 1.7 2.0 
Portugal  0.1 0.4 2.7 3.3 
Spain  0.1 0.4 2.7 3.2 
Sweden  0.2 0.3 2.1 2.5 
United Kingdom  0.4 0.2 2.4 3.0 
United States  0.9 0.4 1.7 3.1 
EU15  0.3 0.3 2.8 3.5 
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differences over climate change and the potential for transatlantic emissions 
trading markets; issues of corporate governance, particularly the transatlantic 
impact of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act; and the transatlantic dimensions of 
the EU’s Lisbon Agenda regarding innovation and competitiveness.  
These cases are not intended to be exhaustive. There are other important 
sectors of the transatlantic economy. Other policy areas also deserve 
attention. A number of new US regulations governing trade and security 
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, were advanced 
with little or no consultation with EU governments or companies, with 
significant consequences for transatlantic commerce. Similarly, various 
competition policy decisions by the European Commission have taken US 
officials and companies by surprise. A comprehensive examination of the 
full range of US-EU interaction is beyond the scope of this volume. These 
case studies are intended to underscore the quasi-domestic nature of some 
aspects of transatlantic relations today, and to illustrate the types of issues 
that arise when domestic decision-making interacts with deep transatlantic 
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4.  The Sleeping Giant: Services in the 
Transatlantic Economy 
  Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
ervice activities are the sleeping giant of the transatlantic economy – 
an economic force that, if awakened and unbound, would further 
deepen the commercial stakes between the United States and Europe 
and enhance the global competitiveness of both parties. At present, however, 
the full potential of the transatlantic service economy remains hampered by 
internal barriers, regulations and obstacles in the United States and, in 
particular, in Europe. 
As a recent report from the OECD
1 has noted, restrictions at the sectoral 
level are largely centered in service activities, with sectoral barriers in the 
European Union and the United States highest in such sectors as transport 
services, telecommunications, and electricity. Restrictive regulations in these 
and other sectors have hampered economic growth and reduced the economic 
efficiencies of the transatlantic economy over the past few decades. 
Regulatory reform, on the other hand, would help promote growth, create 
employment and increase the value of cross-border trade and investment. 
The Globalization of Services 
Service activities are rapidly being reshaped on a global basis. Functions that 
were once considered non-tradable (e.g. data processing, education and 
medical services) are now being traded regularly. Activities long classified as 
domestic endeavors (advertising, legal services and consulting) today easily 
take place across borders. Industries that were once the domain of the 
overregulated public sector (telecommunications, insurance and electric 
utilities) have been privatized and, in many cases, opened to foreign 
competition. Consequently, service activities have spread globally, notably 
across the Atlantic. 
The global role of services has been recast in large measure because of the 
accelerating pace of technological change. In Europe and many other parts of 
the world, technological advances have appreciably lowered the cost of 
communications, making it more feasible and efficient to retrieve, process 
and disseminate multiple forms of information. Just as container ships made 
the physical export of goods possible in the past, fiber-optic cables have 
made it possible to export more data, information and other knowledge-based 
                                                           
1 OECD, The Benefits of Liberalising Product Markets and Reducing Barriers to 
International Trade and Investment: The Case of the United States and the 
European Union, Economics Department Working Paper 432, Paris, June 2005. 
S 40 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
services that used to be considered non-tradable. In short, communications 
technology increasingly allows firms to split and disperse parts of service 
functions to foreign affiliates or to non-equity joint partners. 
As communications costs have fallen, the information infrastructure has 
expanded and the Internet has proliferated, knowledge-based services of both 
the United States and Europe have become more linked, promoting more 
trade and foreign investment in services. Industry deregulation, a more 
liberal investment environment and falling communications costs all 
converged in the 1990s to drive a transatlantic investment boom in services. 
Other variables supporting transatlantic service investment include the rising 
share of services in economic activity on both sides of the Atlantic; the 
growing service intensity of the production of goods; and greater competitive 
pressures in service markets that have pushed firms to seek markets abroad 
and strengthen their competitiveness.  
Against this backdrop, more than three-quarters of global mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) in the services sector took place among developed 
nations during 1987-2003, with the bulk of the transactions occurring either 
within Europe or across the Atlantic. According to UN figures, services 
accounted for 36 of the top 100 cross-border M&A deals in 1987-1995 and 
for 64 of the top cross-border M&A deals in 1996-2003. 
Today, the service economies of the United States and Europe have never 
been as intertwined as they are today, notably in such activities as financial 
services, telecommunications, utilities, insurance, advertising, computer 
services and other related functions.  
Enhanced Economic Integration through Services 
Following in the footsteps of manufacturers, US and European service 
companies now deliver their services more through foreign affiliate sales 
than through trade. In the 1970s and 1980s, firms delivered services 
primarily via trade. In the 1990s foreign affiliate sales became the chief 
mode of delivery.  
Sales of services by US foreign affiliates in Europe soared from $85 billion 
in 1994 to roughly $212 billion in 2002, the last year of available data. That 
marks a 150% increase, well ahead of the roughly 65% rise in US service 
exports to Europe over the same period. After being roughly equal to US 
service exports to Europe in 1992, foreign affiliate sales of services in 
Europe were nearly double the value of US service exports in 2002, with US 
service exports to Europe totaling $117.5 billion.  
Europe is the most important market in the world for US foreign affiliate 
sales of services, just as it is the most important market for US foreign SERVICES IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY| 41 
affiliate sales of goods. Indeed, of total affiliate service sales of $401 billion 
in 2002, Europe accounted for 53% of the total, with Asia (with 23% share) 
and Latin America (13%), a distant second and third, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.US-Europe service linkages 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
Figure 2. Service Sales of US Foreign Affiliates Abroad – Europe vs. China 
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By country, the UK, whose various service sectors are most aligned with 
those of the US, accounted for the largest share of US affiliate sales not only 
in Europe but also the world. In fact, foreign affiliate service sales of $98.5 
billion in the UK in 2002 were greater than foreign affiliate service sales in 
all of Asia ($97 billion) and Latin America ($52 billion). In Europe, 
Germany ($24.6 billion), France ($23.5 billion) and the Netherlands ($14.4 
billion) trailed the UK.  
 
Figure 3. Sales of Services to Europe by US Affiliates, by Country, 2002 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
By industry, sales of services to Europe by US affiliates are quite diverse, 
with information ($41.9 billion) and financial and insurance ($41 billion) 
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Figure 4. Sales of Services to Europe by US Affiliates, by Industry, 2002 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
Sales of services by US affiliates of European firms have also soared over 
the past decade. As Europe’s investment position in services has expanded in 
the US, so have foreign affiliate sales of services in the US. The latter totaled 
$269 billion in 2002 versus $86 billion in 1994, a jump of 213%. US service 
imports from Europe expanded over the same period, by roughly 85%, well 
below the rate of growth of affiliate sales of services.  
 
Figure 5. Europe – US Service Linkages 
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Leading the way were British service firms, whose US affiliate sales in 
services totaled $67 billion in 2003, or 25% of total European affiliate sales. 
German, French and Dutch affiliates in the US posted substantial sales of 
services as well, totaling $44 billion, $42 billion and $33 billion, 
respectively, in 2002.  
Figure 6. Sales of Services to US by European Affiliates, by Country 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
 
Figure 7. Sales of Services to US by Foreign Affiliates, Europe vs. China, 
2002 
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Financial and insurances services accounted for one-third ($89.6 billion) of 
total services sales in the US by European affiliates, followed by 
manufacturing services ($34.4 billion), information services ($31 billion), 
professional and technical services ($25.6 billion) and a variety of other 
service sectors.  
Figure 8. Sales of Services to US by European Affiliates, by Industry 2002 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce. 
 
In short, foreign affiliate sales of services on both sides of the Atlantic have 
exploded over the past decade. In fact, affiliate sales of services have not 
only become a viable second channel of delivery for US and European 
multinationals, they have become the overwhelming mode of delivery in a 
rather short period of time. Moreover, countries where services accounted for 
close to 60% of overall employment – such as the US, UK, the Netherlands 
and Norway – had the best record of job creation within the OECD.
2 
The Services Directive: Impact on the Transatlantic Economy  
Despite the major significance of the transatlantic services economy, barriers 
remain on both sides of the Atlantic. US barriers are most prominent in 
maritime, legal, engineering, architectural and accounting services. In the 
EU15 as a whole, barriers appear highest for domestic and foreign firms in 
accounting, maritime and legal services, and higher for foreign firms relative 
                                                           
2 Tobias Buck, “OECD stresses services market reform benefits”, Financial 
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to domestic firms in distribution, maritime and architectural services.
3 The 
key issue, however, remains the continued existence of service barriers 
within the EU itself. Liberalization of inner-EU services would be the single 
most important stimulus to the transatlantic services economy.  
The EU has been committed to a common market for services and goods 
since its inception in 1957. The EU Single Market was supposed to 
materialize on January 1, 1993, providing freedom of movement in goods, 
capital, people and services. Seven years later, EU leaders agreed to 
announce by the end of 2000 “a strategy for the removal of barriers to 
services.” Five years later, however, goods continue to move across the 
Union largely without difficulty, while services remained hampered by 25 
different sets of national rules and regulations – even though services 
account for almost 70% of GDP and jobs in the EU.
4  
Through an initiative called the Services Directive, the European 
Commission seeks to break down service barriers all at once, rather than by 
tackling liberalization sector by sector. The Services Directive covers a wide 
range of services provided to businesses and consumers in all 25 member 
states. The Directive seeks to provide “a legal framework that will eliminate 
the obstacles to the freedom of establishment for service providers and the 
free movement of services between the Member States.”
5 
                                                           
3 See C. Findley and T. Warren (eds), Impediments to Trade in Services: 
Measurement and Policy Implications, London: Routledge, 2000; K. Kalirajan, 
“Restrictions on Trade in Distributive Services”, Productivity Commission Staff 
Research Paper, Canberra: AusInfo, August 2000; D. Nguyen-Hongh, 
“Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services”, Productivity Commission Staff 
Research Paper, Canberra: AusInfo, August 2000; Copenhagen Economics, 
Economic Assessment of the Barriers to the Internal Market for Services. Final 
Report, Copenhagen, January 2005. 
4 See Tobias Buck, “A recipe for jobs or a race to the bottom? The EU debates a 
single market in services”, Financial Times, March 15, 2005; AmCham EU 
submission to the US-EU Stakeholder’s Dialogue, December 6, 2004; Daniel 
Gros, “Europe needs the single market in services”, Financial Times, April 7, 
2005; and Copenhagen Economics, ibid. 
5 European Commission, “Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Services in the Internal Market”, Proposal, COM(2004) 2 final/3, 
March 5, 2004. SERVICES IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY| 47 
While some controversial elements
6 of the current Services Directive have 
caused some member states to question its implementation, analysts estimate 
that it could be the single most important initiative to improve the continent’s 
competitiveness and employment. Copenhagen Economics, a think tank 
consultancy in Denmark, estimates that the Services Directive would yield 
significant economic gains. European consumers, businesses, governments 
and foreign investors would benefit from enhanced productivity, higher 
employment, increased wages and lower prices. A comprehensive study by 
Copenhagen Economics concluded that implementing the Services Directive 
could result in a total welfare gain of 0.6% of EU GDP, or €37 billion, create 
up to 600,000 jobs and boost foreign investment by up to 34%.
7 A second 
study by Dutch economists, published in 2004, came to similar conclusions. 
Given the dense interconnections in the transatlantic service economy, 
implementation of the Services Directive would be very likely to boost US 
direct investment in the EU considerably.  
Implementing the Services Directive would be akin to waking the sleeping 
giant of the transatlantic economy – services. Ultimately, it could produce a 
number of benefits and gains for the both the United States and Europe, 
including the following:  
  Boost transatlantic foreign direct investment flows. Like the Single 
Market program, which sparked a rise in more service-related foreign 
investment, notably in transportation and telecommunications, the 
elimination or reduction of barriers to service activities in Europe would 
attract more foreign direct investment from leading service firms in the 
United States. Under such a scenario, Europe would most likely remain 
the top destination of US foreign direct investment, continuing the trend 
of the past half-century. Service deregulation would also promote more 
intra-European foreign investment, leading to consolidation and greater 
efficiencies in various service activities. 
  Lower prices while raising productivity and growth. Service reform and 
deregulation would trigger greater cross-border competition in services, 
which would ultimately lead to lower prices, benefiting both consumers 
and businesses. Productivity levels would rise as costs declined and as 
firms leveraged more competitively priced services. Since services are a 
critical component of many manufacturing industries, greater service 
deregulation in Europe would yield a competitive boost to Europe’s 
                                                           
6 This includes the so-called ‘country of origin’ principle, which would grant 
companies the right to provide services in all member states as long as they 
follow the laws of their home state, which has caused some critics to warn of 
‘social dumping’. 
7 Copenhagen Economics, op. cit. 48 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
manufacturing sector. Finally, falling prices, combined with rising 
productivity, would help boost real economic growth in the EU and a 
rise in European corporate earnings. In monetary terms, Copenhagen 
Economics estimates that total value added in the services sector would 
increase by approximately €33 billion.
8 Without competitive business 
services, meeting the EU’s Lisbon Agenda objective of forging a world-
class knowledge economy in the next few years will be quite difficult.  
  Improve wages and create jobs. The service sector of the EU already 
accounts for nearly 70% of total employment; a new regulatory 
framework that removes tariffs and non-tariffs to services would drive 
the percentage even higher. Copenhagen Economics estimates that 
implementation of the Services Directive would boost real wages in the 
EU by 0.4% and create 600,000 jobs.
9 Net employment gains would be 
most noticeable in the new enlargement economies, where service 
employment (as a percentage of total employment) lags the EU average. 
In 2003, for instance, only 55.8% of the Czech Republic’s work force 
was employed in services, well below the OECD average of 68.6% in 
2003. In Slovakia, the service sector employed only 55.9% of the total 
work force, while service employment in Poland and Portugal, as a 
percentage of the total, was 53% and 54.7%, respectively. In terms of 
service employment catching up to the EU average under a more liberal 
service framework, Germany and Greece would also benefit, considering 
that service employment accounts for just 65.6% of total employment in 
the former and just 61.1% in the latter economy.  
  Stimulate greater cross-border trade in services. A more deregulatory 
environment for services would promote greater cross-border 
transactions in services, helping to boost not only intra-EU trade in 
services but also cross-border transatlantic trade in services. Cross-
border transatlantic trade in services is already quite robust, with total 
transatlantic trade in services (US service exports to Europe + US 
service imports from Europe) amounting to $219 billion in 2003. That is 
more than double the level of a decade ago. 
US service exports to Europe totaled $117.4 billion in 2003, with Europe 
accounting for 40% of the global total. Of the top ten markets in the 
world for US service exports, five are transatlantic partners, with United 
Kingdom ranked first in the world. Germany ranked fourth, followed by 
France (6
th), Switzerland (8
th), and the Netherlands (9
th). Of US service 
imports, roughly 45% were accounted for by Europe in 2003. Service 
imports from Europe topped $100 billion for the first time in 2003, with 
                                                           
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., pp. 31-32. SERVICES IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY| 49 
service imports from the United Kinggom the largest in the world ($30 
billion).  
The Way Forward 
Removing barriers to trade and investment in services is one of the key 
challenges before transatlantic policy-makers. While services presently 
account for the largest share of gross domestic product in virtually all of the 
nations that comprise the transatlantic economy, the role of services could be 
even larger and growth-enhancing if the political will was present to push 
ahead with more service deregulation and reform. 
The lack of service reform represents a significant opportunity cost to the 
United States, the European Union and the transatlantic economy. The lack 
of reform could very well undermine the growth, attraction and efficiency of 
the transatlantic economy – the rest of the world is not standing still. | 50 
5.   Beyond Open Skies: The Economic 
Impact of a US-EU Open Aviation Area 
  Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes 
and Boaz Moselle 
lthough aviation is an enabler of globalization, paradoxically, the 
airline industry itself remains subject to highly restrictive national 
controls on cross-border competition and investment. Government-
to-government bilateral agreements often limit the routes that international 
air carriers can fly, the number of flights they can schedule and the fares they 
can charge. All but a few countries prohibit foreign competition in their 
internal markets, by banning both the operation of foreign air carriers 
between domestic points (‘cabotage’) and cross-border ownership of national 
airlines. Government signatories to bilateral agreements even restrict cross-
border investment in foreign carriers through a so-called ‘nationality clause’ 
that requires carriers to be ‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ 
by citizens of the country where they are based. 
The European Union and the United States have the largest and among the 
most deregulated domestic aviation markets in the world. However, despite 
the success of airline deregulation in their domestic markets, Europe and the 
United States still limit transatlantic competition and investment. To be sure, 
bilateral ‘Open Skies’ agreements between the United States and individual 
EU member states have eliminated most controls on the quality, quantity and 
price of aviation services, but such agreements still stop short of full 
liberalization, and major markets are not covered.  
As a result of this system, the aviation industry lags in adapting to 
globalization even as it drives other sectors to globalize. As an editorial in 
the Financial Times put it, “In an era of supposedly borderless markets and 
global competition, the world airline industry remains stuck in a time warp.”
1 
This regulatory time warp imposes significant costs on consumers and air 
carriers alike. And while archaic regulation is not the principal cause of the 
financial crisis currently confronting major carriers in the United States, 
Europe and elsewhere, it impedes their long-term recovery. 
The European Commission has endorsed the elimination of all commercial 
restrictions on EU-US aviation competition and investment. The 
Commission’s goal is to create a single open market encompassing the 
provision of air transport services not only between, but also within Europe 
                                                   
1 “Lowering the Flag”, Financial Times, June 8, 2000. 
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and the United States. We refer to this as an ‘Open Aviation Area’ because it 
would amount to a free trade area in air transport. 
To inform the debate, the Commission asked The Brattle Group in 2002 to 
analyze the economic effects of complete EU-US aviation liberalization.
2 
This chapter discusses the analysis and findings of that study. First, to set the 
stage, we review the history of transatlantic aviation liberalization and 
describe the remaining restrictions and their effects. Second, we describe our 
analysis of the impact that elimination of these restrictions could be expected 
to have on competition, economic efficiency and consumer welfare. In 
particular, we estimated the benefits from three sources: i) airline cost 
savings from increased competition and consolidation, ii) reductions in air 
fares as a result of improved pricing coordination on transatlantic interline 
routes and iii) output expansion from replacement of restrictive bilateral 
agreements. Third, we analyze the merits of concerns raised about the 
potential impact of US-EU liberalization in three key areas – national 
security, airline labor and aviation safety. Finally, we summarize recent 
developments, including last year’s failed US-EU negotiations. 
Two caveats are in order. First, our quantitative analysis was limited to the 
15 countries that were EU members in 2002, and thus did not include the 10 
new EU members that acceded in 2004. The expansion of our analysis to 
include these 10 countries would increase the economic benefits of a US-EU 
Open Aviation Area; thus, the numbers reported here are conservative. 
Second, the numbers reported here were calculated at a time when the 
currency conversion between the dollar and the euro was almost exactly one 
to one. Since that time, the dollar has depreciated, and thus the sums reported 
in euros may be overstated. 
To summarize, our quantitative analysis suggests that, over the long term, a 
US-EU Open Aviation Area would: 
  increase transatlantic travel by up to 11 million passengers a year – a 
24% increase; 
  boost intra-EU travel by up to an additional 35.7 million passengers a 
year – a 14% increase; 
  increase economic output in directly related industries by up to $8.1 
billion a year; and 
                                                   
2 See Boaz Moselle et al., “The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation 
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  create about $5.2 billion a year in consumer benefits through lower 
fares and increased travel, with more than half of those benefits going 
to transatlantic passengers. 
To be conservative, we did not try to quantify benefits in the US domestic 
market. Although we think US domestic passengers will benefit from an 
Open Aviation Area, the US market is already highly competitive because 
entry is fully open to domestic carriers, if not to foreign carriers. 
Our qualitative analysis finds that claims regarding the potential for 
international liberalization to harm national security, labor and airline safety 
do not stand up to scrutiny. Among our conclusions:  
  A US-EU Open Aviation Area would not harm national security. If a 
European entity bought or established a US carrier for business and 
other reasons, it would operate it as a US subsidiary, and that legal 
arrangement would preserve Department of Defense leverage. As 
evidence, foreign-owned, US-incorporated ocean shipping companies 
have top secret clearance and transport a great deal of US military 
cargo. 
  Nor would US airline labor suffer significant harm. Direct labor 
substitution would be very limited because of legal and institutional 
factors that give US pilots considerable bargaining leverage. Although 
there is greater potential for indirect labor substitution, even that 
would likely be limited because the US-EU wage gap is so small. 
  Creation of an Open Aviation Area poses challenges for US and 
European regulators, but these challenges are manageable and do not 
threaten airline safety. 
The US-EU Market: Economic Restrictions and Their Effects 
Transatlantic Liberalization 
Although major impediments to competition remain, air transport between 
Europe and the United States has been significantly liberalized in the last 25 
years. Inspired in part by the success of US domestic airline deregulation, the 
United States negotiated liberal ‘open market’ agreements in the late 1970s 
and 1980s with various European governments, beginning with the 
Netherlands. Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg followed.
3 In exchange for 
                                                   
3 See Rigas Doganis, The Airline Business in the 21st Century, London: 
Routledge, 2001, pp. 23-30. ‘Open market’ is Doganis’ term for these 
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access to more (but not all) US cities, European governments agreed to let 
US carriers fly from any point in the United States to specified points in their 
country. In addition, the agreements eliminated all restrictions on the 
frequency of flights and the seat capacity on those flights, provided greater 
opportunities for innovative and competitive pricing, removed restrictions on 
charter operations and allowed for the designation of multiple airlines. The 
latter provision was of interest largely to the United States because most 
other countries had only one international carrier (their so-called ‘flag 
carriers’). 
Predictably, international traffic increased and fares dropped following 
liberalization. Between 1987 and 1993, the number of passengers traveling 
on US airlines between the United States and foreign destinations increased 
by 47%, while domestic traffic increased by only 6%.
4 (Liberalization had a 
similar impact within the European Union, where member states had 
negotiated open-market-style agreements on a bilateral basis.
5) 
By the early 1990s, as a result of structural changes in the airline industry, 
the limits of open market agreements were becoming more apparent. US 
airline deregulation and the industry consolidation that followed had 
produced several carriers with large national networks and a strong 
commercial orientation. These carriers saw greater opportunities for 
expansion in international markets than within the more mature US domestic 
market. And in Europe, where international traffic already constituted a 
substantial part of flag carriers’ revenue, the trend toward privatization and 
away from state aid was putting increased pressure on carriers to become 
self-sufficient.
6 
In response to these factors, the United States and individual European 
governments in the 1990s negotiated bilateral ‘Open Skies’ agreements that 
went beyond the earlier open market agreements – in effect, deregulating 
international travel between the United States and the other country. A 
typical Open Skies agreement allows carriers from either signatory country 
to fly to any point in the other country with no restrictions on fares or 
frequency of service. In addition, carriers receive unlimited fifth freedom 
(also known as ‘intermediate’ and ‘beyond’) rights – i.e. the right to carry 
traffic between the other country and a third country. Finally, carriers from 
                                                   
4 US General Accounting Office, International Aviation: Airline Alliances 
Produce Benefits, but Effect on Competition is Uncertain, GAO/RCED-95-99, 
April 1995, p. 2. 
5 Doganis, op. cit., p. 27. 
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Ten of the 25 EU member states have not signed Open Skies agreements 
with the United States, and they account for about half of all EU-US traffic.
7 
We refer to the US bilateral agreements with these 10 countries as ‘output 
restricting’, because they limit to some degree the volume of traffic to and 
from the United States. The most restrictive agreement is Bermuda 2, which 
governs US-UK aviation, the largest single transatlantic aviation market. For 
passenger services, the 1977 Bermuda 2 agreement: 
  restricts access to Heathrow, London’s preferred airport, to two 
airlines each from the United States (currently, American and United) 
and the United Kingdom (currently, British Airways and Virgin 
Atlantic); 
  limits the number of US cities eligible for non-stop service to and 
from Heathrow and Gatwick Airports; and 
  effectively caps entry in most markets at one US and one UK airline. 
In addition, the British government has used Bermuda 2 to limit the number 
of flights US airlines can offer and to disallow pro-competitive pricing 
initiatives. All-cargo services between the United States and the United 
Kingdom operate under a more liberal regime, with no limits on entry, 
capacity, pricing or which cities can be served in either country. However, 
fifth freedom operations are restricted to three US airlines and only nine 
countries.
8 
Bermuda 2 imposes huge costs on UK and US business travelers. Bermuda 2 
also imposes major costs on US cargo carriers and the UK shippers they 
serve. Federal Express, which has its major European hub in Paris, operates 
daily service from the United States to Stansted Airport outside of London, 
                                                   
7 The 10 member states are: Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
8 Under Bermuda 2, US cargo carriers have ‘beyond’ rights only to Belgium, 
Germany, India, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Syria and Turkey. Thus, 
they cannot travel from the United Kingdom to many commercially important 
markets, including France, Italy and Spain in Europe, as well as China, Hong 
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where it delivers UK-bound express cargo and collects UK cargo outbound 
for the European continent. Because it does not have fifth freedom rights 
from the United Kingdom to France, Federal Express must transport the UK 
outbound cargo to Paris by truck or train, or hire an EU carrier to fly it to 
Paris. At the same time, Federal Express planes must fly empty from 
Stansted to Paris. 
As another example, under the US-Ireland air services agreement, a US 
carrier serving Ireland must operate as many flights to Shannon as it does to 
Dublin (the so-called ‘50/50 rule’). Irish carriers, in turn, are limited in the 
number of US gateways they can serve.  These restrictions limit air services 
between the United States and Ireland to the detriment of consumers and air 
carriers in both countries. 
‘Open Skies’ Agreements 
Although Open Skies agreements eliminate all restrictions on output, they 
retain a number of restrictive features of traditional air services agreements, 
either by omission or by explicit provision.  With respect to transatlantic 
competition, perhaps the most restrictive feature is the nationality clause, 
which provides that only airlines that are ‘substantially owned and 
effectively controlled’ by nationals of the signatory state can operate direct 
service between that state and the United States. For example, a German-
owned airline may operate direct service from Frankfurt to Chicago, but it 
may not operate direct service from Paris to Chicago. A senior US 
transportation official recently described the differential impact this 
provision has on Europe versus the United States: 
Consider, first, two different trans-Atlantic aviation route maps as 
they appear today…The first map shows – with lines connecting every 
conceivable transatlantic city pair – all of the opportunities currently 
available to every US airline wishing to fly to Europe…There are 
some famously anachronistic restrictions at London’s Heathrow 
Airport and some other less important exceptions, but it’s still pretty 
difficult to see the outlines of the continents under the dense tangle of 
available routes on this first map – the opportunities available to US 
carriers. 
The second map looks very different.  It shows the transatlantic city 
pairs currently available to EU carriers. Instead of the dense tangle of 
routes we saw on the first map, this map shows a separate spray of 
routes coming out of each EU country to the United States. The 
airlines of each of our many EU Open Skies partners are certainly 
allowed to fly to and from any city in the US, but all those flights must 
funnel in and out of their individual home countries. At the present 
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bilateral agreements to do what every US carrier can do: connect any 
point in the US to any point in Europe.
9 
The nationality clause is a traditional air services provision that serves the 
same function as rules of origin in preferential trade agreements – namely, to 
prevent third countries from obtaining negotiated privileges through the back 
door. However, by denying European airlines the right to serve US 
destinations from anywhere in the European Union, this provision thwarts 
internal European liberalization and integration.  
To elaborate, EU flag carriers must base their operations in their home 
countries, because transatlantic traffic constitutes a substantial part of the 
revenue of most European carriers. Moreover, it would be difficult for one 
European flag carrier to challenge a competitor in another EU country, 
because it could not fly directly to the United States from that country. 
The nationality clause is also a barrier to EU consolidation. Restructuring via 
mergers and acquisitions is one of the key drivers of change in most 
industries, and the European Commission has indicated a desire to see 
Europe’s airlines consolidate. However, if one of the merging airlines were 
from a non-Open Skies EU country (and several of the more likely merger 
candidates are), it is likely that the United States would effectively block the 
transaction.
10  
In sum, the current regulatory regime leads to an ‘artificial’ proliferation of 
hubs or mini-hubs in Europe to serve the transatlantic market. At the same 
time, transatlantic routes are effectively insulated from entry by more 
efficient competitors from different EU member states. Thus, the current 
system impedes the evolution of an efficient network design in Europe. 
                                                   
9 “International Aviation Priorities”, remarks by Jeffrey N. Shane, Under 
Secretary for Policy at the US Department of Transportation, at Phoenix Sky 
Harbor International Airport’s Aviation Symposium, April 27, 2005. 
10 For example, British Airways explored the acquisition of KLM in 2000. 
Because the United States had an Open Skies agreement with the Netherlands 
but not with the UK, US officials made clear that such an acquisition would not 
give British Airways additional access to the United States through the ‘back 
door’ of the Netherlands. More significantly, they cautioned that the merger 
would cost KLM its longstanding Open Skies rights to the United States. A 
senior Clinton Administration official announced at the time that “if KLM comes 
under effective control of British Airways while Bermuda 2 still governs US-UK 
air services, KLM will immediately lose the benefits of the US-Netherlands 
Open Skies Agreement”. Remarks to the International Aviation Club by Dorothy 
Robyn, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, National 
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Although airline alliances provide a way around some of these restrictions, 
they have their own serious limitations.  
A second major restriction that persists even under an Open Skies agreement 
is the statutory limit on foreign ownership and control of domestic airlines. 
Under US law, at least 75% of the voting stock of a US airline must be 
owned by US citizens, and US citizens must also control the airline. EU law 
has similar restrictions, although the cap on foreign ownership is higher – 
49%. In addition, some EU member states have their own prohibitions on 
airline takeovers by non-EU investors.  
The restrictions on foreign ownership and control also preclude a right of 
establishment. Such a right allows an airline or other investor from one 
country to establish an airline in another country and to operate it under the 
laws and regulations of the other country. Thus, although UK entrepreneur 
Richard Branson would like start up a low-cost airline in the United States 
and operate it as a US company, he would not be able to control it.  
Open Skies agreements effectively preserve a number of other restrictions as 
well, although their impact on competition is less significant: 
  Stand-alone cabotage. An airline from one Open Skies country cannot 
carry domestic traffic solely between two points within the territory of 
the other Open Skies country. For example, Lufthansa cannot carry 
US domestic passengers solely between two airports inside the United 
States. Likewise, a US airline cannot carry German domestic 
passengers between two airports in Germany. 
  Consecutive (‘fill-up’) cabotage. An airline from one Open Skies 
country cannot carry domestic traffic between two points within the 
territory of the other, even in the course of providing international 
service. For example, on a flight from Paris to Mexico City via New 
York and Chicago, Air France can drop off Paris-originating 
passengers, and pick up Mexico-bound passengers, in both New York 
and Chicago; but it cannot carry US domestic passengers solely 
between New York and Chicago. 
  Wet leasing.
11 US carriers can ‘lease-out’ US aircraft and crew to 
foreign carriers, but they are prohibited from ‘leasing-in’ foreign 
aircraft and crew. EU carriers do not face such an absolute 
prohibition, although leasing-in of third-country aircraft is limited to 
temporary needs and exceptional circumstances. 
                                                   
11 ‘Wet leasing’ involves the lease of aircraft and crew, in contrast to ‘dry 
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  ‘Fly America’ requirements. Most US government commercial air 
transport, domestic as well as international, must take place on US 
airlines. This includes the transport of US government personnel and 
cargo, as well as most items handled by the US Postal Service. 
However, on international flights, foreign code-share partners of US-
flag carriers can transport US government personnel, cargo and mail 
under the US carrier’s code on routes covered by their code-sharing 
agreement.  
US-EU Open Aviation Area 
To remove these market distortions, the European Commission has endorsed 
the elimination of all commercial restrictions on US-EU competition and 
investment. The resulting US-EU Open Aviation Area would amount to a 
free trade zone in air transport encompassing not just transatlantic operations 
but operations within the European Union and the United States as well.  
There is support for an Open Aviation Area on both sides of the Atlantic, 
including among many (although not all) flag carriers seeking greater 
commercial flexibility. While economists and aviation policy experts 
generally favor the proposal because it embraces market principles, specific 
groups, including airline labor unions and some US Department of Defense 
officials, express serious concerns about key provisions. Moreover, US 
carriers have been reluctant to battle with their pilots on this issue in the 
current climate.  Largely based on the position of these groups, the US 
government, despite having blazed the trail on aviation liberalization for 
more than two decades, has not endorsed significant elements of a US-EU 
Open Aviation Area.    
Economic Impact of an Open Aviation Area 
To quantify the benefits of an Open Aviation Area, we focused on three 
efficiency effects: cost savings, price reductions and output expansion. Using 
a variety of quantitative methods, we estimated the impact of each effect on 
prices, passenger traffic volume and consumer welfare.  
Economic Benefits of More Efficient Firms Replacing Less 
Efficient Firms 
In a liberalized market, more efficient airlines would replace less efficient 
ones, or less efficient airlines would adopt the practices of more efficient 
ones, leading to significant cost savings and an increase in industry 
efficiency. This substitution would occur through two mechanisms: industry 
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competition (e.g. a carrier from one EU country could establish a 
transatlantic hub in another EU country). 
This same process of expansion and consolidation would allow air carriers to 
exploit size-related economies, leading to further efficiency gains. For 
example, a merger or ‘deep’ alliance might allow two carriers to spread 
certain fixed costs over more passengers (scale economy). The carriers might 
achieve added savings by reconfiguring their combined network to connect 
more flights to certain hub airports (scope economy). They might also 
achieve higher utilization – e.g. by combining traffic to raise load factors 
(density economy). 
We used route-level cost data for US and EU carriers to estimate the 
potential for cost savings under an Open Aviation Area. Our primary source 
was a database of airline costs and revenues provided by the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Energy and Transport and originally 
commissioned from British Aerospace (BAe). The database estimates airline 
costs on a route-by-route basis, using essentially the same cost categories 
used by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). To preserve 
carrier anonymity and commercial confidentiality, it groups airlines into 
‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ cost categories and presents average costs for 
each category rather than cost figures for individual airlines.  
First, we used these data, together with qualitative industry input, to identify 
five cost categories for which the variation in costs across airlines was the 
largest and the potential for network efficiencies the greatest. The categories 
were: flight deck crew; cabin attendants; passenger service; ticketing, sales 
and promotion; and general and administrative.  
Second, we determined a ‘best practice benchmark’ for these five cost 
categories. Specifically, we used ‘medium-cost’ airlines rather than ‘no frills’ 
airlines as our benchmark for industry best practice. It would be 
unreasonable to claim that traditional airlines could reduce their passenger 
service costs to those of Ryanair or easyJet, because traditional airlines 
provide a higher level of in-flight service.  
Third, for each cost category, we calculated the savings that would result if 
high-cost airlines cost were to reduce their costs to the benchmark level. 
These calculations were done on a route-by-route basis within four 
geographic regions: the transatlantic, northern Europe, southern Europe and 
north-south European routes. We limited our comparison to carriers that 
already served an individual region. That is, we excluded US carriers from 
our analysis of intra-EU routes, and our analysis of the three intra-EU 
regions ignored EU carriers that did not already serve that particular region. 
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Table 1. Estimated Impact of Cost Reductions 
 Flight  type 
 Intra-EU  Transatlantic  All  flights 
Current costs (€ million/year)  39,531  28,578  68,110 
Potential savings 
(€ million/year) 
2,268 621 2,888 
Percent of current costs  5.7%  2.2%  4.2% 
Note: These figures were calculated as of December 2, 2002, when €1 = $0.9927. 
Consequently, these figures may be overstated due to currency changes since 
that time. 
 
Table 1 shows our results. We estimate that the potential cost savings to the 
airline industry from greater ‘productive efficiency’ are about €2.9 billion 
annually, or 4.2% of total costs. Nearly 80% of the savings would come from 
intra-EU, as opposed to transatlantic, operations. We further estimate the 
impact if these savings were passed through to consumers in price 
reductions. In addition to the direct benefit of €2.9 billion a year, these 
savings would produce an annual increase in consumer welfare of as much as 
€370 million due to the increase in passenger traffic that lower prices would 
generate. 
Economic Benefits of Pricing Synergies owing to Transatlantic 
Integration 
By facilitating deeper forms of integration between US and EU carriers, 
liberalization would allow improved price coordination on transatlantic 
interline routes (i.e. routes that require passengers to fly on two or more 
airlines to reach their destination). Without coordination, each carrier will set 
the fare for its leg of the flight without considering how it will affect demand 
for the other legs. If the same carriers are allowed to coordinate, each will 
have an incentive to set lower fares so as to increase combined profits. This 
process, which seems counterintuitive to many non-economists, is known as 
‘elimination of double marginalization’. 
We assessed the impact of improved price coordination by interlining 
carriers in an Open Aviation Area. In particular, we relied on previous 
studies that examined the fare difference on transatlantic interline routes 
when the route is covered by an airline alliance, as opposed to no alliance. 
Economists Jan Brueckner and W. Tom Whalen analyzed fares on US 
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interline routes as a result of improved price coordination.
12 The authors 
found that alliance partners charge interline fares that are between 18% and 
28% below the prices charged by non-allied airlines on the same route. They 
concluded that when allied airlines are allowed to share revenues or profits 
and engage in coordinated fare-setting, consumers benefit from lower 
interline prices. Moreover, they found that alliances increased consumer 
welfare overall, even though they may reduce competition, and thus raise 
prices somewhat on gateway-to-gateway routes. 
To produce indicative estimates of these benefits, we made three 
calculations. First, we calculated fares and volumes for traffic on all 
transatlantic interline routes not currently subject to price coordination. (We 
excluded routes covered by the four output-restricting bilateral agreements, 
because we considered those separately.) To determine fares, we used 
average passenger revenues for all transatlantic routes as derived from the 
revenue, volume and load factor information in the BAe database. With 
respect to traffic volume, we used an industry estimate that around 10% of 
total transatlantic traffic involves interlining carriers that do not engage in 
price coordination. We applied this figure to total US-EU transatlantic traffic 
volumes derived from the US Department of Transportation T-100 data. 
Second, we estimated the size of the fare reductions that improved price 
coordination among transatlantic carriers would produce. We relied on the 
Brueckner and Whalen results showing that existing alliances have produced 
fare reductions on interline routes ranging from 18% to 28%. 
Third, we calculated the increased traffic volume that would result from 
these price reductions. We used two estimates of the price-responsiveness 
(elasticity) of demand – a lower bound estimate of 1.0 and an upper bound 
estimate of 2.5. 
Using these steps, we estimate the gains to consumers that would result if 
there were comparable fare reductions on transatlantic routes not currently 
subject to price coordination. Table 2 summarizes our findings, showing an 
estimated annual benefit to consumers of between €629 million and €1.347 
billion, depending on passengers’ responsiveness to changes in price (the 
elasticity of demand). 
                                                   
12  See Jan K. Brueckner and W. Tom Whalen, “The Price Effects of 
International Airline Alliances”, Journal of Law & Economics 43, No. 2, 
October 2000, pp. 503-545. The majority of the alliances examined in Brueckner 
and Whalen’s analysis were subject to antitrust immunity. International airline 
alliances may have other, less desirable effects as well. These potential anti-
competitive effects of alliances are the subject of ongoing research by Brueckner 
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Table 2. Annual Impact of Increased Interline Price Coordination 




Increased passenger volume 
(‘000s/year) 
975 5,654 
Increase in consumer surplus 
(€ million/year) 
From price decreases for existing 
customers 
571 888 
From increased traffic  59  458 
Total 629  1,347 
Note: The lower bound scenario assumes an 18% price reduction and a price 
elasticity of demand of 1.0, while the upper bound scenario assumes a 28% 
price reduction and a price elasticity of demand of 2.5. 
Economic Benefits of Eliminating Output Restrictions 
At least three mechanisms would lead to expanded output (passenger traffic) 
in a liberalized market. First, cost savings from the first two efficiency 
effects described above would be passed through to consumers (at least in the 
long run) in the form of lower prices, leading to increased passenger demand 
for travel. Second, price reductions resulting from improved price 
coordination on transatlantic interline routes would increase demand. Third, 
US bilateral agreements with Greece, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom 
all restrict output to varying degrees; an Open Aviation Area would eliminate 
these restrictions. (Recall that our analysis did not include the ten newly 
acceded EU members, six of which have output restricting agreements with 
the United States.) 
We estimated the impact on airline industry output of liberalizing those four 
‘output-restricting’ bilateral agreements. Our methodology involved 
estimating the impact of prior, ‘partial’ transatlantic liberalization – namely 
the Open Skies agreements of the 1990s. Specifically, we estimated the 
impact of these Open Skies agreements by using statistical techniques to 
analyze historical data on passenger traffic as well as market cost and 
demand variables. By controlling for these economic variables, we isolated 
the contribution of Open Skies agreements to changes in the volume of 
transatlantic passengers over time. We used this result as a lower-bound 
estimate of the output expansion that would accompany the replacement of 
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Our analysis found that, controlling for other factors, the 1990s Open Skies 
agreements led to a 10% increase in the number of transatlantic passengers. 
To estimate the impact of liberalizing the four remaining output-restricting 
bilateral agreements, we simply extrapolated from that result, as shown in 
Table 3. By this measure, an Open Aviation Area would lead to an additional 
2.2 million passengers traveling annually between the United States and 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. As Table 4 shows, the 
corresponding impact on consumer welfare would range from €0.6 billion to 
€1.5 billion a year. 
Table 3. Estimated Volume Increases from Lifting of Output Restrictions for 









Predicted volume in 
2000 
(‘000s) 
[3] = (1+[2]) x [1] 
Change in 
volume in 2000 
(‘000s) 
[4] = [3] – [1] 
Greece 342  10%  377  35 
Ireland 1,587  10%  1,748  161 
Spain 1,825 10%  2,011  185 
UK 17,810  10%  19,617  1,807 
Total 21,564  10%  23,753  2,188 
Source: DOT International T-100 Data. 
Table 4. Predicted Increase in Consumer Surplus due to Lifting of Output 
Restrictions (€ million/year) 
Country  Lower bound scenario  Upper bound scenario 























Greece 18  1  19  8  0  8 
Ireland 95  5  99  39  2  41 
Spain 106  5  112  44  2  46 
UK 1,181 58  1,239 486  24 510 
Total 1,401  69  1,469  577  29  605 
Notes: Calculated for routes where volume and bi-directional fares are both available. 
Utilities January 2001 fares. 
The lower bound scenario assumes an elasticity of 1.0, while the upper bound 
scenario assumes an elasticity of 2.5. 
These labels are used to be consistent with the rest of the analysis, even though the 
assumptions behind the two scenarios result in greater gains in the lower bound 
scenario than in the upper bound scenario. 
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Total Economic Impact 
Combining the results from Tables 1 through 3, we developed indicative 
estimates of the total economic impact of an Open Aviation Area on two key 
measures: passenger traffic volume and consumer welfare. 
As Table 5 shows, we estimate that passenger traffic would increase annually 
by between 4.1 million and 11.0 million passengers on transatlantic routes, 
and between 13.6 million and 35.7 million on intra-EU routes, for a total 
increase of 17.7 million to 46.7 million passengers per year. These are 
significant increases. They represent an increase of 9-24% in total 
transatlantic travel, and 5-14% in intra-EU travel. 
Table 5. Total Estimated Increase in Passenger Volume (‘000s/year) 




Cost savings  Transatlantic  968  3,169 
Price synergies  Transatlantic  975  5,654 
No output-restricting bilaterals  Transatlantic  2,188  2,188 
Subtotal   4,131  11,011 
Cost savings  Intra-EU  13,527  35,720 
Total   17,658  46,731 
 
As Table 6 shows, we estimate that an Open Aviation Area would increase 
consumer surplus by a large amount – from €5.1 billion to €5.2 billion 
annually.
13 Transatlantic traffic accounts for €2.7 billion to €2.8 billion, or 
just over half of that increase. The lion’s share (€3.1 billion to €3.8 billion 
annually) comes from gains to consumers that do not involve any reduction 
in airline profits. 
We also quantified the impact of an Open Aviation Area on industries that 
supply direct inputs to aviation, such as aircraft and computer equipment. As 
Table 7 shows, we estimated that the increased airline revenue would lead to 
additional economic output in ‘directly-related’ industries ranging from €3.6 
billion to €8.1 billion a year. Note that this figure excludes any of the 
                                                   
13 For Table 5 through Table 7, the lower bound scenario represents an assumed 
elasticity of 1.0, while the upper bound scenario represents an assumed elasticity 
of 2.5. For the price synergies results, the lower bound scenario also assumes an 
18% price decrease, while the upper bound scenario assumes a 28% price 
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potential impact on industries such as tourism and leisure that would be 
among the most significant beneficiaries of aviation liberalization. 
Table 6. Total Estimated Increase in Consumer Surplus (€ million/year) 
  Lower bound scenario  Upper bound scenario 


























Transatlantic 621  41  662 621  158 778 
Pricing 
synergies 




Transatlantic 1,401  69  1,469 577  29  605 
Subtotal    2,592 168  2,760  2,085 645  2,730 
Cost 
savings 
Intra-EU 2,268  83  2,351  2,268  216  2,483 
Total    4,860 251  5,111  4,353 860  5,213 
 
Table 7. Revenue Impact on Directly-Related Industries (€ million/year) 
  Lower bound scenario  Upper bound scenario 
















Pricing synergies  571  571  1,053  2,908  2,908  5,365 
No output-restricting 
bilaterals 
1,401 1,401 2,584  1,484  1,484 2,738 
Total 1,971  1,971  3,637  4,392  4,392  8,103 
Potential Impact of Liberalization in Three Key Policy Areas 
Opponents of international aviation liberalization argue that it will have an 
adverse impact in at least three areas – national security, airline labor and 
aviation safety. Below, we analyze the merits of these claims in the context 
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Would an open aviation area jeopardize US national security? 
Some in the US Department of Defense (DOD) are concerned that 
international aviation liberalization could threaten the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
(CRAF), a critical component of America’s military readiness. Under the 
CRAF program, US commercial air carriers pledge to provide military airlift 
in a defense emergency in exchange for exclusive access to US government 
peacetime business. DOD officials fear that allowing foreign investors to 
acquire US air carriers would jeopardize the military’s dependable access to 
this emergency capability. DOD concerns rest on three assumptions: 
  US air carriers are more dependable than foreign air carriers. 
  If a foreign entity bought a US air carrier, it would operate as a 
foreign carrier. 
  If the US government changed its statutory policy to allow foreign 
ownership of US carriers, it would open itself up to problematic 
transactions. 
The first assumption is generally valid. US carriers are more dependable 
because the US government has legal leverage over them (it could revoke the 
operating certificate of a non-compliant CRAF carrier, seize the aircraft and 
call up the carrier’s reservist-pilots to fly them, etc.). The US government’s 
leverage with foreign carriers is far more limited. 
However, the second assumption is flawed. Legal requirements and business 
strategy almost certainly would compel the European buyer of a US carrier to 
operate it as a US subsidiary, giving the US government the identical 
leverage. The alternative – operating as a European carrier in US domestic 
commerce – would amount to stand-alone cabotage. Cabotage operations on 
that scale would be highly impractical from a commercial standpoint. In 
addition, most US aviation law experts believe that, even if the statutory 
restriction on stand-alone cabotage were eliminated under an Open Aviation 
Area, a foreign carrier operating in US domestic commerce would be subject 
to all of the laws and regulations that apply to other US-based companies.
14 
In sum, because the European buyer of a US carrier would (by choice or 
mandate) exercise its right of establishment, DOD’s dependable access to the 
aircraft would be preserved. 
                                                   
14 Presumably, the same logic would apply to a US carrier operating in European 
domestic commerce. The legal argument would not necessarily extend to the 
transport of domestic traffic as part of international service (i.e. consecutive or 
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Only one scenario would put CRAF aircraft at risk – if a US carrier (whether 
US- or foreign-owned) re-flagged its international operations to Europe, 
presumably to substitute lower-wage EU pilots. But this scenario is unlikely, 
and there are ways to preclude it. 
As evidence that this approach (i.e. US incorporation under a right of 
establishment) protects national security, DOD already allows participation 
by foreign-owned commercial vessels in its Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) program – the maritime equivalent of CRAF – and the 
closely linked Maritime Security Program (MSP). Much of VISA and MSP 
capacity comes from ships that meet US ‘citizenship’ requirements and fly 
the US flag despite being foreign-owned. For example, the Danish-owned, 
Norfolk-based Maersk Line, Limited has top-secret clearance and transports 
half of all DOD’s peacetime maritime cargo. 
The third assumption also is flawed. Even if it were to allow foreign 
ownership of US carriers, the US government still could block or restrict 
individual transactions, using the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense 
Production Act. Under Exon-Florio, an interagency executive-branch 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviews 
foreign mergers solely to determine if they would harm US national security. 
Since 1988, CFIUS has imposed conditions on a number of transactions to 
protect US national security. 
A second DOD concern is that elimination of market access restrictions (Fly 
America requirements and the ban on cabotage) would make the CRAF 
program more costly. Because CRAF is financed indirectly, by giving 
participating carriers exclusive access to the market for US government air 
transport services, it requires no direct funding. Economists have long 
criticized cabotage and Fly America restrictions: by excluding foreign 
carriers from the US government market, they impose direct and indirect 
costs on users. On balance, the US government would save money if it paid 
US carriers directly to participate in CRAF and opened the government 
market to all qualified carriers. As noted above, however, stand-alone 
cabotage is impractical for legal and business reasons. Moreover, elimination 
of Fly America requirements may be politically impractical in the near term, 
because it would require the US Congress to appropriate money for a 
program that is currently ‘free’ in budgetary terms. If Fly America 
restrictions were maintained, it would diminish somewhat the benefits of an 
Open Aviation Area, but European carriers could get around that restriction 
by exercising their right of establishment. 
We conclude that a US-EU Open Aviation Area would not jeopardize the 
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How would an open aviation area affect workers and wages? 
Economic theory tells us that by liberalizing trade and investment in aviation, 
an Open Aviation Area could facilitate the substitution of less expensive 
foreign workers for more expensive domestic workers (‘labor substitution’), 
either directly or indirectly. In fact, a major impediment to US-EU 
liberalization is the concern by labor groups that US pilots and flight 
attendants would be replaced by lower-wage EU flight crew on transatlantic 
flights. US pilots point to two scenarios that are of particular concern. The 
first is a US-EU merger: for example, if Delta were to buy Aer Lingus and 
substitute Irish pilots on transatlantic flights. Under the second scenario, a 
US carrier would re-flag some or all of its transatlantic operations to, say, 
Portugal – what labor groups refer to as flying a ‘flag of convenience’ – so as 
to substitute lower-wage EU flight crew. 
Based on a comparison of US-EU wage differences and an analysis of legal 
and institutional barriers to labor mobility, we draw three conclusions. First, 
the potential for direct labor substitution appears to be very limited. Under 
US immigration law, US carriers cannot avoid using US flight crew for their 
domestic operations, which account for nearly 75% of their total revenue. 
This gives US pilots significant bargaining leverage with which to prevent 
US carriers from engaging in direct labor substitution. US pilots have already 
negotiated protection against the comparable risk associated with 
international alliances and other international operations, and that process 
will only accelerate as the prospects for liberalization improve. Moreover, 
pilots are organizing themselves in parallel with the cross-border airline 
alliances, and these international pilot alliances will thwart airline efforts to 
introduce competition in aviation labor markets. 
In addition, the lack of significant US-EU wage disparity would limit the 
appeal of direct labor substitution for US carriers under an Open Aviation 
Area. Pilots and flight attendants at major airlines in the EU15 member states 
earn only about 15% less than their US counterparts. There is, however, a far 
wider wage gap between US flight crew and their counterparts in the 10 
member states that acceded in 2004. Still, these countries have relatively few 
qualified pilots, and it is expensive to train new ones. Moreover, because 
new member state pilots are scarce and well-informed, their wages will 
converge with those of other pilots in a competitive market. 
Second,  the potential for indirect labor substitution is greater, by 
comparison – particularly over the long run. Under this scenario, relatively 
lower-wage transatlantic carriers such as Virgin Atlantic would take market 
share from high-wage US and EU carriers. But, even here, any adverse 
impact on US labor would be limited because US and EU wage levels, which 
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Third, the pejorative discussion of ‘flags of convenience’ in the context of 
US-EU aviation liberalization is fundamentally misleading. The checkered 
history of open-registry vessels in the maritime industry, which opponents of 
liberalization often cite, has limited relevance for an Open Aviation Area. US 
carriers are unlikely to re-flag for the reasons cited above, and high-wage EU 
carriers are equally unlikely to re-flag for a different reason: they can hire 
workers from lower-wage EU countries even without re-flagging. Finally, 
even if re-flagging were to occur under an Open Aviation Area, it would not 
pose a threat to airline safety or labor conditions, given the high standards in 
place in Europe and the United States. 
Although our analysis suggests that airline workers would not be harmed 
seriously by liberalization, it nevertheless may be desirable to cushion them 
against possible losses under an Open Aviation Area. Policy-makers should 
avoid policies that distort competition (e.g. mechanisms to preclude re-
flagging). Far preferable are policies that directly compensate dislocated 
workers, although policy-makers would have to make a credible commitment 
to honor such policies. 
Would an open aviation area harm airline safety? 
Western Europe and the United States have aviation safety records that are 
(in the words of safety expert Arnold Barnett) “astoundingly close to 
perfect”. In part, these records reflect the strength of government regulatory 
systems that subject aviation to a higher level of safety scrutiny than that 
received by any other industry. US and European safety systems are part of a 
longstanding international regulatory regime that has proven highly effective 
in those parts of the world where it is fully implemented. Most important: 
  The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) develops and 
disseminates detailed international standards covering every aspect of 
aviation. 
  Member countries, through their national or regional civil aviation 
authority (CAA), apply and enforce ICAO standards. Specifically, 
CAAs are responsible for the safe operation of air carriers that bear 
their nation’s flag. 
More recently, the United States and ICAO have begun formal programs to 
assess whether third-country CAAs comply with ICAO standards. Regulators 
in the United States and elsewhere use the results of these assessments to 
limit or deny access to their national airspace by carriers from non-compliant 
countries. 
Although a US-EU Open Aviation Area would not alter the strong regulatory 
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international liberalization, generally, have raised concerns from labor 
groups and questions from aviation regulators at the US Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). 
Labor groups warn that increased international competition could force 
carriers to cut spending related to safety. US airline deregulation prompted 
similar concerns in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, extensive research 
found no evidence that deregulation had any adverse impact on safety, and 
the US accident rate improved during deregulation roughly in line with long-
term trends. A second concern is that practices fostered by globalization 
(e.g., international code-sharing) make it easier for carriers to avoid national 
regulatory oversight. While these practices do make safety regulation more 
complex, an Open Aviation Area would pose no new or added risk. 
Most FAA officials view international liberalization as an issue that should 
be decided on the basis of economic policy, not safety, considerations. 
However, they urge that liberalization be carried out in a way that preserves 
or enhances safety. One issue is how to handle operations by EU carriers 
inside of the United States under an Open Aviation Area – primarily, fill-up 
cabotage or wet leasing that is cross-border in nature. Under international 
rules, those operations would be the regulatory responsibility of European 
authorities; but FAA officials worry that Congress would impose direct FAA 
oversight, subjecting the operator to two regulatory standards. As an 
alternative to having no oversight or direct oversight, the FAA might certify 
such operations using its Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement, a mechanism 
currently used to facilitate reciprocal certification of aircraft and aeronautical 
products. A second FAA issue concerns international flights to and from the 
United States under an Open Aviation Area. The key is to preserve aviation 
authorities’ ability to know precisely who has operational control of, and 
regulatory control over individual flights. 
In sum, although an Open Aviation Area would challenge regulators, it 
would not harm aviation safety, given the generally high level of regulatory 
oversight in Europe and the United States. Globalization of aviation is 
unavoidable. Aviation authorities in the United States and Europe are 
devoting ever more time and resources to dealing with the international 
dimensions of regulatory oversight. US-EU aviation liberalization would 
focus and accelerate this important effort. In the end, that could be one of the 
most valuable contributions of an Open Aviation Area. 
Recent Developments 
Although creation of a US-EU Open Area remains a seemingly distant goal, 
a great deal has happened since our study was published in early 2003. The 
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Justice (ECJ). In a group of cases brought by the European Commission 
against selected member states, the ECJ ruled that the nationality clause was 
a violation of the Treaty of Rome, and told the member states in question to 
remove the clause from their bilateral agreements. In June 2003, after months 
of internal debate, member states granted the European Commission its long-
sought mandate to negotiate international air services agreements on their 
behalf, albeit with certain restrictions. That same month, at the US-EU 
Summit, President Bush and his EU counterparts announced the start of 
comprehensive air services negotiations. 
A year later, following six formal rounds of talks, the European Commission 
and the US government reached a major agreement that stopped short of an 
Open Aviation Area but that nevertheless went beyond traditional Open 
Skies. The agreement eliminated most of the remaining restrictions on US-
EU aviation competition, with the notable exception of the prohibition on 
foreign ownership and control, which also precludes a right of 
establishment.
15 Most important, the agreement replaced the problematic 
nationality clause with an ‘EU carrier clause’. In addition to resolving 
member states’ internal legal problem, that clause was intended to facilitate 
consolidation of the fragmented EU airline industry. The agreement also 
replaced all of the existing bilateral agreements with a single EU-wide Open 
Skies agreement, thus extending the Open Skies model to the 10 EU member 
states that do not have such an arrangement with the United States. In 
addition, the agreement opened up Heathrow Airport to all US carriers, 
although it did not provide any takeoff or landing slots.  
Despite the European Commission’s strong support for the agreement, it was 
rejected in June 2004 by the EU Transport Ministers, whose approval was 
required. Not surprisingly, the UK was the most vocal objector, but several 
member states with Open Skies agreements also opposed the agreement. The 
naysayers maintained that granting the US its major wish – greater access to 
Heathrow – would leave them little leverage to induce for the United States 
to return to the table later and negotiate access to its domestic market. 
However, in a speech delivered a month later, John Byerly, a senior official 
at the State Department who led the US delegation, left little doubt that the 
                                                   
15 Shortly before it reached an agreement with the Commission, the Bush 
Administration proposed legislation to raise the cap on foreign ownership from 
25% to 49% of voting stock, but that proposed change, which met with only 
limited support in Congress, would have had little practical effect without a 
simultaneous change in the prohibition on foreign control.  The agreement also 
left the prohibition on cabotage in place, although that restriction, in contrast to 
the limitation on foreign ownership and control, has little commercial effect.   72 | ROBYN, REITZES & MOSELLE 
real impediment was continued protectionism on the part of British Airways, 
Lufthansa and several other European carriers:  
Publicly, the Association of European Airlines had long called for a 
Commission mandate and for EU-wide negotiations with the United 
States. Privately, however, individual European carriers – many of 
which enjoy protected positions on international routes to third 
countries negotiated by their national governments – expressed 
concern that the Commission might pursue a more independent 
course, one that could work to their commercial disadvantage. Why, 
they implied, should member states give the Commission an early win 
that could only bolster its quest to negotiate market-opening 
agreements with other countries?
16 
The European Commission was also stung by the no vote. (According to 
Byerly, the Commission’s Minister for Energy and Transport, Madame 
Loyola de Palacio, complained publicly about some European carriers’ desire 
to maintain ‘closed market shares’ that make ‘victims’ of consumers.) 
However, the Commission remains intent on getting an agreement. In an 
effort to put pressure on the member states, the Commission recently ordered 
11 European countries to renounce their bilateral agreements with the United 
States, in keeping with the ECJ’s 2002 decision.  
The Bush Administration is sympathetic to the Commission’s agenda: in a 
recent speech, a senior DOT official all but endorsed elimination of 
restrictions on foreign ownership of US airlines.
17 However, the 
Administration does not yet appear ready to expend the political capital 
necessary to secure congressional support for that long-overdue change in the 
law. Thus, as much as the United States would like to conclude the 2004 
agreement, it is reluctant to restart talks without some guarantee of success.  
Despite the seeming stalemate, support for a US-EU Open Aviation Area is 
growing, slowly but surely. The issue has been studied and debated 
extensively in the last several years on both continents, and supporters and 
                                                   
16 “US-EU Aviation Relations – Charting the Course for Success”, remarks to 
the International Aviation Club by John R. Byerly, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Transportation Affairs, US Department of State, July 13, 2004. 
17 Remarks of Jeffrey N. Shane, op. cit. Shane said that “the one industry in 
which capital is not allowed to flow freely across national boundaries, ironically, 
is the very industry that has facilitated the globalization of all the others – 
commercial aviation. It does not seem radical in 2005 to suggest that it is time to 
reconsider the justification for a law that restricts US airlines’ access to the 
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opponents are gradually finding common ground.
18 If a European ‘white 
knight’ were to express interest in a financially troubled US carrier, it is 
likely that Congress – presumably with support from US airline labor – 
would amend the foreign ownership law in short order to make the rescue 
possible. Absent this scenario, which does not seem likely, complete 
liberalization may still be several years away. But it is increasingly seen as 
inevitable. 
                                                   
18 As one illustration, an American Bar Association (ABA) working group 
recently reached unanimous agreement to recommend elimination of statutory 
restrictions on foreign ownership and control of US airlines subject to three 
(admittedly controversial) conditions that are designed to deal with national 
security and labor concerns. Four years earlier, a similar ABA working group 
was unable to reach any consensus because of disagreements over the 
implications of a change in the law for national security and labor. “Working 
Group Position Statement on Relaxing Airline Foreign Ownership Restrictions”, 
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6.  Commercial Aerospace and the 
Transatlantic Economy 
Richard Aboulafia 
A Very Useful Agreement 
Transatlantic trade in commercial jetliners and their associated components 
is a major success story. This industry has achieved a very high level of 
supply-chain internationalization, and jetliners from the US and the EU are 
increasingly sold to airlines on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite the recent 
dispute over EU launch aid for Airbus aircraft and contracts for US military 
and technology development for Boeing, the US and the EU have achieved 
an impressive level of jetliner industrial integration. 
A rough metric of this trade is shown in Figure 1. Much of the trade is in the 
form of defense equipment, where the US enjoys a strong advantage, so 
Europe actually has a better position in commercial aerospace. In the figure 
the EU is represented by only its top five EU aerospace players – France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK – although these constitute over 
80% of the EU’s aerospace output and market. The important point, 
however, is that aerospace trade is clearly a healthy two-way street, with 
both sides importing and exporting $10-15 billion worth of equipment 
annually. 
Figure 1. US-EU Aerospace Trade ($ billion) 
 
* Top five EU aerospace trade partners – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
UK (data derived from the AIA/ITA) 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
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This success is largely the result of a very useful WTO component, the 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (ATCA).
1 At the very least, a maturing 
global attitude towards this industry is reflected in the ATCA. Even where 
the ATCA did not remove trade barriers, it did codify their removal and 
extend the precedent to new signatory nations. 
The ATCA was created as a component of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, negotiated during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. From the standpoint of transatlantic jetliner trade, the treaty’s 
most important effects include the elimination of:
2 
•  tariffs on imported aircraft, engines and parts; 
•  quantitative import restrictions, such as quotas; 
•  government influence over aircraft purchase decisions through 
incentives or ‘unreasonable’ pressure on aircraft purchasers; and 
•  elimination of mandatory subcontracts associated with aircraft sales. 
It also inludes the avoidance of using technical measures, such as standards, 
to restrict civil aircraft trade unfairly. Art. 4.1 of the ATCA summarizes the 
objective: “Purchasers of civil aircraft should be free to select suppliers on 
the basis of commercial and technological factors”. The implication is that 
no other factors, such as local content, technology transfer or government 
mandate, should play a role in airline purchase decisions. Art. 4 also 
precludes mandatory purchases of local equipment (also known as offsets) in 
exchange for jetliner sales. In other words, a signatory nation cannot 
mandate that the selling company purchase its national products in exchange 
for a jetliner sale to that signatory nation’s airlines.
3 
Transatlantic commercial aerospace trade takes three primary forms. The 
first is purchases of aircraft. The second is purchasing equipment for use in 
jetliners. Finally, there are joint ventures and alliances among US and EU 
manufacturers, to co-produce and co-design new equipment. Each of these 
categories offers strong examples of successful transatlantic trade and merits 
                                                           
1 The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Annex 4a of the World Trade 
Organisation Agreement of 1994, WTO, Geneva (retrieved from 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/air-79_e.pdf). 
2 A good summary of the ATCA provisions can be found in a recent jetliner 
study by the US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 
The US Jet Transport Industry: Competition, Regulation, and Global Market 
Factors affecting US Producers, Washington, D.C., March 2005, (retrieved from 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/jet_transport_study.htm). 
3 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, op. cit. 76 | RICHARD ABOULAFIA 
individual discussion. This paper also considers the risks to and benefits of 
US-EU commercial aerospace trade. 
Aircraft Purchasing 
Because of the ATCA, US- and EU-based airlines are free to purchase 
commercial aircraft from Boeing or Airbus (or from Brazil’s Embraer or 
Canada’s Bombardier). Increasingly, they are exercising this option. 
Airbus’s first big break in the US market occurred with the sale of A300s to 
Eastern Airlines in 1978. Since then, the European plane-maker has gone 
from strength to strength. Pan Am was the second customer. In the 1990s, 
America West, United and USAirways all became customers. JetBlue built 
the second most successful low-cost carrier (after Southwest Airlines) in the 
US using an all-Airbus fleet. 
Meanwhile, Boeing managed to keep a very strong presence in Europe. 
While its market share inevitably fell as Airbus matured (in terms of product 
line and sales force), it has continued to sell jets successfully to a free and 
open market. Most notably, France and Germany, which at another time 
might have been termed Airbus ‘home market’ countries, have continued to 
take large numbers of Boeing jetliners. Consistently praising its Boeing 777 
fleet, Air France continues to order additional 777s instead of the competing 
Airbus A340. Most recently, in May 2005 Air France has joined the firms in 
the launch order book for the 777-200 cargo version. 
The low-cost carrier (LCC) market illustrates this trade equality. Just as the 
US LCC market is split between Airbus and Boeing carriers, EU LCCs are 
evenly split too. Of the two dominant LCC players, Ryanair has an all-
Boeing fleet, while EasyJet mostly has Airbus aircraft. Owing to the 
politicized nature of the LCC business (they depend on de-regulation, low-
cost airport access and the general goodwill of politicians) the LCCs make 
an interesting test case for market openness. 
Figure 2 clearly indicates the increase in Airbus’s US market position. In 
1999, a mere 403 planes belonging to US carriers (active fleets of passenger 
planes, excluding cargo) were built by Airbus – just 10.8% of the fleet. By 
the end of 2004, this figure had increased to 676 aircraft – 18.2% of the fleet. 
In addition, backlogged (unfilled) Airbus orders for US carriers were 
approximately equal, implying continued strong growth in Airbus’s fleet 
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Figure 2. US Airline Large Jet Fleets (all planes above 100 seats) 
 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
Meanwhile, EU carrier Boeing and legacy McDonnell Douglas jetliner fleets 
have continued to diminish, both in relative and absolute terms. Figure 3 
shows how the position of US manufacturers in the EU has shrunk from 
1,246 aircraft (or 69.8% of the fleet) in 1999 to 1,157 aircraft (or 58.7% of 
the fleet) in 2004. 
In short, the numbers indicate that there are no serious barriers to selling 
jetliners across the Atlantic. The market standing enjoyed by Airbus and 
Boeing in both US and EU markets is gradually equalizing. Although some 
commentators still discuss the desirability of jetliner transplant factories to 
facilitate civil market access, the reality is that this step is not necessary at 
all. 
Ironically, owing to this trade liberalization, Airbus has extensively 
benefited from the US government aid provided after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. Among the 10 carriers who received the most aid, four 
have taken mostly Airbus aircraft over the last four years. 
The proposed US Airways/America West airline merger, which was 
announced in May 2005 highlights a related phenomenon. Airbus is an 
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support in exchange for an order for Airbus’s new A350 wide-body aircraft 
(and to support two key markets for Airbus’s A320 narrow-body family). 
Because of the trade liberalization engendered by the ATCA, Airbus and 
Boeing directly employ relatively few people outside of their home 
countries. Boeing has a small administrative presence in Europe, while 
Airbus employs approximately 500 persons in the US, primarily in training, 
engineering, and customer service roles. Airbus claims to support 120,000 
US jobs
4 although, most of this employment in the US as well as that 
associated with Boeing’s economic activity in the EU revolve around 
contract work for systems and structures. Nevertheless, these indirect jobs 
are also a transatlantic trade success story. Figures 4 through 7 present both a 
retroactive and forward look at trade in Airbus and Boeing aircraft. 
Figure 3. Large Jet Fleets among EU Airlines (all planes above 100 seats) 
 
 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
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Figure 4. History and Forecast for Commercial Jetliners  
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
Figure 5. Historical Jetliner Orders and Deliveries (all Airbus and Boeing 
 aircraft) 
 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
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Figure 6. Comparative Backlog Values – Airbus Growth since Boeing-MDC 
Merger, 787 Stops the Trend 
 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
 
Figure 7. Outlook for Jetliner Market Share – 787 Holds the Line (assumes 
current A350 launch) 
Source: Teal Group Corporation.  
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Aircraft Contract Sourcing 
Subcontracting is broadly divided into two categories. One covers discrete 
aircraft systems, which are nearly always contracted out. The second 
category is airframe work, subcontracted out at the prime contractor’s 
discretion. 
Discrete systems, the first category, include engines, avionics (airborne 
electronics), landing gear, interiors and other systems (such as the 
environmental control system or the auxiliary power unit). These 
subcomponents comprise 60-65% of the value chain of a commercial 
jetliner. The second category entails discretionary contracts primarily for the 
airframe. Airframe work typically comprises 35-40% of the value chain of a 
commercial jetliner. 
Aircraft Systems 
The bulk of transatlantic jetliner contract work covers individual systems. 
This trend is owing both to the importance of these systems within the 
jetliner value chain, and to the strong market dominance enjoyed by the US 
and EU contractors with these systems. Almost all of the prime contractors 
for these systems are domiciled in the US, the UK and France. Several prime 
and some secondary contractors are domiciled in Germany, Italy, Japan and 
the Netherlands. 
Engines are the single highest-value systems. The world’s jetliners are all 
powered by Rolls-Royce, General Electric or Pratt & Whitney turbofans; 
they are manufactured by these contractors alone, in concert with one 
another or with other major subcontractors. 
Almost all twin-aisle (wide-body) and about half of the single-aisle (narrow-
body) jetliners offer a choice of engines, to be determined by the airline. In 
fact, until 1988 all Airbuses were delivered with US engines – either General 
Electric or Pratt & Whitney. 
As with jetliners, there is strong evidence of robust transatlantic trade in 
engines. An analysis of two wide-body twinjets that have seen fierce engine 
manufacturer competition in the last 10 years – Airbus’s A330 and Boeing’s 
777 – produces interesting numbers, as may be seen in Figure 8. For 
example, more US airlines than EU airlines have chosen EU engines (from 
Rolls-Royce) for these aircraft. Yet, the two US engine companies enjoy a 
higher market share on these two aircraft in the EU than they do in their 
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Figure 8. US-EU Engine Orders for the Airbus 330 and the Boeing 777 
 
Source: Teal Group Corporation. 
The myriad other aircraft systems are much tougher to quantify and seldom 
involve a customer choice within a single airframe. As Table 1 indicates, 
however, a look at systems contracts placed for the most recent Airbus and 
Boeing jetliners – the A380 and 787 – reveals very strong evidence of 
transatlantic trade. As a result of its acquisition of legacy businesses, BAE 
Systems, which owns 20% of Airbus, has substantial systems roles on most 
Boeing aircraft, including the 747. 
Most systems contractors endeavor to obtain a diverse portfolio for their 
engines, landing gear, etc. Over-reliance on the prime contractors of either of 
the two jetliners is considered a bad strategy. In any event, contractors seek 
to leverage their systems development work over as broad a range of 
platforms as possible. 
Therefore, when Airbus claims economic benefits for the US related to the 
contract work it places in companies located there or when Boeing makes 
similar claims for the EU, they are overlooking the fact that these benefits 
usually accrue to either side. For example, whether an airline buys a Boeing 
737 or an Airbus A320 with a CFM56 engine, General Electric receives 
exactly the same economic benefits. In short, the estimated indirect jobs are 
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Table 1. Systems Contracts Placed for Airbus and Boeing Jetliners 
US systems on the Airbus A380 
Company Systems 
Goodrich   Multifunction probes, evacuation slide 
systems, ice detector, elevator actuators, 
lower level cargo mechanical system, cabin 
attendant/cockpit occupant seats 
Hamilton Sundstrand   Air generation system, ram air turbine 
(United Technologies) 
Honeywell  Electrical distribution-secondary, aircraft 
environment surveillance system, flight 
management system 
Parker  Fuel measurement and management system 
Rockwell Collins  Communications and navigation equipment, 
avionics ether switch 
TRW  Cargo loading system, elevator actuators, 
control systems 
EU systems on the Boeing 787 
Company Systems 
Dassault Systemes  Product development software 
Labinal (SNECMA)   Electrical wiring system 
Messier-Bugatti (SNECMA)   Electrical brake system 
Messier-Dowty (SNECMA)   Main and nose landing gear 
Smiths Aerospace  Common core avionics system, actuation 
systems, power drive units 
Techspace Aero    Has a 3% share in GenX engine (General 
Electric’s 787 engine) 
Thales   Integrated standby flight display 
Volvo Flygmotor   Has a 6% share in GenX engine 
Source: Author’s data. 
Airframe Contracts 
Transatlantic contracting for airframe work is less active than for component 
(systems) contracting, for two main reasons. First, Airbus retains a relatively 
high percentage of airframe work in-house. Second, Asian aerostructure 
contractors enjoy higher levels of government support than US or EU 
contractors and are better able to participate as risk-sharing (cash-providing) 
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There are notable exceptions to these limitations, however. The biggest EU 
transatlantic aero structures contractor is Finmeccanica’s Alenia unit. The 
Italian company is taking an estimated 13% share in Boeing’s 787 airframe. 
It also has major roles in the 717 and 767 programs. 
France’s Latecoere has achieved notable success as a specialty aero 
structures provider for both Boeing and Airbus. It recently won the contract 
to build passenger doors for Boeing’s 787. Meanwhile, owing to the 
evolution of European industrial restructuring, Airbus parent EADS provides 
ailerons for Boeing’s 777. For similar reasons, BAE Systems Aerostructures 
provides wing-fixed leading edges for the 777. 
This success in transatlantic equipment trade is largely related to the ATCA. 
The agreement makes the mandatory transfer of commercial work illegal. 
Governments are barred from “attaching inducements of any kind to the sale 
or purchase of civil aircraft”.
5 This stipulation frees jetliner contractors to 
make aircraft component decisions based on technology, quality and value. 
Joint Programs 
Despite the open nature of transatlantic aerospace trade, a joint transatlantic 
jetliner industry does not now exist. Sadly, there is an increasing division 
between Boeing and Airbus and between their national political supporters 
in the US and the EU. Yet historically there have been notable transatlantic 
joint ventures and the engine industry provides a good model for the future. 
Regarding aircraft, there is an interesting history behind the 
internationalization of passenger aircraft programs. Most notably, Fokker of 
the Netherlands granted a license to Fairchild for production of its F27 44-
seat turboprop transport. Fairchild built over 200 F27s at its Maryland 
factory. Fairchild also signed an agreement with Saab covering production of 
its 33-seat Saab 340, but later reduced its role to major subcontractor. 
More recently, before McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing and exited 
the jetliner business, it considered a joint jetliner venture with Airbus. 
Specifically, the two companies discussed mating the fuselage of McDonnell 
Douglas’s MD-11 with the larger wing of Airbus’s A330. The resulting 
product, the AM 300, would have seated up to 400 persons and competed 
with Boeing’s four engine 747 with the economics of a three-engine jetliner. 
Further, in the mid 1990s, Boeing initiated discussions with Airbus member 
companies (but not Airbus itself) covering joint development of a new large 
transport (with 500 seats or above) and a supersonic jet transport (with about 
250 seats). These discussions produced nothing substantive. 
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Aside from the political and product divergence between Airbus and Boeing, 
the idea of jetliner joint ventures has not happened for another reason: it is 
not necessary for market access. Thanks to the ATCA, both sides can sell 
freely in the other company’s territory, removing a key driver behind the 
creation of joint programs. Yet there are other drivers, including resource 
pooling, risk spreading and technology sharing. 
Today, the engine industry offers two examples of transatlantic, co-prime 
business relationships. The two primary engines for single-aisle jetliners are 
built by such arrangements, including: 
  CFM International. This is a joint venture between General Electric 
and France’s SNECMA. The CFM56 engine powers all Boeing 737s and 
just over half of the Airbus A318/319/320/321 fleet. It uses core 
technology from General Electric’s F101 engine, developed for the US 
Air Force B-1 bomber and SNECMA technology developed for France’s 
Mirage fighters. 
  International Aero Engines (IAE). This is a multinational program 
comprising Rolls-Royce (32.5%), Pratt & Whitney (32.5%), Japan Aero 
Engine Corporation (23%) and Germany’s Motoren und Turbinen Union 
(12%). The V2500 engine powers just under half of the Airbus 
A319/320/321 fleet, as well as McDonnell Douglas’s legacy MD-90 
fleet. 
These two engines represent a strong future trend, in terms of teaming 
arrangements and cross-border industrial alliances. To compete in new 
markets with new technology development, companies are increasingly 
looking to spread risk and share costs. The CFM56 program began because 
General Electric wanted to challenge the Pratt & Whitney JT8D, which 
enjoyed a dominant market position. The V2500 resulted because Pratt & 
Whitney needed a JT8D replacement and lacked the resources to go head-to-
head with General Electric and SNECMA. 
Again, this approach has not been adapted by airliner primes, although 
Boeing’s 787 makes extensive use of Japanese industry participation (35% 
of the airframe). Further, if jetliner technology moves on to a new level of 
technological sophistication with supersonic aircraft, for example, the logical 
approach would be through a multinational consortium along CFM/IAE 
lines. 
Benefits 
The benefits of transatlantic jetliner trade are impossible to quantify. Yet 
they are very real and broadly fall into five categories: 86 | RICHARD ABOULAFIA 
1.  Price reduction related to competitive jetliner offers. Since the US 
and EU markets can only sustain one manufacturer, jetliner autarky 
would allow monopoly pricing. This would mean higher list prices, and 
no discounts (today, a 30% discount from the list price is more or less 
standard). Ultimately, it would cost the consumer more to fly as these 
higher capital costs would be passed from the manufacturer to the airline 
to the flying public. 
2.  Qualitative improvements owing to competition. Jetliner autarky 
would remove the impetus for technology development, new product 
launches and current product improvement. Boeing would have taken 
considerably longer to launch its 767 wide-body twinjet if it were not for 
Airbus’s innovative A300, the world’s first wide-body twinjet. 
3.  Technology sharing through joint venture (as described above). 
4.  A ‘best technology’ approach to component selection. The extension 
of free trade down to the component and subcomponent level ensures 
low prices, technical innovation and high quality at all levels of the 
component chain. 
5.  Multiple market exposure. Worldwide air transport markets do not rise 
and fall in tandem. For prime and subcontract manufacturers, it is much 
better to be exposed to as many markets as possible, allowing access to 
at least one healthy market when one or more of the others are in 
recession. This point is as equally true for new equipment sales as it is 
for aftermarket exposure (sales of spare parts, service work, etc.). 
Threats 
The biggest threat to this international market is political pressure aimed at 
promoting selection of a particular manufacturer’s aircraft. There have been 
no notable accusations by the EU of US political pressure seeking to induce 
US carriers to purchase Boeing jets. The US has hinted at EU pressure on 
European carriers to purchase Airbus planes, but has filed no particular 
complaints as far as core EU countries are concerned. 
New problems could arise as the EU grows. The new EU states are more 
susceptible to political pressure, because of the importance of EU markets 
for their goods and their desire to be accepted as full EU members. 
The EU has been accused by the US of taking advantage of this dynamic, 
most notably in the Czech Republic. According to the US Department of 
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Republic for eliminating a tariff differential that favored Airbus, thereby 
pressuring the Czech Republic to order Airbus aircraft.
6 
A related threat concerns the attachment of inducements to aircraft sales to 
the new EU states. Most of the older EU members have economies and 
societies that are basically too sophisticated to care about local work in 
exchange for jetliner purchases. For the most part, airlines are in private 
hands or will be soon. Deregulation in the EU has also given airlines 
independence from their home markets and they now serve many regions. 
Therefore, the individual governments have no real ability to demand these 
commercial offsets. 
Again, however, EU enlargement could change this healthy situation. In 
1992, Romania’s airline Tarom ordered five 737s, followed by four more in 
1999. In return, Boeing gave the country production tools and contracts for 
aircraft components. Greg Dole, Boeing’s Director of International Trade 
Policy, remarked: “This [ATCA] was a very new agreement. I don’t think 
the salespeople really were being asked or should have known this was 
illegal. Our contracts staff probably should have engaged [in] this more 
fully.”
7 
Another danger concerns the political pressure routinely placed on foreign 
carriers (non-US or EU), even in ATCA signatory nations, to purchase 
Airbus or Boeing equipment. The US has been accused of using its strategic 
might to gain advantage over purchase decisions, primarily in such allied 
countries as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Japan. 
The Taiwanese and Japanese cases provide two recent examples. In Taiwan, 
16 senators and at least four representatives sent a letter asking that China 
Airlines re-consider an Airbus order and go with Boeing instead (China 
Airlines did indeed order some Boeing aircraft as a result).
8 
Airbus and the European Union have also accused the United States of using 
similar tactics in Japan, which has remained a loyal Boeing client for both 
military and commercial aerospace equipment. After the most recent 
purchase by All Nippon of Boeing 737s, a European Commission 
spokesperson suggested that their “reasons weren’t entirely commercial”.
9 
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7 Quoted in the Seattle Times, June 1, 2004. 
8 See “US Lawmakers Push Taiwan to Cancel Airbus Deal, Hire Boeing”, Wall 
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Most recently, in May 2005 Airbus accused the US of exercising political 
pressure to secure an Air India order for Boeing 777s and 787s over 
competing Airbus planes. One claim was that India purchased the planes to 
offset US government criticism of a growing US-India trade gap.
10 
This alleged political pressure to buy a particular plane is matched by an 
unfortunate trend towards offering commercial incentives to purchase 
aircraft, which are clearly illegal under the ATCA. In 2004, Airbus implied 
that a prospective Indian Airlines order for its jets would result in $630 
million worth of subcontract and other work given to Indian industry – a 
clear violation of the ATCA agreement.
11 
In effect, there is the risk of ‘blowback’ from all of these political 
maneuverings: if they become an accepted practice in jetliner sales outside 
the US and EU, they could become a standard part of doing business 
everywhere, even in the US and EU home markets. 
At the very least, politicians in the US and EU might use resentment over 
lost sales owing to political interference in export markets to generate 
protectionist sentiment at home. Despite the current trade dispute over 
jetliner subsidies, at the time of writing neither side is currently using the 
WTO to stop government intervention in sales campaigns.
12  
Another issue overlooked in current trade disputes has to do with technology 
development funds for subcontract suppliers. While this is less immediately 
threatening than support for jetliner prime contractors, it effectively 
undermines the principal of free trade in subcontracts.  
Both the US and EU have given extensive support to their national 
subcontractors, especially for engine manufacturers. Since 1988, the UK 
government has provided £949 million for the development of Rolls Royce’s 
civil jet product line, of which only £314 million has been repaid.
13 
The effort to promote national engine champions is particularly pernicious, 
because it results in aircraft that are more heavily European or Amercian (by 
value). For example, in the late 1990s, both Airbus and Boeing launched 
new, long-range 300/400-seat derivative aircraft families with a single 
                                                           
10 See “Lex: Protectionism”, Financial Times, May 10, 2005 (retrieved from 
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11 See “Airbus to Place Orders in India if it Wins Bid, Standard Says”, 
Bloomberg News, March 2, 2004. 
12 US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, op. cit.,  
p. 142. 
13 US Trade Representative, 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
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engine choice. Boeing’s 777-200LR/300ER family offered only General 
Electric engines, while the competing Airbus A340-500/600 family offered 
only Rolls-Royce engines. These actions made the aircraft more ‘vertical’ in 
their national composition, one being heavily American and the other 
heavily European. Thankfully, since then, both sides have retreated from this 
trend, launching new aircraft with full, international engine alternatives. 
For the most part, the support given by governments to systems contractors 
ultimately benefits both sides; improved subsystems technology and lower 
costs helps both Airbus and Boeing aircraft. Yet with the A380, there is an 
unfortunate precedent being set. France’s 2005 government budget provides 
330 million in A380 development money, not just for Airbus, but also for 
French equipment manufacturers developing subsystems for the A380.
14 In 
essence, the French government is skewing the balance of trade in jetliner 
subsystems away from US competitors and towards French ones. 
The absence of meaningful foreign direct investment (FDI) in the aerospace 
sector compounds these risks to trade. EADS, the Airbus parent with an 80% 
share, is largely owned by major European stakeholders, including Daimler 
Chrysler, Lagardere, and the Governments of France and Spain. These large 
institutions own about 70% of EADS and the remainder largely comprises 
French and German financial institutions, while a few percent are employee-
owned. Boeing, by contrast, is more widely floated, with no shareholder 
owning more than about 10% of the company, and most owning less than 
1%, but most of these are based in the US.  
In short, there is very little manufacturer-ownership money crossing borders 
in the jetliner industry. FDI increases and balances support for continued 
open borders and again, its absence in this sector should be a source of 
concern. 
Last, there is the threat of creeping protectionism. While this industry has 
seen no suggestions of ‘voluntary’ quotas or other market protection 
measures, politicians are increasingly aware of jetliner imports and their 
relevance to trade. This is largely related to the politically heated battle over 
subsidies. Most notably, in May 2003, US Representative John Mica said he 
wanted airlines to provide plastic cards in seat pouches that inform 
passengers where their aircraft was made.
15 This is roughly analogous to the 
textile industry period when foreign labeling came into vogue. 
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The current US WTO trade complaint, firmly launched in May 2005, and the 
likely resulting EU counter-complaint will exacerbate all of these threats. 
Politicians in both the US and EU will probably use the dispute to further 
protectionist aims.  
Equally dangerous is the prospect of a trade war resulting from any forceful 
WTO ruling. WTO enforcement provisions can be blunt instruments. A 
ruling might give one side the right to retaliate with barriers or other trade-
distorting measures; any retaliation could set off a series of actions that 
unravel the tremendous progress made towards globalizing the commercial 
aerospace industry. 
Lessons 
The ATCA provides a most compelling lesson for transatlantic trade from 
the commercial aerospace industry. While not a flawless treaty (there is 
disagreement about the wording in several clauses) it does apply a useful 
principle: private enterprise should be free to make business decisions 
without political interference. This principle has nearly universal 
applicability to many traded goods and services. 
The application and enforcement of the ATCA is of course an ongoing issue, 
providing new lessons for transatlantic trade as the jetliner market evolves. It 
also provides an ongoing test for politicians: Will they be able to resist the 
short-term rewards of intervening in commercial jetliner trade or will they 
keep faith in a long-term institution that has served both sides admirably? | 91 
7.  The Transatlantic Outlook for the 
Biopharmaceutical Sector 
 Françoise  Simon 
he impact of the health care sector on the transatlantic economy is 
substantial and expected to grow in the coming decades due to several 
trends: aging populations, consumer demand for innovative medical 
care, and post-genomic advances toward personalized medicine leading to a 
portfolio shift toward effective but expensive biologics and targeted small 
molecules. 
Within this sector, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals have effectively 
merged due to several factors: top biotechnology firms such as Amgen have 
matured and emerged as mid-cap biopharmaceuticals. Through acquisitions 
and internal research, pharma companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Lilly 
and Roche have become major biotechnology players. Innovation also 
depends on global alliance and equity networks linking small biotech firms 
and Big Biotech or Big Pharma. 
Through the value chain from R&D to manufacturing and marketing, the 
industry has globalized. Multinationals have manufacturing sites on both 
sides of the Atlantic to rationalize their supply chains and to facilitate price 
negotiations with national agencies. For US and European biotechs, sales and 
marketing are often carried out through local partners, due to their limited 
resources outside of their home markets. 
For these reasons, the appropriate measure of economic integration in this 
sector is investment rather than trade. 
This chapter will first review health care expenditures, sector performance 
and economic impact in the US and Europe. It will then analyze integration 
drivers and barriers at the policy level, from Medicare reform and the focus 
on drug safety in the US to national reimbursement policies and parallel trade 
in Europe. Analysis will then shift to the industry and in particular to 
innovation networks and consolidation across the Atlantic. 
International Health Care Spending 
US health care spending per capita continues to exceed that of other OECD 
countries by huge margins and with disappointing outcomes. Expenditures 
reached $1.7 trillion in 2003 (15.3% of gross domestic product), i.e. $5,670 
per person. Prescription drugs accounted for $179 million, or 11% of health 
spending. Their 2003 growth of 10.7% marked a fourth consecutive year of 
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decline – due to increased generic penetration and co-payments shifting costs 
to consumers.
1  
Despite this slowing growth, US expenditures tower over those of major 
European countries. An OECD comparative study listed British spending per 
capita at less than 41% that of the US. Even Germany reached only 57% of 
the American spending level, on a purchasing power parity basis (Table 1). 
The gap is projected to increase; the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) forecasts that the US will spend $3.4 trillion on health by 
2013, or 18.4% of GDP. 
 









as % of GDP 
US  $4,887 3.1  13.9 
Germany   $2,808 2.4  10.7 
France   $2,561 2.4  9.5 
Italy   $2,212 1.5  8.4 
UK   $1,992 4.1  7.6 
Spain   $1,600 3.2  7.5 
Japan  $2,131   3.9   8  
 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2002 (data for 
2001); growth rates calculated from national currencies (not purchasing 
power parities). 
 
This high US spending level does not translate into better outcomes on most 
measures of human development. For instance, Europe performs better than 
the US on life expectancy and neonatal mortality. In 2000, Europe averaged 
75.6 years for men and 81.7 for women, versus, respectively, 74.1 years and 
79.5 years in the US.
2  
This may be attributed partly to factors such as the lack of US universal 
insurance, managed care restrictions on preventive health care and 
inefficiencies in reimbursement systems. 
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Sector Performance 
Higher expenditures and drug prices turned the US into a global growth 
engine over past decades, but the sector is now at an inflection point 
throughout major markets. 
Biopharmaceutical sales reached $550 billion worldwide in 2004 (including 
$518 billion in major markets audited by IMS Health), but growth slowed 
markedly, at 7% versus 10% compound annual rate of the preceding five 
years. There was also a greater convergence between the US and major 
European markets, with 8% growth in the US and 6% in the European 
Union.
3 Nevertheless, the US still accounts for 46% of the world market 
(versus less than 30% for EU25), and thus remains a major investment 
magnet for European companies (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Pharmaceutical Sales by Region 
 
  2004 Global sales  % Growth (constant $) 
World Audited Market  $ Billion  % Global 
sales  2004  CAGR 
99-03 
North America  248 47.8 7.8 13.7 
European Union  144 27.8 5.7 8.8 
Rest of Europe  9 1.8 12.4 10.9 
Japan  58 11.1 1.5 3.3 
Asia/Africa/Australia  40 7.7 13.0 10.3 
Latin America  19 3.8 12.4 1.5 
Total IMS Audited  $518 100.0% 7.1% 10.0% 
 
Note: Excludes unaudited markets and Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Dominican Republic, Russia and Ukraine 
Source: IMS Health MIDAS, MAT December 2004. 
 
While global growth will continue to be driven by aging populations (not 
only in the OECD but also in emerging markets such as China), a flow of 
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innovative therapies and consumer demand for high-tech care, there are some 
moderating factors: a universal focus on cost containment, more cautious 
regulators and the increased role of US federal and state agencies in drug 
purchasing. For those reasons, the global market is projected to grow at only 
6-9% through 2008.  
Growth in the North American market is likely to remain in the single digits 
through 2008. In addition to cost containment, negative pressure on growth 
will come from major patent expirations. From 2006 to 2008, products that 
generated revenues of about $70 billion in 2004 will lose patents. These 
include Merck’s Zocor (simvastatin), with over $5 billion in sales, and 
Pfizer’s Norvasc (amlodipine), which recorded $4.5 billion in sales. In 
contrast to Big Pharma’s slowdown, two bright growth areas are the 
biotechnology and generics subsectors – the former driven by innovation and 
the latter by cost containment. 
In 2004, biotech drugs generated over $44 billion in worldwide sales, with 
overall growth of 20%. Biologics accounted for 27% of research pipelines. 
Among mid-size biotechs, Gilead Sciences was profitable in 2004, reaching 
over $1 billion in revenues and growing by nearly 43%, thanks to its 
HIV/hepatitis product line. Even a mature biotech such as Amgen grew by 
26% and reached nearly $11 billion in global sales.  
Both US and European pharma companies show an increasing reliance on 
biotech products. Roche led the industry, as biologics generated over 45% of 
its 2004 sales and nearly 70% of its net present value. Next came Johnson & 
Johnson and Lilly, with approximately 25% of their sales from biologics.
4  
The generic side grew equally fast. Canada’s Apotex reached over $1 billion 
in global sales, with growth of 42% in 2004, and in the US, Par and Ivax 
grew by more than 30%.
5 In Europe, Novartis expanded its Sandoz division 
into the largest generic company with the $7 billion acquisition of 
Germany’s Hexal and its US subsidiary, Eon Labs. This brought Sandoz’s 
2004 combined proforma sales to $5 billion, with a portfolio of more than 
600 active ingredients.
6 Novartis also took the lead in biosimilar medicines 
with the 2004 approval in Australia of its generic human growth hormone, 
Omnitrope. 
While Europe shares negative trends with the US, such as cost containment, 
major national markets differ sharply in their strategies and growth rates (see 
Table 3). 
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5 Global Strategic Management Review, IMS Health, May 10, 2005, p. 16. 
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New reference prices for patented 
drugs 




New reference prices for large classes 
(statins) 




7% price cut (Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation scheme) 
Focus on cost effectiveness by National 
Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
Italy 
18.9 4.7 
6.8% price cut by Italian National 
Medicines Agency 
60% clawback of manufacturer 
overspending 
Spain  13.9 8.5  Price cuts of 4%, reduction in 
wholesaler & pharmacist margins 
US 
236.0 7.7 
Cost containment (Medicare reform, 
generic growth) 
Focus on safety/consumer promotion 
Source:  Intelligence.360/Global Pharmaceutical Perspectives, IMS Health, 
2004. 
The German market remains the largest at $29 billion in 2004 sales but with 
an anemic growth of 1.6%, due to an expansion of reference pricing to 
patented drugs. For instance, in the statin class of cholesterol reducers, 
Germany plans to reduce reimbursement for Pfizer’s Lipitor (atorvastatin) to 
the level of generic simvastatin. 
France closely follows Germany at $28.5 billion in sales, but grew by over 
7% in 2004. This gap may moderate with the expansion of reference prices to 
large classes such as statins, a delisting of drugs with low medical benefit 
and an effort to curb over-prescribing.  
The United Kingdom grew by over 8% to $20 billion in sales, but this was 
partly due to the strong growth of generics (25%), boosted by the patent 
expiry of major drugs such as pravastatin. A price reduction policy continues 96 | FRANÇOISE SIMON 
with 7% cuts under the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) in 
2005.
7 The UK also leads Europe in its focus on pharmacoeconomic data to 
demonstrate the cost effectiveness of new drugs, as recommended by the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence. 
Economic Impact of the Biopharmaceutical Sector 
According to a study by the Milken Institute, biopharmaceuticals employed 
406,700 people in 2003 in the US (including over 198,000 in biotechnology). 
It was among the most productive sectors with real output per worker of 
$157,300. The industry was directly responsible for nearly $64 billion in real 
output and a total of almost $173 billion when the economic impact across 
other sectors was incorporated. The sector nearly doubled in size over the 
past two decades and accounted for over 8% of all industrial R&D, despite 
representing only 0.3% of total non-farm employment. 
The Milken Institute econometric model projects that employment in the 
biopharma sector will grow to nearly 540,000 people in the next decade. If 
multiplier dynamics are fully applied, the sector will have a total impact of 
3.6 million jobs by 2014. Multipliers include the indirect impact (jobs, wages 
or output generated by all supplier industries) and the induced impact (higher 
employment and wages in supplier industries leading to more purchases of 
goods and services, which in turn generate more income to spend in the local 
economy). 
With these multipliers factored in, the US biopharmaceutical sector 
accounted for 2.7 million jobs, or over 2% of non-farm employment in 2003. 
For every job in the sector, an additional 5.7 jobs were created elsewhere. By 
contrast, the retail and textile sectors generated, respectively, only 0.9 and 
2.9 jobs. 
On a regional level, the industry is highly clustered on the two coasts, with 
California directly accounting for nearly 70,000 jobs and key northeast states 
(Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania) directly 
generating nearly 140,000 jobs.
8 
A European Commission report on competitiveness
9 showed labor input 
(either measured by numbers employed or total hours worked) growing faster 
in the US than in the EU15. For both the US and the European Union, 
                                                 
7 Intelligence.360, IMS, pp. 16-19. 
8 R. De Vol et al., Biopharmaceutical Industry Contributions to State and US 
Economies,  Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA, October 2004 
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growth in hours worked has been higher in the health sector than in the 
overall economy, but the latter Europe shows significant variance: Germany 
and the Netherlands have larger increases in labor input than France or the 
UK. Related factors are varying shortages of health professionals (nurses in 
particular) and labor skill levels. 
Capital input, specifically equipment capital, also shows higher growth rates 
in the US than in most EU countries. This gap can be partly attributed to a 
greater US focus on information technology, and also to a reduction in EU 
hospital investment, as technology has reduced hospitalizations and length of 
stay, and led to a decrease in hospital beds across Europe. 
The same discrepancy is found in the biopharmaceutical sector. Another 
study conducted in 2000 for the European Commission found Europe less 
competitive than the US in this respect, largely as a consequence of the 
industry’s performance in Germany and Italy, by contrast with relatively 
better results in the UK, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark.
10 Germany 
continued to under perform vis-à-vis other markets, registering the lowest 
European growth in 2004, due to aggressive cost-containment policies 
ranging from expanded reference pricing to manufacturer discounts. 
Integration Drivers and Barriers 
Since the biopharmaceutical sector has globalized through the entire value 
chain, from research to marketing, transatlantic integration can be tracked 
through investment rather than trade.  
The key cross-regional investment driver is clearly the need to recover R&D 
costs on a worldwide basis. Estimates of drug costs from molecule to market, 
taking into account high attrition rates, vary from $802 million (Tufts Center 
for Study of Drug Development) to over $1 billion (Lehman Brothers).
11  
A major draw for European companies is also the sheer size of the US 
market (46% of world sales by value) and its relatively ‘free market’ pricing 
system – although restrictions are being rapidly applied by private and public 
payers. 
First and foremost, the major appeal of the US market for European firms is 
its dominance in biotechnology innovation. This has caused a much-
                                                 
10 A. Gambardella, L. Orsenigo and F. Pammoli, “Global Competitiveness in 
Pharmaceuticals. A European Perspective”, Report for the Directorate General 
Enterprise of the European Commission, 2000. 
11 Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts University, 
presentation by Kenneth Kaitin (http://csdd.tufts.edu) and Lehman Brothers, op. 
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lamented ‘brain drain’ for several decades, and is now reinforced by the 
relocation of major research operations from Europe to the US. For instance, 
Novartis moved much of its research to Cambridge, Massachusetts in order 
to be at the core of the Boston area biotech cluster. 
In coming years, however, the US market will be constrained on several 
levels, ranging from sharper regulator scrutiny to the increased role of public 
agencies in drug purchasing, as well as the high growth of generics, favored 
by legislators as well as public and private payers. 
Despite the slower growth of the European market, it remains indispensable 
for US companies to be implanted there because of several factors: rising 
consumer demand due to aging populations and expectations of high-tech 
medicines, maturing of bioscience clusters in the UK, Germany and 
Scandinavia, and centralization of the drug approval process. 
In addition, manufacturing in Europe has several benefits, including the 
rationalization of supply chains. For instance, Wyeth built in Ireland a major 
biomanufacturing plant to expand its capacity in this area. Local production 
also facilitates job creation. On the other hand, Europe still suffers from 
substantial barriers to integration, from national reimbursement policies that 
often delay drug launches to parallel trade within the Union and extensive 
cost containment policies (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Integration Barriers and Drivers 
 Drivers  Barriers 
United 
States 
Need to recover R&D costs in 
global markets  
Investment attractiveness of US 
market 
Bioscience innovation clusters 
EU biopharma need for US 
partners 
 
Focus on safety/regulator scrutiny 
Increased influence of federal and 
state agencies on price 
High growth of generics in US/ 
patent disputes lost by originator 
firms 
Legal restrictions on stem cell 
research/other bioethics issues 
Europe 
Consumer demand for new 
medications, population aging 
Centralization of drug approval 
process 
Emerging bioscience clusters 
Benefits of EU manufacturing 
sites (supply chain rationali-
zation, price setting 
National reimbursement policies 
Parallel trade within EU 
Cost containment (expanded 
reference pricing, pro-generic 
policies) 
Pharmacoeconomic requirements 
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US Regulation: From Medicare to Bioethics  
The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act (MMA) was 
initially announced at a $400 billion price tag from 2006 to 2016, but this 
cost has since been sharply revised upward and many of its provisions 
remain controversial. The provision of outpatient drug benefits for the 40 
million Medicare beneficiaries will increase the federal government’s share 
of the national drug bill to more than 49% by 2014. This will increase price 
pressure from a number of factors: greater transparency through public 
dissemination of prices by the CMS, preferred drug lists favoring generics 
and tiered formularies.
12 
Although drug trans-shipment from Canada to the US has been prominent in 
press headlines, it has not had a major impact on the market thus far. 
Importation by states and individuals remains low, and will be further 
constrained by Canada’s limited capacity and planned Canadian policies to 
block exports to the US by online pharmacies. 
The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Task Force on 
Drug Importation issued a final report in December 2004 that opposed any 
broad opening of US borders for prescription drugs, and ruled out individual 
importing due to an expected $3 billion cost to regulate product inflow. The 
report advised Congress to legalize importation only for certain high-volume, 
high-cost drugs, since any system to track products and to sample imports by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would likely require hundreds of 
millions of dollars to set up and maintain.
13  
Far more worrying for US and European companies is the intensified focus 
on drug safety, following the 2004 recall by Merck of its arthritis drug Vioxx 
(rofecoxib) and added warnings for other drugs in the COX-2 inhibitor class, 
such as Pfizer’s Celebrex (celecoxib), due to cardiovascular side effects 
revealed by large clinical trials. This had direct consequences for European 
manufacturers: Novartis temporarily withdrew its application to market its 
anti-arthritic Prexige in the European Union and postponed its application in 
the US. 
Following several high-profile recalls, such as that of Bayer’s statin Baycol, 
this event represents a turning point in the way regulators, health 
professionals and patients view safety issues in major markets. 
                                                 
12 CMS Report, 2005 (http://www.healthaffairs.org), cited by Jill Wechsler, 
“Creeping Single-Payerism?”, Pharmaceutical Executive, March 2005, pp. 43-
44. 
13 Jill Wechsler, “No Surprises”, Pharmaceutical Executive, February 2005, p. 
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The US Congress and consumer groups have called for stricter approval 
standards, greater independence for the FDA from the pharmaceutical 
industry and tighter controls on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTC); the 
latter is seen as responsible for artificially inflating demand for the COX-2 
class, which might have been restricted to a more targeted patient population, 
instead of the more than 20 million people who have used these therapies. 
The Medicare bill authorized the HHS Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) to support more studies on the comparative effectiveness of 
medical interventions, including prescription drugs for the top 10 conditions 
affecting the elderly, from heart disease to arthritis, depression, cancer and 
asthma. The 2005 budget includes $15 million for this initiative. 
Probable policy changes in the post-Vioxx era include: 
  A ‘conditional approval’ system requiring regular assessment of safety 
and efficacy data to allow continued marketing of a drug. 
  Expanded post-approval studies to be required by the FDA. 
  Intensified pharmacological vigilance; adverse event reporting would 
move from voluntary to mandatory; the Medicare drug benefit could 
provide essential prescribing and utilization data. 
  Curb on DTC advertising, especially for products that raise safety 
concerns; the FDA’s Division of Drug Marketing Advertising and 
Communications (DDMAC) issued 12 warning letters in 2004 (versus 
4 to 5 in previous years) to marketers about exaggerated benefits, 
minimized risks and unsupported claims in drug advertising. DDMAC 
plans a year-long consumer survey to assess understanding of risks 
and benefits; previous studies showed that consumers seldom read 
clinical summaries in ads and usually do not understand the ones they 
read.
14 
If these steps are partly or wholly implemented, they will have direct 
financial consequences for both US and European manufacturers: Late-stage 
clinical studies already account for most of the $800 million to $1 billion 
R&D costs; post-approval studies would greatly increase that cost. In 
addition, added regulator scrutiny will lead to approval delays. The demand 
for greater global transparency of clinical trials will also strengthen the case 
for a single global regulatory dossier. 
                                                 
14 Jill Wechsler, “Side Effects”, Pharmaceutical Executive, February 2005, pp. 
40-41, and “FDA on DTC: Get Serious”, Pharmaceutical Executive, March 
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In addition to these marketing constraints, the US market is losing 
attractiveness for local R&D by European companies, due to its restrictions 
on stem cell research and other bioethical concerns. In 2001, federally-
funded embryonic stem cell research was limited to cell lines already in 
existence. Although 78 were then identified, only 19 are actually available 
for study. To counter a ‘brain-drain’ threat and related loss of 
competitiveness, California approved in late 2004 state funding of $3 billion 
for stem cell research, and other states such as New Jersey followed suit. 
Universities including Harvard, Stanford and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology have also allocated private funds in this area.
15 Given the 
magnitude of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) budget (over $28 
billion), these steps may not be sufficient to prevent some exodus of stem 
cell research to less restrictive countries such as Singapore. 
Last but not least, a policy area that will severely affect both US and 
European manufacturers relates to biosimilar products, or generic biologics. 
American and European authorities have converged in their postponement of 
market authorization. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) guidelines on 
biosimilars are still a work in progress, and the FDA’s draft scientific 
guidance is expected in 2006. Generic biologics are currently sold in 
countries such as India, and the door to OECD markets was opened in 2004 
with Australia’s approval of the Novartis human growth hormone, 
Omnitrope. 
Biosimilar approval would have a massive impact on Big Biotech and 
several Big Pharma firms, since most first-generation biologics are already 
off-patent, including epoetin alfa (Amgen’s Epogen and Johnson & 
Johnson’s Procrit) and most interferons. 
The industry’s stance is that bioequivalence between two biologics cannot be 
proven, citing cases such as that of Johnson & Johnson’s Eprex (epoetin 
alfa). A difference in one manufacturing step between the US and Europe led 
to adverse reactions and to the withdrawal of one formulation from the EU. 
In this context, it is unlikely that the FDA will apply a single regulation to all 
follow-on biologics. A roadmap including clinical trial hurdles may be issued 
for a subset of less complex, lower-risk biologics such as insulin and human 
growth hormone. These were approved under the Food Drug and Cosmetics 
Act (FDCA), which contains a statute 505(b)(2) allowing the use of clinical 
data to establish comparability to the innovator product. By contrast, most 
biologics are approved under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), which 
does not include this provision. 
                                                 
15 Nicole Gray, “Unleashing the Promise”, Pharmaceutical Executive, April 
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As biogenerics emerge in future years, they are unlikely to disrupt industry 
economics to the extent that small molecule generics have done. Due to the 
high cost of biomanufacturing, biosimilar discounts may range from 30-50% 
of the originator price – whereas standard generics can reach an 80% 
discount range.
16 
EU Regulation: From Pricing to Parallel Trade  
The strongest barrier to transatlantic integration remains the fragmented 
national reimbursement systems in the European Union. To address record 
healthcare budget deficits, European governments are implementing 
aggressive cost containment measures, which are projected to limit 
compound annual growth in the top five markets to 4-7% in the coming 
years. 
In addition, country-by-country reimbursement negotiations significantly 
slow product launches. Europe is therefore less attractive than the US both 
on price levels and speed to market. 
Cost-containment measures are converging across top markets, from 
manufacturer discounts and price cuts (Germany, UK, Italy) to reference 
pricing and delisting of low-benefit prescription medicines or OTC drugs 
(Germany, France). There is no relief from the new EU members: although 
they show higher growth rates, they are enthusiastically adopting the same 
cost-containment strategies. Poland adopted the German reference price 
scheme and volume restrictions similar to those in France, and Hungary uses 
the French and Spanish methods of price negotiations and international price 
referencing. 
Wide price differentials remain across Europe. The spread around the 
average European price ranged from -20% to +20% in the top five markets, 
and was much higher in the rest of Europe. There is also little price 
consistency between the US and Europe. Among 2003 launches, the average 
European price was 29% lower than the American level for Abbott’s 
rheumatoid arthritis drug Humira, and reached new depths for lifestyle and 
follower drugs: 55% to 65% less for Bayer’s Levitra and Lilly’s Cialis 
(erectile dysfunction) and 79% less for Crestor (follower statin by 
AstraZeneca). 
On the bright side, first-in-class products and biologics are generally able to 
command narrower global price ranges. For example, Lilly’s Forteo 
(recombinant parathyroid hormone for the treatment of osteoporosis) was 
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launched at an average European price only 3% lower than its American 
level. 
In addition to price pressures, reimbursement negotiations delay market 
access in Europe. On average, new products reach only about 20% of EU15 
markets six months post-launch. Here again, breakthrough products tend to 
diffuse faster: Lilly’s Forteo reached more than 40% of the EU-15 after six 
months on the European market. This gap may narrow, however, as 
formulary listings and co-pay tier restrictions increasingly slow down 
diffusion in the US market.
17 
Parallel trade accounting for about 5% of the European market, at a cost of 
over €1 billion to originators, represents another investment barrier. 
Authorized by the EU principle of free movement of goods and services, and 
mandated by the German government as a cost containment measure, parallel 
trade has slowed down recently, partly because of pharma companies’ efforts 
to manage their supply chains more effectively. This was supported by a 
court ruling that GlaxoSmithKline did not break European law by limiting 
sales to Greek wholesalers suspected of parallel trade. Further pressure will 
come from patent expirations in large drug classes, leading to generics across 
Europe. 
A study carried out by the London School of Economics in six product 
categories (ACE I and II blockers, anti-psychotics, proton pump inhibitors, 
statins and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) from 1997 to 2002 found 
only modest savings from parallel trade for health insurers, at less than €50 
million (or €100 million with manufacturer discounts). Due to cost-sharing 
structures in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, financial 
benefits to patients amounted to zero, and were marginal in Denmark and 
Norway.
18 
Innovation: From National Policies to Global Networks 
Despite cross-regional investment barriers, biopharmaceutical companies are 
sourcing innovation globally and have active transatlantic collaborations. At 
the public policy level, Europe lags behind the United States, and this 
threatens the maturation of innovation clusters in the region.  
The industry faces an innovation problem globally. FDA drug approvals 
declined in 1999-2002, and only slightly rose in the last two years, despite 
                                                 
17 Pricing and Reimbursement Review, IMS Health, 2003, pp. 7, 11, 18-21. 
18 Pavos Kanavos, “Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in the European Union: 
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the fact that the industry spent almost $50 billion on R&D in 2004 (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. New Drug Approvals 
 
 
Source: US Food and Drug Administration, 2004. 
Contributing factors include the higher risk and complexity of post-genomic 
science, dealing with over 5,000 biological targets rather than the 500 
addressed by traditional small molecules. The question ‘is bigger better?’ 
may also apply to biology research. With an annual research budget of $7 
billion, Pfizer may have reached the limit of manageable innovation, and 
GlaxoSmithKline addressed this problem by splitting its own research into 6 
semi-independent units. Big Biotech, like Big Pharma, increasingly depends 
on outside innovation. Amgen bought Immunex in 2001 for $16 billion to 
access high-potential products such as its rheumatoid arthritis drug Enbrel 
(etanercept), and it acquired Tularik in 2004 for $1.3 billion partly for its 
small-molecule research. These acquisitions are complemented by hundreds 
of alliances. 
Leading players are therefore highly dependent on innovation from clusters 
of small biotechs, universities and major health centers. In the 
commercialization of biotechnology, Europe can claim 30% of global sales, 
but half comes from Roche’s shareholding in Genentech. Blockbuster drugs 
of European origin accounted for 42% of the total by 2004, but the world 
share of revenues for European companies declined from 30% in 1994 to 
24% ten years later.
19 
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This is partly related to the huge transatlantic imbalance in research support. 
In the US, NIH has a 2004 budget of nearly $28 billion. Through a joint 
program with the Small Business Administration, it encourages R&D for 
small firms with Small Business Innovation Research grants. This budget 
was increased by 10% in 2003-04.
  
Across industry sectors, there is a significant gap between the US and Europe 
in both public and private financing. Some help may come from national 
initiatives such as the 2003 French incentives for Young Innovative 
Enterprises, exempting them for up to eight years from most taxes and, social 
contributions. The UK also announced a ten-year ‘Strategy for Science.’ 
At the European level, a new goal to increase Europe’s R&D investment to 
3% of GDP was set in Barcelona in 2002, but governments have since been 
keener to contain costs than to reverse the damage caused by long-term 
disinvestments. While European businesses increased R&D spending by over 
50% in 1995-2001, their US counterparts raised it by 130%. Accession of the 
new member states will increase the EU’s scientific stock, but their 
commercialization experience and venture capital are both minimal.
 20 
An EU-wide harmonization of capital market rules would be a crucial step to 
a true single capital and stock market in Europe. The post-2000 retrenchment 
of risk capital and the arrival of many new companies with the same 
financing need (due to the success of programs such as Germany’s Bio Regio 
in the 1990s) have combined to threaten start-ups in key markets. 
In 2003 the European Investment Bank committed half a billion euros for the 
European Investment Fund to invest in high technology, and the European 
Commission’s 6
th Framework Program for Research allocated over €810 
million to the life sciences and food sectors; about 10% of the budget will go 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the US, public funding is 
strongly reinforced by private finance.
  After lean years in 2001-03, US 
biotech fundraising rebounded in 2004 with nearly $20 billion in financing 
and another $11 billion from partnering. Both levels dwarfed European 
biotech funding.
21 
Among pillars of innovation, Europe ranks well on labor skills, scientific 
education and academic medical centers, but it still lags on capital markets, 
venture capital and reimbursement policies (see Table 5). 
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Source: Ernst & Young, Progressions, Global Pharmaceutical Report, 2004. 
Industry Consolidation: From M&As to Alliances 
Despite discrepancies in public policy, the industry’s need for global 
innovation and marketing has led to significant cross-border integration. Of 
the top ten Big Pharma companies by global sales, half are European, and 
some US firms grew by merging with European companies (Pfizer and 
Pharmacia). Intra-European consolidation is also growing; while the 
Sanofi/Aventis $66 billion merger was the result of overt government 
intervention, Novartis (Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz) and Astra-Zeneca merged 
because of market forces such as the need for global scale (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Top 10 Corporations by Global Pharma Sales  
  2004 Global sales  % Growth (constant $) 
  $ billion  Global 
sales %  2004  CAGR 
99-03 
Pfizer 50.9  9.8  4.9  12.3 
GlaxoSmithKline 32.7  6.3  1.9  9.4 
Sanofi-Aventis 27.1  5.2  9.1  12.7 
Johnson & Johnson  24.6  4.7  8.0  16.7 
Merck & Co.  23.9  4.6  3.5  12.4 
Novartis 22.7  4.4  7.5  11.3 
AstraZeneca 21.6 4.2  9.3  8.1 
Roche 17.7  3.4  10.7  8.1 
Bristol-Myers Squibb  15.5  3.0  -3.2  4.6 
Wyeth 14.2  2.7  9.8  11.9 
Total Top 10 Corporations  $ 250.9  48.4%  5.8%  10.9% 
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Big Biotech is dominated by US companies, but Europe’s Serono, Shire and 
Elan are in the top tier. A new trend is the transformation of mid-size 
European pharma companies into biotechs, as was shown by UCB’s 
acquisition of Celltech for $2.7 billion.  
Consolidation will continue for both pharma companies and biotechs. As Big 
Pharma’s largest company, Pfizer still holds less than 10% of the world 
market, and both large and mid-size pharma companies will continue to 
merge to maintain growth rates, access products or gain critical mass. 
The sheer number of biotechs dictates further consolidation. There are nearly 
1,500 companies in the US, of which only about 300 are publicly held, and a 
handful have profits from marketed products. Europe counts over 1,800 
companies, of which only about 100 are public. Germany alone has nearly 
350 firms, of which fewer than 15 are public – and most have financing 
needs that are not met by local venture capital.
22 
While there is little cross-national partnering in Europe, global collaborations 
sharply increased in 2004, to over 500 alliances (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. New Biotech-Pharma Collaborations 
 
 
Source: BioWorld Financial Watch, American Health Consultants, BioCentury. 
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A significant trend is the rise of biotech/biotech partnerships in a field that 
was historically dominated by the Big Pharma/biotech satellites model. 
This is partly due to Big Biotech’s increasing need to insource innovation, 
and to the perception by small biotechs that they may have a better cultural 
fit with other biotechs than with Big Pharma. 
Due to the global nature of biopharmaceutical innovation, these networking 
strategies will continue to grow both between and within regions. 
Conclusion 
As bioscience emerges as the innovation driver across many sectors ranging 
from health care to energy, food and biodefense, the industry’s public 
policies and private investment patterns will be a bellwether for high 
technology in general. 
A general conclusion from this analysis is that public policies lag behind the 
private sector in spurring transatlantic integration. Biopharmaceutical 
companies have globalized their value chain from research to marketing, 
have formed global innovation networks and are taking their products to 
market through ever-increasing partnerships.  
Public policies on both sides of the Atlantic need to be more proactive and 
harmonized, in areas ranging from research funding to pricing and 
reimbursement, in order to provide appropriate support for this vibrant 
sector. | 109 
8. The  Transatlantic  Automotive  Sector 
 Garel  Rhys 
orth America and Western Europe were the original centers of 
automotive production and remained dominant until the Japanese 
industry emerged as an international force in the 1960s, but 
particularly in the 1970s. As a result, links between these two world regions 
were established early in the development of the automotive sector. 
Background 
Even before 1920, the size of the US market was such that there were 
opportunities to make vehicles in high volumes and to reap economies of 
scale that were out of the reach of the fragmented national European 
industries. As a result, US car prices were on average 50% lower than those 
in Europe before 1920. Thus, there was a considerable flow of vehicles from 
North America to Europe with very few going in the reverse direction. In 
addition, there were the beginnings of considerable investment in vehicle-
making plants by the likes of Ford (in the UK in 1911) and others, but this 
really took off in the inter-war period. These investments were aimed at 
circumventing the massive increase in tariff barriers (see Table 1) erected by 
European countries to protect their auto industries from US competition and 
to serve what was a growing local market. 
Table 1. Import Duties on Passenger Cars (%) 
 US  France  Germany  Italy  UK 
1913 45  9-14 3 4-6  0 
1924 25-50  45-180 13 6-11  33.3 
1937 10  47-74  40  101-111  33.3 
1950 10 35 35 35  33.3 
1960 8.5 35 35 35  33.3 
1973 3  0/10.9  0/10.9  0/10.9  0/10.9 
1983 2.8  0/10.5  0/10.5  0/10.5  0/10.5 
2004 0/2.5/10  0/10  0/10  0/10  0/10 
Sources: Alan Altshuter et al., The Future of the Automobile, Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT). 
The flow of trade in vehicles output from the pre-1920 period was limited 
until the years following World War II, and then it was mainly from Europe 
to North America. The relatively open and prosperous North American 
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market was a huge attraction to companies and governments in Europe 
wishing to earn foreign exchange to finance essential imports. Tariff 
protection in Europe remained enormous, compared with the US, from 1945-
1970. It took the various GATT rounds (‘Dillon’, but particularly ‘Kennedy’) 
to reduce European tariffs significantly, but even today they are much higher 
than US tariffs on passenger cars (see Table 1). 
In addition to tariff protection, diverging car designs in the US and Europe in 
the 1930s meant that demand for US cars in post-war Europe was limited. In 
effect, they were too large for the European roads of the time (which is also 
largely true today), and placed high demands on the restricted supply of 
petrol, which was rationed until the early mid-1950s. As a result, at no time 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s did US car exports worldwide reach 
the levels of the 1920s, despite excess demand during this period. This was 
not the case for trucks, since countries were more inclined to buy essential 
capital items such as trucks needed for reconstruction and development.  
Current Position 
The pattern of automotive trade between Europe and North America over the 
last 25 years is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Pattern of Trade ($ billions) 
  1981 1999 2000 2003 
North America to Europe  1.9  7.4  6.8  9.8 
Europe to North America  6.3  28.2  28.0  40.8 
Asia to North America  13.7  49.2  54.7  60.4 
North America to Asia  0.2  4.6  5.4  5.4 
North America to Latin America - 11.8  15.9  13.3 
Latin America to North America - 25.3  30.8  30.7 
Sources: GATT and WTO. 
The striking phenomenon is that trade from North America to other world 
regions is not a major trade flow compared with flows into North America or 
intra-North American trade, which was $94.8 billion in 2003. North America 
– particularly the US – remains what it has been throughout the post-war 
years: an open and liberalized market ready to absorb large numbers of 
imported cars notwithstanding the voluntary export arrangements imposed by 
the Japanese on themselves at the behest of North American auto industries 
and government. The balance of payments position in automotive products of 
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2003, the US imported $112 thousand million more than it exported in 
automotive products compared with $46 billion in 1990. The European 
Union exported to the world $58 billion more in automotive products than it 
imported in 2003, compared with $22 billion in 1990. Of course, the 
Japanese balance of payments situation these figures dwarfs (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Balance of Payments in Automotive Products ($ millions) 
 1990  2003 
  Exports Imports Exports Imports 
US 32,547  79,320  69,245  181,283 
European Union 
(outside the EU) 
45,751 23,329  124,973  66,523 
Japan 66,230  7,315  102,734  11,130 
Source: WTO. 
Significance of the Transatlantic Automotive Sector 
Trade in automotive products between Western Europe and North America 
remains significant with a more than 4-to-1 imbalance in favor of Europe 
(Table 2). Also, from 2000 to 2005, trade from Europe to North America 
grew by 45.7% compared with 10.4% from Asia to North America, and 
compared with -0.3% from Latin America to North America. Given that 
North American exports to Europe grew by 44.1% over the same period, the 
trade imbalance did not worsen much in percentage terms, although it did in 
absolute numbers. The growth of European exports to North America 
compared with those from Latin America, where many US firms operate and 
export to North America, is a good performance.  
In 2003, Western Europe exported $380 billion of which $270.6 billion was 
intra-European trade while North America exported $126 billion, of which 
$94.8 billion was intra-North American trade. So while Europe sold almost 
$110 billion of automotive products to the world, North America sold $31.5 
billion. North America is not a significant exporter in world terms. 
Therefore, the imbalance in trade with Western Europe is not in any way 
unusual. In fact this is offset by the effects of major US investments in 
vehicle-making in Western Europe, which is more than an adequate 
substitute for the lack of vehicle exports. Cars made in Europe by US firms 
are a significant part of the overall equation. 
The North American car and light truck market is broadly equivalent to the 
West European car market, at around 15 million each. However, US-owned 
companies have around 20% of the West European market, whereas 
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markets. So while Europe sells 1.1 million vehicles in North America, 
mainly imports, North Americans sell over 3 million cars and light 
commercial trucks in Europe. At the same time, US firms account for only 
12% of the West European heavy truck market via Paccar’s control of DAF 
and Foden, but West European firms DaimlerChrysler and Volvo have 60% 
of the North American heavy truck market. Both markets are similar, varying 
around a typical figure of 300,000 units a year. However, the American share 
of European car production more than offsets the European dominance of the 
Class 8 heavy truck market via the control of Freightliner by 
DaimlerChrysler and White, Mack and GM heavy trucks by Volvo Trucks. 
This trade position plus the nature of direct investment by North American 
and West European companies in each other’s markets has produced a state 
of affairs where there is very little tension internally in the transatlantic 
automotive sector. The tension tends to be with third parties, notably Japan. 
In 2003, the share of North American automotive products in the region’s 
trade in merchandise was 12.7% of exports and 15.8% of imports, and for 
Western Europe the figures were 12.1% and 11.0%, respectively. In terms of 
the share of automotive products in trade in manufacturers by North 
America, they account for 16.8% of exports and 20.2% of imports, and in 
Western Europe the respective figures are 15% and 14.6%. In short, not only 
are automotive products important, but they are also important to a similar 
degree in both regions.  
The total production of passenger cars in Western Europe, including in the 
new EU member states, was 15.9 million in 2003 and 16 million in 2004. In 
North America, the figures were 15.9 million and 15.8 million, respectively. 
The latter includes light trucks (LTs), which in the main are included in ‘car’ 
figures in Europe. In Western Europe the automotive sector accounts for 
10% of manufacturing output, employs 2.5 million people directly and 
accounts for about 3% of GDP. In addition, through its research & 
development (R&D) and investment in production and information systems, 
the industry is central to technological developments in the EU. It also 
contributes greatly to Western European trade with a trade surplus to offset 
deficits in many other sectors.  
The situation is similar in North America, where the auto sector is the largest 
manufacturing industry; no other activity is linked to so much of US 
manufacturing or directly generates so much retail business or employment. 
The industry employs almost 3 million people directly, with the usual knock-
on effects that some studies put as high as another 5 million people. The 
dynamic effects are the same as in Europe, and although the industry has a 
balance of payments deficit, over 80% of sales are from domestic output, 
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The automotive sector as a whole is robust in both Western Europe and 
North America. Despite problems and challenges facing individual firms, car 
and light truck production together with the supply chain is at or about record 
levels, with little likelihood of a major structural decline any time soon.  
European car production has been revitalized by firms fully conversant with 
what needs to be done to achieve maximum efficiency on the supply side and 
attractive products on the demand side. More specifically, Europe is the 
primary source of specialist car production while its main comparative 
advantage is in the manufacture of heavy trucks and buses. The volume car 
industry is vibrant and has been reinforced by Japan’s inward investment.  
In North America the inward investment by the Japanese and others has 
created a new industry capable of making over 2.5 million units a year, more 
than most national motor industries. This is offsetting the problems faced by 
the more traditional US-owned makers. The real strength of the North 
American automotive industry is no longer in car making – less than half of 
the US market is in the hands of GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler – but in 
light trucks, which is largely in US hands because of considerable tariff 
protection (see Table 4). Japanese firms are investing in truck production in 
North America, however, so increased competition will occur. US 
manufacturers face serious challenges because: a) they have seen much of 
their car market disappear, b) they now depend on light truck production for 
financial underpinning, but this sector is under attack by Japanese firms on 
the one hand and environmentalists on the other and c) their position in the 
European market has weakened in the last decade. 
Table 4. US Market Share (%) (cars and LTs) 
 2002  2003 
GM 28.3  28.6 
Ford 20.9  21.5 
DaimlerChrysler 14.1  14.4 
Toyota 11.2  10.4 
Honda 8.1  7.4 
Nissan 4.8  4.4 
Hyundai 3.8  3.6 
Mitsubishi 1.9  1.8 
VW Group  1.8  2.0 
BMW 1.4  1.4 
Mazda 1.6  1.5 
Subaru 1.1  1.1 
Suzuki 0.4  0.4 
Isuzu 0.2  0.3 
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Transatlantic commerce plays a major role in maintaining the growth of the 
West European motor industry, especially in the executive and luxury car 
sector. Western Europe exports around 1 million cars a year to North 
America out of a total production of 15 million, and a North American 
market of 8.5 million cars. The export of light trucks to North America is 
tiny, but will grow as Land Rover (Ford) sales develop. This is by far 
Europe’s largest export market. Trade in the opposite direction is small, with 
7,000 cars and 41,000 trucks being exported to Europe in 2003. As already 
indicated, however, North America’s presence in the West European market 
is via the local subsidiaries of US firms, rather than through trade (see Table 
5). These are GM’s Opel, Vauxhall and Saab brands and Ford’s own brand 
plus the Premier Automotive Group of Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover and Aston 
Martin. In 2004 these had 21.5% of the West European markets (see Table 5, 
although only Volvo of PAG is listed). These subsidiaries are amongst the 
largest in US firms’ portfolio, and are responsible for many of the cars 
designed and developed to sell in the world market outside North America. 
In short, transatlantic commerce, whether in visible trade and capital 
transfers or invisibles such as R&D, is a major underpinning of the two 
regions’ automotive sectors. 
Table 5. The West European Market Share (%) 
  1990 1995 2001 2003 2004 
VW  15.5 16.8 18.9 18.2 17.7 
GM*  12.1 13.1 10.8 10.6 10.6 
PSA  13.2 12.0 14.4 14.8 14.4 
Ford (Blue Oval)  11.7  11.9  8.8  8.6  8.9 
Volvo  2.0 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Renault  9.9  10.3 10.6 10.6 10.4 
Fiat Group  14.6  11.1  9.6  7.4  7.7 
Rover  2.8 3.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 
BMW  Group  2.8 3.3 3.5 4.4 3.6 
DaimlerChrysler  2.8 3.4 6.4 6.5 6.1 
Toyota  2.7 2.5 3.7 4.7 5.1 
Nissan  2.9 3.1 2.5 2.8 2.5 
Honda  1.2 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.5 
Japanese  (total)  12.0 10.1 10.4 12.7 13.1 
Korean    1.5 2.8 2.5 2.9 
* From 2003, Daewoo's share (0.9%) was also included in the GM figure. In 2004, it 
was 0.8%. 
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An ‘Open’ Relationship 
Transatlantic commerce in the automotive sector is open to a very large 
degree. European car imports face a 2.5% import duty while North American 
exports encounter a 10% tariff in Western Europe. The imbalance in trade is 
not due to this tariff discrepancy but to the type of vehicle made in the US In 
the main they are too large in body and engine size for European conditions. 
Furthermore, US firms have shown little, if occasional, enthusiasm for 
selling US products in Europe, preferring to use their local subsidiaries 
geared to meeting European conditions. They conduct their transatlantic 
business primarily through investment rather than trade. Apart from some 
concerns over technical, safety and emissions issues, there are no great 
concerns about the openness of transatlantic trade in this sector. There are no 
quotas or voluntary export restraints and modest import duties. 
Because trade in automotive products is so open, the question of the 
opportunity costs of continued barriers and lack of further economic 
integration in this sector does not really arise. If US customers want smaller, 
more fuel-efficient vehicles, then they can buy them from abroad or from 
transplant operations. North American car prices are among the lowest in the 
world, which is testimony to the competitiveness of the market. In the heavy 
truck sector, competition is intense, with European-controlled firms 
challenging the remaining US-owned companies, Navistar and Paccar. Local 
operating conditions and customer preference are the key to the dominance 
of North American-built, but not owned, firms in this sector. The area where 
tariff protection may be abetting the manufacture of over-large and gas-
guzzling vehicles is the light truck area. However, the tariff protection is 
geared at Japanese products, not European ones, so transatlantic trade 
conditions are not an issue. As regards Europe, North American products are 
not entirely appropriate to European conditions, except for some light trucks 
and imports from US Japanese transplants. Trade is governed by corporate 
decision-making, not by the state of trade regulations. 
Convergence or Divergence? 
The automotive sectors in Western Europe and North America are different. 
The type of product, imports’ share of the market, structure of the industry 
and size of the leading firms are different in each case. The size of the mass-
market car in North America, but especially the light truck, is much larger 
than the ‘average’ European product. In this regard, the North American 
industry is out of line with the rest of the world: even though GM and Ford 
are the most global of companies they find it difficult to design a ‘world car’ 
suitable for North America and elsewhere. The cars made by the transplants 
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but much has to be done before similar products are made on both sides of 
the Atlantic. In the case of heavy trucks, there is only some evidence of 
convergence, and in the world of light trucks divergence is continuing. It is 
here that the ‘American Dream’ of large vehicles and large engines continues 
to be experienced. 
In 2005, for the first time, the West European new car market may see over 
one-half of its cars having diesel engines. In North America, the diesel light-
vehicle market is very small, due to the very low price of gasoline and severe 
technical regulations. North America is showing greater interest in hybrids 
than is Western Europe, however, because diesel is not being used to attack 
the CO2 problem. This could lead to divergence via non-tariff barriers. A 
convergence of engine size and future fuel sources would probably emerge if 
North America raised fuel taxes to international levels, but this is not likely 
to occur and not just for political reasons. A curious alliance is being formed 
between consumerists and environmentalists who see an increase in fuel 
prices as letting US firms off the hook by forcing consumers to buy smaller 
vehicles, rather than obliging manufacturers to supply expensively developed 
large vehicles with environmentally cleaner characteristics. If the North 
American market shifted its preference to smaller vehicles, then it would be 
easier for North American firms to make world cars. This would cut 
development costs and give much larger production runs and greater 
economies of scale. In effect, North American firms have to run two 
operations, one for North America and one for ‘the rest of the world’ 
European firms face no such imperative since they are not part of the market 
for the big volume-made vehicles. The West European large car is for the 
more specialist end of the market. 
The North American and West European industries are different and, in some 
ways, this divergence may be increasing, for instance as regards future fuel 
sources. This as yet, however, does not create friction in transatlantic 
commerce in this area. The developments are not due to protectionist or 
special interest pressures, although there are differences in the preferences of 
consumers on each side of the Atlantic. On the other hand, harmonization of 
fuel taxes would have a major impact on the convergence of such 
preferences. 
The market structures (Tables 4 and 5) in North America and Western 
Europe are very different. In North America, the two top firms have 50% of 
the market, whereas in Western Europe the top two firms have 28% of the 
market. The top five have 82% and 63%, respectively. But the North 
American industry is changing. The erstwhile dominance of Ford and GM is 
being eroded and genuine multi-firm competition is appearing as never 
before. In Western Europe, the ‘European’ market share is a myth with very 
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has 26% of Italy, but 2% of the UK car market). However, as European 
integration proceeds the ‘European’ share will become more real, and the 
seemingly competitive picture in Table 5 will become a reality. Hence the 
two regional markets are converging in terms of form and behavior. This will 
strengthen the links between them, since their philosophy and aspirations 
will continue to coincide. 
Measures to Increase Trade 
Although there are no real obstacles to transatlantic commerce in the auto 
sector, a large flow of trade only occurs in one direction. Hence, it is not the 
removal of regulatory obstacles that will increase integration but ways and 
means to make North American-made vehicles more attractive to European 
consumers. At present over 80% of cars made in Western Europe have 
engines of less than 2 liters; in the US over 80% of cars and light trucks have 
engines  over 2 liters. This complementarity of product is not generating 
business for North American firms, however, since the types of vehicle made 
are inappropriate for European conditions. This does not just mean size but 
operating characteristics such as performance. The North American motor 
industry's lack of interest in directly exporting to Western Europe duplicates 
its trade flows with other parts of the world. In 2003, only 117,000 cars and 
245,000 commercial vehicles were exported to the world. Hence, North 
America's export performance in vehicles is a general problem, and not one 
peculiar to its relations with Western Europe. Any increase will require a 
change in North American vehicles, a change of policy by US firms to 
supplement European production by imports, and greater integration of 
European and North American production programs by Asian producers. In 
short, if the North American auto industry wants to export more, it will have 
to become more export-orientated. The activities of some of the North 
American component firms show that such a philosophy can be very 
rewarding.  
For their part, the European manufacturers must improve their act to launch 
an attack on the volume car markets of North America, which have been lost 
to the Japanese. Among the European volume market brands, only VW has 
any sort of business in North America. The French and Italian makers are 
conspicuous by their absence. Some Japanese products sold in North 
America are sourced in Western Europe, and the components sector has had 
some success supplying North American firms from Europe. Renault's links 
with Nissan may be the way for the French company to return but the 
prospects of Fiat and Peugeot in North America do not appear promising. As 
Table 2 shows, Western Europe has had a successful push into North 
America since 2000, with improved and more competitive products, but even 
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export performance is 50% better than the Europeans. The appearance of 
some European transplant manufacturers in North America with incremental 
products may increase the sales volume and value. 
Do Barriers to Trade Exist? 
Because commerce in transatlantic automotive products is already so 
liberalized, any further liberalization can only be minor. As a result, no extra 
significant beneficial knock-on effects would be likely. If West European or 
North American automotive enterprises want to sell in each other’s markets, 
then there are no protectionist issues preventing them from doing so. Perhaps 
what is required are further efforts at increasing knowledge to improve 
transparency. However, both industries and their respective authorities are 
adept at commercial marketing, but no doubt continuous improvement means 
that something can always be done. This may be particularly so at the 
supply-chain level where component and systems suppliers are all too often 
ignorant of possibilities. 
This means that any barriers to deeper transatlantic commerce are not 
regulatory or fiscal, but more likely to result from competitive dynamics. 
That is, the products of one or both industries are not attractive enough in the 
other market. Although Western Europe exports one million vehicles to 
North America, this is only 11.8% of the car market and 6.6% of the car and 
LT market. The former is similar to the 10% import penetration of the West 
European car market and the latter to the 6% import share of the Japanese car 
market. Japanese imports hold 19% of the North American car market, apart 
from transplant production. Western Europe does not make cars for the North 
American large car volume market and makes very few pick-ups, sports 
utility vehicles and minivans suitable for the US market. This is because only 
a limited ‘home’ market would exist for such vehicles. To serve the North 
American market, BMW and Daimler have established plants in the US, but 
Ford’s Land Rover subsidiary will supply from the UK. Similarly, the 
Europeans realized the best place to make North America-type heavy trucks 
is in North America, through the purchase of US firms. It appears that any 
significant increase in transatlantic trade in automotive products, which the 
West European performance since 2000 has shown is possible, must be based 
on the overall competitiveness of the firms involved, which includes such 
characteristics as price, quality, delivery, reliability, service and repair. 
The area where harmonization could reduce unit costs and generate trade is 
in technical regulations. After all, the harmonization of such was seen as a 
major benefit of the creation of the single market in the EU post-1992. Such 
a harmonization that allowed vehicle homologation in Western Europe and 
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and allow the same products – including components, accessories and sub-
assemblies such as engines – to be used in both markets. This would have 
great trade potential. After all, where tariff barriers are small, any non-tariff 
issue becomes important. Harmonization of regulations could increase trade 
by a significant amount. 
The Non-Transatlantic Competitive Challenge 
Enough has been said to indicate that where world trade between regions is 
concerned, it is the Japanese who are the main force. In trade with North 
America, the West Europeans export around one million vehicles a year but 
the Japanese export over 1.6 million. The Europeans export 130,000 vehicles 
to Japan but import over one million from them. Also from Asia, the South 
Korean motor industry exports 725,000 vehicles to North America, taking 
2,000 in return. The Koreans export 500,000 vehicles to Western Europe, 
taking 16,000 in return. If North American industry was able to integrate its 
North American and European operations, the quality, economies of scale 
and model program of such an eventuality could strengthen their position 
against the leading Japanese producers, remembering that Mazda, Suzuki, 
Isuzu and Subaru are linked to North American firms. Similarly if the West 
European volume producers were able to duplicate the performance of their 
premium brands, such as Mercedes Benz, BMW and MINI, Jaguar, Audi, 
Volvo and Land Rover, they would return to the North American market, 
perhaps mainly at the expense of Asian producers. This is much easier said 
than done, given the present impressive record of Toyota, Hyundai, Honda 
and, to a lesser extent, Nissan (the latter being controlled by Renault). If all 
predictions are realized, then China, and possibly India, will become major 
challengers by 2015. 
Automotive Trade: A Lesson in Market Opening 
The openness of the transatlantic commerce in automotive products provides 
a benchmark for other sectors. The European industry has never threatened 
the existence of the North American auto industry in the way the Europeans 
feared US competition in the period from 1920 to 1970 (see Table 1) and 
illustrated by the relative tariff protection. As a result, European imports 
were tolerated and were often seen in the 1950s and 1960s as a safety-valve 
for diverting criticism of the North American producers that they did not 
offer small cars and had no intention of doing so at that time. Equally, the 
North American producers established themselves in Europe to make cars 
and commercial vehicles, providing jobs, using local suppliers and becoming 
accepted as ‘European’ producers. Also by manufacturing in a number of 
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The R&D facilities, the best-practice operations and acceptable products all 
added to their acceptance by the European auto sector and market. So 
although there has developed a great imbalance in the trade flows to 
Europe’s advantage, the activities of US plants in Europe has created an 
impression of balance and fairness in auto trading arrangements. 
Transatlantic commerce in automotive products demonstrates that 
opportunities may exist but companies must be competitive to grasp them. 
The European manufacturers face only a 2½% import duty in the US and 6% 
in Canada. Under such circumstances, their ability to carve out a significant 
share of these markets depends upon their competitiveness. The relatively 
small share of the North American market held by European firms other than 
the specialists such as Mercedes Benz or BMW is due to a lack of 
competitiveness amongst the mass-market producers and the lack of 
competitiveness of the European operations of the North American 
companies in comparison with their Japanese associates such as Mazda, 
Isuzu, Suzuki and Subaru. In short, best-practice market opening depends 
upon competitiveness. 
Competition in the auto sector has not been greatly distorted by ‘unfair’ 
practices such as subsidy and market sharing. This has removed a potential 
source of friction from transatlantic commerce in automotive products. 
As said above the main threats to each other’s auto industries are not each 
other. Rather it is Japan, and particularly Toyota, which is the ‘Airbus’ of the 
auto sector. The Japanese pose a threat to the dominance of GM and Ford in 
the global market for the first time ever. To this extent European exports are 
marginal. In the opposite direction, the development of North American-
owned auto production sites in Europe with all the beneficial effects that 
flow for the local economies are a substitute for direct imports. In a sense 
these facilities are an ‘offset’ arrangement, compensating for European auto 
trade flows into North America. What is so often an artificial and costly 
device in aerospace has emerged through market forces in response to pre-
war trade barriers. This has also occurred in the heavy truck industry where 
European direct investment in North American companies secures their 
future and is an offset for the very large hold that General Motors and Ford 
have on the European auto markets. The sector is characterized by openness 
in trade and investment flows in both directions. 
Another feature of the relationship is that the bulk of trade flows are 
complementary rather than substitutes, as in the case of the Japanese. The 
main auto products sold to North America from Europe are specialist cars, 
which only compete with a small minority of North American car producers 
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utility vehicles plus components and major sub-assemblies such as engines. 
This also reduces the potential for friction and conflict. 
Technology transfer has been liberal in the relationship between the 
automotive sectors in North America and Europe. The companies often 
cooperate and collaborate and engage in joint ventures. So while the sector is 
highly competitive, there is an underlying trust between the North American 
and West European players. 
The result of all this is that transatlantic commerce in automotive products is 
largely free of market-distorting arrangements and market failure. Failures 
are mainly the result of entrepreneurial mistakes rather than institutionally-
inspired distortion. Compared with many sectors, the auto industry is an 
example of best practice where market-opening is concerned. In the 
transatlantic auto sector, there is nowhere for the inefficient to hide. | 122 
9.  A Transatlantic Financial Market?
1 
 Karel  Lannoo 
ack in the early days of the European Single Market, a ‘reciprocity’ 
provision in the second banking directive caused much uproar in 
transatlantic relations. According to this clause, the EU could ask 
trading partners to grant access to their markets in a manner that was 
reciprocal to the one obtained for third countries in the EU. It was claimed 
that the European Union was becoming a ‘fortress’ and that the United States 
would never accept being forced to change its regulatory structure. Although 
the provision has never actually been applied, it took more than 10 years 
before officials started to have regular discussions on coming to more 
equivalence in regulatory regimes on both sides. This dialogue culminated in 
an agreement on April 22, 2005 between the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the European Commission on equivalence of 
accounting standards. 
Yet equivalent standards also have some drawbacks. First, financial markets 
on both sides are fundamentally different in structure, meaning that it is not 
easy to find issues that are of comparable importance. Moreover, EU 
financial markets are still largely fragmented and consolidated at the national 
level, meaning that the benefits of the Single Market still have not been 
realized within the EU. Second, the process may be seen as a way to reduce 
regulatory competition, which could limit the benefits of equivalence.  
A Bank-Based versus Market-Based Financial System 
The EU and US financial systems continue to differ fundamentally. In 
comparing the size of bank, bond and equity markets in the US and the EU, it 
is striking to note that a highly developed banking market and a (much) less-
developed bond and equity market characterize the EU, while the opposite is 
true for the US (see Figure 1). This asymmetry between the two systems 
largely results from regulatory differences, in particular the universal 
                                                  
1 This chapter builds upon earlier work by the author. For a more extensive 
discussion of ongoing EU financial market regulation issues and references, see 
K. Lannoo and J.-P. Casey, Financial Regulation and Supervision beyond 2005, 
CEPS Task Force Report, CEPS, Brussels, February 2005. For US-EU issues, 
see M. Draghi and R. Pozen, US-EU regulatory convergence: Capital market 
issues, John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series No. 444, Harvard Law School, 
Cambridge, MA, 2003; and also E. Posner, “Market power without a single 
market: The new transatlantic relations in financial services”, mimeo, George 
Washington University, Washington DC, June 2004. 
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banking system in Europe and the segmentation of the US financial system 
by the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which separates commercial banking from 
investment banking. In addition, the 1933 Securities Act laid the basis for the 
market-based financial system in the US as we know it today. 
The segmentation of the US financial industry stimulated tough competition 
between intermediaries. It provided the environment in which capital market 
financing, specialization and innovation emerged, creating the most 
competitive industry worldwide. As noted by Chief Economist at the 
European Investment Bank Alfred Steinherr, “In no other industry has the 
United States been as resolutely superior as in the financial industry. (...) All 
significant innovations have come out of the US financial system.”
2 
Figure 1. Amounts of Bonds Outstanding, Total Domestic Stock Market 
Capitalization and Bank Assets, end 2003 (in billions of euros and 
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Competition between commercial banks, investment banks and brokers in the 
US stimulated a process of disintermediation and securitization. Caps on 
short-term bank deposits led to the emergence of higher-yielding money 
market mutual funds. Banks responded by transforming liabilities into 
negotiable certificates of deposits, on which interest could be paid without 
restrictions. In order to obtain a share of the profitable loan market, 
investment banks stimulated corporations to securitize their loans. As a 
                                                  
2 A. Steinherr, Derivatives, the Wild Beast of Finance, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc., 1998, p. 29. 124 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
result, the balance sheets of banks became fully disintermediated and 
securitized and relationship banking disappeared. The growth of a deep and 
liquid money and capital market had deprived relationship banking of its 
implicit insurance value and made valuations more important. The key 
principle of transparency, which underlies US financial, securities and 
accounting law, emerged. 
In Europe, the universal banking system has remained dominant, having been 
taken as the model in the EU’s 1992 program of financial market 
liberalization. There was no incentive for banks to securitize debt and capital 
markets remained underdeveloped. Furthermore, the regulatory framework 
for direct issues on capital markets left much to be desired and differed from 
one member state to another. For example, until recently corporate bonds 
were discouraged in Germany through very strict emission criteria, including 
the obligation to issue the bonds only in the domestic currency of the local 
market, with unfavorable tax treatment. Governments wished to keep close 
control of the local debt securities market to ease public finance.  
So far, there has been no real break in the structure of the EU financial 
system. Bank assets to GDP have continued to grow and stood at 237% of 
GDP in 2003, but there has been a pronounced growth of debt securities 
markets in the EU, which increased from 84% of GDP in 1992 to 142% in 
2003. The creation of the euro has allowed Europe’s capital markets to 
deepen, accounting for 31% of the global financial stock in 2003, up from 
28% in 1999. This compares to 37% for the US, whose share declined from 
40% in 1999.
3  
The realization that the EU would not fully capture the benefits of economic 
and monetary union, but also that its financial system was missing out on 
innovative investments, led to the adoption of the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP) in 1999 and the reform of its system of financial lawmaking and 
supervisory cooperation as discussed in the 2001 ‘Lamfalussy’ report. By 
mid-2004, a new regulatory framework was in place for the issuance of 
securities on capital markets (Prospectus Directive, 2003/71/EC), market 
disclosure (Transparency Directive, 2004/109/EC), tackling insider trading 
and market manipulation (Market Abuse Directive, 2003/6/EC) and 
promoting fair trade and the best execution of securities transactions 
(Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 2004/39/EC). The effects of 
these directives should allow a more market-based system to develop. 
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EU-US Dialogue on Financial Markets Regulation 
The success of the EU in reforming its financial regulatory and supervisory 
structure led to the start of a regular dialogue with the US, which could be 
considered a model for other areas of transatlantic or bilateral trade 
cooperation. Although the direct motive was the impact of the EU’s 
Conglomerates Directive (2002/87/EC) on US firms, it has become a 
permanent feature, focusing on a broader set of financial market issues and 
involving the EU Commission and Lamfalussy Committees on the one side 
and the US Treasury, the SEC and Federal Reserve Board on the other. The 
aim is to improve understanding and identify potential conflicts in regulatory 
approaches on both sides of the Atlantic and to discuss issues of mutual 
interest.
4 As noted by EU Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services 
Charlie McGreevy in New York on 20 May 2005, “The goal must be mutual 
recognition of equivalence. You can also call it the home-country principle. 
If you agree to accept each other’s system as equivalent then duplicative 
requirements disappear. You can then operate in the other country under the 
rules of your home country.”
5 Hallmarks so far have been the agreements on 
the equivalence of rules for auditor oversight and accounting standards, but 
difficult issues remain on the agenda, such as the implementation of the 
Basel Accord and the direct access to EU exchanges by the US market.  
The background to the start of the regulatory dialogue was the exponential 
growth of transatlantic portfolio investment in the second half of the last 
decade. Purchases of US equities by EU investors grew from $144 billion in 
1990 to reach $2,631 billion in 2000. At the same time, US investors also 
stepped up their diversification into EU equities, rising from $141 billion in 
1990 to reach $1,937 billion in 2000.
6 This trend was mainly driven by 
                                                  
4 See the Joint Report to leaders at the EU-US Summit on 25-26 June by 
participants in the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue, for the June summit 
held at Dromoland Castle, Ireland (retrieved from  http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/finances/docs/general/eu-us-dialogue-report_en.pdf); both of the 
parties at the meeting agreed to “intensify” their cooperation.  
5 See “The integration of Europe’s financial markets and international 
cooperation” by C. McCreevy, Concluding Remarks at the Euro Conference in 
New York on April 20, 2005. There is no full agreement on the terminology. 
While the EU uses the phrase ‘mutual recognition’, US authorities prefer 
‘equivalence’, which may be more correct, as supervisory accountability remains 
at the federal level. See also the testimony of Alexander Schaub, Director-
General of the European Commission DG on the Internal Market, before the US 
House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, May 13, 2004. 
6 B. Steil, Building a Transatlantic Securities Market, International Securities 
Markets Association, Zurich, 2002, pp. 17-23.  126 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
institutional investors. Moreover, the emergence of a more securitized and 
disintermediated financial system increased the attractiveness of the EU 
market for US firms.
7  
Until a few years ago, the EU was not considered a credible partner for 
discussions on financial regulatory and supervisory matters. Progress toward 
the adoption of the FSAP, however, changed things. Still, US regulators were 
hardly interested in discussing some form of equivalence with other 
countries. It strictly applied the principle of territoriality and considered its 
financial regulatory system superior.
8 Then the corporate scandals of Enron 
and others altered things further. Serious flaws had been revealed in the US 
securities supervisory system and its accounting standards were no longer 
held to be superior. At the same time, because of the scandals, new laws such 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) were adopted, creating severe problems at 
the transatlantic level.  
The issue regarding auditor oversight results from the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, which created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and required all audit firms to be 
registered with the PCAOB, including EU-based audit firms with US-listed 
clients. A declaration of intent on the equivalence of rules for auditor 
oversight, reached between the European Commission and the US PCAOB 
in March 2004,
9 would lift the requirement for EU-based audit firms. It 
stipulates, however, that EU member states create auditor oversight   
 
                                                  
7 See the testimony of Marc Lackritz, President of the Securities Industry 
Association, at a Congressional hearing of the Committee on Financial Services 
on May 22, 2002, who stated, “Our very largest members engaging in global 
business receive about 20% of their net revenues from Europe. And I might add 
that that is about two times more than the net revenues that we receive from 
Asia. And we employ about 35,000 Europeans in the business.”  
8 Evidence of this attitude was revealed by former Chairman of the SEC Arthur 
Levitt in a Financial Times article,  in tempore non suspectu, concerning the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). He argued that the US GAAP 
(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) was “the most transparent and 
comprehensive disclosure regime in the world” and that the US should never 
recognize IAS as equivalent. See A. Levitt, “The world according to GAAP: 
Global capital markets cannot work without uniform, high-quality financial 
reporting standards”, Financial Times, May 2, 2001. 
9 This declaration of intent was made public by European Commissioner Frits 
Bolkestein and US PCAOB Chairman William McDonough in Brussels on 
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authorities, which are not yet present in all member states, and agree on the 
European Union’s draft 8
th Company Law Directive on the statutory audit, as 
a precondition.
10 
The agreement on equivalence between International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), reached between the European Commission and the US SEC on 
April 22, 2005, probably has the most far-reaching implications. It would 
effectively allow companies to use one single accounting standard in the EU 
and US. So far, the US has always required firms to reconvert their accounts 
to the US GAAP when listing on US capital markets, whereas the EU 
requires listed firms and issuers to report in IAS or the equivalent from 2005 
onwards. The agreement allows US firms to continue to issue bonds on EU 
capital markets in the US GAAP, whereas the SEC will eliminate the need 
for companies using the IFRS to reconcile to US GAAP standards possibly 
as soon as 2007, but no later than 2009.
11  
The transatlantic dialogue has also proliferated to the supervisory side, where 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the US SEC 
announced a cooperation agreement on June 4, 2004 covering increased 
communication about regulatory risks in each other’s securities markets and 
the promotion of regulatory convergence in the future. This move was 
followed by a cooperation initiative with the US Commodities and Futures 
Trading Commission on October 21, 2004. The same form of extended 
cooperation is happening in the areas of banking and insurance, with the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors and the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors. 
Other issues still on the agenda are the latest capital adequacy rules resulting 
from the new Basel Accord and the direct access of EU exchanges to the US 
market. Whereas the EU would leave all EU-licensed banks the choice of 
which approach to follow for the measurement of their minimum level of 
regulatory capital, US regulators would allow only the advanced internal 
ratings-based approach of the new Basel Accord to some 20 internationally 
active banks and apply the old Basel I framework to all the other banks. This 
action would seriously distort the playing field for EU banks in the US 
market, while US banks would have the full range of choices in the EU. The 
                                                  
10 See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and amending 
Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, COM(2004) 0177 final of 
March 15, 2004. 
11 See D.T. Nicolaisen, “A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence”, 
Northwestern University Journal of International Law and Business, April 2005. 128 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
justification of the US supervisors that these internationally active banks 
control 99% of the foreign assets in the US banking system does not take into 
account the significant stake EU banks have in the US banking system. In 
addition, it will also hamper integrated risk-management and supervisory 
reporting within these groups, with all the negative consequences this may 
entail. 
A similar distortion applies with regard to trading on regulated stock 
markets. Whereas US-regulated stock markets are directly accessible for EU 
licensed brokers, the same is not the case for EU regulated markets in the 
US. American authorities argue that the level of investor protection in the EU 
stock market is not equivalent to what is in place in the US. From the EU 
perspective, this is seen as a protectionist measure. While all major EU stock 
exchanges operate a screen-based trading system, the major US stock 
exchange, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), maintains a floor-based 
trading structure. Having direct access to the EU-regulated market would 
allow US brokers to trade directly on EU stock markets, thereby not only 
reducing the listings of EU firms on the NYSE, but also threatening the 
antiquated trading structure of the world’s largest exchange.
12 
Benefits of a Transatlantic Market 
Although the agreements reached in the context of the transatlantic agenda 
clearly have benefits, how to quantify these is not evident. Some studies have 
been undertaken on the specific aspects of the transatlantic financial market, 
but an overall figure would be almost impossible to distill. Moreover, as an 
integrated financial market does not yet exist at the EU level, how could the 
benefits of a transatlantic market be measured?  
As regards the integration of securities markets, Steil has estimated that full 
transatlantic integration may lead to a 9% reduction of the cost of capital for 
listed companies. This study is based on the assumption that greater 
competition between the more efficient, automated trading structures on the 
EU side and the more competitive brokerage industry in the US would 
reduce transaction costs by 60%. This cost reduction would also lead to an 
increase in trading volume of almost 50%.
13 On top of that, a fully integrated 
capital market would also do away with the duplicate costs and fees 
companies incur through listing on multiple markets. By mid-2005, there 
                                                  
12 J. Board et al. for example do not expect substantial benefits from introducing 
EU screens in the US – see Distortion or distraction: US restrictions on EU 
exchange trading screens, Corporation of London, City Research Series, No. 3, 
2004. 
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were 235 EU companies with listings in the US, whereas there were 140 US 
companies with listings on the London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse and 
Euronext. 
A much more important reduction in the cost of the capital and regulatory 
burden would accrue from the agreement on the equivalence of accounting 
standards, although no studies have been carried out on the aggregate benefit 
of this equivalence, as far as we are aware. This exercise would certainly be a 
complex undertaking, as many elements need to be taken into account. First, 
there are the costs for European companies of converting their accounts to 
the US GAAP, as a condition for listing on the US capital market (the US 
GAAP is accepted in most EU markets), of which individual figures exist. 
Second, there is the advantage of having mutually accepted accounting 
languages, which means that analysts on both sides will trust firms’ financial 
statements, leading to higher investment across the Atlantic (and certainly in 
the EU). Third, the agreement does away with the cost of the confusion and 
the lack of credibility caused by converting accounts to another language, 
often depressing the stock price. An example is Deutsche Bank’s shift to the 
US GAAP in 2002, which led to net profit distortions in the US GAAP of 
minus 88% for 2001 to plus 220% in 2000 because of differences in the tax 
treatment of the disposal of industrial holdings.
14 Analysts therefore 
considered the changeover a strategic mistake. 
At a more general level, stronger market integration could be an important 
incentive to stimulate the competitiveness of the EU financial services 
industry, which is lagging behind its American counterpart in performance. 
Return on assets in the EU banking industry stood at about 0.4% in 2003, 
compared with 1.4% in the United State, a performance that has stabilized at 
these levels for the last few years.
15 The strong productivity growth observed 
in the US in the second half of the 1990s can largely be attributed to a limited 
number of services that use information and communications technology 
intensively, including certain financial services. Hence, there is a need to 
stimulate EU financial market integration.
16 Segmented markets at the retail 
level in the EU, such as in mortgage lending or investment funds 
 
                                                  
14 See Financial Times, September 10, 2002. 
15 See the Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC, April 2005. 
16 Annex I of the European Commission’s recent Green Paper on Financial 
Services Policy (2005-2010), (COM(2005) 177, Brussels, May 3, 2005) 
reiterates the economic benefits of financial integration – on which studies had 
been published in 2002 showing the impact on the lower cost of capital and 
increase in GDP growth. 130 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
prevent firms from exploiting economies of scale and increasing their overall 
performance, which ultimately increases costs for the end-users of financial 
services. 
Would transatlantic dialogue therefore only have beneficial effects? Not 
necessarily: the danger is not imaginary that it may lead to over-regulation – 
that the one side may hope the other will follow its standards, even if 
circumstances or needs may be different. Examples are the implementation 
of the new Basel Accord in the United States or the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on corporate governance regulation in the European Union. In 
these two cases, circumstances are different and do not require full 
equivalence, although there are clearly pressures from both sides respectively 
to level up the host-country model to the one presently applicable at home.  
Within certain bounds, competition between regulatory regimes can be 
healthy – something that is also noticeable in the EU. Nevertheless, a high 
degree of international cooperation between regulators replicates the dangers 
of excessive regulatory intervention at the national level: an (unaccountable) 
regulatory leviathan with monopoly authority, which does not need to pay 
great attention to the quality of regulation, and an opaque entity subject to 
capture by special interest groups. Not only does this scenario have the 
ability to reduce welfare by excluding some economic options that free 
market competition would have enabled market participants to choose from, 
but it also removes the freedom to choose in the first place, a value from 
which economic actors may derive some utility. In addition, excessive 
regulatory cooperation at the international level outside the contours of a 
clearly defined legal framework effectively amounts to a lack of democratic 
legitimacy. 
Two forces – one public, one private – can explain why excessive regulatory 
convergence leaves little room for innovation in securities market regulation. 
To begin with, a common standard or regulatory regime enjoying a 
monopoly need not pay much attention to upstart rivals, so there is little 
incentive for regulators to improve their regime or to introduce better 
standards when they cooperate closely at the international level. In addition, 
there is an inherent risk in ‘benevolent planners’ choosing what they believe 
to be the most appropriate market structure, because they may impose the 
wrong market structure and respond inadequately to changes in demand or to 
the introduction of new technologies, which may warrant a need to radically 
alter the market structure.
17  
                                                  
17 See L. Harris, Trading and Exchanges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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With regard to private forces, as the incumbent standard is challenged on 
efficiency grounds, pioneers with low switching costs may migrate to the 
new standard, undermining the entrenched standard in the process. Yet, firms 
with high switching costs owing to scale effects will be loathe to part from 
the old standard. They may deliberately stifle innovation to maintain a 
certain market infrastructure that is advantageous to them. Such behavior can 
explain why outdated trading systems such as that employed by the NYSE 
are still in existence.
18  
                                                  
18 Ibid.  
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10. Transatlantic Telecommunications: 
Markets, Policies and Issues 
Michael Tyler and Matthew Dixon 
1.  Introduction and Overview 
Transatlantic telecommunication, reliable, inexpensive and increasingly 
taken for granted, enables all of the other kinds of transatlantic commerce 
and economic integration. Financial markets on one side of the Atlantic 
respond within seconds to changes on the other side. Manufacturers on one 
side of the Atlantic incorporate components or whole major assemblies, built 
on the other side, all flowing across the Atlantic under tightly coordinated 
‘just-in-time’ logistics. Massive quantities of media content news, opinion, 
information and entertainment flow across the Atlantic every day. This can 
happen because the telecommunications industry provides immense capacity, 
high reliability and quality, and remarkably low prices. Transatlantic 
telephone calls to and from virtually all of the European Union countries now 
rarely cost the user more than $.20 per minute and often cost much less. Data 
transport has become so inexpensive and effortless that users on one side of 
the Atlantic accessing a website on the other side, through the Internet, are 
usually entirely unaware of the cost per megabyte or per minute, or even that 
they are accessing a resource on the other side of the Atlantic.    
This chapter discusses how that state of affairs – astounding in relation to all 
previous eras of communication – developed. It provides a profile of 
transatlantic telecommunications today and outlines an agenda of remaining 
issues for public policy that should be addressed across the Atlantic 
community of countries, if this achievement is to be sustained and extended 
through the 21
st century. 
By ‘transatlantic telecommunications’ we mean three distinct (although inter-
related) kinds of activity:  
•  the carriage of international telecommunications traffic – voice, data and 
video – between North America (the United States and Canada) and 
Europe; 
•  the extension of telecommunications operators’ networks, originally set 
up as national networks, across the Atlantic so that US networks have 
been able to gain ‘points of presence’ (PoPs) in Europe and vice-versa; 
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•  participation in the domestic communications markets of North America 
and Europe by foreign (European and North American, respectively) 
telecommunications operators, either directly or by taking an ownership 
interest in (or acquiring outright) established local telecommunications 
operators. 
We show how each of these areas has evolved and comment on the current 
issues affecting each of them. 
2.  Development of Transatlantic Telecommunications: 
Background to Today’s Industry Structure and Issues  
2.1 Origins 
Economic interdependence and integration across the Atlantic have been 
enabled and stimulated by telecommunications since the 1860s, when 
transatlantic telegraph services first came into use. Yet massive day-to-day 
use of telecommunications in business and personal life can reasonably be 
dated to the mid-1980s, when the volume of transatlantic voice and fax 
calling for the first time exceeded 1 billion minutes per year (in other words, 
more than 45,000 hours of transatlantic conversations on an average day).  
Transatlantic telecommunication has been accompanied from the start by 
remarkable accomplishments, drastic challenges and profound social and 
economic impacts. The first transatlantic telegraph cable, an enterprise 
instigated by Cyrus Field, vividly demonstrated all three aspects. The first 
cable, laid in 1858 from Valentia, Ireland, to Trinity Bay, Newfoundland, 
conveyed an inaugural telegram from Queen Victoria to President Buchanan 
of the US, expressing the hope that the cable would prove an “additional link 
between the nations whose friendship is founded on their common interest 
and reciprocal esteem”. Buchanan responded “that it is a triumph more 
glorious, because far more useful to mankind, than was ever won by 
conqueror on the field of battle”. He further wished that “the Atlantic 
telegraph, under the blessing of heaven, prove to be a bond of perpetual 
peace and friendship between the kindred nations, and an instrument destined 
by Divine Providence to diffuse religion, civilization, liberty, and law 
throughout the world”. 
The cable promptly failed a few days later, never to function again, 
demonstrating that technological triumphs should not be taken for granted. 
Perhaps subsequent experience might also prompt rueful reflections on how 
far superior technical means of communication really lead to better human 
behavior. Nevertheless, once replacement transatlantic cable systems were 
laid in 1865 and 1866 with better technology, the commercial benefits of 
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The evolution from the dots and dashes of words in Morse Code trickling 
through the telegraph cable, to today’s torrent of voice, data and video, was 
gradual at first, but accelerated dramatically from the mid 1950s. The first 
transatlantic telephone service, radio-based, was started in 1927, with tiny 
capacity and priced in the region of $15 per minute (about $150 at today’s 
value of money). TAT-1, the first transatlantic telephone cable, was 
completed in 1956, providing a grand total of 36 telephone channels. Further 
cables of much greater capacity followed, as did communications satellites, 
starting with AT&T’s Telstar I, launched in 1962 and used for television 
broadcasts and data communications as well as voice. 
2.2  The Era of Mass Scale 
The road from these early beginnings led to today’s world of $.15 per minute 
transatlantic telephone calls and more than 700,000 hours of daily calling 
across the Atlantic. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, transatlantic capacity 
increased from scores of channels to hundreds of thousands of channels and 
prices began to be reckoned in cents per minute rather than dollars. As Figure 
1 shows, by the 1990s the dollar-a-minute transatlantic telephone call was 
fast becoming a fading memory. It is noteworthy that this happened first and 
fastest on the US-UK route, as revealed in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Average US Prices for Telephone Calls to Selected European 
Countries  
























Source: FCC, Trends in the International Telephony Industry, Washington, D.C., 2004. TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMS: MARKETS, POLICIES AND ISSUES | 135 
 
The UK was the first European country that had headed down essentially the 
same road toward a regulated multi-competitor industry structure that the US 
had already embarked upon in the 1970s. The UK’s Telecommunications Act 
of 1984 (privatizing British Telecom or BT) and the licensing of competitors 
opened the market to competition. It did so in a broadly similar way as the 
US Execunet decision of 1977, the break-up of AT&T and industry 
restructuring from January 1984 under Judge Greene’s Modification of Final 
Judgment (MFJ) and the series of pro-competitive decisions of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the courts in the US. 
Low prices, combined with high service quality and ample capacity, created 
mass-scale use of transatlantic telecommunications, as Figure 2 shows. No 
longer was a transatlantic telephone call the preserve a handful of financiers, 
political office holders and members of top management. In the first half of 
the 1980s, traffic doubled; then it doubled again by 1990. In the 1990s, the 
pattern was repeated, but now the scale was much larger: in 2000, the traffic 
volume was about 20 times the 1980 level and growth continued unabated 
into the 21
st century.  
Figure 2. US-Europe Voice Traffic (both directions combined) 1980-2002 
















































Source: FCC, Trends in the International Telephony Industry, Washington, D.C., 2004. 
Some further notable features of the large-scale transatlantic 
telecommunications business, as it took shape in the 1990s, are apparent in 
Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the large (and, through most of the 1990s, 
widening) gap between the volume of traffic from Europe to the US and the 
much larger volume of traffic from the US to Europe.  136 | TYLER & DIXON 
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This gap, partly reflecting the more competitive conditions in the US, with 
lower prices for calls, resulted in very large net out-payments by US 
operators under the settlement arrangements that formed an integral part of 
the traditional correspondent system, and consequently growing pressures for 
change in the accounting rate system. These pressures were reflected in 
petitions to the FCC, in FCC policy positions, in bilateral negotiations 
between the US government and European governments and in multilateral 
trade-in-services negotiations held under the auspices of the WTO agreement 
and its predecessor the GATT. All these factors contributed to the recent 
transformation of transatlantic telecommunications described in the next 
section. 
Figure 3. Voice Traffic, 1992-2002 





















































Source: FCC, Trends in the International Telephony Industry, Washington, D.C., 2004. 
Finally, Figure 4 completes the picture for basic telephone service by 
showing the pattern of traffic growth for several different country-pairs. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of this pattern is the very strong growth 
apparent, especially since 2000, in US-UK traffic. This reflects the effects 
over time of the pro-competitive policy stance of the UK government, the 
openness of the market to competitive entry, and the consequent pressure on 
the incumbent operator (BT) to keep its services and prices fully competitive.  TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMS: MARKETS, POLICIES AND ISSUES | 137 
 
Figure 4. Voice Traffic between the US and European Countries 










































Sources: FCC, Tyler & Company analysis. 
This period not only saw the rapid expansion just described and evolutionary 
changes toward a more competitive industry structure (with newer players 
such as MCI and Sprint in the US and Mercury in the UK participating in the 
correspondent system), but also the emergence of radically new 
developments that have begun to reshape the telecommunications industry. 
Although reshaping always takes much longer than the breathless 
commentaries of business journalists might lead us to believe, reshaping has 
undoubtedly been in progress since the early 1990s. Notable features of the 
reshaping included: 
•  the transition of the Internet from a network used mainly by universities 
and a few leading-edge businesses to a familiar, indeed ubiquitous, tool 
of everyday life and work. In 1991, the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) (a United Nations specialized agency that plays a central 
role in international telecommunications) reported 4.4m Internet users 
worldwide; in 2001, this had risen to half a billion;  
•  the emergence of Internet voice telephony, using voice-over-Internet 
protocol (VoIP) technology to provide telephone calls over the Internet 
as a low-cost competitive alternative to conventional international 
telephone service;  138 | TYLER & DIXON 
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•  the extension of national telephone networks across the Atlantic, creating 
truly international networks (‘trans-national networks’) under a single 
ownership and management for the first time; and 
•  the emergence of a number of other new modes of operation (later 
described in detail), which, unlike trans-national networks, were 
affordable for smaller companies, thus greatly reducing the barriers to 
entry in the transatlantic telecommunications business. Trading-
exchange operations emerged such as Arbinet (based in the US) and 
Band-X (based in the UK) through which smaller players as well as 
larger ones could buy and sell traffic and wholesale services to transmit 
and complete calls. 
In the next section, we describe more fully the reshaping of transatlantic 
telecommunications that resulted from these far-reaching developments. 
We do so by first reviewing how the transatlantic telephone service 
business worked before the reshaping; then discuss the impact of the 
forces for change; and finally seek to give a balanced picture of the 
situation today, indicating the (many) elements of continuity as well as 
the far-reaching changes that are in progress.  
3.  Structure and Structural Change 
3.1  The Old Structure: Traffic Exchange between National 
Correspondents 
Transatlantic telecommunication reached the dollar-a-minute, 2-3 billion 
minute per year, mass-scale stage of the late 1980s, apparent at a glance in 
Figures 1 and 2, under essentially the same traditional, historical industry 
structure that had prevailed since the late 19
th century. Because this structure 
shaped much of the transatlantic telecommunications business as it is today 
and large elements of it remain in place, an outline of it is essential to 
understanding the present, despite the far-reaching structural changes that 
have taken place since the 1980s. The traditional structure originally 
consisted largely of national ‘incumbent’ operators such as AT&T in the US; 
and BT, France Telecom, Telecom Italia and their numerous other national 
counterparts in Europe, exchanging traffic. BT, for example, would sell a 
UK-to-US call in the UK, pass it to AT&T for completion in the US and pay 
AT&T a fee (based on notional price called an ‘accounting rate’) for doing 
so. This structure has often been called the ‘correspondent system’. As new 
operators were licensed such as MCI or Sprint in the US, Mercury in the UK, 
or Tele2 in Sweden, they too joined the correspondent system.  TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMS: MARKETS, POLICIES AND ISSUES | 139 
 
One useful summary of the correspondent system for the exchange of 
transatlantic traffic takes the form of the following three short points: 
•  Incumbent national operators own domestic networks and international 
gateways.  
•  The gateways in a pair of countries are linked by international 
transmission facilities (cable or satellite), which are owned by the 
national operators under a variety of arrangements (but were 
traditionally thought of as ‘half-circuits’ meeting at a notional mid-point 
between the two countries).  
•  Under ‘settlement’ arrangements, operators notionally pay each other for 
terminating each international call, according to a settlement rate, which 
represents an agreed share (usually 50%) of an internationally agreed 
wholesale price (the accounting rate). Such arrangements provide for 
periodic settlements between the two operators of the net balance of such 
charges. 
The pattern varied a little from case to case. For example, the US side 
historically had ‘record’ carriers providing non-voice (text and data) services 
alongside AT&T’s voice services. From January 1984, the newly formed 
regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) carried originating international 
calls to AT&T, and terminated international calls passed to them by AT&T. 
Some European countries also had variations on this type of arrangement, 
with a division between the international carrier and separate domestic, 
regional or local operators. In the US, as MCI and Sprint grew through the 
1980s and 1990s, they joined AT&T as part of the US pillar of the 
correspondent system. Still, the broad lines of that system were more or less 
universal and more or less stable over time; and, as the numbers in Figures 1 
and 2 show, the system worked.  
Today, the same companies are still and will continue to be, very important 
players and a large majority of the telephone traffic across the Atlantic is still 
passed from one of the incumbent national carriers in Europe (the former 
national monopolies) to AT&T, MCI or Sprint in the US; or vice versa. The 
terminology has changed, but the reality of the market structure has changed 
much less. The economics of the reciprocal exchange of traffic remain an 
important factor stabilizing the market structure. Nevertheless, fundamental 
changes are emerging as discussed in the next section. 
3.2  Forces for Change 
Two fundamental forces have begun to transform the structure of 
transatlantic telecommunications (discussed in more detail in the next 
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•  the emergence of newer modes of operation that represent alternatives to 
the correspondent system, even in its current modernized form; and 
•  the changing regulatory frameworks emerging from a combination of 
national regulatory and legislative activity and international negotiations 
resulting in international treaty law. 
Newer Modes of Operation 
Alongside the old-established correspondent system described above, which 
has been relabeled and modified, but is still very much in business (to 
paraphrase from Mark Twain, rumors of its death have been greatly 
exaggerated), newer alternative modes of operation have emerged: 
•  leased-line resale; 
•  refile, hubbing and re-origination; 
•  trans-national networks, in which a network initially set up with national 
scope is extended to include PoPs in other countries: in this case, across 
the Atlantic; 
•  international alliances; and 
•  Internet telephony. 
We briefly discuss each of these in turn, indicating how their respective roles 
and impacts have varied over time.  
Leased-Line Resale 
In leased-line resale, newer operators make up for the limited reach of their 
own network facilities by renting leased line capacity from more established 
carriers and using it, in conjunction with their own switching capabilities, to 
provide international telephone services. Calls originate on the pre-existing 
public, switched telephone network (PSTN), usually provided by a long-
established ‘incumbent’ operator such as an RBOC, AT&T or BT. These are 
then transmitted to the destination country by a leased line or other bulk 
private transmission facility, before terminating through the destination 
PSTN. This mode of operation, often called ‘international simple resale’ 
(ISR), was historically a major factor in making cheap transatlantic calls 
available to European and North American consumers, by greatly reducing 
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Refile, Hubbing and Re-origination 
In a refile operation, a telecommunications operator sends international 
traffic to an intermediate ‘hub’ country (e.g. one where a more competitive, 
open market ensures lower charges), for ‘reorigination’ to the ultimate 
destination country. The operator in the intermediate country settles the 
termination charge with the incumbent in the ultimate destination, who has 
no indication of the actual origin of the call. 
Trans-national Networks with Foreign PoPs  
The example of MCI WorldCom (notwithstanding the financial travails that 
the company underwent subsequently because of fraud) illustrates well how 
trans-national networks have emerged. In the 1990s, the US company MFS 
not only pioneered the concept of independent Metropolitan Area Networks 
(MANs) (alongside another US company, TCG) and built numerous MANs 
across the US, but extended this activity to the construction of MANs in 
many European cities as well. By acquiring MFS and connecting its various 
MANs on both sides of the Atlantic to international links and to MCI 
WorldCom’s US domestic long-distance (‘inter-exchange’) network, MCI 
WorldCom became able to carry transatlantic calls all the way from a US 
customer to any one of numerous foreign PoPs. The PoPs connected locally 
into the pre-existing foreign PSTN. This by-passed the old correspondent 
system, and thus the payment of settlements to foreign correspondent 
carriers, substituting instead much smaller charges for local interconnection. 
In some cases, MCI WorldCom was even able to carry the call end-to-end 
over its own facilities, launching comprehensive facilities-based competition 
with the incumbent operator within the destination country. The role of the 
foreign incumbent’s network in terminating incoming transatlantic calls was 
diminished, and for calls to locations connected to the destination MAN (‘on-
net’ locations), it disappeared altogether. 
International Alliances 
Telecommunications operators have attempted several times to pool or share 
transmission capacity and certain classes of traffic and revenue, under 
diverse alliance arrangements. Most examples have been in the market for 
worldwide telecommunications services to multinational corporations 
(MNCs): they have at various times included Concert (led by AT&T and BT) 
and Global One (led by France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint). Yet 
most examples have not been successful. Both Concert and Global One 
disappeared in 2001. 




Internet telephony has been ‘waiting in the wings’ to play a major role in the 
transatlantic telephone service business, providing a low-price alternative, 
since it was first demonstrated commercially in the mid 1990s. Similarly IP 
telephony – using similar Internet protocol (IP) technology, but not over the 
public Internet – has been expected for a long period to become a major 
feature in the marketplace. Two factors have led this potential to become a 
large-scale reality in the mid-1990s: 
•  the emergence of technology, such as the advanced software codec 
provided by Skype, which assures an acceptable quality of voice signal; 
and 
•  the recent enormous expansion in broadband access, for example DSL, 
which provides large numbers of residential and small business 
customers with a sufficiently fast data connection. 
Together these allow consumers and service providers to substitute data for 
voice telephony services. The most basic form of this substitution requires 
nothing more than a software client application operated by the end-user on 
an Internet-connected personal computer. At the other extreme are ranges of 
high-end IP services. Between these two poles are many hybrid solutions that 
effectively resell or repurpose data transmission capacity for use in all or part 
of a voice call. 
Evolving Roles of the New Modes of Operation 
In the transatlantic marketplace, the mix between the various new modes of 
operation has varied rapidly over time. Leased-line resale, refile, hubbing 
and re-origination have played an important role in bringing about the onset 
of competition. They have greatly reduced the barriers to entry into the 
international telephone service business, but in recent years have shown a 
diminishing return as competitive market pressures have reduced the pricing 
anomalies between different types of switched calls and leased line pricing, 
which were ‘arbitraged’ by these modes of operation. Trans-national 
networks were expected, in the heyday of MCI WorldCom and by the efforts 
of Cable & Wireless of the UK, to build a truly global network. The reality 
has proven in the event to be much more modest: there has certainly been 
some interpenetration of networks across frontiers, with the establishment of 
foreign PoPs, but most traffic is still exchanged through an updated form of 
the traditional correspondent system. In our view, the greatest strategic 
significance of trans-national networks is a competitive safeguard: a 
competitive ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over each correspondent operator.  
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3.3  Changing Public Policy, Legislation and Regulation 
In this section, we discuss the impact of changing public policy, legislation 
and regulation under three headings: 
•  US public policy, legislation and regulation; 
•  European public policy, legislation and regulation, at both the EU level 
and the national level; and  
•  international agreements. 
In each case, we do not purport to cover the entire immense range and 
complexity of national (and EU) telecommunications law and policy. 
Instead, we simply pick out those aspects we consider most salient for an 
understanding of today’s transatlantic telecommunications business and the 
agenda of current policy issues affecting it. 
US Public Policy, Legislation and Regulation 
In many respects, the US telecommunications environment is still strongly 
shaped by the provisions of the 1934 Communications Act, which created the 
FCC. The 1996 Telecommunications Act extensively revised pre-existing 
law, notably by clarifying and extending the FCC’s authority to choose to 
‘forbear’ from regulation when it finds that market conditions justify this. 
Further, the 1996 Act clarified and relaxed the conditions under which the 
RBOCs would be allowed to provide long-distance (‘inter-exchange’) and 
international services. Finally, it gave the US the ability to make certain 
international market-opening commitments, as discussed below. Out of all 
the complex history of US public policy, legislation and regulation for 
telecommunications, we have selected the following strands of this history as 
having particular relevance to an understanding of today’s industry structure 
and policy environment for transatlantic telecommunications: 
•  the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) settling the Department of 
Justice/AT&T anti-trust case. From January 1984, this broke up the pre-
existing Bell system into a new and reduced (but still very large) AT&T 
and the segregated RBOCs; 
•  a series of case-by-case FCC decisions on the extent to which non-US 
telecommunications operators were permitted to carry traffic into the US 
from abroad, or from the US to other countries (as distinct from 
exchanging traffic with US operators under the traditional correspondent 
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•  the development by the FCC of a doctrine codifying its approach to such 
decisions, known as the equivalent competitive opportunities (ECO-) 
test, and based in essence on a doctrine of reciprocity, i.e. only allowing 
telecoms operators from outside the US the same opportunities extended 
to US-based operators;  
•  a period of controversy over the ECO-test doctrine, following ratification 
of the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement (discussed below) by 
the US Senate and focusing on two incompatible approaches involved – 
strict reciprocity, in the case of the ECO-test; and the principles of 
national treatment and most favored nation that apply to the application 
of market-opening commitments made by national governments under 
the Basic Telecommunications Agreement (like all WTO agreements);  
•  the resulting revocation of the ECO-test doctrine in FCC decisions of 
November 1997, which retained certain safeguards against anti-
competitive behavior by foreign operators (mainly designed to prevent 
them leveraging market power in their home markets to gain an 
advantage in the US) and which were claimed to be non-discriminatory 
and therefore legitimate under the WTO Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement. The application of this is well illustrated by the FCC’s 
recent consideration of Deutsche Telekom’s acquisition of WorldStream. 
Some observers have criticized this regime as deterring competitive 
entry and investment by creating uncertainty as to what will and will not 
be permitted;  
•  a current controversy (addressed by an FCC policy statement in 
November 2004) over the FCC’s use of its radio licensing powers, and 
whether the way it does this is equitable to foreign telecoms operators 
(the FCC claims it has little discretion under current US law to waive 
various restrictions that foreign operators are objecting to); and  
•  the ORBIT Act, which reflected the objections of several US 
commercial satellite communications players to competition from 
Intelsat, Inmarsat and certain other satellite operating organizations 
benefiting from international treaty rights. The ORBIT Act imposed far-
reaching preconditions on these organizations before they would be 
permitted to compete fully in the US market. This delayed the full 
removal of barriers to entry in satellite communications for many years; 
but with recent changes of ownership (the affected organizations are now 
primarily owned by private equity investors), the ORBIT Act obstacles 
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Overall, this complex history has moved the US regulatory environment for 
transatlantic telecommunications a very long way toward providing for a 
transatlantic ‘single market’ comparable to the single market that now exists 
throughout the EU. Nevertheless, as indicated by the last two aspects we 
cited, difficulties and obstacles are by no means a thing of the past. 
European Public Policy, Legislation and Regulation (EU and 
National) 
The evolution of European telecoms markets has been shaped by the 
interaction of national and EU level policy, regulation and legislation. We 
discern four stages. In the first stage, some EU member states, notably 
Sweden and the UK, took a lead in moving toward a more pro-competitive 
policy and a multi-player industry structure (e.g. the UK’s privatization of 
BT and the establishment of the BT-Mercury duopoly in 1984). In the second 
stage, beginning at the end of the 1980s, these ‘leading edge’ countries 
moved to a more radically pro-competitive approach. The UK for example 
abolished the duopoly and established essentially open entry into the 
domestic fixed-service business. Additional countries moved at the national 
level toward a pro-competitive policy. At the European level, the EU’s 1990 
Framework Directive became law throughout the EU member states. This 
legislation established basic principles for the licensing of operators and for 
harmonization of ‘network access’ (for example, interconnection rights for 
new operators) in EU member states. 
The third stage involved a package of more detailed EU measures designed 
to extend the EU Single Market, by then long-established for trade in goods, 
to telecommunications services. This package, which came in to force at the 
beginning of 1998 made it mandatory for national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), such as OFTEL in the UK (subsequently, OFCOM) to provide that 
national regulatory rules: 
•  ensure non-discriminatory licensing in each EU country of telecoms 
operators from other EU countries; 
•  permit unrestricted ownership of domestic telecoms operations in each 
EU country by telecoms operators from other EU countries; 
•  mandate unrestricted rights of interconnection to the pre-existing PSTN 
in each EU country for telecoms operators from other EU countries, on 
non-discriminatory terms and at prices bearing a reasonable relationship 
to costs; and 
•  forbid various specific forms of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent 
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These rules were extended to benefit certain associated European countries 
not in the EU (notable Norway and Switzerland); they were also (as we 
describe more fully below) extended by means of the WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement, to benefit telecoms operators from other 
WTO member countries, including the US and Canada. All of this was 
intended to come into force simultaneously on January 1, 1998 and despite 
some delays in the case of the WTO agreement, all of it was in fact in force 
by the end of 1998.  
The fourth stage of the evolution was the new regulatory framework (NRF), 
introduced in 2002. This superseded the pre-existing EU legislative 
framework, although not the provisions of the WTO agreement. The NRF 
consists of several separate legislative instruments, together with guidelines 
for their application issued by the European Commission. It requires NRAs 
under the oversight of the Commission to use the following process for 
regulatory decisions: 
•  definition and analysis of markets according to principles of competition 
law and economics;  
•  assessment of significant market power (SMP) within those markets. The 
concept of SMP is aligned with the competition law concept of market 
dominance, and NRAs are permitted to regulate only where they can 
show that a telecoms operator has SMP and that there is consequent 
economic harm (or the potential for harm); and 
•  the design and imposition of remedies that are proportionate to the 
problems resulting from SMP. 
The framework is based on two key principles: 
•  technology neutrality – regulatory measures should not discriminate 
between equivalent services delivered over different technological 
platforms, for example along the PSTN or cable-TV systems; and 
•  a forward-looking basis – unlike competition law (which, with the 
exception of consideration of proposed mergers, is applied on an ex post 
basis in response to identifiable abuses by a market player), the market 
definition, SMP analysis and design of remedies are all undertaken on an 
ex ante basis. 
The most important practical effects of the NRF legislation, from the point of 
view of this chapter, have been: 
•  the licensing of telecoms operators, such as newer entrants that do not 
have SMP in European markets, has become little more than a formality, 
except where scarce radio spectrum (which may already have been 
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•  most European incumbent telecom operators have been found to have 
SMP in fixed line and data communications markets. As a result, they 
have been subject to remedies generally centering on the mandated 
provision of wholesale network access, including regulated 
interconnection and provision of wholesale network services (often 
including local loop unbundling), to their competitors. They have also 
been subject to a degree of separation of wholesale and retail activities 
(usually accounting separation for ensuring transparent regulated pricing 
of interconnection and related wholesale offerings used by competitors). 
International agreements to which the EU (which nowadays acts on behalf of 
all member states in such matters) is a party have had the effect of extending 
to telecoms operators from outside the EU, on a non-discriminatory basis,  
the various rights of unrestricted licensing and interworking with the 
incumbent’s networks. In the case of European countries not yet in the EU 
(such as Norway, Switzerland and various Eastern European countries), this 
was assured by the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty and various 
Association Agreements. For a much wider group of countries, including the 
US and Canada, it was assured by the WTO Basic Telecommunication 
Agreement, which we discuss below.  
International Agreements 
The efficient operation of transatlantic telecommunications businesses 
depends, to a much greater extent than is usually appreciated, on two kinds 
of international agreements concerning: 
•  technical and operational matters, such as the use of radio frequencies 
and the geostationary orbit, numbering, and technical standards and 
compatibility; and 
•  commercial matters, especially market access and participation across 
national frontiers. 
The first of these, involving institutions ranging from the ITU to the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is of great practical importance and we fear 
the potential consequences of not-so benign neglect: to maintain high quality 
operations in an increasingly complex and diverse environment will require 
more resources, not less. 
The second of these has been critical in creating a competitive 
transatlantic marketplace: the centerpiece of a complex web of bilateral 
and multilateral agreements is the WTO Basic Telecommunication 
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3.4  WTO Basic Telecommunication Agreement 
Foreign operators’ freedom to establish their own interconnections with 
incumbent networks was assured under the WTO Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement. The agreement was concluded in 1997 and came in to force 
during 1998. Technically a protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), it was adopted as part of the WTO Treaty (the Marrakech 
Agreement) finalized in 1995 and implemented to varying timetables in the 
years immediately following. Under the agreement, national governments 
committed to ‘schedules of commitments’ in varying degrees to different 
measures to open their telecommunications markets to competition. In 
practice, American, Canadian and European governments made some of the 
most far-reaching market-opening commitments and these commitments 
have been transposed (not without some conflict and controversy) into 
national (and in Europe, EU) legislation and regulation. The commitments 
addressed the following areas: rights of entry for foreign competitors in 
domestic and international fixed markets, rights of foreign operators to 
establish networks and non-discriminatory interconnection at cost-based 
prices. 
4.  Current Industry Structure and Market Dynamics: The 
Impact of Technological, Commercial, Legislative and 
Regulatory Forces for Change 
This section discusses the state of transatlantic telecommunications today, 
focusing especially on the impact that can already be seen from the new 
modes of operation and the changing policy, legislative and regulatory 
environment, described above. We discuss in turn two different aspects of 
the telecoms business spanning the Atlantic: 
•  the carriage of international telecoms traffic – voice, data and video – 
between North America (the US and Canada) and Europe, whether under 
correspondent relationships or through newer modes of operation such as 
the extension of telecoms operators’ networks, originally set up as 
national networks (although interconnected to other national networks) 
across the Atlantic, so that US networks gained PoPs in Europe and vice-
versa; and 
•  participation in the domestic communications markets of North America 
and Europe by foreign (European and North American respectively) 
telecoms operators, either directly or by taking an ownership interest (or 
even by outright acquisition) of established local communications 
operators. 
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4.1  The Carriage of International Telecommunications Traffic 
An overview of the current state of the market for international telecoms 
traffic – voice, data and video – across the Atlantic shows that the various 
‘forces for change’ we reviewed in the previous section have had a 
substantial effect. Scholars debate endlessly about the relative importance of 
the various factors. For example, did the WTO Basic Telecommunication 
Agreement change the course of events, or did it merely record and 
consolidate what was happening anyway? Here we do not attempt to answer 
such questions or even debate whether or not they matter: there is no doubt 
that the cumulative effect of all these factors has led to a much more 
competitive environment, with a trans-national competitive marketplace 
across the Atlantic region of the world. Rather, we point to three notable 
aspects of the current state of the market, all of them manifestations of 
themes already identified. 
First, increasing competition from new entrants has eroded incumbents’ 
market share considerably. One of the many indications of this is provided 
by the European Commission’s data on the market shares of the incumbent 
telephone companies in Europe, such as BT or France Telecom. These data, 
summarized in Figure 5, show that while incumbent market shares across all 
communications services have declined substantially as communications 
markets have become more liberalized, incumbents have enjoyed far lower 
market shares in international communications than in local ones. 
Figure 5. Average Market share of Incumbent Firms in EU-15 Countries  

































Source:  European Commission, Implementation of the Regulatory Framework in the 
Member states – 10th Report, COM(2004) 759 final, Brussels, December 2, 
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Second, available capacity has continued to increase, driven by both new 
physical transmission capacity and by using existing capacity more 
efficiently. In particular, there is still a significant overhang of unlit 
transatlantic capacity. While the cost of lighting this capacity is by no means 
negligible, its availability suggests continued downward price pressure. 
Figure 6. Cable Capacity 




























Source: Telegeography, 2004. 
Figure 7. Estimated of Transatlantic Switched and VoIP Minutes 
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Third, the impact of Internet telephony on the industry, although many 
commentators have exaggerated it so far, is now quite significant. Figure 7 
shows our estimate of the number of VoIP minutes on transatlantic routes, 
derived from using data on worldwide circuit-switched and VoIP minutes. 
These figures do not include computer-to-computer VoIP where, for 
example, Skype claims to have ‘served’ 7 billion minutes since its launch in 
2003. The effect is to create additional price pressure and open up major new 
opportunities for entrants. 
4.2  Trans-national Market Participation and Investment 
A review of the current degree of openness of European and US 
telecommunications markets shows few remaining restrictions on foreign 
ownership and wide participation by foreign communications operations. 
There are a very few exceptions; in some cases there are notification 
requirements for ownership changes. In the US the FCC retains legal 
authority to deny radio licenses to companies with more than 25% foreign 
ownership on the grounds of public-interest. 
Companies on both sides of the Atlantic have participated in each other’s 
markets, both by directly owned operations and by taking ownership stakes. 
This has been most pronounced, as Table 1 shows, in the faster evolving and 
growing markets: in mobile communications and in cable networks whose 
ability to offer voice and data communications services has increasingly 
made them major competitors to incumbents’ PSTN-based services. It has 
also taken place in wholesale capacity markets, with the acquisition and 
construction of fiber-optic backbone networks. Although the Table 1 is 
necessarily selective, the scale of these participations demonstrates that what 
has arguably been the major item on the international policy agenda of the 
last 20 years, namely to lower barriers systematically to competitive entry, 
has in large part been achieved. 
New Players 
Superficially, one might ask how it is that in an era of market liberalization, a 
list of leading players on major routes including transatlantic routes would 
turn up names familiar to the industry for at least 20 years (in the case of the 
American long distance carriers) and longer (in the case of the European 
incumbents). In fact, competition has been generated largely by the 
emergence of new markets based on new technologies and only to a lesser 
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Most obviously, the growth and consolidation of the mobile telephony 
market has created a small number of very large and powerful players (such 
as Vodafone) and fixed-to-mobile substitution is now a significant factor in 
consumer demand for traditional services.  
Further, the emergence of the cable industry as a competing provider of 
fixed-line telephony services and the convergence of voice and data 
communications services have created powerful new sources of competition 
for traditional telecommunications. Participation in these markets has proved 
an effective route to transnational competition. 
5.  The Outlook and the Policy Agenda  
From one point of view, one might even ask why there is a policy agenda in 
transatlantic telecommunications. We have shown that the sector is a success 
story: soaring productivity, plummeting prices and rapid innovation. We 
have also considered how increasingly open transatlantic competition has 
grown and added to this favorable result. It contributes strongly to 
productivity gains in user industries, and since every industry is a 
telecommunications user (although some, like financial services and 
international trade, are naturally more intensive users than others), the 
beneficial effect is pervasive across the economy. The industry consumes 
little energy, hardly pollutes at all (except perhaps for some concerns, still 
very much subject to further research, about the possible biological effects of 
radio frequency energy). So what is there to make policy about? 
We have picked out four key areas we foresee as being important for future 
policy debate, intentionally highlighting some that are relatively ‘low profile’ 
and perceived as specialized and technical or whose importance has yet to be 
fully recognized. These four are: 
•  sustaining key measures to facilitate competitive entry and physically 
efficient operation. These include the management of the numbering 
plan and addressing as well as standards for interworking/ 
interoperability among the growing range of networks, technologies and 
players; 
•  managing the remaining issues concerning market entry, open 
competition and non-discriminatory treatment of foreign 
telecommunications operators within the North Atlantic region. Even as 
a ‘single transatlantic market’ emerges, that is not to say that it is ever 
free of disputes or issues; 
•  management of common resources such as spectrum, the role of 
innovative approaches to this resource (e.g. spectrum trading), with a 
possible international marketplace for spectrum rights; and TRANSATLANTIC TELECOMS: MARKETS, POLICIES AND ISSUES | 155 
 
•  emerging controversies pitching the public interest in interoperability 
against intellectual property issues raised by proprietary formats (e.g. 
voice communication codecs integrated into online chat software 
applications). 
Because of the pervasive importance of telecommunications as an essential 
infrastructure and productivity enhancer for other sectors throughout the 
economy, which we emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, successfully 
managing policy issues in these and other areas will be of major importance 
to the Atlantic economy as a whole.  
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11.  Telecommunications Services: 
A Transatlantic Perspective 
Andrea Renda 
Introduction: The Telecommunications Anomaly 
Over the past two decades, the information and communication technologies 
(ICT) sector has gradually become the most important engine of economic 
growth, productivity and welfare for developed and developing countries. 
The ICT industry in 2005 was valued at €2.044 trillion. The transatlantic 
economy accounts for 61.4% of the global ICT industry, with the United 
States and the EU respectively comprising 29.3% and 32.1% of the total. 
Yet the two regions have experienced starkly different patterns of growth in 
this sector. The US showed a real productivity boost during the late 1990s, 
thanks to the development of its ICT sector, which appears to have driven 
two-thirds of US economic growth.
1 Today, even after the Internet bubble, 
US growth has gradually resumed, with estimates of 3.9% for 2005 and 4.5% 
in 2006.
2 The EU, on the other hand, not only lags consistently behind the 
US, it is being outperformed by Asian countries, notably South Korea, India, 
China and Japan. The European Commission reported that as much as 40% 
of the productivity growth in the EU between 1995 and 2000 stemmed from 
ICT, although an important productivity gap remains between the EU and the 
US, which can be explained largely by the EU’s lower investments in ICT.
3  
Both the US and the EU have formulated ambitious goals in the ICT sector. 
On March 26, 2004, President George W. Bush launched the new US 
broadband policy, aiming at achieving universal broadband availability no 
later than 2007. At the March 2000 European Council meeting in Lisbon, 
European Union leaders declared the EU’s ambition to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010, highlighting 
ICT as a main driver to achieve that goal. The key role of information and 
communications technology in the Lisbon strategy was also confirmed in the 
                                                      
1 See inter alia D. Jorgenson, “Information Technology and the U.S. Economy”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 1-32. 
2 Data derived from the European Information Technology Observatory (EITO), 
2005 Annual Report, EITO, Frankfurt. 
3 See B. Van Ark and O. Mahony, EU Productivity and Competitiveness: An 
Industry Perspective – Can Europe Resume the Catching-up process?, Office for 
Official Publications of the EU, Luxembourg, 2003.  TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 157 
 
Europe Action Plan at the spring Council meeting in 2004, as well as the 
recent Kok Report and the new i2010 initiative launched on June 1, 2005.
4 
Fulfilling such ambitious goals, however, crucially depends on whether 
national governments and regulators will be able to stimulate investment and 
competition in their telecommunication (hereafter telecom) infrastructures. 
Recent data show that both US and EU telecom industries have started to 
rebound, after the ‘boom and bust’ phase at the beginning of this decade. The 
sector’s worldwide revenues have climbed from $388 million in 1991 to 
$952 million in 2003.
5 The European Information Technology Observatory 
(EITO) has recently estimated growth of the telecoms sector in Europe at 
3.7% for 2005 and 3.3% for 2006, whereas the US market is expected to 
grow by 3.1% in 2005 and 3.2% in 2006. Europe accounts for 30.7% and the 
US for 21.6% of the €1.126 trillion global telecoms sector.
6 As shown in 
Table 1, nine of the world’s top ten telecommunication firms are based either 
in the US or in the EU, except the Japanese giant NTT DoCoMo. 
The current resurgence of investment and growth in turn calls for action by 
national governments to adapt their regulatory frameworks to the changing 
industry landscape and to open up their markets to competition from national 
and foreign carriers, to the advantage of end-users. Thus scholars and policy-
makers are devoting attention to spurring transatlantic dialogue for the 
creation of an integrated US-EU telecoms services market. Such an 
integrated market is still hindered by the persistence of diverging regulatory 
frameworks, incompatible standards and non-tariff barriers to inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Yet, starting with the 1998 EU-US Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA) on communications equipment, many steps 
have been taken toward enhanced cooperation by both sides toward further 
integration. These initiatives have been transposed into positive, constructive 
endeavors after the 2004 EU-US summit, where officials pledged continued 
cooperation in the area of telecommunications during the Brussels meeting of 
the annual Information Society Dialogue (ISD) on September 17, 2004.  
                                                      
4 See the report by V. Kok, Facing the Challenge (retrieved from 
http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/pdf/kok_report_en.pdf), November 2004 and 
the European Commission’s Communication, i2010 – A European Information 
Society for Growth and Employment, COM(2005)229, Brussels, June 1, 2005 
(report retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/i2010/ 
index_en.htm). 
5 The source of this data is OECD Key ICT Indicators, 2005. Mobile service 
revenues only accounted for 7% of overall revenues in 1991 and reached 35.3% 
in 2003. 
6 See EITO (2005), op. cit. In the IT sector, the opposite occurs: the US accounts 









Table 1. Top 10 Telecoms Services Firms ($ millions and number employed) 




















NTT  Japan  92,679  87,948  91,026  224,000  213,062 3,178 3,118  -603  -6,657 
Verizon    US  64,707  67,625  67,734  260,000  245,000 – –  11,797  4,079 
France 
Telecom 
France  30,480  46,600  52,048  188,866  211,554 530 680 3,313  -20,500 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Germany  37,559  50,650  50,528  170,000  255,896 642 849 5,437  -23,195 
Vodafone  UK  11,929  33,109  47,962  29,465  67,178 109 164  838  -23,413 
SBC    US  51,374  43,138  42,310  220,090  175,980 – –  7,800  5,653 
AT&T  US  46,850  37,827  36,480  84,800  71,000 313 254 4,669  -13,082 
Telecom 
Italia 
Italy  27,516  31,200  32,983  107,171  101,713 247 124 3,231  781 
BT  UK  28,356  30,685  30,460  132,000  108,600 552 540 2,111  -1,093 
Telefonica  Spain  24,100  31,800  26,739  145,730  161,029 – – 725  1,800 
Total     –  415,550  460,582  478,270  1,562,122  1,611,012  5,570  5,729  39,317  -75,626 
Note: Revenues for 2003 are based on the financial year reported in 2003 or the most recent four quarters. 
Sources: OECD, IT Outlook (2004) and OECD, Key ICT Indicators (2005). TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 159 
 
The future transatlantic dialogue in the communications field will necessarily 
have to take into account the changes that have occurred in the telecoms 
industry over the past few years. These changes include the ongoing 
transition from wireline to wireless telephony, fast-growing competition 
from all-Internet protocol (IP) networks, fixed-mobile substitution and 
increased convergence between end-to-end communication technologies and 
broadcasting services, which promote ‘premium’ content as one of the main 
spurs of success for all kinds of network operators. For this reason, the first 
section of this paper provides a brief overview of major trends in the 
telecoms industries on both sides of the Atlantic, identifying key drivers and 
consolidation trends in the fixed-line and mobile sectors. The second section 
illustrates some of the remaining obstacles that hinder the creation of a 
transatlantic telecoms market, with specific emphasis on existing non-tariff 
barriers between the EU and the US. The third section concludes by 
suggesting possible advantages that might follow from enhanced regulatory 
convergence and cooperation for global industry operators as well as for 
consumers. 
Industry Trends: A Global Reshape  
The worldwide telecoms industry is changing at a breathtaking pace. Only a 
few years ago, telecoms markets in most countries were simply the realm of 
state-owned (EU) or privately owned (US) monopolies. The first wave of 
liberalization started in the US with the breakup of AT&T in 1984. Later, the 
US 1996 Telecommunications Act and the European Regulatory Framework 
on Electronic Communications created important pre-conditions for greater 
competition in wireline and mobile telephone markets. Today, both of these 
pieces of legislation appear hardly suited to govern market change effectively 
and efficiently.  
The fixed-line sector is increasingly going wireless and IP-enabled, whereas 
the mobile sector is rapidly moving to broadband, becoming a viable 
substitute for fixed voice and data services. The number of mobile 
subscribers has already overcome that of fixed-line users, and fixed-mobile 
substitution is one of the main causes for the gradual margin erosion suffered 
by traditional fixed-line incumbents. Such operators – although still enjoying 
large market shares in most EU countries – are now struggling to resist the 
increased competitive pressure from mobile and voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
service providers, which are credited with better market prospects and higher 
margins (especially third-generation or 3G players). Finally, the convergence 
between Internet-based communication technologies, broadband 
technologies and broadcast services has significantly reshaped the 
competitive arena, paving the way for future inter-platform competition. The 
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demand is leading industry operators to adopt comprehensive market 
strategies (such as ‘triple play’), in which network operators increasingly 
take the role of platform operators competing in multi-sided markets.  
As a result, the competitive strategies adopted by most industry operators 
have become increasingly ‘consumer-centric’, as consumer attention is 
emerging as the scarcest and (thus) most precious resource in an all-IP world. 
Accordingly, players in the fixed, mobile, broadcast and content industries 
are now becoming familiar with new challenges, such as ‘competition for 
eyeballs’ and inter-platform competition, which call for new revenue-sharing 
models focused on enhanced cooperation with competitors (so-called ‘co-
opetition’), content providers and device manufacturers. The new, proactive 
role of consumers in expressing their preferences also leads to increasingly 
diversified pricing strategies, which require careful use of versioning and flat 
pricing schemes. In this changing landscape, consumers are becoming ‘pro-
sumers’ and many industry players are reverting to regional strategies instead 
of striving to become global.  
All these developments certainly exert an impact on the policy options 
chosen by regulators. It is therefore hardly surprising that telecoms regulators 
on both sides of the Atlantic are currently in the process of thoroughly 
reviewing their respective regulatory frameworks. Accordingly, issues such 
as technological neutrality and hands-off regulation for new emerging 
markets will be under the spotlight in the coming months.  
From Wireline to Wireless and Beyond 
The motto for fixed-line telecommunications companies (hereafter telcos) is 
now ‘mobility’. The goal of mobility has spurred a massive migration to 
wireless access technologies, which include short-range solutions (such as 
801.11a, 802.11b (WiFi), RLAN, HiperLAN, HomeRF or Bluetooth) and 
emerging technologies with extended range – the most important being 
802.20 (HiperMAN) and 802.16 (WiMAX). Of these, WiFi and WiMAX, 
both promoted by Intel, represent the most reliable prospects for fixed-
network operators, although they are at a very early stage, especially in 
Europe. Given the increased convergence and substitution between fixed and 
mobile services, these platforms are likely to complement 3G (and 4G) 
cellular technologies in the near future. In particular, WiFi-deployed hotspots 
are expected to grow ten-fold between 2003 and 2007, reaching more than 
404,000 worldwide, of which 93,300 are likely to be in the EU and 103,200 
in the US.
7 Revenues are also expected to skyrocket, from $3.3 billion in 
                                                      
7 Data derived from ON World Inc., European Hotspots: A rapidly growing 
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2003 to $6.4 billion by 2007.
8 WiMAX revenues are expected to reach $5.4 
billion in 2007. This technology, currently in its infancy, promises to cover 
15 to 20 miles at the outstanding speed of 15-20 megabits per second, thus 
faster than WiFi and 3G.  
It is unclear, however, whether current wireline operators will exploit the 
potential for innovative solutions. First, it is quite hard to imagine where 
such operators will find the necessary financial resources for a rapid roll-out 
of next generation networks (NGNs), given the current shortage of revenues 
in this industry. As a result, equipment manufacturers such as Intel and giant 
mobile operators such as T-Mobile, Nextel and NTT DoCoMo are taking the 
lead in WiFi deployment. Second, for incumbent wireline players incentives 
to invest are further jeopardized by converging all-IP technologies. In fact, 
Internet service providers (ISPs) are in a privileged position for reaping the 
benefits of local loop unbundling (LLU) and increased broadband 
deployment. The emerging VoIP technology is said to promise up to 40% 
savings in the operating costs of the voice network.
9  
VoIP really has a disruptive potential. Although it is currently being used as 
Internet telephony with voice traffic routed on a ‘best effort’ basis over PC-
Internet-PC, PC-Internet-PSTN and PSTN-Internet-PSTN networks, the next 
generation will include voice-over-broadband (VoBB), which allows for 
high-quality voice transmission over an NGN rather than over the public 
Internet. Once such a transition is complete, VoIP operators will simply be 
able to offer high-quality voice and data services at lower price. Hence, the 
new challenge for incumbent voice operators on both sides of the Atlantic is 
to move their networks to VoIP. According to a recent study, massive 
migration to VoIP will take place mostly in the 2009-14 timeframe, but many 
small businesses and consumers will be moving over between 2005 and 
2009.
10  
Industry operators active in the promotion of these new technologies are 
advocating regulatory relief that would allow them to deploy new 
infrastructures without having to face heavy-handed regulation. Hands-off 
regulation for “new and emerging markets” is considered key for innovation 
in the fixed-line market.
11 In this respect, as explained below, the US and EU 
seem to be converging on a common path.  
                                                      
8 See “No Wires, No Rules”, Business Week Special Report, April 26, 2004.  
9 See Analysys Research, The Role and Impact of WiMAX and Proprietary BWA, 
Cambridge, November 2004. 
10 As estimated by InStat, Carrier NGN Migration Strategies set VoIP Timing, 
University of Reading, April 2005. 
11 See for example the KPMG report, A Tough Road to Recovery, London, 2005.  162 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
Trends in the US Fixed-Line Sector 
Prior to 1984, primarily a single firm, AT&T, supplied both local and long-
distance telephone services in the US. In 1984, following a 1982 antitrust 
settlement with the US Department of Justice, AT&T was broken up into a 
number of regional firms (so-called ‘baby bells’ – regional Bell operating 
companies or RBOCs) providing local services and one long-distance 
provider that retained the AT&T name. Between that time and the explicit 
deregulation of US telecommunications with the entry into force of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, the US telecoms industry was characterized by an 
artificial regulatory segregation of local exchange telephony from long-
distance telephony, which arose principally from the consent decree signed 
by the US Department of Justice and AT&T in 1984.
12 While local services 
were considered essentially a natural monopoly and as such were subject to 
rate regulation, the market for long-distance calls was considered potentially 
competitive and gradually experienced entry by alternative providers.
13 As a 
result, between 1984 and 2002, per-minute long-distance prices fell by more 
than 80% after adjusting for inflation,
14 whereas local exchange carriers 
(RBOCs) were expressly prohibited from manufacturing equipment, offering 
‘information services’ or long-distance services outside their local access and 
transport areas (LATAs). After failing to obtain relief from the court 
enforcing the AT&T decree, the RBOCs turned to a legislative solution. In 
1996, they finally obtained it, but the price was high: a new asymmetric 
regulatory regime and the liberalization of entry into local and intrastate 
markets. 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act deregulated long-distance telephone 
services, local exchange telephone services and local cable television 
                                                      
12 Modification of Final Judgment, reprinted in United States v. AT&T Co., 552 
F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 
460 US 1001 (1983).  
13 This trend was heightened by the FCC inadvertently allowing MCI to begin 
offering long-distance services without explicit FCC permission, then inhibited 
by the D.C. Circuit Court in the so-called 1978 Execunet I case. See MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and the description in 
G.O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of 
Telecommunications, 5 Yale J. on Reg., 517 (1988), pp. 523-27. On the slow 
emergence of a competitive environment in long-distance services, see H.A. 
Shelanski and J.G. Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1, 40 (2001).  
14 As reported in the 2005 Economic Report of the President, Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, transmitted to Congress on February 2005, US 
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services. As a result, the RBOCs were finally allowed to enter the lucrative 
long-distance markets under the condition that they provided unbundled 
access to any entrant that wished to use part of their networks (the so-called 
‘unbundled network elements’ or UNE) at just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory conditions, based on the TELRIC pricing.
15  
The 1996 Act, initially welcomed with enthusiasm as a ‘Camelot moment’, 
soon proved inadequate to regulate the fast-changing US telecoms industry 
efficiently.
16 First, the mandatory unbundling obligation has been 
increasingly considered as an insurmountable hurdle for investments in 
(DSL) broadband deployment by RBOCs. Second, the so-called ‘silos’ 
approach adopted by the Act – in which each type of telecommunication 
service (broadcasting, telephony, cable television and information services) 
is subject to its own regulatory structure, seems to have significantly stifled 
competition in the market and proved hardly consistent with the ‘layered’ 
approach required by the new all-IP networks. Under the 1996 scheme, 
wireline telephone companies were subject to ‘common carrier’ regulation 
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, and their retail services 
were subject to the traditional division of regulatory authority between the 
FCC and the states. On the other hand, use of the airwaves, such as for over-
the-air broadcasting or cellular telephone services, was regulated completely 
or in part under Title III, which, among other things, preempted most forms 
of state regulation. In addition, cable services were regulated under Title VI, 
which essentially divided regulatory responsibility between the FCC and 
local franchising authorities, but generally exempted cable providers from 
common carriage obligations. 
It is no surprise, given such ‘regulatory apartheid’, that cable operators have 
taken the lead in broadband deployment.
17 The legacy of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act is the main explanation for the cable-intensive 
nature of broadband connection in the US.
18 Figure 1 shows the enormous 
                                                      
15 TELRIC stands for total element long-run incremental cost. 
16 Senate Commerce Committee Hearing, Voice over Internet Protocol, February 
24, 2004.  
17 The definition of regulatory apartheid was given by Peter Huber, quoted in 
T.W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 Conn. L. Rev, 217 (1996). 
18 Another explanation is that DSL is constrained by the distance between the 
subscriber and the central office. DSL over a copper wire only works within 
18,000 feet of a central office facility. See inter alia, A.A. Gilroy and L.G. 
Kruger,  Broadband Internet Access: Background and Issues, Issue Brief for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., updated April 4, 
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increase in high-speed lines that occurred in the US between 1999 and 2004, 
with cable broadband rising from 1.4 million lines in 1999 to 18.6 million in 
2004, with a growth of 15% in the first six months of 2004 alone.
19  
Figure 1. High-Speed Line Growth in the US, 1999-2004 
 
Source: FCC’s High Speed Services for Internet Access Report, 12/04. 
 
Overall, RBOCs have experienced constantly decreasing margins from 
traditional voice services. The most (if not only) relevant source of profits 
today is provided by wireless services and by the adoption of multi-market 
strategies, such as that offered by triple play.
20 The FCC attempted to remedy 
the uncertain prospects for DSL with its 2003 Triennial Review Order 
(TRO), which was challenged in the US Court of Appeals and finally 
approved in December 2004.
21 Under the TRO, the FCC no longer required 
local exchange carriers to lease their lines to competitors at wholesale rates, 
                                                      
19 See US FCC, High-Speed Services for Internet Access Report, Washington, 
D.C., December 2004. 
20 RBOCs are currently trying to reach triple play in two main ways: a) through 
developing fiber-to-the-home connections (FTTH), which promise enormous 
speed – up to 500 Mps shared over a maximum of 16 subscribers; and b) by 
signing marketing agreements with satellite providers, such as DirecTv (Qwest) 
and EchoStar (SBC). See FCC, High-Speed Services for Internet Access, 
Washington, D.C., December 2004.  
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as was required by the 1996 Telecom Act. This will lead RBOCs to raise 
their rates by as much as 30% in 2005 on 13 million leased lines, once the 
contracts expire.
22  
Today, cable companies still hold the lion’s share of broadband connections 
(68%). In 2004, however, telcos outpaced cable operators in subscriber 
growth for the first time, by focusing on price instead of speed. The price for 
DSL broadband services is reported to have fallen down substantially from 
February 2002 to January 2005. In 2002, SBC and Verizon both priced their 
monthly DSL subscriptions at $49.95, whereas in January 2005 Verizon 
priced it at $29.95 and SBC at $26.95.
23 New prospects for former baby bells 
spurred a rapid phase of industry restructuring. As of today, former long-
distance giants AT&T and MCI are being acquired by RBOCs such as SBC 
and Verizon, respectively. 
The US fixed-line industry appears increasingly characterized by 
infrastructurally based competition. The 2004 broadband policy advocated 
the efficient auctioning of spectrum for the development of new technologies 
– e.g.  the upperbands (>24Ghz), the lowerbands (multipoint distribution 
services, <3Ghz) and a ‘hands-off’ approach to technologies such as WiFi 
and WiMAX, which remain not subject to licensing. WiFi is growing fast in 
the US, with 24,000 hotspots already in place. Yet industry analysts are still 
uncertain about the potential for WiFi as a stand-alone service, given the 
prospects of WiMAX development in the medium-term as well. Presently, 
SBC and Verizon offer WiFi mostly as an add-on service to their DSL 
promotions, while T-Mobile and other mobile operators charge a separate 
subscription fee for it.
24  
The hands-off approach to regulation was also applied to IP-enabled services 
such as VoIP. The FCC has taken advantage of its silos-approach legacy by 
classifying VoIP as an ‘interstate information service’ in November 2004, 
therefore exempting it from state regulation just as with cable modem 
services. More recently, the FCC has started its IP-enabled services 
proceedings in order to assess whether VoIP is to be considered a telecom or 
an information service.
25 Meanwhile, VoIP has already become a reality in 
                                                      
22 See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Reconnected to Growth – Global 
Telecommunications Industry Index 2005, New York, 2005.  
23 See the “Bucks for Broadband Summit” presentation by FCC Commissioner 
K.J. Martin at the summit in Frankfort, Kentucky on January 12, 2005.  
24 See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, TMT Trends: Predictions, 2005 – A Focus on 
the Wireline Sector, New York, 2005. 
25 An example is the order issued by the FCC on May 19, 2005, requiring VoIP 
providers to “supply enhanced 911 (E911) emergency calling capabilities to their 166 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
the US. According to a recent study by the Yankee Group, almost 1 million 
US customers will subscribe to VoIP services by the end of 2005 and by 
2008 VoIP will serve as many as 17.5 million households. Cable operators 
such as Cablevision and Time Warner are taking the lead in this sector, 
which has so far been dominated by Vonage, and will gain 56% market share 
by the end of 2005. Increased competition is also coming from firms active 
in the computer industries, including Microsoft and hardware manufacturers 
such as Cisco, 3Com and Intel.  
Trends in the EU Fixed-Line Sector 
Compared with recent developments in the US fixed-line sector, most EU 
member states lag far behind in terms of technological advancement. This is 
also owing to the relatively recent and still incomplete liberalization of 
national markets, which started in the 1990s but was only officially attained 
on January 1, 1998; it was then further promoted by the adoption of the EC 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, which entered into 
force on January 1, 2003.
26 
Under the new regulatory package, telecoms services are not classified in 
rigid categories. National regulatory authorities (NRAs), in charge of 
enforcement, are called to perform detailed market analyses in order to 
identify (and notify) operators with significant market power (SMP) in a 
given set of markets. Such analyses are more rooted in economics than in 
formal pre-defined categories, requiring NRAs to perform the so-called 
‘SSNIP test’
27 and to rely on a notion of SMP that reflects that of dominance 
under Community competition law. In addition, Reg. 2887/2000 on local 
loop unbundling provides that all SMP operators meet all reasonable requests 
                                                                                                                        
customers as a mandatory feature of the service”. On that occasion, the FCC also 
clarified that “[t]he IP-enabled services marketplace is the latest new frontier of 
our nation’s communications landscape, and the Commission is committed to 
allowing IP-enabled services to evolve without undue regulation” (WC Docket 
Nos. 04-36, 05-196, May 19, 2005).  
26 The new regulatory package consists of the Framework Directive 
(2002/21/EC, OJ L 108, April 4, 2002, p. 33), the Access Directive (2002/19/EC, 
OJ L 108, April 4, 2002, p. 7), the Authorization Directive (2002/20/EC, OJ L 
108, April 4, 2002, p. 21), the Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC, OJ L 
108, April 4, 2002, p. 51), the Radio Spectrum Decision (676/2002/EC, OJ L 
108, April 4, 2002, p. 1), the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (2002/58/EC, OJ L 201, July 31, 2002, p. 37) and the 
Regulation on Unbundling of the Local Loop (2887/2000/EC, OJ L 336, 
December 30, 2000, p. 4).  
27 SSNIP refers to small, significant, non-transitory increase in price. TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 167 
 
for unbundled access to their local loop and related facilities under 
transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions, which entail cost-
oriented pricing. Nevertheless, no formal reliance on the long-run 
incremental cost (LRIC) model by NRAs has been mandated by the EC 
legislation.  
The main changes introduced by the 2002 regulatory package were the 
adoption of a more comprehensive definition of ‘electronic 
communications’, including: 
•  broadcasting, telecoms and cable TV networks and services (but 
excluding content);
28  
•  emphasis on ‘technological neutrality’;  
•  the replacement of licenses with authorizations;  
•  a mandate for EU member states to decide whether  to introduce 
secondary trading in the radio spectrum; and  
•  the provision that sector-specific regulation would be rapidly dismantled 
in case effective competition developed in the relevant markets. 
The economic benefits of the new regulatory package for the fixed-line 
sector today seem promising.
29 As regards fixed-voice services, the last few 
years have exhibited a significant reduction in prices and a marked increase 
in the number of operators. Between 2001 and 2003, the average market 
share of incumbent operators in the EU-15 decreased from 86.9% to 76.8% 
for local calls, from 72.8% to 66.5% for calls to mobile phones, from 71.3% 
to 67.4% for long-distance calls and from 64.9% to 59.9% for international 
calls. Furthermore, the Commission reported encouraging results for LLU 
activities. In 2004, Europe scored an impressive 110% increase in unbundled 
local loops (fully unbundled and shared lines) in the EU-15, jumping from 
                                                      
28 The Framework Directive (2002/21/EC, OJ L 108, April4, 2002) applies to all 
networks and services conveying signals “by wire, by radio, by optical or by 
other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and 
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks” (Art. 2a).  
29 The overall electronic communications market has grown by 4.6% from 2003 
to 2004, reaching €277 billion. The Commission has estimated that the 
liberalization of the telecommunications and electricity markets would lead to an 
increase in GDP and employment levels of 0.4% and 0.6% respectively, four 
years after the liberalization, and a GDP increase of 0.6% ten years after 
liberalization. See European Commission, “Structural reforms in labour and 
product markets and macroeconomic performance in the EU”, Chapter 2 in The 
EU Economy: 2002 Review, Office for Official Publications of the EU, 
Luxembourg, 2002. 168 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
1.8 million in July 2003 to more than 3.8 million in July 2004. This result is 
particularly important as a signal of enhanced market opening to national and 
foreign investors. In the five years to 2003, non-incumbent fixed-line 
operators invested as much as €70 billion in the EU-15 for the development 
of new infrastructures.   
A lot still needs to be done, however, as regards broadband deployment, 
although the last year has shown encouraging results. The European 
Commission has reported advancement in broadband deployment to reach 
more than 85% of the EU-15 population, but the average broadband 
penetration rate in the EU-25 is still at 9%, as opposed to 11.5% in the US. 
Figure 2 shows the broadband penetration rate for most advanced OECD 
countries. 
Figure 2. Broadband Subscriptions 
 
The slow broadband catch-up in most EU member states also depends on the 
incumbents’ major share in most national markets, which still averages 
76.8% in local calls (more than 90% in accession states), 67.4% in long 
distance calls, 66.5% in calls to mobile phones and 59.9% in international 
calls. The new entrants’ market share in the broadband market is now at 
46.7%, with significant recent increases in DSL technology – which accounts 
 TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 169 
 
for 78% of the broadband market. Whereas incumbent telephone companies 
have traditionally dominated this market, the new entrants’ share reached 
30.8% in 2004.
 30  
Evidence also shows that countries that do not rely solely on DSL for 
broadband availability are those in which broadband has developed more 
rapidly. Examples of countries in which cable and DSL have been actively 
competing include the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. Another major 
problem faced by EU member states is the slow speed attained by its current 
broadband infrastructure. As the European Commission has recently 
acknowledged, “the EU is a long way behind its international competitors on 
network speed”. It added that nearly 10% of Japan’s 15.4 million broadband 
subscribers were connected through fiber optic cable with downlink rates of 
up to 26 Mbps in 2004. In the EU, few of the 40 million subscribers are 
connected with a bandwidth above 3 Mbps.
31 
The limited speed of EU broadband connections also threatens the 
development of new services. One example is VoIP, which is still an 
embryonic market in Europe. Only recently, a number of VoIP offerings 
have started populating the European market, ranging from pure players like 
Gossiptel and Sipgate in the UK, Freenet in Germany, to broadband players 
that offer it as an add-on service such as Free, Neuf Telecom and Tiscali in 
France and FastWeb in Italy.
32 Even though EU regulators – in particular, 
OPTA in the Netherlands and OFCOM in the UK – are taking action to 
exempt VoIP from heavy regulation, the lack of sufficiently fast connections 
hampers the penetration of IP-enabled services. Moreover, the relatively 
modest penetration of cable broadband leaves VoIP mostly in the hands of 
national incumbents, which account for 69.2% of DSL offerings and seem to 
have scant incentives to promote a service that promises to erode the margins 
of fixed-voice services further. 
Regarding wireless access technologies, Europe hosted roughly 24,000 Wi-
Fi hotspots in 2003; it is expected to have 93,300 by 2007.
33 Major 
                                                      
30 See European Commission, Implementation of the Regulatory Framework in 
the Member States – 10th Report, COM(2004) 759 final, Brussels, December 2, 
2004a. 
31 Ibid.;  see also the Commission’s Press Release “i2010 – A European 
Information Society for growth and employment”, MEMO/05/184, Brussels, 
June 1, 2005. 
32 See the Briefing Paper by the Telecom Infotech Forum, IP Telephony and 
Voiceover Broadband, Hong Kong, December 2004 (retrieved from 
http://www.trp.hku.hk/tif/home.php). 
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companies such as British Telecom and France Telecom, however, have 
already started trial experiments with WiMAX. Wireless access technologies 
in Europe can operate in many different parts of the spectrum, licensed and 
unlicensed. The four main suitable bands are the UMTS TDD spectrum (1.9-
2.0 GHz), which was included in most UMTS licenses; the band set aside for 
UMTS extension (2.5-2.6 GHz); the 3.5 GHz spectrum, which in most 
countries is intended to be used for fixed wireless networks/the wireless local 
loop; and the 450 MHz spectrum previously used for analogue mobile 
services. With the exception of the 3.5GHz spectrum, the bands are mostly 
unused, as licenses have either not been awarded yet (in the UMTS extension 
band), licenses have been awarded but are not being used (in the UMTS 
TDD band) or licenses have just expired (as in the analogue 450 MHz 
spectrum).
34  
Given the initial stage of wireless access in Europe, no market effect can be 
reported to date. The promising development of new access technologies, 
however, will certainly help new entrants in overcoming the LLU problem. 
The future shape of EU telecoms services – just as on the other side of the 
Atlantic – will be a matter of competition between wireless broadband and 
mobile broadband services. The European Commission’s i2010 initiative 
identifies the development of broadband as the key enabling factor for 
convergence among telecommunications, media and electronic devices. For 
this reason, during 2005 and 2006 major regulatory reforms are expected in 
this sector, starting with a review of the Directives on Television without 
Frontiers and Universal Service (end of 2005) and later a more 
comprehensive assessment of the new Regulatory Framework on electronic 
communications (June 2006).
35   
Meanwhile, industry trends show that the ‘boom and bust’ of telcos in 
Europe is being replaced by a period of slow resurgence. Consolidation in 
the industry is taking place at high speed, mostly between fixed and mobile 
operators: France Telecom, for example, took total control of Orange, 
Wanadoo and EQUANT; Deutsche Telekom recently announced its intent to 
purchase T-Online, its affiliated Internet service provider, and, Telecom 
Italia is re-acquiring its mobile subsidiary TIM. Some attempts to stimulate 
investment in Europe are coming from a gradual lowering of local loop 
charges by some national regulators. In May 2005, for example, the 
Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts (Reg TP), the 
German regulator, cut charges by 9.75% from €11.80 to €10.65 in an attempt 
to bolster local competition for broadband services. Nevertheless, local and 
                                                      
34 See Goldman Sachs, WiMAX and Family: Threats and Opportunities, New 
York, September 7, 2004. 
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regional telecoms carriers suspended their plans to invest around €500 
million in DSL development in some 700 local areas as charges remained 
above €10.
36 Similarly, Ireland’s regulator cut LLU charges by more than 
50% starting on February 1, 2005, in its attempt to boost broadband catch-
up.
37  
Overall, the broadband market today appears far more competitive than the 
traditional fixed-voice market. Table 2 shows that incumbents rely almost 
exclusively on DSL technology, whereas new entrants also rely on other 
technologies (for 46.1% of connections). The most relevant obstacle for new 
entrants is in some cases the high wholesale prices compared with 
competition-driven low retail prices for residential subscriptions. In some 
countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia), the line rental for full unbundling is higher than the retail 
subscription fee for residential customers. This form of ‘price squeeze’ 
makes it impossible for an LLU-based entrant to make positive profits from 
(only) selling voice telephony subscriptions to end-users.
38  
Mobile technologies: Will 3G Break Even? 
Just as has occurred in the fixed-line industry with the advent of wireless 
access technologies, the mobile sector is increasingly exhibiting signs of 
convergence between the US and EU member states. Such convergence will 
be boosted by the introduction of 3G platforms, which are reducing (but not 
eliminating) the problem of incompatible standards on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. For 3G platforms, the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), following its IMT-2000 initiative, defined and adopted five families 
of standards – the CDMA-2000, the WCDMA (UMTS), the TD-SCDMA, 
the UWC-136 and DECT+. Currently, all 3G commercial mobile data 
services are based on either the CDMA-2000 or the WCDMA, with 
increased competition from the TD-SCDMA, adopted by the powerful China 
Academy of Telecommunication Technology.  
                                                      
36 See Reg TP, “Regulatory Authority Lays Down Further Conditions for Local 
Network Competition”, Reg TP press release, Bonn, April 29, 2005. 
37 See the Commission for Communications Regulation (ComReg), “ComReg 
Announces 50% Cut in Local Loop Unbundling Process Charges”, Media 
Release, Dublin, December 22, 2004 (retrieved from 
http://www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/PR221204.pdf). 
38 See P. de Bijl and M. Peitz, Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, 
Prospects and Policy Challenges, Working Paper No. 29/2005, International 
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Austria   249,400  100.0  456,325  23.3  100.0  10.90  15.40  5.50  14.50  15.98 
Belgium 731,825  100.0  712,848  22.1  54.4  11.60  16.30  1.70  6.50  16.80 
Cyprus   14,520  99.8%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  11.70  17.00  7.30  14.00  9.97 
Czech 
Republic   
30,000 100.0%  46,000  13.0%  0.0%  15.50  42.00  8.70  n.a.  9.44 
Denmark    539,343 79.2%  299,807 45.0%  100.0%  8.60  12.50  4.30  7.40  16.00 
Estonia   51,876  97.9%  50,895  0.2%  40.5%  8.90  13.70  n.a.  n.a.  6.26 
Finland    411,800 74.5%  160,300 58.3%  100.0%  11.30  25.30  5.70  15.50  11.77 
France    2,358,200 96.3% 2,557,287 86.8% 71.4%  10.50  17.10  2.90  9.40  13.00 
Germany    4,704,906 99.9%  710,341 82.5%  100.0%  11.80  15.80  2.40  7.50  15.66 
Greece   10,245  100.0%  15,686 80.9%  100.0% 10.40  13.40  5.20 9.10  12.38 








Table 2. Cont’d. 
Ireland    45,360 94.9%  20,210 61.8%  100.0%  16.80  26.90  9.00  19.30  24.18 
Italy    2,475,881 99.2% 1,043,916 73.5% 99.9%  8.30  11.60  2.80  7.10  14.57 
Latvia   27,427  97.8%  6,477  0.0%  0.0%  9.00  13.40  4.50  8.90  6.34 
Lithuania   31,986  99.5%  56,293  4.0%  100.0%  12.50  20.40  6.70  16.80  6.66 
Luxembourg    18,630 97.2%  6,704 60.1% 59.0%  15.80  31.30  7.50  23.90  18.40 
Malta   4,511  100.0%  9,227  74.9%  0.0%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.56 
Netherlands   1,053,000  100.0%  1,319,529  24.3%  100.0%  9.60  12.00  1.90  5.00  18.16 
Poland    181,501 100.0%  10,806 100.0%  0.0%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  9.71 
Portugal    530,422 49.1%  137,128 27.3%  100.0%  12.00  19.00  3.00  10.30  15.07 
Slovakia   9,900  100.0%  11,785  61.1%  0.0%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.39 
Slovenia   54,236  97.6%  22,103  4.1%  100.0%  15.30  21.50  7.00  12.80  10.70 
Spain    1,536,148 99.9% 1,231,479 44.7%  100.0%  11.40  13.20  3.00  5.50  15.28 
Sweden    439,000 98.9%  647,167 38.9% 40.5%  11.40  15.30  5.40  15.40  13.75 
UK    1,117,474 99.8% 3,278,087 50.0% 14.6%  13.30  24.40  3.40  13.90  16.84 
EU-25  16,738,819 96.3  12,922,151 53.9 67.1  11.75 19.18  4.87 11.99  12.95 
Source: P. de Bijl and M. Peitz, op. cit. 174 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
With its 379 million subscribers, Europe has taken the lead on mobile 
services, with a penetration rate in some countries now around 100%. 
Increased fixed-mobile substitution has led a substantial portion of the 
population to become ‘mobile only’ in some European countries.
39 Table 3 
presents the number of mobile subscriptions and forecasts up to 2007, 
showing that US mobile subscribers are expected to grow at an average 
annual rate of 10.5%, therefore reducing the gap with Europe. Yet both the 
US and EU markets are faced with a slow migration from 2.5G to 3G. Initial 
hopes for a rapid transition have now transformed into a more cautious 
outlook. Consumers still do not find 3G services compelling, mostly because 
of limited coverage and poor handset performance.
40 As a result, mobile 
operators in the EU and – to a lesser extent – in the US are still looking for 
the ‘killer application’ that will finally drive demand toward 3G.  
Table 3. Mobile Subscriptions, 2003-07 
   2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  CAGR* 
% 
Western 
Europe**  361,440  383,972 402,042 418,502 433,098  4.6 
Eastern 
Europe  111,885  150,417 172,384 185,432 194,010  14.8 
Total 
Europe  473,325  534,389 574,427 603,934 627,108  7.3 
US    157,625  175,713 195,718 215,561 235,204  10.5 
Japan 80,027  85,729  90,834 96,919  104,090  6.8 
Rest of the 
world  639,224 847,008  986,547  1,115,616 1,236,552  15.6 
World 1,404,201  1,642,840  1,847,526 2,032,029 2,202,954  11.9 
* CAGR refers to compound average growth rate; ** includes Turkey. 
Source: EITO report (2005), op. cit. 
                                                      
39 Ireland’s Commission for Communications Regulation recently estimated that 
almost a quarter of the country’s households are now ‘mobile only’, with no 
family member having a fixed-line subscription at all (ComReg Trends Report 
Q1 2005, prepared by Amárach Consulting, ComReg, Dublin, April 2005).  
40 The European Commission reported in its Implementation of the Regulatory 
Framework in the Member States – 10th Report (2004a, op. cit.) that “In most 
cases 3G networks have limited coverage, mostly concentrated in the largest 
cities, and population coverage ranges from around 80% in the United Kingdom 
and Sweden to less than 10% in those countries where services started to be 
offered at the end of year” (Annex 2, p. 50).  TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 175 
 
The EU’s Path toward 3G 
During the last few years, most EU countries have experienced the successful 
entry of new players in the mobile industry and in some countries the entry 
of 3G operators have led to as many as five mobile network operators 
(MNOs) populating the market.
41 Revenues from mobile services exceed 
those of fixed-voice services. Continued strong growth of 7% was achieved 
in 2004, driven in part by mobile data services. The European Commission 
reported an average penetration rate of mobile technologies as high as 87% 
in the EU-15 and 83% in the EU-25. This result is certainly remarkable, 
given that the penetration rate was only 18% in 1998 and 52% in 2000.
42 
Further, the average market share of leading mobile operators fell from 
46.6% in 2003 to 43.2% in 2004, because of further market opening and the 
gradual achievement of effective competition. Faced with intense 
competition, firms operating 2.5G mobile services are striving to achieve 
new profit streams through increased segmentation strategies, mostly based 
on a careful use of flat (pre-paid) pricing and micro-payments and group 
pricing for residential and business customers. Yet future growth in Europe 
crucially depends on the availability of value-added services and a rapid 
transition to 3G platforms.  
As regards 3G, 75 licenses have been granted in the EU-25, with Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom being the only 
member state to have granted licenses to five operators.
43 The first player to 
enter the EU market – the Hong Kong-based firm Hutchison – announced in 
April 2005 that it had signed up more than 3 million customers in the UK, 
thanks to steadily increasing demand for its next-generation technology. As 
of March 30, 2005, the operator had 3.02 million UK customers, compared 
with 1.2 million in September 2004 and 361,000 in March 2004, owing in 
                                                      
41 Such a market structure is said not to be financially viable, given the 
substantial economies of scale that characterize the mobile sector and increased 
inter-platform competition by fixed-line operators and ISPs. As a result, a 
consolidation process is expected in the next few months. 
42 Some commentators, however, have argued that such an impressive result was 
facilitated by the adoption of the so-called ‘calling-party-pays’ principle, which 
leads mobile operators into a situation of substantial monopoly when terminating 
calls on their networks. The US adopted a ‘receiving-party-pays’ principle. 
Anyway, the Commission announced that the average fixed-to-mobile 
termination rate for SMP operators in the EU-15 fell by 14% between July 2003 
and July 2004. 
43 See European Commission (2005), op. cit., Annex 2, p. 51. 176 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
the main to its improved network coverage, a wider range of handsets and 
content, and general improvements in the 3G technology on offer.
44 
The EU adopted a top-down approach to standardization in the deployment 
of 3G platforms. The UMTS standard was chosen through a number of 
measures taken at the EU and national levels, starting from the EU UMTS 
decision of 1998.
45 Nevertheless, the auctioning of spectrum licenses for 3G 
services faced a number of insurmountable problems. The most important of 
these were the stark differences in the terms of the licenses granted as well as 
in the auction design chosen by individual member states, ranging from 
beauty contests (Finland, France, Norway, Spain and Sweden) to standard 
auctions (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) to a 
hybrid design (Greece and Italy). In most cases, these methods resulted in an 
extremely high level of bids.
46 Consequently, most operators are still on their 
way to recovering from financial losses incurred during the auction process, 
which could not be recouped so far given the slow take-up of 3G platforms 
among European consumers. 
Currently, more than €116 billion is reported to have been spent on 3G 
licenses in Western Europe. The highest prices for 3G licenses were paid in 
Germany (€8.4 billion) and the UK (€ 7.7 billion). The reaction of stock 
markets to these huge investments have been negative, with many mobile 
operators facing a downgrade in their credit ratings and a decline of their 
market value because of the high debt exposures. This impact further 
complicates the arduous task of collecting funding to cover rollout costs, 
estimated at €7.8 billion for Deutsche Telekom and €13.7 billion for British 
Telecom.
47 
                                                      
44 See “Hutchison Whampoa Profits Take 3G Hit”, Financial Times, March 31, 
2005.  
45 Decision No. 128/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December 1998 on the coordinated introduction of a third-generation mobile 
and wireless communications system (UMTS) in the Community. 
46 See J.M. Bauer et al., “Transition Paths to Next-Generation Wireless 
Services”, Presentation at the 32nd Research Conference on Communication, 
Information and Internet Policy, Arlington, VA, October 1-3, 2004. For a 
critique of the auction design chosen for UMTS licenses, see P. Klemperer, 
Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.  
47 See the estimates by McKinsey & Co. in Comparative Assessment of the 
Licensing Regimes for 3G Mobile Communications in the European Union and 
their Impact on the Mobile Communications Sector, final report for the European 
Commission, Brussels, June 25, 2002. TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 177 
 
More recently, the EU has sought to remedy the uneasy case for 3G spectrum 
licenses by thoroughly reconsidering its spectrum policy and allowing for 
various forms of facilities sharing, such as site sharing, tower sharing, radio 
access network sharing, and a geographical split of the network or full 
network sharing. Several NRAs have approved sharing agreements, 
following the decision issued by the German regulator Reg TP in 2001. A 
centralization of spectrum policy – so far left in the hands of member states – 
seems to have been put on the agenda for the review of the regulatory 
framework that will enter into force in June 2006.  
Finally, some degree of uncertainty in the EU market is related to the 
approach of NRAs to the regulation of mobile termination charges for 3G 
operators. Given Europe’s current calling-party-pays regime, all mobile 
operators can be said to hold SMP in the market for mobile termination. 
Additionally, the UK’s OFCOM seems to be considering the regulation of 
charges for calls terminating on Hutchison’s 3UK network.
48 Such a move 
would run counter to the ‘hands-off’ approach normally reserved to emerging 
markets such as 3G services.   
The Long Road to 3G in the US 
Unlike the EU, and in line with its traditional regulatory approach, the US 
has adopted a market-driven strategy to the standardization of mobile 
technologies. This strategy eventually led to the emergence of three 
incompatible standards: GSM (Cingular, T-Mobile), CDMA (Sprint, 
Verizon) and iDEN (Nextel). Licenses for 2G were not issued until 1995 – a 
significant delay compared with the EU, where mobile operators obtained 2G 
licenses between 1989 and 1992. The 10-year delay in the introduction of 2G 
services was estimated to have created potential welfare losses of 
approximately $50 billion per year.
49 Further, the 2G band allocation adopted 
in the US (in the 1.9 GHz range) currently prevents use of the band chosen in 
most EU member states.  
The 3G band allocation began with a Memorandum signed by President Bill 
Clinton on October 13, 2000, establishing guiding principles for the FCC and 
                                                      
48 3UK is currently appealing OFCOM’s June 2004 ruling that the company has 
significant market power because it owns a network and thus has control over the 
termination rates it charges. So far, 3UK has been exempt from regulation since 
it operates only a 3G network. See “OFCOM’s termination rate regulation 
update may affect 3G”, Dow Jones Newswires, May 19, 2005. 
49 See J. Hausman, “Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in 
Telecommunications” in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  1997, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., pp. 1-38, 1997. 178 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to 
identify the 3G spectrum. Although the attempt to meet the initial deadline 
set on November 15, 2000 failed, the FCC eventually issued its final report 
on the allocation of band frequencies in the 2500-2690 MHz band and in the 
1755-1850 MHz band on March 31, 2001.
50 Later on, in September 2001, the 
FCC added a mobile allocation to the 2500-2690 MHz band. In June 2002, 
the NTIA published a report containing an assessment of the viability of 
accommodating 3G services in the 1710-1770 MHz band and in the 2110-
2170 MHz band. As the 90 MHz band was already allocated to other 
services, however, the FCC did not seek to relocate existing licenses. As a 
result, the actual availability of this band for 3G services is still uncertain. 
The Chairman of the FCC recently announced that 3G licenses would not be 
auctioned before summer 2006.
51  
The first launch of (unlicensed) 3G services was made by a regional carrier, 
Monet Mobile, in October 2002. In October 2003, Verizon Wireless began 
offering high-speed mobile Internet access services in Washington, D.C. and 
San Diego, California, using the EV-DO technology, which allows for 
maximum data transfer speeds of 2 Mbps. In 2004, AT&T Wireless (later 
acquired by Cingular Wireless) announced the commercial availability of 
wideband CDMA (WCDMA) or UMTS technology, in Seattle, San 
Francisco, Phoenix and Detroit.  
At present, the US mobile industry is highly competitive and fast changing, 
dominated by aggressive inter-network competition and increasingly 
sophisticated market strategies. At the end of 2004, six nationwide operators 
and more than a hundred regional operators served the US market. Today, 
the acquisition of AT&T Wireless by Cingular, the proposed Sprint/Nextel 
merger and recent talks about a possible Verizon/Alltel merger are 
revolutionizing the competitive landscape, with Cingular Wireless currently 
the top player and as many as 21 mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
active in the market.
52 As regards competition policy, the FCC has carefully 
                                                      
50 See the FCC report, Spectrum Study of 2500-2690 MHz Band: The Potential 
for Accommodating Third Generation Mobile Systems Seeks Comment on Final 
Report in Pending Spectrum Allocation Proceeding (ET Docket No. 00-258), 
FCC, Washington, D.C., March 30, 2001. See also the NTIA report, Federal 
Operations in the 1755-1850 MHz Band: The Potential for Accommodating 
Third Generation Mobile Systems, Interim Report, Washington, D.C., November 
15, 2000. 
51 See “Powell Says FCC Plans to Auction 3G Spectrum in Summer of 2006”, 
Tech Law Journal, December 29, 2004. 
52 See T. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and Without 
Mandatory Sharing, Working Paper 05-07, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, TELECOM SERVICES: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE | 179 
 
scrutinized the possible anticompetitive effects of the Cingular/AT&T 
merger, identifying those markets in which the merged entity would have 70 
MHz or more in at least part of the market. The FCC held that “the merger 
could result in an imbalance in the availability of spectrum that would cause 
other carriers to be more spectrum-constrained than Cingular at a later point 
in the deployment of next-generation services” and gave leeway only after 
Cingular committed to divest spectrum holdings in excess of 80 MHz in all 
areas.
53 Similar scrutiny is expected for the Sprint/Nextel merger.  
Future prospects for the mobile sector in the US crucially depend on the 
availability of additional spectrum. US mobile operators currently use 170 
MHz of spectrum, which is approximately 100 MHz less than players in 
other developed countries. A recent study shows that allocating additional 
spectrum to mobile services would produce huge consumer gains: the 
average price per minute of use would decrease from $11 cents to $8.5 cents 
if an additional 80 MHz were made available and to $6 cents if 200 MHz 
were allocated to mobile operators. The resulting consumer surplus would be 
approximately $32 billion per year in the case of an additional 80 MHz.
54 
What’s Next? 
As clearly emerges from the analysis of the telecoms services markets in the 
US and EU, technology is already leading transatlantic markets to converge. 
US and EU industries still diverge in many respects, notably in the 
deployment of wireless access technologies (with the US taking the lead) and 
in 3G rollout (with the EU running ahead, although not without problems). 
The future shape of the telecoms industry crucially depends on the 
convergence of fixed and mobile technologies, as well as on the increasing 
convergence of the telecoms, multimedia and broadcast industries.  
Against this backdrop, enhanced transatlantic dialogue could provide 
valuable contributions in areas such as: 
•  Technological neutrality. The US in particular still exhibits a mixed 
landscape, with cable operators and emerging VoIP operators being 
exempt from state regulation. Most EU regulators still have to take 
action on VoIP. Both the US and EU will have to consider regulating 
                                                                                                                        
Washington, D.C., March 2005. 
53 See the FCC’s Cingular-AT&T Wireless Merger Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 21522 
(2004), §9. 
54 See J. Hausman, “From 2G to 3G: Wireless Competition for Internet-related 
Services”, in R.W. Crandall and J.H. Alleman  (eds), Broadband: Should we 
Regulate High-Speed Internet Access?, AEI-Brookings Monographs, AEI-
Brookings Center, Washington, D.C., December 2002. 180 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
content as it is a main driver of consumer demand in an era of 
convergence. In addition, the need for a light touch in regulating 
emerging markets needs to be restated, especially for 3G services.   
•  Standardization. 3G was a failed attempt to close the never-ending 
debate on the incompatibility of standards adopted in the US and EU for 
mobile communications. The same problem occurs in digital terrestrial 
television, where the ATSC technology is incompatible with the 
established DVB-T standard adopted in the EU. Currently, the 
International Telecommunication Union is still in the process of defining 
the specific features of the oncoming 4G platforms, expected to be 
standardized in 2007 and deployed from 2010. The advent of 4G 
technologies is anticipated to put an end to the fixed-mobile dichotomy, 
leading to inter-technology integration into an open wireless 
architecture.
55 
•  Future regulatory frameworks. Both the US and the EU are in the 
process of thoroughly reconsidering their existing regulatory 
frameworks. Both will need to take action by the end of 2006, if they 
want to preserve some chance of achieving their stated ambitions of the 
US having universal broadband coverage by 2007 and the EU having the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy by 2010. The 
creation of a more homogeneous and pro-competitive regulatory 
environment on the two sides of the Atlantic is crucial for these goals as 
well as for the future welfare of consumers in the US and the EU. 
As regards regulatory cooperation, the creation of an integrated transatlantic 
market for telecoms services is still hindered by the existence of restrictions 
to market openness and inward FDI in the US as well as in most EU member 
states. Accordingly, the next section focuses on pending issues in bilateral 
EU-US trade negotiations on telecoms.  
Trade and Investment: Prospects for EU-US Dialogue 
Trade and investment issues in telecommunications services have been 
subject to extensive debate over the past few years, especially after the 
GATS negotiations on basic telecommunication services were concluded on 
February 15, 1997 in the form of a Fourth Protocol to the GATS, known as 
the WTO basic telecoms agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 
1998. The EU and the US then declared their intention to foster bilateral 
cooperation on trade and investment with specific respect to information 
society issues, with the declared aim of achieving full liberalization of the 
transatlantic market. Table 4 shows data for the import and export of 
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communications services in the US and in a number of EU member states in 
1996 and 2002, showing a substantial increase in trade. In 2002, the US was 
the leading importer and exporter of communications services. Among the 
leading exporters were also the UK, France, Belgium-Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Ireland, while the UK, Italy, France and the 
Netherlands were also among the leading importers of communications 
services.  
On R&D investments in the ICT sector, however, the EU seems to lag far 
behind the US, as recently confirmed by the European Commission in its 
i2010 Communication. As shown in Table 5, in 2002 the level of private 
investment in ICT in the US was more than three times higher than the 
corresponding figure for the EU-15, whereas public sector investment was 
2.5 times higher. Indeed, Japan invested more than the EU-15 in R&D in the 
ICT sector.  
Table 4. Trade in Communication Services, 1996-2002 ($ million) 
1996 2002 
Country 
Import Export  Import Export 
Austria 338  361  633  431 
Belgium-
Luxembourg  1,274 448 2,238  1,311 
Czech Republic  77  64  172  262 
Finland 155  194  232  255 
France 582  417  2,262  1,725 
Germany 2,025  2,692  1,409  3,381 
Greece 71  78  207  264 
Ireland –  –  1,162  468 
Italy 536  944  983  2,569 
Netherlands 648  668  1,494  1,540 
Norway 216  172  330  220 
Poland 315  203  164  188 
Portugal 281  172  248  217 
Spain 642  443  922  1,022 
Sweden 211  161  623  576 
UK 1,649  2,091  2,912  3,035 
US 3,543  8,792  4,372  4,546 
Source: OECD, Information Technology Outlook 2004, Paris, 2004. 182 | ANDREA RENDA 
 
Table 5. Investments in ICT Research, 2002  
CT R&D  EU-15  US  Japan  
Private sector investments  €23 bn  €83 bn  €40 bn 
Public sector investments  €8 bn  €20 bn  €11 bn 
Inhabitants  €383 mn  €296 mn  €127 mn 
Investments/inhabitant  €8  €350   €400 
ICT R&D as % total R&D  18  34  35 
Source: IDATE Foundation, Investment in ICT Research, Comparative Study, 
Montpellier, 2002. 
As regards barriers to trade and investment between the EU and US, bilateral 
negotiations have led to identifying major pending issues, mostly related to 
existing regulatory obstacles to inward FDI caused by federal and state 
regulations (US) and by incomplete market liberalization (EU). The next two 
sections briefly describe these issues. 
Barriers to Inward FDI in the US 
Although the 2005 Economic Report of the President acknowledges that 
“direct investment into the United States by foreign firms can increase the 
competitiveness of US domestic firms”
56 through increased competition with 
welfare-enhancing outcomes for consumers, in a number of cases the US has 
proven reluctant to allow FDI in the telecommunications sector. The 
European Commission has repeatedly invited the US government to tackle 
the following issues in order to allow full access of foreign (EU) companies 
to the US market: 
•  The ECO-test. In November 1995, in the run-up to the WTO agreement 
on basic Telecoms the FCC adopted a rule on the entry of foreign-
affiliated carriers into the US market, by introducing the so-called 
‘effective competitive opportunity test’ (ECO-test). In the aftermath of 
the basic telecoms agreement, the FCC replaced the test with a ‘refutable 
presumption’ that entry by a foreign-affiliated competitor is pro-
competitive, but retained a ‘public interest’ criterion that can still be 
invoked to deny a license to a foreign operator in the presence of trade or 
foreign policy concerns, or a very high risk to competition. These rules 
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are said to create uncertainty for foreign operators wishing to invest in 
the US. Yet the system has been extended to satellites licensed by WTO 
countries.
57 
•  Common carrier radio licenses and broadcast licenses. Foreign direct 
investment in US companies holding common carriers radio licenses is 
limited to 20% by Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act. This 
rule – which also applies to the broadcast sector – seems contrary to the 
commitments undertaken by the US within the WTO basic telecoms 
agreement, and inevitably limits the freedom of EU firms to invest in US 
companies. As the EU has expressly stated, “the US broadcasting market 
today is hardly accessible to foreign media companies”.
58 
•  Satellite operators. After the basic telecoms agreement, the US has kept 
a market access restriction on satellite-based services – i.e. protecting the 
monopoly of Comsat although formally abolished by the 2000 ORBIT 
Act. European satellite operators such as Intelsat, Inmarsat Ventures plc. 
and New Skies N.V. have experience substantial barriers to entry and 
suffered from complex and lengthy proceedings in their attempts to enter 
the US satellite market. In addition, the US has taken an exemption to 
the most-favored nation principle for one-way satellite transmission of 
direct-to-home, direct-broadcast-satellite and digital audio services. This 
exemption was considered by the European Commission as a measure 
that “may impair European interests”.
59  
•  Rigid taxonomy of services. American commitments within the WTO 
framework on value-added services strongly depend on the domestic 
classification of services as communication or information services, 
which in turn depends on the legacy of the silos approach adopted in the 
1934 and 1996 legislation. Such classification arrangements may, 
according to the European Commission, affect the ability of new players 
to enter the US market in the near future.  
•  Incompatible standards. Entry of European companies in the US 
market can be highly dependent on the standards chosen in the US for 
deployment of given technologies. This influence of course mostly 
applies where the EU already holds widely adopted standards, as is the 
case of mobile telephony and digital terrestrial television. Accordingly, 
the European Commission has highlighted the need to promote further 
                                                      
57 See European Commission, 2004 Report on US Barriers to Trade and 
Investment, Brussels, December 23, 2004b. 
58 Ibid. 
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cooperation on the development of common or interoperable standards 
for 3G mobile telephony and for digital terrestrial television, where the 
US ATSC technology is incompatible with the established DVB-T 
standard adopted in the EU.  
Barriers to Inward FDI in the EU 
Similarly, the US trade representative (USTR), in reviewing the operation 
and effectiveness of US telecommunications trade agreements, pursuant to 
Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
recently identified remaining barriers to investment in EU member states and 
at the Community level. The most relevant barriers cited are the following: 
•  Slow market liberalization, especially in the fixed-line sector. The 
effective ability of US firms to enter the EU market successfully relies 
on the correct and timely implementation of the new regulatory 
framework by national governments and NRAs. It also relies on the 
approach that will be adopted by national competition authorities on 
anticompetitive conduct by incumbent firms – for example, in cases of 
margin squeeze, such as by Deutsche Telekom and Telecom Italia. In its 
10
th implementation report, the Commission highlighted that primary 
legislation still has to be adopted by five member states (Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece and Luxembourg), while secondary 
legislation has not been fully transposed into national law by another 
eight member states (Spain, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia).
60 A timely implementation of the new package 
in laggard member states would certainly contribute to further boosting 
the telecom sector in the EU and open up the market to US firms. As was 
explained earlier, the average market share held by incumbents in most 
EU member states remains quite large, and potential new entrants often 
envisage difficulties in reaching the critical mass for profitable entry. 
•  Use of incompatible standards. The US has always adopted a market-
driven (bottom-up) approach in selecting communications standards, 
especially in the mobile sector, whereas the EU has always relied on a 
committee-driven top-down approach. For these reasons, the use of 
incompatible, non-market-driven standards by some EU countries has 
been heavily criticized by US officials over the past few months as 
harming US firms in their attempt to enter the EU market profitably. US 
Ambassador David Gross clearly condemned such tendencies during the 
recent Information Society Dialogue, stating, “This must stop”.
61 
                                                      
60 See European Commission (2005), op. cit. 
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•  Excessively high interconnection prices (especially in Germany). The 
USTR has in several instances remarked that the incumbent operator in 
Germany, Deutsche Telekom, was refusing to guarantee provisioning 
times in private lease contracts. The question of whether the German 
regulator, Reg TP, is sufficiently equipped to contradict Deutsche 
Telekom’s refusals to offer competitors access to private circuits and 
ISDN lines – seen as a form of raising rivals’ costs – has been raised by 
several US firms as a major obstacle to entry in one of the largest 
telecoms markets in the EU. On February 28, 2005, Deutsche Telekom 
announced that it will lower its local and long-distance fixed-line tariffs 
and will offer, for the first time, a flat rate tariff for high volume 
callers.
62  
•  Excessive mobile termination charges (mostly in Germany). A major 
issue raised by the USTR is that of mobile termination rates, currently 
subject to a fierce debate at academic and industry levels. Countries that 
have adopted a calling-party-pays model, such as most EU member 
states, normally exhibit higher termination rates than receiving-party-
pays countries (such as the US), since each MNO can freely set the price 
for the termination on its own network and uses its monopoly position to 
subsidize its retail tariffs and (often) handset manufacturers – the so-
called ‘waterbed effect’. Nevertheless, the USTR has complained that 
the German regulator Reg TP is setting mobile termination charges way 
above those of other calling-party-pays countries such as France and the 
UK.  
Figure 3 shows the level of mobile termination charges as of January 
2004. Since then, most EU NRAs have already taken action to reduce 
termination charges. The French regulator, for example, required annual 
reductions of 17% and 24% plus a third (yet unspecified) reduction from 
2005 to 2007, estimating a savings of €250 million for final consumers 
in 2005 alone. The Italian regulator also required SMP mobile operators 
to lower their termination charges to €8.7 cents by 2007, a reduction of 
more than 40% from the current rate (€12.6 cents). Figure 4 shows the 
decrease in average mobile termination charges observed in the EU-15 
from July 2001 to July 2004.  
                                                                                                                        
Economy Workshop, Brussels, September 16, 2004.  
62 See “Deutsche Telekom Responds to Competition with Cut-Price Calls”, 
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Figure 3. Mobile Termination Rates 
 
Figure 4. Fixed-to-Mobile Interconnection Charges 
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Conclusion: Can the US and EU learn from each other? 
Enhanced cooperation between the US and the EU in the telecoms sector is 
likely to bring valuable improvements in terms of innovation and long-term 
consumer welfare. Both de facto and de jure restrictions to competition and 
investment still exist on either side of the Atlantic, and national and 
Community regulators are envisaging important changes in their current 
regulatory frameworks to account for the changing competitive and 
technological landscape in the industry. Although hard to quantify with 
precision, the economic benefits that would follow from the creation of a 
more integrated transatlantic market for telecoms services would 
undoubtedly be substantial.   
In some respects, the US and the EU can both learn from each other in 
reconsidering the appropriateness of their regulatory frameworks in the field 
of electronic communications. In the US, growing criticism of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act has even led one commentator to argue in favor of 
reviewing the US law “with an eye on Europe” – i.e.  on the 2002 EU 
Regulatory Framework, which adopted a more flexible approach to 
regulation based on a systemic view and on the convergence of sector-
specific regulation and competition policy.
63 Many authoritative scholars 
have expressed similar views over the past few years.
64  
The US also seems in great need of enhanced technological neutrality, 
although the FCC has been reconsidering the differential treatment of cable 
and DSL operators in the fiercely debated Brand X case, currently under 
scrutiny by the US Supreme Court.
65 On the other hand, Europe seems to lag 
behind in market liberalization, the standardization policy and spectrum 
allocation, especially after the disappointing adventure of UMTS licensing. 
Most importantly, the EU seems to be falling behind most OECD countries 
in promoting public and private R&D investments, which lie at the core of 
technological innovation.  
 
                                                      
63 J.B. Speta, “Rewriting US Telecommunications Law with an Eye on Europe”, 
preliminary draft (retrieved from http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2004/ 
322/Speta%20TPRC%202004.pdf, August 31, 2004).  
64 See for example P.W. MacAvoy and J.G. Sidak, What is Wrong with American 
Telecommunications?, John Olin Working Paper Series No. 17, Yale School of 
Management, New Haven, CT, 2000.  
65 See “Fight over Line Sharing between FCC and Brand X Reaches Supreme 
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If next-generation regulations converge on a more competition- and 
investment-oriented regulatory environment, consumers in both the European 
Union and the United States will reap substantial benefits in the years to 
come.  
The European Commission, in assessing what is now called the ‘cost of non-
Lisbon’ (i.e. the costs of not implementing its ambitious program to bolster 
European competitiveness and innovation), has estimated that the 
liberalization of the telecommunications and electricity markets would lead 
to increases in GDP and employment levels of 0.4% and 0.6% respectively, 
four years afterwards. Further, a GDP increase of 0.6% could be expected ten 
years after the liberalization.
66  
Recently, the European Commission has also calculated that increasing the 
EU’s total research and development expenditures from 1.9% to 3% of GDP 
by 2010 (to reach the targets set out in the EU’s Lisbon agenda), compared 
with the status quo (no increase in R&D spending) would lead to increases in 
GDP of 1.7% or 0.25% per year by 2010. Furthermore, by 2010, total factor 
productivity in the EU is estimated to increase by 0.8%, employment by 
1.4% and real income by 3%. Additional increases in the European Union’s 
GDP of 4.2%, 7.5% and 12.1% in 2015, 2020 and 2030 respectively are also 
projected.
67  
In the United States, a recent study on promoting competition through 
telecoms reform by Hazlett et al., commissioned by the US Chamber of 
Commerce, analyzed a comprehensive reform package for American 
telecommunications. Table 6 summarizes the main proposals suggested in 
the report and the estimated economic impact that would be achieved. The 
authors further calculated that “each year of delay will cost the US economy 
about $12 billion of investment spending and about $33 billion of GDP and 
will deter the creation of more than 212,000 jobs”.
68 A number of these 
reforms, as explained in previous sections, have already been undertaken in 
the US.  
 
 
                                                      
66 See European Commission (2002) op. cit. 
67 See European Commission, A 3% R&D effort in Europe in 2010: An analysis 
of the consequences, study prepared by the Research Directorate-General, 
European Commission, Brussels, 2004c.  
68 See T.W. Hazlett et al., Sending the Right Signals: Promoting Competition 
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Table 6. Proposed Reforms to the US Telecommunications Industry 
Recommended regulatory reforms  Estimates of economic impact 
•  Phase out mandatory network 
sharing rules and, more 
immediately, regulated 
wholesale rates set at 
theoretical costs. 
•  Make 438 MHz of prime radio 
spectrum available for 
commercial wireless oper-
ators. 
•  Exempt high-speed cable 
modem and DSL services 
from common carrier 
regulation. 
•  Exempt Internet services from 
phone service regulation by 
states. 
•  Raise funds for universal 
service directly from general 
tax revenues rather than from 
hidden costs that penalize 
telecom competi-tion and the 
growth of network services. 
•  Distribute universal service 
funds directly to targeted 
consumers. 
•  $58 billion of new capital investment 
would be generated in five years. 
•  Investment-led GDP would increase 
by $167 billion over five years. 
•  An additional $467 billion would be 
added to GDP for increased 
productivity. 
•  A combined effect of both supply and 
demand channels totaling $634 billion 
of additional goods and services, 
including $113 billion in new tax 
revenues over five years would be 
attained. 
•  Average employment levels are 
estimated to increase by more than 
212,000 jobs. 
•  Added consumer value from price 
competition and innovative new 
services are envisaged. 
•  US competitiveness in the global 
marketplace would be enhanced. 
•  The rollout of new technologies and 
advanced networks in knowledge-
based industries and applications 
would accelerate. 
•  Social goals such as universal service 
would be achieved.  
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12.   Transatlantic Corporate Governance 
Reform: Brussels Sprouts or 
Washington Soup? 
 Arman  Khachaturyan 
and Joseph A. McCahery 
he reduction in barriers to trade and the liberalization of financial 
markets, transportation and telecommunications have created the 
basis for the increase in flows of factors of production between 
jurisdictions. With the prospect of more capital mobility, it becomes 
conventional wisdom that national governments are prompted to perform 
their economic policy functions more efficiently. Indeed, the EU and US 
have developed successful policy strategies over time to encourage more 
competitive capital, product and labor markets while erecting few barriers 
that could deter substantial benefits. Nevertheless, many scholars view 
current efforts with a mixture of skepticism and optimism, arguing that the 
system of rules and institutions has insufficient incentives and capacity to 
foster equilibrium levels of efficient investments. At the same time, most 
serious proponents of liberalization accept that the separate interests within 
each country may lead to divergences in the optimal outcome with respect to 
standards. Consequently, much of the debate over finding agreement on the 
level of optimal standards is thought to turn on whether, all things 
considered, regulators can press for agreement on the level of standards to 
set. Underlying this fundamental policy question is the concern that the 
capacity to come to agreement on higher standards will lead to substantial 
benefits. 
The EU and the US are enjoying increased and unprecedented integration of 
their economies. Together they account for the largest share of international 
capital and banking flows, levels of trade, investments and securities 
transactions. If anything, this transatlantic economic partnership reflects the 
common will and commitment to strengthen transatlantic relations by 
upgrading the institutional framework of dialogue, identifying specific 
challenges, reducing transatlantic trade barriers and promoting bilateral trade. 
The US-EU summit of 2004 further confirmed the common commitment 
toward the establishment of a multilateral trading system governed by rules, 
as well as policies to produce strong and sustained economic growth and to 
create the cooperative means and best practices to reinforce the underlying 
basis of the transatlantic economic partnership. 
While there are a number of financial and regulatory difficulties that are 
sufficient to pose a threat to increased transatlantic trade and efficient 
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transatlantic capital markets, the EU and the US launched the Regulatory 
Cooperation and the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue in 2002. The 
initiative is designed to promote transatlantic trade through establishing 
better quality regulation and minimize the divergences in the laws and 
policies of the two jurisdictions. A similar function is also served by the 
establishment of the Regulatory Dialogue as a forum for discussion of issues 
of bilateral corporate governance and financial market regulation, which 
have recently been given increased preference in national regulatory policies. 
The high-profile corporate fallouts of recent years have underscored the 
interconnection and interdependency of transatlantic economies and the need 
for regulators to work cooperatively to create timely and effective solutions 
to improve transatlantic auditing and governance policies. Whereas corporate 
governance failures usually occur at the national level, there is no denying 
that the recent financial scandals at Enron and Parmalat involved 
questionable dealings (SPEs, improper swap arrangements and flaws in 
financial disclosure) that took on a global dimension. These scandals 
provoked a variety of responses and brought the issue of transatlantic 
governance and accountability to the attention of law-makers and the public. 
Responding rapidly to the corporate scandals, the US Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter referred to as SOXA) in 2002, the most 
comprehensive legislative package in the history of US corporate regulation 
since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
The SOXA introduced sweeping reforms in corporate governance systems of 
publicly traded companies aimed at increasing the disciplinary systems of 
managers and gatekeepers. In an attempt to restore public trust and 
confidence in corporate accounting and reporting, the SOXA was designed to 
improve the governance and accountability of boards, managers and 
gatekeepers by inducing increased oversight and monitoring of US-listed 
companies and reputational intermediaries. In addition to the audit reforms, 
the SOXA put in place a number of measures specifically designed to 
counter the governance failures. These include requiring CEOs and CFOs to 
certify, on pain of criminal penalties, their firms’ periodic reports and the 
effectiveness of internal controls; the imposition of obligations on corporate 
lawyers to report any evidence of suspected violations of securities law; the 
prohibition of corporate loans to managers or directors; restrictions on stock 
sales by executives during ‘blackout periods’; and requiring firms to 
establish an independent audit committee, of which at least one member must 
be a financial expert.  At the same time, the NYSE and NASDAQ quickly 
proposed new corporate governance guidelines. 
The wave of US regulatory reform that followed the collapse of Enron has 
spilled over into Europe. Most directly, the SOXA applies to non-US firms 
that are listed on a US exchange and obliges EU audit firms to register with TRANSATLANTIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM | 195 
 
the United States Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). This 
extraterritorial application has triggered widespread criticism in Europe. An 
indirect effect of the events in the US has been to provoke a host of parallel 
reforms in the EU. Interestingly, EU policy-makers quickly responded to the 
US scandals by accelerating their own company law modernization and 
corporate governance reform program that was earlier instituted by the 
Commission through the High Level Working Group, chaired by Professor 
Jaap Winter. EU regulators were motivated by a concern to ensure that US 
collapses are not replicated in Europe, a desire to ensure that domestic and 
EU legislation reflect best practice and the need to give credibility to claims 
of regulatory parity for the purposes of negotiations over the extraterritorial 
impact of US law.  
In their second report, the Group recommended strengthening mandatory 
disclosure obligations for listed companies, granting special investigation 
rights to minority investors and considering the introduction of a 
disqualification sanction for directors associated with misleading disclosures. 
Besides these reforms, the Group suggested the development by EU member 
states of UK-style codes of best practice, primarily enforced by markets 
through ‘comply or explain’ mechanisms, improved investor access to 
corporate information through the use of electronic dissemination facilities 
and the strengthening of shareholders’ rights to vote via electronic means.  
Taking up the recommendations of the High Level Group to establish a new 
framework for corporate governance, the EU launched its Action Plan in 
May 2003.
1  The Action Plan is intended to give a fresh and ambitious 
impetus to EU company law harmonization and is meant to meet three 
challenges in the area of corporate governance: i) improving the integrity and 
accountability of board members, ii) restoring the auditors’ credibility and 
iii) promoting fair presentation of the company through sound and reliable 
accounting and hence, restoring investor confidence and fostering efficiency 
and competitiveness of businesses in the EU. 
This chapter examines the major transatlantic regulatory challenges posed by 
the latest spate of regulation promulgated on both sides of the Atlantic. 
While some question whether the reforms are optimally designed to limit 
future financial frauds or whether they pose excessive burdens for small 
businesses, EU and US policy-makers, in contrast, contend that it is 
important to work out cooperative solutions for improving governance 
performance overall. The development of a ‘transatlantic practice’ is 
underway and regulators, lawyers and other parties in the fields of 
                                                 
1 EC Commission Communication, “Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward”, 
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accounting, corporate law and securities regulation are influencing its 
development, leading to the adoption of common standards and convergence 
in legal techniques to solve similar problems.  
Despite these substantive reforms, corporate law remains a domestic matter. 
Interestingly, securities regulators, who have been developing the recent 
regulatory innovations, have been a significant influence on the 
developments that have taken place in EU company law. Similar incursions 
into the terrain of US corporate law were not significant until legal changes 
were introduced by the SOXA in 2002.  To be sure, impediments remain on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and questions remain as to whether and how 
adoption of common standards and convergent measures will influence 
transatlantic market developments. This policy brief concludes by arguing 
that regulatory diversity rather than harmonization will be more conducive 
toward the establishment of a truly transatlantic marketplace. See Table 1 for 
an overview of the main characteristics of the principal actors on the 
corporate governance stage of the United States and selected EU member 
states. 
Transatlantic Regulatory Challenges  
In the post-scandal era, the EU and US have continued to face increased 
transatlantic regulatory challenges. These challenges stem in part from the 
corporate fallouts and the subsequent regulatory responses, and more 
comprehensively from the ambition to design an international regulatory and 
supervisory system of cooperation in accounting and auditing. 
Whereas the EU’s reform moves remain nascent and have been treated with 
indifference in the US, the cross-border implications of the SOXA and its 
‘moral DNA’ for US-listed European companies have raised apprehensions 
and objections in the EU for creating ‘unnecessary extraterritorial 
consequences’ and ‘unnecessary difficulties’. EU policy-makers and 
businesses alike have expressed growing discontent that the extension of 
SOXA requirements to US-listed European companies is costly and might 
possibly oblige these European companies to de-list from major US markets 
such as NYSE and NASDAQ. Moreover, the SOXA has been perceived as 
an attempt to export US corporate governance rules with disregard to the 
distinct legal and institutional framework in the EU and the very virtue of the 
EU’s approach to regulatory reform. Against this background, a number of 
pending transatlantic regulatory challenges remain high on the agenda of 
policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic. We turn next to the most 







Table 1. Main Characteristics of Transatlantic Corporate Governance Players  
Country United  States  UK  Germany  France  Italy 
Employees *Flexible  labor 
*Low unionization 
*Employment at will 
*Flexible labor market *Work  councils 
*Co-determination 
*High skills 
*Non-flexible labor  





*Rigid labor market 
*Medium skills 
Shareholders *Institutional  investors 











Government *Liberal  policies 
*Arms-length 
*Weak takeover 




        barriers 
*Protectionist policies 
*Medium takeover  
       barriers 
*Protectionist policies 
*Interventionist 
*Medium takeover  
       barriers 
*Protectionist policies 
*Interventionist 
*Strong takeover  





*High % of outsiders 
        due to investor 
        pressure 
*High activism 
*High % of outsiders 
     determined by law 
*Moderate activism 
*Stakeholders as a  












     (finance/MBA) 
      background 
*Some foreign-born 
      management 
*Open labor markets 
*Semi-professional  
      background 
*Some foreign-born  
      management 
*Open labor markets 
*Technical background 
*Few foreign-born  
       managers 
*Closed labor markets  
       (long-term) 
*Common educational  
       backgrounds 
*State links 
*Few foreign-born  
      managers 
*Closed labor markets  
     (long-term) 
*Non-professional 
*No foreign-born  
      management 
*Closed labor markets  
      (long term) 
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Internal Controls  
The first transatlantic regulatory challenge relates to compliance with 
SOXA’s internal controls standards. According to the SOXA, management 
of a US-listed company is required to file a report that should state: i) 
management's responsibilities for establishing and maintaining adequate 
internal controls and procedures over financial reporting; ii) management’s 
assessment about the effectiveness of the company's internal controls as of 
the end of the company's most recent fiscal year, including a statement as to 
whether the controls are effective; iii) any ‘material weaknesses’ in internal 
controls that management has identified; iv) the framework used by 
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the company's internal controls; 
and v) an outside auditor’s attestation to and report on management’s 
evaluation of the company’s internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting.
2 
Moreover, managers are responsible for creating, maintaining and regularly 
evaluating the effectiveness of a system of ‘disclosure controls and 
procedures’. As noted above, the CEO and CFO are accountable for 
reliability and accuracy of both the financial and non-financial information 
contained in their periodic reports and internal accounting controls. They 
must personally certify for compliance and take personal responsibility 
(criminal penalties) for non-compliance.
3  
Whereas the SEC states that such internal controls standards and compliance 
measures are necessary to enhance US investor confidence and promote deep 
and liquid capital markets, critics note that the new reporting demands of  
SOXA Section 404 are perceived in the EU as imposing unjustified costs and 
time-consuming transitions on all US-listed EU companies. For many types 
of firms, these regulations impose costs but bring few benefits to investors. 
Following intense lobbying efforts from the EU and European businesses and 
faced with possible delisting of European companies from the US capital 
markets, the SEC has recently granted a year-long reprieve to non-US listed 
companies from SOXA’s internal controls standards. As a result, European 
companies have to implement US internal controls standards by July 15, 
2006.  
                                                 
2 For more details, see SOXA Section 404: Management Assessment of Internal 
Controls.  
3 For more details, see SOXA Sections 302 and 906: Corporate Responsibility 
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Auditing Standards 
The second transatlantic regulatory challenge concerns the recent shift in 
auditing standards. In an effort to create a more independent and accountable 
audit environment, the SOXA puts significant emphasis on the regulation of 
not only accounting and auditing practices of a registered public accounting 
firm but also that of any Certified Public Accountant (CPA) associated 
therewith, and any CPA working as an auditor of a publicly traded company. 
The SOXA establishes a direct reporting responsibility between the auditor 
and the audit committee of the issuer, subjects audit and non-audit services to 
pre-approval by the audit committee, limits non-audit services to be provided 
by an auditor to the issuer, clearly defines rules for audit and non-audit 
service fees, regulates the conflict of interest between the auditor and the 
issuer, and requires more frequent rotation of lead and review audit partners. 
Moreover, following the SOXA’s enactment, the SEC ended a long era of 
self-regulation and established PCAOB as a regulator. Subject to SEC 
oversight and aimed at protecting public interest in “informative, accurate, 
and independent audit reports” for publicly traded companies, the function of 
PCAOB is to: i) register public accounting firms; ii) establish, or adopt, by 
rule, “auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards 
relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers”; iii) conduct 
inspections of accounting firms; iv) conduct investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings, and impose appropriate sanctions; v) perform such other duties 
or functions as necessary or appropriate; vi) enforce compliance with the 
Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the securities laws 
relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports and the obligations 
and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto.
4  
As we have already seen, the fact that PCAOB authority extends to any non-
US accounting firm that ‘prepares and furnishes’ audit and accounting 
services to any US-listed company has further sharpened the focus of 
transatlantic regulatory dialogue and became one of the major points of 
contention between the US and the EU.
5 EU policy-makers and industry 
groups have expressed their discontent that any European accounting firm 
that provides material services to publicly traded companies in the US should 
supply its work papers upon the request of the PCAOB or the SEC and be 
subject to their controls.
  Moreover, the fact that European accounting 
companies that do not issue audit reports but are still substantially involved 
                                                 
4 For more details see Section 103 of the SOXA: Auditing, Quality Control, and 
Independence Standards and Rules.  
5 For more details see Section 106 of the SOXA: Foreign Public Accounting 
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in the process of their preparation are treated as a public accounting firms, 
for SOXA purposes, is likely to cause continued irritation in the EU until 
convergence or equivalence has been achieved.  
Even though EU policy-makers and European businesses have insisted on 
mutual recognition of equivalent systems of auditing, the SEC remains 
skeptical of European audit practices, which may impede progress in this 
area. The SEC takes the view that EU standards, which are largely national 
and rely on enforcement by national-level regulators, are not adequate in 
most respects and contrast poorly to the level of regulation in place in the US 
While the SEC acknowledges that there may be some variation in standards, 
the US investor is nevertheless entitled to the same level of protection no 
matter whether the party invests in a domestic or foreign company publicly 
traded in the US 
Accounting Standards 
The third challenge in the transatlantic regulatory dialogue relates to the 
introduction of a single set of global accounting standards. As of January 1, 
2005, all listed European companies have to comply with reporting 
requirements of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). EU-
listed US companies publish their financial statements according to the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Whereas EU policy-
makers have expressed their willingness to extend the mutual recognition 
principle to EU-listed US companies reporting in US GAAP, and hence, 
granting equivalence to US GAAP with the IFRS, the SEC has been so far 
reluctant to judge the equivalence of IFRS with US GAAP.  
The SEC requires that all US-listed companies, including European ones, 
have to reconcile accounting differences arising from IFRS with US GAAP. 
This virtually means that US-listed European companies should report 
according to US GAAP. The position of the SEC reflects the fact that despite 
the markedly improved quality of transparency and disclosure in the EU 
since the introduction of more stringent listing rules on national stock 
exchanges and the enforcement of the IFRS, enforcement of accounting rules 
in the EU is still national and there is no EU enforcement body. In some new 
member states there is very weak enforcement of accounting rules. 
Moreover, even though the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) plays an important role, it does not have ‘EU enforcement leverages’ 
or the necessary authority to allow for accounting standards across both sides 
of the Atlantic offering equivalence.  
Nevertheless, the transatlantic regulatory dialogue has already produced 
positive results with regard to accounting standards. Taking into 
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historical results by US-listed European companies. Finally, the SEC and EU 
policy-makers have recently announced a road map that would eliminate the 
reconciliation requirement for US-listed European companies by 2009.  
De-Listing and Deregistration 
As a consequence of sweeping changes in corporate governance, accounting 
and auditing practices in the US and their across-the-board application to all 
US-listed companies, the cost of regulatory compliance, possible delisting 
and deregistration from the US markets by European companies became yet 
another challenge on the EU and US regulatory agenda. EU policy-makers 
and business groups alike have warned that they might decide to de-list and 
deregister because of high regulatory costs and costly transitions that US-
listed EU companies will face. Nevertheless, de-listing is not a simple task 
for European companies with more than 300 shareholders. Indeed, such 
companies are unable to deregister pursuant to Rule 12(e) and consequently 
must remain listed on the exchange. 
Even though most EU listed companies would not rush to de-list if the 
barriers were dropped, EU policy-makers have long argued that the SEC 
should take actions to ease the process of deregistration from the SEC for 
European companies with more than 300 shareholders. Currently, the SEC is 
examining ways whether such European companies can be exempted from 
some corporate governance requirements. It may be an argument to 
recommend that EU listed companies may opt out of the US measures if the 
SEC, having assessed all details, is satisfied that the parallel EU measures are 
sufficient.   
International Regulatory and Supervisory Cooperation 
The next challenge in the transatlantic regulatory dialogue refers to the long-
running dispute as to greater EU representation and participation in 
international standards-setting bodies. The EU is keen to have more 
involvement in the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and in 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) to be 
able to influence governance thereof as well as the reform process in 
accounting and auditing initiated by these bodies.  
The fact that the PCAOB might ‘overrule’ the IAASB by extending its 
system of inspections and investigations to US-listed foreign companies and 
issue standards independently from those developed by the IAASB as 
evidenced by the PCAOB Release 2003-023 on “Proposed Auditing 
Standard on Audit Documentation and Proposed Amendment to Interim 202 | KHACHATURYAN & MCCAHERY 
 
Standards on Auditing”,
6 elevated concerns in the EU as to the future of 
global standards setting in accounting and auditing.  
The debate in this area is heating up, but ‘the fight’ moves into another round 
with no concrete results so far.  
A Transatlantic Road Map 
The new US audit and accounting regulatory environment (particularly by 
limiting the role of the profession) will probably have a major influence on 
future efforts to establish a convergence model for a global auditing and 
accounting profession. While the EU’s approach offers different regulatory 
menus, we should expect substantial convergence in the area of governance 
and disclosure.  
Turning our attention to the introduction of new regulatory frameworks, it is 
important to keep in mind that measures should be left sufficiently flexible in 
order to accommodate the wide range of firms and corporate law regimes. 
The more innovative and adaptable a legal system is, the more likely it will 
be able to supply firms with measures that they require while ensuring an 
adequate level of investor protection.  
In this context, the US legislative reforms introduced in wake of the 2002 
governance scandals impose a number of new statutory measures that seek to 
improve the level of transparency of accounts, ensure auditor independence 
and limit the abusive actions taken by boards and officers. While such 
measures have surely taken away some of the shortcomings of the original 
corporate law regime governing listed firms in the US, they may suffer from 
several shortcomings as we have seen. In this context, EU listed firms do not 
have the possibility of opting out of the EU regime. Those who support the 
introduction of a lower regulatory regime can cite the benefit of allowing 
investors and firms to enjoy different levels of protection, which is likely to 
correspond to the diverse needs of investors for information and legal 
protection. In this respect, the issue of flexibility and reliability of different 
measures should be examined and assessed. 
For the EU, the emphasis on increased use of recommendations by regulators 
can provide a coherent foundation for reform. Another beneficial aspect 
might be the use of less intrusive self-regulatory measures which could speed 
up the process of reform while taking into account the dynamic changes in 
the market. From this perspective, the role of the EU would be to ensure a 
certain level of coordination between the member states, and make it possible 
to provide for certain minimum standards. Either way, focusing solely on 
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directives and other hard law measures, as opposed to flexibility and national 
level decision-making, is to ignore arguably the key policy issues for firms 
for years to come. 
Finally, the transatlantic dimension of corporate governance reform 
represents a unique experiment in corporate law reform. While it is unclear 
whether EU-US cooperation has make it easier for firms to comply with 
regulation, made it more attractive for new investment or protected the 
interests of minority shareholders sufficiently, there may be good reasons to 
support more extensive cooperation between the EU and US since it may 
eventually affect capital mobility, and hence, drive product and labor market 
reforms, leading in turn to lower costs of capital. In this respect, some level 
of regulatory competition may be necessary to ensure the high rate of 
flexibility and innovation necessary to create an effective system of corporate 
law. On the other hand, the increasing trend toward adoption of similar 
techniques and institutions, accompanied by extensive interest group 
pressures, may create additional incentives for directors and managers to 
adopt internal organizational forms that are more efficient. Whether the EU 
and US will create an effective transatlantic regulatory environment in the 
various areas of corporate law will depend on how successful the parties are 
in striking a balance between fostering regulatory competition in some areas 
to favor heterogeneity of issuers, investors, creditors and to allow them to 
choose between possible governance structures, while introducing limited 
harmonization in other areas.  | 204 
13. Climate Change: Could a transatlantic 
greenhouse gas emissions market 
work? 
Christian Egenhofer 
he disagreement between the European Union and the United States 
over climate change has become one of the most highly publicized 
and contentious disputes in transatlantic relations. The high-handed 
manner in which the incoming Bush Administration handled its rejection of 
the Kyoto Protocol came to symbolize US foreign policy for many 
Europeans. Despite the best of efforts of the United States to bury the 
international accord, EU member states agreed to stand up and work together 
to implement its provisions. Ultimately, the EU succeeded in convincing 
other countries to ratify the Protocol and to bring it into force without the 
US. Although this has been touted by many as a major EU diplomatic 
success, this image is a little misleading in that it tends to obscures the fact 
that the Kyoto Protocol is actually in rather poor shape. All countries face 
major challenges in meeting their targets, and there is little likelihood that 
Kyoto will survive in its current form.
1 With the exception of the EU, only a 
few countries seem prepared to extend the pure target and timetable approach 
beyond 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol expires.  
Neither the EU nor the US on its own can solve the global climate change 
challenge. It is only with the is full participation by all major emitters – 
including the US, the EU, other OECD and fast-growing developing 
countries – that climate change objectives can be achieved. Moreover, 
important differences between EU and US carbon constraints – especially if 
the gap were to widen further – will be a major and increasing source of 
transatlantic economic and environmental tension. As evidence mounts that 
climate change represents a significant potential threat to the world and as a 
scientific consensus continues to support this view, it is evident that the issue 
will not go away, either in the EU or the US. It is virtually impossible to 
imagine a further integration of EU and US markets without a resolution of 
the climate change dispute. On the other hand, an EU-US agreement would 
almost certainly create a precursor of the future global regime.  
This chapter examines practical ways to reach a transatlantic climate change 
agreement, including prospects for a common greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions market. One bottom-line conclusion is that the deep integration of 
the transatlantic economy means that both US and European business have 
                                                           
1 See N. Purvis, Climate Change Policy: Next Steps, Brookings Briefing, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, February 9, 2005. 
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much to gain by such a market, but also much to lose by failing to achieve it. 
The possibility for such a market may not be as remote as one thinks. If one 
believes leading global business associations, there is a growing concern 
about an increasingly fragmented or even disintegrating regulatory 
framework. One of the recurring themes in the responses put forward by 
business is the possible creation of a greenhouse gas emissions market. 
According to Steve Lennon, Chairman of the Environment and Energy 
Commission of the International Chamber of Commerce, whose membership 
includes major US companies, business sees a “global system of emissions 
trading as inevitable”.
2 
Beyond Kyoto… At Last 
Although the real root of transatlantic disagreement is that the EU accepts the 
need for carbon constraints and the US Administration – as well as parts of 
the US Congress –  as yet does not, the focus of the dispute in the past has 
been on the Kyoto Protocol. With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, 
there finally may be an opportunity to move the political agenda beyond 
Kyoto into the ‘post-2012’ period and address two fundamental questions. 
First, how urgent is the problem? And second, what is to be done next? 
The Changing EU Context  
In the EU, the ‘beyond Kyoto’ agenda has taken shape with the European 
Commission’s February 2005 Communication on post-2012 climate change.
3 
This document explicitly discusses differentiated commitments from a wider 
circle of participating countries and refrains from proposing targets,
4 partly 
to avoid renewed international acrimony. According to Henry Derwent, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s special representative during the UK’s G8 
presidency, the door has been opened to more flexibility on the part of the 
EU on the issue of targets and the nature of commitments.
5  
                                                           
2 “Business pushes G8 on global warming”, by Fiona Harvey, Financial Times, 
June 10, 2005, p. 1. 
3 European Commission, Winning the Battle against Global Climate Change, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(2005) 35 final, February 9, 2005.  
4 Although the Commission has hedged, both the EU Council of Environment 
Ministers as well as the European Council (which consists of EU heads of 
governments) have set targets, with conditions. 
5 “We must accept the future may not be like the past and repeat a target and 
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To date, the EU has built its domestic strategy on a cap-and-trade program, 
which is modeled to a good degree upon the successful US emissions trading 
programs to fight acid rain. The EU emissions trading scheme (ETS), as it is 
generally referred to in the EU, has become the cornerstone of EU climate 
change policy. It has also proven to be the most politically acceptable 
instrument to deal with climate change and to be the instrument of choice at 
least for the business community. Emissions trading is seen as a means to 
move beyond traditional ‘command and control’ environmental policies by 
establishing a long-term and predictable price signal upon which firms can 
base investment decisions, while retaining significant flexibility in how they 
achieve the environmental objective. This approach both reduces costs and 
increases certainty. The irony, of course, is that the US initially advocated 
emissions trading against EU resistance, whereas now the EU has pressed 
ahead with emissions trading while US initiatives are limited to voluntary 
and state-sponsored schemes.  
Yet emissions trading alone cannot explain the relative ease with which 
climate change policy has been formulated in the EU.
6 Another factor is the 
relatively modest Kyoto Protocol target. More importantly, however, is the 
EU’s security of supply position with regard to natural gas and its 
transformation through gas and electricity market liberalization. The strategic 
positions of the EU and the US in natural gas are profoundly different: 
according to European Commission data, 80% of global gas reserves are 
located within an economically transportable distance to the EU, compared 
with around 10% for the US. These reserves could cover Eurasian demand 
for 50 years. Hence, switching from coal to gas is a viable, cost-effective 
short-term policy for the EU, but less so for the US, where the share of coal 
in power generation is expected to remain stable and continue to account for 
about half of all fuels.
7 Climate policy will nevertheless put pressure on coal. 
Any US alternative short of deploying ‘carbon capture and storage’ would 
increase concerns about security of supply.  
                                                           
6 M. Wriglesworth and C. Egenhofer, “Security of Energy Supply and Climate 
Change in the EU: Setting the Stage”, background paper for the INTACT Project 
on Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change, March 2005. 
7 According to the International Energy Agency, the share of gas in power 
generation is projected to more than double in the period from 2002 (15%) to 
2030 (35%). The European Commission does not rule out the possibility that 
40% of total electricity will be produced from natural gas by that time. See 
World Energy Outlook 2004, International Energy Agency, Paris, 2004. For US 
figures, see Annual Energy Outlook – With projections to 2025, US Energy 
Information Agency, Washington, DC, 2003. COULD A TRANSATLANTIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MARKET WORK? | 207 
Against the background of minimal trade-offs – at least in a short-term 
perspective – between climate change, security of supply and market 
liberalization, it should not come as a surprise that the energy sector has been 
broadly supportive of EU climate policy approaches and the EU ETS. A 
modest carbon constraint, especially when implemented through the EU 
emissions trading scheme and based on free allocation, has been seen in 
business circles as enhancing efficiency and even security of supply, as many 
energy savings measures come at a low or even negative cost.
8 In addition, as 
long as allowances are given for free (‘grandfathering’), the 
‘competitiveness’ effects on industry are minimized.
9 Given that medium-
term targets will be more constraining, requiring more radical changes and 
leading to greater distributional consequences, this relative consensus among 
stakeholders may come under pressure. This effect can already be observed 
in during the emerging discussions on the post-2012 EU strategy, as well as 
on the future of the EU emissions trading scheme. 
The US Political Economy of Climate Change Issues  
The EU perception of the US political economy on climate change is that 
there are various responses on different levels.
10 At the federal, or national, 
level there is a focus on research and technology programs as well as on 
voluntary measures. The sub-federal level is characterized by a plethora of 
state and local government initiatives, including trading schemes. There are 
advocates for federal regulation, mainly in Congress, as exemplified by the 
bipartisan McCain-Lieberman cap-and-trade legislation. The business 
community remains largely divided. Corporations participate in numerous 
                                                           
8 European Commission, European Climate Change Programme, Final Report, 
Brussels, June 2001 (retrieved from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/ 
environment/climat/eccpreport.htm). 
9 See The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Implications for 
Industrial Competitiveness, Carbon Trust, London, June 2004; J. Renaud, 
Industrial competitiveness under the European Union emissions trading scheme, 
International Energy Agency Information Paper, Washington, DC, December 
2004; P. Quirion, and J-Ch. Houcarde, “Does the CO2 emissions trading 
directive threaten the competitiveness of European industry? Quantification and 
comparison to exchange rate fluctuations”, presented at the EAERE Conference, 
Budapest, June 2004 (retrieved from http://eaere2004.bkae.hu/download/paper/ 
quirionpaper.pdf); and C. Egenhofer, N. Fujiwara and K. Gialoglou, Business 
Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, Report of a CEPS Task 
Force, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2005. 
10 See Climate Change Activities in the US: 2004 Update, Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, Arlington, VA, 2004; T. Brewer, The Political Economy of US 
Responses to Climate Change Issues (working title; forthcoming 2005).  208 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
voluntary initiatives but most oppose mandatory emissions limits.
11 A 
majority of US public opinion tends to favor stronger climate change policies 
than those advocated by the Bush Administration,
12 as also do a number of 
religious organizations and churches.  
One result of the impasse over climate change policies at the national 
government level has been increased activism and cooperation among state 
and local governments at the sub-national level. It is often noted in this 
regard that there is a tradition of some states (especially California) taking 
the lead on environmental issues, with the national government eventually 
adopting policies that have been developed at the sub-national level. To some 
extent, this may yet happen with climate change policies.  
A growing coalition of Members of Congress – in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives – supports a policy of mandatory domestic limits 
on GHG emissions. Although the coalition is composed predominantly of 
Democrats, it includes a number of Republicans, and its bipartisan leadership 
includes Senator John McCain, a prominent Republican. Both the 
congressional coalition and activist state and local governments tend to hail 
from the west coast and the northeast. The economic and political 
significance of fossil fuel industries in many mid-western and 
southern/south-western states is likely to prevent them from following the 
trend toward increased mitigation efforts in the far western and north-eastern 
regions of the country. 
As for public opinion, there is a majority in favor of more action than the 
Bush Administration appears prepared to take. Yet the public is also likely to 
remain relatively passive about the issue, enabling the US Administration to 
continue along its basic policy course. Greater public consensus for stronger 
action may develop as the Kyoto and EU schemes become better known in 
the US, and as scientific evidence and actual climate events heighten 
awareness of the implications of climate change. But this is by no means an 
absolutely certain outcome.  
The Daunting Task of Addressing Global Climate Change  
The task to stabilize GHG emissions, as has been laid out in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and ratified 
by the US, is daunting. Since more than 60% of global GHG emissions relate 
                                                           
11 Some electric power companies have, however, publicly advocated a 
mandatory cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. 
12 For a detailed review of public opinion data from 1989-2005, see T. Brewer, 
“US Public Opinion on Climate Change Issues: Implications for Consensus-
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to the burning of fossil fuels, a look at global energy demand projections 
alone is sobering. In ‘business as usual’ scenarios, world energy demand is 
projected to grow by around 60% or even more until 2030,
13 and could even 
triple by 2050. The principal drivers are economic and population growth, 
especially in developing countries, which by 2030 will be responsible for 
two-thirds of the increase in global energy demand. At the same time, the EU 
and the world at large will continue to rely on fossil fuels as principal fuels.  
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, using scenarios 
developed by the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), estimates that in order to achieve stabilization of GHG 
concentrations, there is a need to reduce global CO2 emissions by 22 billion 
tons of CO2 per year by 2050 – almost as much as today’s total global 
emissions
14 (see Figure 1). This may require a peak of global emissions by 
around 2020, since GHG emissions stay in the atmosphere for a long time.
15  
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Source: Facts and Trends to 2050 – Energy and Climate Change, World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2004 (retrieved from 
http://www.wbcsd.ch). 
To illustrate the scale of the task, a reduction of just 3.3 billion out of 22 
billion tons of CO2 (or 1 gigaton out of 6-7 gigatons of carbon) would 
                                                           
13 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, op. cit.; European 
Commission, World energy, technology and climate policy outlook, WETO 2030, 
Luxembourg, 2003; see also Long Range Economic and Energy Outlook, 
ExxonMobil, Irving, TX, 2004 (retrieved from http://www.exxonmobil.com/ 
corporate/Citizenship/Corp_citizenship_energy_outlook.asp). 
14 22Gt CO2 equals 6-7 Gt of carbon.  
15 CO2, for example, the most important GHG, stays in the atmosphere for 100 
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necessitate increasing current global wind power capacity 150 times, 
bringing into operation 1 billion hydrogen cars to replace conventional 30-
miles-per-gallon cars, boosting current nuclear capacity five-fold, or using 
half of the agricultural area of the US for biomass production.
16 Although 
there are different opinions on whether or not the 2050 goals can be reached 
with technically proven technology, there is a broad consensus that there is a 
need for real breakthrough technology (not technically proven) beyond 2050. 
Pacala and Socolow and the IPPC argue that current technologies could solve 
the climate problem for the next 50 years, while Hoffert et al. believe that 
new and revolutionary technologies will be needed.
17  
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the climate change challenge can only be 
effectively addressed on the condition that all emitters, including all 
industrialized countries and at least the major emitters among developing 
countries participate in an emissions-abatement scheme. This requirement 
has long been acknowledged by the US Administration and Congress, and is 
also the position of the EU.
18 Participation by the US in any global effort to 
combat climate change is essential, since the US is the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, accounting for around 20% in 2000. 
No Quick Fix but Progress is Possible  
In the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and especially after the 
US rejection of Kyoto, numerous alternative proposals to the Protocol have 
been put forward (see Box 1).
19 When assessing these different approaches 
                                                           
16 See C. Egenhofer and L. van Schaik, Towards a Global Climate Regime: 
Priority Areas for a Coherent EU Strategy, Report of a CEPS Task Force, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2005. 
17 S. Pacala and R. Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate 
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies”, Science, Vol. 305, 
August 13, 2004, pp. 968-972; IPPC, Third Assessment Report, summary for 
policy-makers, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations, 
2001; M.I. Hoffert et al., “Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate 
Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet”, Science, Vol. 298, November 1, 
2002, pp. 981-987. 
18 Although there are differences about how developing countries could 
participate.  
19 For an overview, see A. Torvanger, M. Twena and J. Vevatne, Climate policy 
beyond 2012 – A survey of long-term targets and future frameworks, CICERO 
Report 2004:02, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, 
Oslo (retrieved from http://www.cicero.uio.no); J.E. Aldy, S. Barrett and R.N. 
Stavins, “Thirteen plus one: A comparison of global climate policy 
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against environmental, economic or equity criteria, it quickly becomes 
apparent that there is no magic solution to the climate change challenge. It 
will take many years to reach a global consensus. This conclusion should not 
be surprising. An effective response to climate change requires nothing less 
than aligning the national energy policies of more than 150 countries.
20 
Rather than ‘reinventing the wheel’, however, it seems more promising to 
build a comprehensive agreement that is based in large part on the Kyoto 
Protocol structure, while at the same time accommodating a number of 
additional components, the most important being the nature of the 
commitments made (i.e. the type of targets).  
 
Box 1. Different approaches to the climate change challenge post-2012 
•  An international agreement with absolute – Kyoto style – targets, but 
with modifications such as a safety valve, i.e. a maximum price on 
allowances. 
•  Energy or carbon-intensity targets to improve energy efficiency; the 
ultimate target can be an equal per capita emissions target. 
•  Linkages, i.e. linking participation to R&D cooperation or financial 
transfers. 
•  Environmental conditionality in which emissions trading is linked to 
environmental ‘progress’, e.g. the Green Investment Scheme, or trade-
and-back approaches. 
•  Sector-specific targets, i.e. a coordinated approach for domestic policies. 
•  Coordinated global carbon taxes. 
•  Technology development and international cooperation on R&D 
activities. 
•  A combination of different instruments, such as a combination of the 
intensity targets, sector-specific domestic measures and technology 
development in the so-called ‘triptych approach’. 
•  Orchestration of treaties focusing on different co-existing commitments 
under different legal frameworks. 
Source: Egenhofer and van Schaik, op. cit. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches, Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, Arlington, VA, 2004 (retrieved from 
http://www.pewclimate.org; Y. Kameyama, “The Future Climate Regime: A 
Regional Comparison of Proposals”, International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics, No. 4, 2004, pp. 307-326; see also Box 1. 
20 J. Ashton and T. Burke, “The Geopolitics of Climate Change”, SWP 
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The Kyoto Protocol has set absolute targets for industrialized countries. 
Despite its merit of relative simplicity as a negotiation tool and its sensitivity 
to environmental integrity, such an approach is inherently inflexible. It 
cannot accommodate differences in economic or population growth. The 
absolute cap approach is generally credited with the successful phasing out 
of ozone-depleting substances in a multilateral framework under the latter. 
The latter, however, had special features – such as readily available 
technologies. Perhaps most importantly, the phasing out of the responsible 
substances was the only solution to avoid ozone depletion. It is also often 
forgotten that the Montreal Protocol foresaw reviewable exemptions for 
‘essential uses’.
21 To ensure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, several 
approaches have been advanced that reduce the rigidity of absolute targets – 
including flexible mechanisms, banking provisions, periodic revision of 
relative short-term targets, transfers and, most importantly, price caps on 
allowance prices. None of these could ensure a global agreement.  
The Next Priorities  
Most scholars and analysts attribute the EU-US climate change disagreement 
to divergent views on climate science, the role of domestic versus 
international action, technology, costs, the role of developing countries and 
the Kyoto Protocol process itself.
22 In order to overcome the climate divide, 
there is a need for some convergence in all of these areas. This will take 
time, however. In the meantime, we argue that the EU and the US 
(governments and stakeholders) should concentrate on three areas likely to 
be critical for the EU-US climate change agenda: i) a (common) sense of 
direction, ii) a determination to make the EU climate change policy work and 
iii) convergence on technology. Progress in these areas is a prerequisite for a 
more constructive transatlantic dialogue.  
                                                           
21 D.G. Victor, “A Herd Mentality in the Design of International Environmental 
Agreements?”, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2005, pp. 
24-57. 
22 See W.R. Cline, The Economics of Global Warming, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, DC, 1992; W.D. Nordhaus, Managing the Global 
Commons: The Economics of Climate Change, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1994; W.D. Nordhaus (ed.), Economics and Policy Issues in Climate Change, 
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 1998; P.G. Harris (ed.), Climate 
Action and American Foreign Policy, NY: St Martin’s, 2000; N. Purvis and F. 
Mueller, Renewing Transatlantic Climate Change Cooperation, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC, April 19, 2004; D. Michel (ed.), Climate Policy for 
the 21
st Century: Meeting the Long-Term Challenge of Global Warming, Center 
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A (Common) Sense of Direction  
The first important step is to forge a common understanding between the US 
and the EU on the urgency of climate change and to demonstrate together the 
will to achieve more ambitious reductions and technological innovation. The 
EU has tried to provide direction after EU heads of governments in March 
2005 endorsed a target to limit the global average temperature increase to 
2°C and indicated a willingness to explore with other countries the 
possibility of a reduction target for industrialized countries of 15-30% for 
GHG emissions by 2020 on a 1990 basis. 
The UK intends to use its G8 presidency to develop a package of practical 
measures to cut emissions, focusing largely on technology as well as 
building a partnership with rapidly developing economies to find a way to 
combine economic growth with a low-carbon economy. This is an 
opportunity to inject fresh political momentum toward a new global 
consensus. The focus on technology and developing countries as the keys to 
tackling climate change has been a key US demand for some time. It is 
important, however, that this new strategy not only responds to the concerns 
of the current US Administration, but also to those of other stakeholders, 
notably business, as reflected in the following remark by a representative of 
Tony Blair’s government: “Business and the global economy need to know 
that this isn’t an issue that is going to go away”.
23  
Making EU Climate Change Policy Work  
It is now up to the EU to show that climate change policy can be undertaken 
without ruining the economy. Implementation of the EU ETS has already 
given strong signals to the US. Successful EU performance can help change 
the minds of US stakeholders. The EU ETS is increasingly seen globally as 
the world standard for GHG emissions trading and not just by Kyoto 
Protocol countries. US scholars are watching the EU ETS intensively. The 
total value of current EU allowances of permits stands at around €50 billion, 
as the allowance price has risen to almost €20 recently. This might be too big 
a market to ignore. It is often forgotten that climate change policy can have 
important benefits beyond climate policy objectives. Such co-benefits of 
climate change measures are the reduction of local pollution caused by NOx 
or SO2, less congestion or noise from transport, innovation and technological 
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leapfrogging and employment.
24 In fact, most studies assume that the 
benefits of reducing local air pollution are higher than the costs of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.
25 In short, climate policy is likely to have 
significant benefits that are not yet explicitly acknowledged. The examples 
of BP, Entergy, Toyota or Rio Tinto show that reducing GHG emissions can 
yield net profits.
26 Finally, as the case of the Kyoto Protocol has shown, 
when the US is absent, other countries will proceed to define the 
international agenda as they deem most appropriate. 
Convergence on Technology  
It is a widely held view that technology will play the decisive role in 
ultimately achieving stabilization of GHG emissions at politically acceptable 
levels. Furthermore, international cooperation to promote the development 
and diffusion of new breakthrough technologies has appeared as the single 
most important initiative to rebuild transatlantic relations. Unfortunately, the 
EU and the US have found themselves supporting two polar views: 
technology push versus market pull.
27 
The technology-push approach argues that the principal emphasis should be 
on technology development, financed through typical, public R&D 
programs. Proponents argue that it would be preferable to invest in the short 
term in R&D and to adopt emissions limitations later, when new 
technologies will have lowered the costs of limiting GHG emissions.
28 The 
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25 See Ancillary Costs and Benefits of GHG Mitigation: Policy Conclusions, 
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26 BP calculated that reducing GHG emissions by 10% below its 1990 level had a 
net benefit of $650 million. See J. Browne, “Beyond Kyoto”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 83, No. 4, August 2004, pp. 20-32. 
27 See M. Galeotti and C. Carraro, “Traditional environmental instruments, 
Kyoto mechanisms and the role of technical change”, in C. Carraro and C. 
Egenhofer (eds), Firms, Governments and Climate Policy – Incentive-based 
Policies for Long-term Climate Change, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2003; 
M. Grubb and R. Stewart, “Promoting Climate-Friendly Technologies: 
International Perspectives and Issues”, INTACT Project Paper, March 2004; L. 
Goulder, Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy, Report for the Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA, October 2004. 
28 See K. Humphreys, “The Nation’s Energy Future: The Role of Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency”, testimony to the Committee on Science of the 
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market-pull approach argues that technological change is an incremental 
process emanating primarily from business and industry, induced by 
government incentives. Profit-seeking firms would respond with 
technological innovation.
29 
There is a growing consensus that neither ‘technology push’ nor ‘market 
pull’ on its own will be able to meet the climate change challenge. The 
International Energy Agency, for example, argues that energy efficiency 
improvements offer the greatest potential to reduce GHG emissions in a 2030 
perspective. Such improvements depend critically on government 
incentives.
30 At the same time, it is increasingly accepted that new and 
technically unproven (i.e. breakthrough) technologies need to be developed 
in the long term to meet the stabilization objective of the UNFCCC. In short, 
incentives for abatement and innovation are inexorably linked.  
Since longer-term targets can only be met by the development of new 
technologies and the massive diffusion of both new and existing 
technologies, the EU also needs a greater focus on technology. This will 
become increasingly apparent after 2012, when the modest sacrifices that 
have had to be made among EU countries until now give way to starker 
distributional trade-offs and harder political choices. Such trends may prod 
the EU toward greater convergence in thinking with the US, where the strong 
emphasis on technology is already apparent. 
The Business Dimension  
In the light of the EU’s firm position and America’s economic and political 
pluralism, business may well need to take to the lead in overcoming the 
transatlantic climate change disagreement. If anything, climate change will 
become more important with regard to such issues as emissions trading, 
other regulations, carbon liabilities and risks, and investment decisions, as 
well as questions of ‘image’. 
US-based firms are already affected by the tangible implications of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS. Large multinational firms have many 
operations in EU countries and in other nations operating under Kyoto 
Protocol provisions. Not only are their affiliates directly subject to emissions 
                                                                                                                                   
Development of a Global Energy Technology Strategy to Address Climate 
Change”, paper prepared for a strategic roundtable at the Global Energy 
Scenarios of the World Gas Conference, June 2, 2003. 
29 M. Grubb, J. Koehler and D. Anderson, “Induced Technical Change: Evidence 
and Implications for Energy-Environmental Modelling and Policy”, Annual 
Review of Energy and Environment, 27, 2002, pp. 271-308. 
30 International Energy Agency, op. cit. 216 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
limits, but they are indirectly affected, for instance, by changes in energy 
prices. Multinational companies will be increasingly exposed to the EU ETS 
and other national or regional climate change initiatives. Multinational 
companies could draw upon their experience with the US SO2  and NOx 
trading programs to their benefit in the allocation process of the EU ETS. 
More generally, the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS will deepen experiences 
with carbon management. This was among the reasons why US companies 
have set up a pilot trading program with the Chicago Climate Exchange, 
where major firms are building a market for trading emissions allowances. 
To date, however, brokers, market-makers in general, certifiers and other 
service companies from the US and elsewhere increasingly see the 
significant emerging market in the EU. Once the market is up and properly 
running, the annual €50 billion EU carbon market should turn over at least 
four or five times more than the underlying physical stock of allowances. 
Carbon emissions dwarf those of the US sulphur scheme. And the EU market 
is likely to be only the beginning. If Russia, Ukraine, Canada or Japan join, 
let alone the US, the sums become gigantic. No wonder the Chicago Climate 
Exchange has set up a fully-owned subsidiary in the EU, in Amsterdam. 
Nobody would want to miss that market. 
Increasingly, investors and analysts will inquire about carbon liabilities and 
carbon strategies. Tangible evidence that these multilateral and regional 
regulatory systems can function effectively is likely to have a subtle but 
potentially profound impact on the thinking of US business leaders, and thus 
accelerate the process of change in the US.
31 The concept of a ‘carbon-
constrained’ world will no longer be a hypothetical vision of the future; it 
will be a palpable fact of the present, with important implications for 
strategic business thinking. A strong European presence in the US and 
international discussions could reinforce this impression. 
Furthermore, these developments are likely to lead to increasing pressures 
from the financial services sector (including investment banks and brokerage 
houses, as well as insurance companies) and from religious and other 
organizations on firms in fossil-fuel industries to report their carbon 
exposure and to respond more positively to climate change issues.
32 Once it 
is firmly understood that climate change policy is here to stay, many 
                                                           
31 T h i s  i s  a r g u e d  b y  T .  B r e w e r  i n  Political Economy Models of Strategic 
Behaviour: Explaining Firms’ Responses to Global Warming (forthcoming 
2005). 
32  See  Corporate Governance and Climate Change: Making the Connection, 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics, Boston, 2003; Carbon 
Disclosure Project, Carbon Finance and the Global Equity Markets, Innovest 
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businesses may – albeit reluctantly – accept regulation. They may ultimately 
prefer uniform federal rules, and possibly more consistent international 
regulations, over a patchwork of state, federal, regional and international 
regimes.
33 Finally, companies cannot forever defer necessary capital 
investments, for example in the power sector, because of an unsettled climate 
policy.  
A Transatlantic GHG Emissions Market: Could it work?  
At the time of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, the US attempted to 
create a global GHG emissions market as the backbone of a global climate 
change agreement. Emissions trading would not only reduce abatement costs 
significantly, it would also ensure a global carbon price, which was thought 
at least to some extent to accommodate concerns of ‘competitiveness’. As 
this has not worked, analysts and policy-makers are exploring bottom-up 
approaches, i.e. linking together different emerging national or regional 
trading schemes.
34 Such a market could easily be worth $100 billion. 
The main benefit of bringing together different schemes is cost reduction, 
which is a key concern in the US debate. Linking effective and transparent 
national or regional emissions trading schemes or creating global sector-
specific (i.e. industry-wide) emissions trading schemes is seen by European 
business as a means to ensure a global carbon (clearing) price at least for the 
industrial sector.
35 As previously mentioned, there are important initiatives in 
the US, notably the McCain-Lieberman draft bill for a US cap-and-trade 
program and the Chicago Climate Exchange.  
Some have suggested that the EU and the US should negotiate a transatlantic 
climate change agreement that would include a joint emissions trading 
program.
36 The EU ETS Directive would allow for this, and other countries 
could join. But could it work? There is no insurmountable obstacle to linking 
widely differing schemes. Differences in design could be resolved by 
technical fixes,
37 although at the price of reduced market efficiency. That 
                                                           
33 See Brewer, op. cit.  
34 See Greenhouse gas market 2003 – Emerging but fragmented, International 
Emissions Trading Association, Geneva, 2003. 
35 Egenhofer, Fujiwara and Gialoglou, op. cit. 
36 S. Eizenstat and D. Sandalow, “The Years after Tomorrow”, New York Times, 
July 5, 2004. 
37 E. Haites, “Harmonisation between national and international tradable permit 
schemes: CATEP synthesis paper”, paper prepared for the OECD global forum 
on sustainable development: CATEP country forum, March 17-18, 2003; W. 
Blyth and M. Bosi, Linking non-EU domestic emissions trading schemes with the 218 | CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER 
price would be worth paying, however, if it meant the engagement of both 
sides of the Atlantic to work together to tackle climate change.  
What would be needed?  
First, the EU would need to accept that the EU ETS can be linked with 
countries that have not joined the Kyoto Protocol. In the longer term, the 
reference to the Kyoto Protocol becomes obsolete in any event, since it 
expires in 2012. There are some signs of a new willingness on the part at the 
EU to trade with non-Kyoto Protocol countries. For example, Alexander de 
Roo, the former MEP who was responsible for steering the Linking Directive 
through the European Parliament to amend the EU ETS, has proposed 
opening the EU ETS to individual US states operating cap-and-trade 
programs. Exploratory talks have already begun between EU decision-
makers and US state representatives on possible linking. The new EU focus 
on participation is likely to strengthen this approach. 
Second, to assuage US fears of ‘uncontrollable’ costs, the EU should 
consider permitting a price cap on allowance prices of any joint scheme, 
which would fix a maximum allowance price (per ton of CO2 for example) as 
a safeguard against rocketing CO2 prices. This is why it has been called a 
‘safety valve’. There are promising signs in this regard: the European 
Commission has been holding exploratory – although very preliminary – 
talks with Canada about the possibility of linking with a price-capped 
scheme. There is a drawback, however. Linking the EU ETS to a scheme 
with a price cap would almost certainly split the market and reduce economic 
efficiency. It would therefore be better for the EU and the US to agree on a 
common price cap. If the EU and the US could agree on a price cap of, say, 
$25 per ton of CO2 – which is slightly less than the current EU price under 
the emissions trading scheme – there would be no need to negotiate 
quantitative emissions targets between the US and the EU or at a multilateral 
level. The price cap would in effect function as a globally harmonized carbon 
tax as long as the allowance price reached the level of the price cap, as has 
been advocated by many scholars and practitioners both in the US and the 
EU in the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
38  
                                                                                                                                   
EU emissions trading scheme, International Energy Agency, Washington, DC, 
June 17, 2004 (COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)6). 
38 See W.J. McKibbin, and P.J. Wilcoxen, “The role of economics in climate 
change policy”, Journal of Economics Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, pp. 
107-129; R. Kopp et al., A Proposal for Credible Early Action in US Climate 
Change Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 1999; D.G. Victor, 
The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001; H.D. Jacoby and A.D. Ellerman, “The safety valve and climate policy”, COULD A TRANSATLANTIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MARKET WORK? | 219 
Third, such an approach would not do away with the need to set an absolute 
cap in the US, which many oppose. The fact that the cap could be set 
domestically either at national or state level could, however, reassure those in 
the US who fear they may find themselves hostage to multilateral 
agreements.  
From the EU side, this would require a change in the EU ETS Directive, 
which could be achieved following the 2006 EU ETS review. 
Why We Would Gain 
Although the case for a common GHG emissions market may be compelling 
in theory, it is no panacea. Such a market will create winners and losers. 
Hence, there is a need to ensure that there will be sufficient benefits for 
business on both sides of the Atlantic.  
What would business gain?  
1) A uniform regulatory framework across the two major global economies 
would be established, including one market price for carbon, which would 
most likely become the global price. If history is any indicator, many 
businesses may come to prefer a single, uniform regulation – provided it is 
efficient – over a patchwork of different regulations.  
2) The cost of achieving a given target would decrease, since a larger and 
more liquid market is more efficient. A joint market offers the potential to 
achieve more reductions at the same price or the same reduction at a lower 
price.  
3) Most importantly, a joint EU-US emissions market with a price cap has 
the potential of offering a robust, stable and long-term price incentive, which 
if properly designed could provide the kind of long-term inducement that 
will be needed to successfully tackle the climate change challenge. The 
challenge can only be met with major new investment in energy and 
transport. Such investment is most likely to respond to a stable and long-term 
price signal.
39 We would expect this to be in the interest of business.  
                                                                                                                                   
MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report, 83, 
2002; J.C. Hourcade and F. Ghersi, “The economics of a lost deal: Kyoto-The 
Hague-Marrakech”, The Energy Journal, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001; C. Philibert and 
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One should remain realistic, however. At this stage it is unclear whether such 
an approach would work. There are many issues to be resolved, including 
questions regarding the appropriate institutions (i.e. who should run the 
scheme?), the compliance system, litigation procedures, allocation in a joint 
scheme and more generally, distributional effects. It is also highly uncertain 
whether the potential benefits – mainly long-term – could convince those 
businesses that are opposed to mandatory action to agree to such a scheme. 
Regardless of the merit or the possibility of a joint emissions market, there 
remains a need for a serious dialogue within the business community on 
what can be done about climate change. Failure to achieve an EU-US 
rapprochement on climate change that includes business will result in 
continuous friction on climate change with inevitable negative repercussions 
on transatlantic relations. Industries in some EU member states are 
understood to be exploring the idea of special import border measures to 
offset energy price differentials in US goods if the US continues to refuse to 
move on climate change. While such measures have previously been limited 
to theoretical discussions,
40 a (non-binding) European Parliament resolution 
in May 2005 put the issue on the political agenda for the first time.
41 For 
corporate leaders who lobby hard for a free transatlantic marketplace, this is 
the clearest sign yet that such efforts are wasted without a solution to the 
transatlantic climate change dispute. Huge differences in carbon constraints 
on both sides of the Atlantic would of course make further market integration 
almost impossible. This fact alone should be incentive enough for business to 
have a look again at the options to overcome the transatlantic disagreement.  
Why not be bold? A breakthrough in one of the most controversial areas of 
transatlantic dispute would give a major boost to the prospect of a more 
integrated EU-US market.  
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14.  REACH: Getting the Chemistry Right 
 in Europe 
 Jacques  Pelkmans 
nce REACH, a buzzword in the EU,
1 reached Washington, it almost 
immediately raised eyebrows. The attention is justified. After the EC 
1992 program deepening the internal EU market and following the 
introduction of the euro, nothing has caused more tremors and lobbying 
efforts in the European Union than REACH. Some degree of turbulence has 
spilled over frontiers and across the Atlantic as well. This essay cannot hope 
to explain and properly analyze REACH with its 1,200 pages of proposals, 
rules and annexes, not to speak of the numerous suggestions for 
amendments. Instead, this paper aims to introduce the non-specialist reader 
to REACH from an economic and regulatory point of view. The perspective 
assumed in the following is that of ‘better regulation’, an avowed goal of the 
EU since the turn of the century and a decisive – though not exclusive – 
reason why REACH was proposed. The US government has applauded 
recent EU attempts to subject regulation to ‘regulatory impact assessment’ 
(RIA). The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has insisted for many 
years that regulation on both sides of the North Atlantic should be justified 
by market failures and that their resolution ought to exhibit net benefits to 
society while minimizing the burden to business. At this general level of 
policy-making, the EU and the US, as well as their business communities, 
agree. Let us now see whether a sober, analytical account of REACH fits the 
well-agreed perspective. In taking a detached view, some suggestions of 
improvement or correction will be provided. 
REACH: A Primer 
REACH is a proposal from the European Commission to EU member states 
and the European Parliament to overhaul the entire EU chemicals regulation 
and replace it with a single system with very different rules and incentives, as 
well as a modest degree of centralization. Since REACH applies to the whole 
value chain of chemicals and their derivatives, including applications to 
millions of intermediate and final goods, practically no industry escapes the 
reach of REACH. 
                                                 
1 REACH stands for Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals. 
For further information on existing rules, see V. Maglia and C. Rapisarda 
Sassoon, “The chemical industry and regulation”, in G. Galli and J. Pelkmans 
(eds),  Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness in Europe, Volume II 
(Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2000). 
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Although hazards differ enormously between chemicals, there is nevertheless 
agreement that the EU needs an overall and detailed chemicals regulation. In 
other words, in too many instances, the risks are such that a light form of 
regulation is excluded. But even fairly intrusive and burdensome regulation 
can be in the public interest if the risks justify it. However, precisely when 
regulation cannot be light, the danger of having no regard to cost and genuine 
benefits at all looms large. Current EU chemicals regulation is unduly costly 
and cumbersome while inadequate for the kind of risks which have to be 
addressed (i.e. the benefits). The existing stock of EU regulation, comprising 
more than 40 directives and regulations, has been built up haphazardly over 
time and is in great need of being overhauled. Mere consolidation and 
clarification of current regulations would not do, for at least two major 
reasons. First, incidents, accidents and research in health and environment 
have increased awareness that the hazards of chemicals need to be better 
understood in advance of their application or use. There is a huge 
information gap. The second reason for the overhaul to go beyond mere 
consolidation and classification is that the competitiveness of the European 
chemical industry is not well served by the current regulation and probably 
adversely affected by it. Without watering down the health, safety and 
environmental objectives driving the legislation, an overhaul of EU 
regulation could significantly reduce the costs of implementation (ceteris 
paribus) as well as almost certainly improve the incentives for innovation 
and the supply of new substances. These two critical considerations have 
dominated the debate about the chemical industry ever since 1996.
2 
In February 2001 the European Commission adopted a White Paper entitled 
‘Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy’,
3 the starting point of the REACH 
regulation. Its objective was to ‘develop an integrated strategy for a future 
chemicals policy promoting sustainable development.’ It noted that even the 
seemingly comprehensive EU regulation showed gaps, was extremely 
complicated, and was excessively costly, given its tendency to lean towards a 
zero-risk approach with few exemptions. Moreover, the discrimination 
between so-called ‘existing substances’
4 and ‘new substances’
5 was found to 
have no basis in the associated risks, while exercising a deterrent effect on 
chemical innovation, hence causing a long-run threat to the competitiveness 
                                                 
2 COM(96)187, Communication from the Commission, An Industrial 
Competitiveness Policy for the European Chemical Industry: an example. See 
also Maglia and Rapisarda Sassoon (op. cit.), and KPMG (1997). 
3 COM(2001)188 of 27 February 2001.  
4 On the market in September 1981 and listed in the EINECS registry; see 
Regulation 793/93. 
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of one of Europe’s best performing industries. At the same time the heavy-
handed regulation never led to a much deeper and wider knowledge of the 
hazards or risks of thousands of chemicals, let alone to a systematic 
management of chemical risks for health, safety and environment. It should 
be noted that these considerations as well as the need for radical reform to 
address these shortcomings were widely shared by EU member states and by 
stakeholders. 
REACH amounts to a switch to a single, coherent system based on two new 
principles. First, it shifts the responsibility for risk assessment from the 
authorities to the industry for all chemicals produced, used and imported, 
thereby reversing the burden of proof for putting safe chemicals on the 
internal market. Second, it aims to reduce drastically the lack of knowledge 
on the risks of the tens of thousands of chemicals traded in the EU internal 
market. It tries to achieve this by subjecting existing and new chemicals 
indiscriminately to registration procedures and subsequently, dependent on 
preliminary risk assessments, to further testing obligations for a proper risk 
assessment (‘evaluation’). As proposed in the 2001 White Paper, registration 
is always a prerequisite (above the 1 ton threshold), based on elementary 
data. The idea is: no data, no market. A small subset of chemicals of very 
high concern would require specific permission by the authorities.
6  
Given the massive exercise of subjecting many thousands of existing 
chemicals to at least basic testing, a ten year transition period is foreseen to 
allow the registration to be built up over time, with certain priorities. The 
highly technical and comprehensive nature of monitoring and supporting this 
rather involved process was thought to require an autonomous European 
Chemicals Agency.  
REACH has no less than seven objectives: 
  protection of health and environment 
  competitiveness of the EU chemical industry 
  no fragmentation of the internal market 
  increased transparency 
  integration with international efforts in this sector 
  promotion of non-animal testing 
  conformity with the EU’s obligations under the WTO. 
                                                 
6 The White Paper already identifies subsets such as Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, and Carcinogenic Mutagenic Reprotoxics. Note that PBTs (persistent, 
bio-accumulative, toxic) have meanwhile been included in the list for 
compulsory registration. This may happen to vPvBs (very persistent, very bio-
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The burden of a negligent past (very little and selective knowledge of the 
risks of some 30,000 existing substances) can cause extremely high costs for 
testing and reporting. Even though such costs are only incurred once, they 
are bound to be disproportionate, if one presumes (quite reasonably) that 
many preliminary assessments would not show any serious risks. All these 
substances have been in the market for many years and a large number of 
them have few if any traces which would point to hazards.  
To contain the costs, the White Paper (which is, of course, not yet an official 
proposal, only a set of suggestions for debate) first sets a threshold for 
registration (above 1 ton) and estimates that some 80% of the existing 30,000 
or so substances would require no more than registration. Note that the 1 ton 
was also suggested for new substances, which amounts to an immediate 
relief (given that the existing threshold is as low as 10 kg!).  
Turbulence about High Costs and Unclear Benefits 
REACH has been characterized as the most debated piece of environmental 
legislation in EU history. It has also been one of the most fiercely attacked 
regulatory reforms.  
The run-up to the REACH draft and its RIA offer ample evidence that RIAs 
are far more than straight-forward technical exercises. The process of 
moving towards a draft REACH proposal in May 2003 and a formal proposal 
by the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament in 
October 2003, with an accompanying RIA, was turbulent. Stakeholders such 
as the chemical industry, the business association UNICE, environmental 
NGOs, EU member states, the US and Japan (and their chemical industries) 
and, at a technical level, the OECD, all exercised varying degrees of 
influence from the very outset. In addition, vigorous national debates 
(notably in Germany) prompted a range of alternative, quasi-RIAs by 
ministerial advisory councils and private consultants (contracted, 
respectively, by the German, French and later Italian chemical industry). 
Without any legislative proposals on the table, alarming cost calculations 
were already dominating the debate. Three prime ministers (of Germany, 
France and the UK) wrote a public letter of appeal to the president of the 
European Commission at the time, Romano Prodi, an unprecedented move in 
Europe on such a topic.  
Rather than a serious attempt to improve the chemicals regulation in Europe, 
a ‘battle of REACH’ broke out, causing delay and wasting political and 
business energies. Such intense debate in the absence of actual (even 
preliminary) proposals served to harden positions, fed tendencies to 
exaggerate the potential consequences of REACH, and to inject misleading 
or biased information simply to be heard above the cacophony. Quasi-RIA REACH: GETTING THE CHEMISTRY RIGHT IN EUROPE | 225 
 
proposals by stakeholders generated further confusion by focusing narrowly 
on the private interests of those stakeholders (e.g. by zooming in on the 
perceived ‘costs’ for the chemical industry) without explicit and balanced 
consideration of the EU public interest. But also NGOs also took very fierce 
and antagonistic positions that were driven partly by mistrust and partly by a 
zealous campaign to advance rather extreme applications of the 
‘precautionary principle,’ which inspires REACH. This principle encourages 
government promotion of research or even action or intervention despite a 
lack of sufficient scientific knowledge, if there are signs of great but not fully 
understood damage or of irreversibility. It typically applies to climate 
change, where great uncertainty does not prevent action. In REACH, too, 
risk reduction is to be achieved in the absence of sufficient knowledge. But 
the question is to identify whether and where at least some tentative signs of 
serious hazards or risks for existing substances can be found, and not to 
indiscriminately subject all substances to high-cost procedures.  
As a result of the early turbulence on REACH many participants in the later 
legislative process had already positioned themselves. The pre-2000 
consensus in terms of objectives and major lines of reform splintered and 
fragmented when it came to considering how REACH would work in actual 
practice. The most striking and painful error made during the run-up was the 
singular emphasis on costs. Any regulation, European or otherwise, should 
first and foremost be justified by its potential benefits. European society is 
better served by the knowledge of why the EU wishes to regulate chemicals 
in a new way, with the best available range of quantitative estimates of the 
‘value’ of those benefits, than by a sole focus on the costs in the absence of 
precise proposals. The Commission should have spent resources and political 
energy on a more informative debate about the (occupational and public) 
health and environmental benefits of REACH and the choices that – even in 
the presence of great uncertainty – follow from an exposition of them. It 
should have attempted to show much more convincingly the links between 
the overall design of REACH and the benefits pursued.  
Emphasizing the benefits of REACH was made intrinsically very difficult by 
its chosen design. REACH has two stages, but all attention in the run-up to 
the draft proposal of May 2003 concentrated on the first stage. This stage 
could well take 10-12 years. Its sole purpose is to collect information on 
hazards and risk. Since most existing chemical substances do not appear to 
be problematic, the need to collect information via testing and registration 
burdens the industry with many years of costly preliminary risk assessments 
that are not likely to offer many additional benefits in terms of health and the 
environment. Whereas a strong case can be made that the burden of proof for 
new substances should be shifted to industry, which companies can consider 
as ‘sunk costs’ to put the product on the market (more or less as with 226 | JACQUES PELKMANS 
 
medicines), the case for subjecting many thousands of existing substances 
already in use, without apparent drawbacks, to extensive information 
procedures is much weaker.  
Emphasizing the benefits of stage 1 of REACH becomes exceedingly hard 
because most of the direct gains will be limited to hazard (and to some extent 
risk) information that in most cases is likely to confirm experience. In 
contrast, the benefits of a new procedure for new substances as well as the 
benefits of stage 2 [evaluating ‘risky’ chemicals and authorizing (or 
prohibiting) very risky chemicals] are much more straightforward and far 
less controversial, even if costly.  
Main Technical Issues in the REACH Debate 
REACH is extremely technical, particularly when it comes to testing and 
evaluation. These technicalities make it difficult for non-experts to grasp the 
meaning of the debate and to appreciate the (net) benefits of this giant 
regulatory reform. This brief section offers a basic primer of the main 
technical issues. For readers wishing to get a more comprehensive view of 
REACH, it is good to know that the process of getting to the REACH 
proposals went through four steps: the early debate to forge a general 
consensus; the fierce positioning and technical studies following the 2001 
White Paper; the preliminary draft proposals of early May 2003;
7 and the 
final proposal of October 2003
8 and its RIA.
9 The essential differences 
between the May and October proposals are found in cost cutting measures 
(see below) and a greater role for the European Chemical Agency. The basic 
idea behind REACH is described below.  
Registration concerns chemical substances produced or imported over one 
ton – approximately 30,000 substances. Information requirements are 
                                                 
7 Proposal concerning REACH, 6 volumes. For consultation up to late June 
2003, see the DG Enterprise website, (see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/enterprise/index_en.htm).  
8 COM 2003 644 (03) ‘Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a 
European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and 
Regulation (EC) {on Persistent Organic Pollutants}’ of 29 October 2003. 
9 SEC (20031171/3 of 29th October 2003, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
“Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restrictions of Chemicals (REACH), 
establishing a European Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC 
and Regulation (EC) {on Persistent Organic Pollutants}”, Extended Impact 
Assessment {COM(2003)644 final}. REACH: GETTING THE CHEMISTRY RIGHT IN EUROPE | 227 
 
proportional to the volumes of the substances. There are different deadlines 
for each volume threshold (1 ton, 100 and 1,000 tons). The rationale is that 
different tonnage gives an idea of potential exposure. 
Evaluation is the second stage, required for substances produced over 100 
tons (an estimated 5000 substances) as well as substances produced at lower 
volumes but about which there are particular concerns. The European 
Chemical Agency’s role at this stage is to help in the prioritization process, 
using still-to-be-developed risk-based criteria. A resolution procedure is 
foreseen for cases in which member states do not agree on which substances 
to evaluate.  
Authorization, the last stage of REACH, concerns a certain category of 
substances of very high concern (like the vPvBs as in footnote 6 or endocrine 
disrupters), representing approximately 5% of substances.
10  
Restriction is an additional safety net category providing for EU-wide 
restrictions. The European Chemical Agency (ECA) and any member state 
can propose such restrictions.  
The October 2003 proposal strengthened the ECA by charging with it with a 
coordinating role. It manages the registration stage, plays a vital role in the 
stage of evaluation (by determining criteria for selection of ‘evaluation’ 
substances) and gives opinions in the authorization and restriction cases. The 
original ‘one-stop-shopping’ idea behind the ECA is thereby compromised. 
It is important to understand that REACH affects almost anything made with 
chemicals or their derivatives. Thus, REACH is not only and perhaps not 
even primarily about the chemical industry. Bulk chemicals and a very wide 
spectrum of fine chemicals typically move down the value chain to all kinds 
of intermediate producers in many ways – testimony to the central place 
chemicals have occupied in manufacturing. Some of those second layer 
producers are called ‘formulators’. They include many small and medium-
sized enterprises engaged in extremely product-specific (and often 
confidential) applications and, in some cases, receiving a limited but 
rewarding turnover per application. They create complex combinations of 
substances and/or innovative blends with subtly different properties, often 
for highly specific use by specialized customers in practically every industry. 
Those customers form the third layer in the value chain. Some of their 
products use chemicals only to a very small degree, while others combine 
many different intermediate products with enormous varieties of 
combinations (a car, for instance).  
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In short, REACH is likely to affect all industries to some extent, if only 
because of the new burden of information and registration requirements for 
many inputs they may use. Moreover, various sectors are bound to be hit 
very differently.  
The costs for downstream users quickly became a great concern in business 
circles. Given extensive intra-firm linkages across continents but especially 
within US and EU companies, high levels of foreign direct investment and 
trade (documented in chapter 2 of this book), these concerns swiftly spilled 
over to manufacturers worldwide. Since the cost of testing in the first layer of 
the value chain will have to be shared by second- and third-layer companies, 
it becomes critical to understand whether particular substances would need to 
be withdrawn or replaced with cheaper or ‘safer’ substances. If testing and 
registration costs exceed substitution costs, the market for a particular 
substance will melt away. If no alternative substance is available, certain 
products may be withdrawn, with potentially huge impact on the second 
layer ‘formulators’ – often small and medium-sized companies – who tend to 
generate many distinct usages of a substance. This could, in turn, lead to 
extra costs and complications for final products, including time-to-market 
problems for fast-moving industries such as computers or technical textiles.  
In early studies for the German and French chemical industries,
11 the impact 
on downstream users was asserted to be extraordinarily costly – several 
hundred times the basic costs of testing and registration for the first layer. As 
a consequence, huge turnover losses and job losses were calculated. One 
analysis, termed the ‘hurricane scenario’, projected a decline in German GDP 
by more than 3%! Clearly, these studies were simply not credible for a 
sectoral reform of a sector already strictly regulated. The analytical basis for 
alternate, ‘quasi RIAs’ was weak, biased and, in some cases, not transparent. 
Nevertheless, they formed the basis for a wholesale attack on the 
Commission’s proposals that politicized the REACH debate and engaged 
leading European political figures. The Dutch EU Presidency commissioned 
a sober overview
12 of 36 different impact studies on REACH, which threw 
cold water on such alarming lobby attempts.  
After the initial outraged response by business to REACH, the Commission 
was forced by the European Council to refine its impact study through a 
series of case studies, based on close collaboration with well-selected groups 
of downstream users in the second and third layers. The resulting KPMG 
                                                 
11 See Arthur D. Little, 2003, Economic effects of the EU substances policy, for 
BDI, Wiesbaden; Mercer, 2003, Study of the impact of the future chemicals 
policy, Paris. 
12 Ecorys and Opdenkamp Adviesgroep, 2004, The impact of REACH, 25 
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study
13 demonstrated, for four different industries and in great detail, that the 
withdrawal issue is marginal. This is so for good marketing, transaction cost 
or sunk cost (of innovation) reasons. The four case studies included a cluster 
of ‘(in)organic’ sectors ( such as steel, cement, ceramics, paper, glass, etc.), 
the electronics sector (in particular, the printed circuit board assembly), the 
automotive sector and that of flexible packaging. 
Let us briefly mention a few other technical issues. Many substances never 
reach the consumer in a pure chemical form. Substances are often included in 
final articles or are mixed with many other substances. An important issue 
has been to what extent, and indeed in what cases, substances should be 
included under the REACH regime. Applying REACH to imported 
substances might not meet the WTO test of compatibility of technical 
barriers. The final REACH proposal addresses this concern by specifying 
that ‘the obligation to register or notify a substance contained in an article’ 
only applies when a series of conditions are met (volume threshold, intended 
release, etc.). 
Much attention has focused on whether two further categories of substances 
should be included in REACH, and to what extent: intermediates and 
polymers. A cost-effective way of testing polymers has not yet been found. 
Polymers are usually not hazardous. The final proposal suggests exclusion of 
polymers from registration.  
Another controversial REACH issue concerns the right-to-know and 
transparency. The 2001 White Paper envisaged the establishment of a central 
database, but without giving details. The final 2003 proposal tried to strike a 
balance with a list of safety related data that is never confidential and a 
shorter list of items (precise tonnage, exact formulas, etc.) that is always 
considered confidential. Dependent on the case, there is still a lot of concern 
among innovative second and third layer businesses on the practical 
safeguards about confidentiality.  
Better Regulation with REACH? 
What ultimately matters for European public interest and for world trade and 
investment is whether REACH can be viewed as ‘better regulation’. At the 
present stage, any evaluation has to be tentative. I shall touch upon the 
following aspects, which might help the reader to make an informed 
                                                 
13 KPMG Business Advisory Services, 2005, REACH, further work on impact 
assessment, a case study approach, executive summary. For general reference, 
see KPMG, 1997, Chemicals, The Single Market Review series, Series I, No. 5, 
Luxembourg (Office of Official Publications of the EU, 1997) and London 
(Kogan Page, 1997), p. 232. 230 | JACQUES PELKMANS 
 
judgment: objectives, proportionality (a core requirement in EU law and 
sensible from an economic point of view), benefits and costs. 
One is struck by the numerous objectives the Commission aims to achieve 
through the new chemicals legislation. There are far too many objectives and 
no clear prioritization among them in the RIA. From the general spirit of the 
document one may deduce that the main objectives to be reached are the 
protection of human health and environment as well as the competitiveness 
of the chemicals industry. However, nowhere it is explicitly recognized that 
there may be trade-offs between these two ‘main’ objectives. Indeed, the 
ultimate nature of REACH’s design will determine how severe these trade-
offs are likely to be.  
The Commission has stated that it will not present alternatives to the 
REACH proposal. This is a remarkable position, to say the least. Indeed, the 
fact that no policy alternatives are suggested raises a major methodological 
problem. It is particularly remarkable since the Commission’s own 
methodology paper on RIAs
14 states clearly that proper assessment hinges on 
thinking in terms of alternative policies.  
The Commission asserts firmly that it has been rigorous in its efforts to make 
the proposal ‘proportionate’ – the RIA argues that “care ... taken [that 
REACH]… is not excessive in terms of scope, costs and administrative 
burden”. Furthermore, a range of reduced requirements (compared to the first 
draft) including e.g. lighter obligations for SMEs (low-volume substances) 
and exemption periods for innovation all aim to ‘lessen’ the impact on the 
industry. CEFIC (the European chemical industry) suggests that the proposal 
is very administrative and the procedure extremely cumbersome. They fear it 
would undermine the competitiveness of the chemicals industry. On the other 
hand, environmental NGOs suggest that the concessions made in the final 
proposal of the Commission were the result of heavy lobbying from the 
industry (and, they suggest, captured governments), putting in danger the 
very health and environmental benefits of the proposal. Thus, one could 
argue that the Commission was caught in the middle trying to strike a 
balance. This may be so, but a follow-up document on the implementation 
details of REACH, with many flowcharts about procedures and processes, 
does show that the complications and technical requirements in the various 
                                                 
14 COM(2002)276 of 5 June 2002, Impact Assessment; see also the statement of 
the present author in the REACH hearings in the European Parliament, 19 
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stages, and the data flows and exchange with the Agency, are extremely 
intricate and numerous.
15 
When studying benefits and costs, one first has to appreciate the vast 
difference in timing between the two. If the objectives are meant to reflect 
the benefits, the REACH debate has been misleading because in the first 
stage of ten or more years there are, inevitably, few and minor benefits. Most 
of the current debate is about information gathering, culminating in 
registration – essentially stage 1 of the new regime. Thus, the first objective, 
health and environment, is not even in sight yet! One may only begin to 
pursue health and environmental objectives via authorization and restrictions 
at best late in the first stage, but mainly in the second stage, which may not 
start before 2016 or even later. For the second objective – competitiveness of 
the chemical industry – stage 1 of the regulation appears almost entirely as a 
cost, except for new chemicals, where innovation might be stimulated and 
evaluation facilitated. As to existing substances, these chemicals are already 
in use; the very hazardous or persistent ones are largely known. The critical 
difference between today and the new regime is that nowadays the (national) 
authorities have to carry the burden of proof before existing chemicals which 
are reported to possibly entail some hazards or risks, can be taken off the 
market or subjected to restrictive use. In many thousands of cases this is not 
likely to be an issue. REACH should eventually enable member states, on the 
basis of the advice of the Agency, to intervene and regulate with far better 
knowledge, but the up-front costs are considerable, with the benefits of extra 
knowledge by definition unknown. However, once stage 2 begins (or, in 
some cases, already in stage 1) the step of authorization in the framework of 
REACH still requires a risk management procedure (stage 2 of REACH) 
with case-by-case RIAs that would add to the bureaucratic burden of the 
chemical companies and invite more lobbying.  
Some attempts have been made to calculate the occupational and public 
health benefits of REACH, but most analysts believe it is almost impossible 
to assign monetary values to the environmental effects. Moreover, such 
benefits would only start being significant 10-20 years after implementation 
of the new regulation. Since the Commission has not compared alternative 
approaches, also ranges of benefits cannot be compared. What has been 
shown are merely back-of-the-envelope calculations of crude benefits based 
on DALYs:
16 essentially one guesstimate, no range of benefits, and some 
                                                 
15 European Commission, “The REACH proposal, process description”, June 
2004, Commission website, DG Environment, REACH Implementation Project 
No. 1.  
16 Disability adjusted value of life methodology, a variant of SVOL, as employed 
by the World Bank. 232 | JACQUES PELKMANS 
 
illustrative examples. Worse still, the Commission’s RIA did not readjust 
benefits even though the revised proposal of October includes a series of 
fairly drastic cost cutting measures. If these measures have no effect 
whatsoever on benefits, one naturally wonders why they were included in the 
first place. 
Admittedly, assessing benefits in this area is tough. The challenge of 
quantifying the positive impact of the regulation is that we do not know how 
many of the substances are hazardous and to what extent they are hazardous. 
This knowledge gap prevents a comprehensive benefit analysis. With regard 
to long run benefits, anecdotal evidence and fragmented knowledge suggest 
that chemicals lead to a number of diseases (cancer, skin disorders, etc.); a 
better understanding of the properties of chemicals could thus help reduce 
problems of public health. Nevertheless, EU health and safety rules are 
already strict in the workplace. As far as the environment is concerned, there 
is a huge knowledge gap, effectively preventing any attempt to calculate such 
benefits. An illustration by Pearce and Koundouri,
17 based on what they call 
‘conservative assumptions,’ predicts health-only benefits of approximately 
50 billion euros over a period of 20-30 years (starting 10 years after the 
implementation of REACH). In a simpler calculation the Commission came 
up with the same ‘illustrative’ figure.  
The total direct costs (that is, testing and registration) of the May 2003 draft 
proposal were estimated to be around €12.6 billion over an 11-year period. 
The RIA of the final October 2003 proposal, which included a series of cost-
cutting measures, estimated a reduction in total direct costs by an astonishing 
€10.6 billion to less than €3 billion (also incorporating minor changes). In 
short, the October proposal reduced the May proposal estimates of direct 
costs by 75%!  
No matter what one’s views are about REACH, the remaining direct costs 
would not seem to be so problematic, given that they extend over such a long 
period and that there is enormous turnover in the chemical industry in 
Europe. Even so, Table 1 strongly suggests that the original proposal was 
disproportionate. What about overall economic costs to industry, including 
the costs of withdrawals and substitution? Here there are at least two tales to 
tell. One is that the new series of case studies (see footnote 13) confirms that 
the initial fears of industry were wildly exaggerated. The other tale is based 
on attempts to come to grips with this issue via economic modeling. Since no 
econometric model of the EU chemical industry exists, the Commission 
employed a monopolistic-competition simulation model developed by 
Canton and Allen. The first version (which was unpublished, but the results 
                                                 
17 D. Pearce and P. Koundouri, 2003, The social costs of chemicals, a report for 
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of which were used publicly by Commissioner Liikanen) came to enormous 
(present value) estimated costs ranging from 13.6 billion euros to as much as 
40 billion euros. The final Canton and Allen study not only slashed this cost 
range down to between 2.8 to 5.2 billion euros (the latter being only one-
eighth of the previous maximum), the modeling device was adapted as well, 
testifying to the analytical difficulties of grappling with this complex 
question.
18  
Table 1. Estimated cost reduction of REACH, October 2003 
 
 
                                                 
18 J. Canton and C. Allen, A microeconomic model to assess the economic 
impacts of the EU's new chemicals policy, European Commission, DG 
Enterprise, November 2003. This is not the place to discuss the modelling issues. 
For the economically trained reader, it suffices to say that monopolistic 
competition is hardly the kind of model suitable for the chemical industry as it 
assumes free entry and exit (hence, erosion of market power over time). Canton 
and Allen (2003) simplify (for understandable reasons) by assuming that each 
firm in their model produces one imperfectly substitutable product; as a 
consequence, product withdrawal also changes the number of firms, and this has 
implications for the adjustment process. Their simulation hinges critically on the 
elasticities of substitution and a substitution parameter derived from the mark-
ups over costs. Although it is ingenious as a solution in the absence of empirical 
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REACHing the US? 
US business has every interest in following REACH carefully. The chemical 
industry is of course directly affected. Potentially, the stakes could be high. 
The chemical industry is the largest exporting sector in the US. Recent 
annual exports to the EU hover around $20 billion while importing some $40 
billion from the EU. Both industries have many, sometimes large affiliates 
across the North Atlantic and annual US direct investment outflows to the 
EU add up to some $4 billion. Going beyond the chemicals themselves (the 
first layer of the value chain), it is estimated that well over $400 billion of 
‘downstream products’, made by US firms with chemicals, are sold in the 
EU, be they exports from the US or from other affiliates in Europe or in third 
countries. 
The US chemical industry has essentially pursued a similar approach to 
REACH as the European industry. This is not so surprising, given the strong 
presence of both industries on both sides of the North Atlantic. What is 
interesting is that the US administration has intervened very powerfully in 
the debate, and its strand of arguments and queries seem to reflect industry 
views and concerns – so much so that the considerable support among US 
environmental NGOs and in health circles for REACH never seems to get 
much hearing in Washington, DC. There are many in the US who take the 
view that the US better consider REACH as a future standard for proper 
chemicals regulation and information gathering. The Waxman report is a 
product of the frustration of NGOs and their supporters around Capitol Hill. 
It unveils in extreme detail, based on official documents, how the US 
government has mainly echoed the industry position while refusing to give 
any hearing to the avowed benefits of REACH also for the US.
19 In any 
event, at the OECD level modest new research and testing programs about 
chemicals have been initiated. The US fears that the EU might ignore or 
bypass these cooperative efforts, even though they are least-cost and more 
risk-based (rather than hazard-based, like REACH).  
Concerning the objective or constraint of WTO compatibility, several WTO 
members led by the US have reacted to the REACH proposal. They 
expressed concerns that the draft regulation  could have discriminatory 
effects, especially where (chemical) substances in  (final)  articles are 
concerned. The line of argument is that it could be hard for importers to 
know the substances included in the article (confidentiality concerns) or they 
                                                 
19 The Waxman Report – see Committee on Government Reform, minority 
office, “The Chemical Industry, the Bush Administration, and European Efforts 
to Regulate Chemicals”, 
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may not dispose of the necessary know-how to perform the testing 
procedures of the regulation.
20 
Outlook and Conclusions 
Writing in late spring of 2005 it seems that the greatest turbulence about 
REACH is over. The proposals have been adjusted on the cost side and more 
in-depth studies indicate that initial fears were exaggerated. The original 
underlying idea of an approach based on the precautionary principle, 
implying that one should undertake every attempt to improve knowledge in 
the presence of unacceptably great uncertainty, has been upheld, but its 
unreserved application has become far more measured. Fears now center 
more on how the European Chemical Agency can and should operate, 
including how it can truly offer ‘one-stop-shopping’. 
The European Parliament has not proposed any official amendments at this 
moment of writing. Therefore, it is hazardous to predict how REACH will 
eventually be adopted. Members of the European Parliament have invested 
considerable effort in trying to understand the merits and needs of this major 
reform. Several informal proposals by MEPs have been aired but intense 
consultations continue. MEPs would seem to be aware that the present 
regulatory system for chemicals is not a good option. Reform is badly 
necessary; the decisive question is how far, how fast and how intrusive the 
impositions on business will be, given the broad consensus about the need to 
know much more about the long term health and environmental 
consequences of chemicals.  
                                                 
20 For other potential problems REACH might present in a WTO context, see the 
statement by Professor Marco Bronckers at the European Parliament hearings of 
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15.   All quiet on the transatlantic front? 
Deficits, Imbalances and the 
Transatlantic Economy 
  Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer 
he dollar seems to have stabilized in early 2005, at least relative to the 
euro, after several years of strong decline. While the euro was 
appreciating against the dollar, the rapid movement in the bilateral 
rate generated considerable concern in Europe. However, with new-found 
relative stability, European concerns about the ‘excessive’ strength of the 
euro have abated, and exchange rate developments therefore no longer 
provide a source of transatlantic friction. 
The massive swings in the dollar/euro rate seem to have had little impact 
thus far on the transatlantic trade imbalance. It is usually overlooked that 
until as recently as 2003, the bilateral US deficit with Europe was as large as 
that with China. Over the last year this has changed somewhat; the 
transatlantic imbalance has stabilized whereas the US deficit with China (as 
that of the EU with China) has continued to increase.  
Even today, however, the US deficit with the EU still remains one of its 
largest bilateral deficits, but until now this has generated little political heat. 
There are two reasons why the transatlantic trade relationship should be the 
most robust bilateral trade relationship in the world.  
First, the EU and the US produce similar goods, which is not the case in US-
China trade. There can thus be no accusations of cheap labor and social 
dumping across the Atlantic. 
A second reason why the transatlantic trade imbalance generates little 
political heat stems from the huge amount of two-way foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that has flown across the Atlantic over the last few 
decades.
1 The accumulated stock is now so large that about one-half of all 
transatlantic trade is intra-firm trade. This implies that even large shifts in the 
bilateral exchange rate do not lead to strong protectionist pressures. 
DaimlerChrysler can just shift production from one side to the other and will 
not lobby for protection on either side of the Atlantic. Moreover, when a firm 
produces on both shores of the Atlantic, there is no clear link between the 
exchange rate and its profits.  
                                                 
1 See chapters 1 and 2 of this volume; also Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. 
Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic 
Economy (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004). 
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There are thus solid reasons why trade issues are not the source of 
transatlantic friction. Nevertheless, there remains one source of potential 
conflict: the huge ongoing US current deficit. For US policy-makers, the 
solution to this problem (if it is regarded as a problem at all) lies in Asia, 
especially with the exchange rate policy of China. Many Europeans, 
however, regard insufficient US savings as the root cause. This chapter 
argues that these two views in isolation are both wrong, but that, in 
combination, they provide a convincing explanation. They also point to the 
forces that might bring the US deficit back to more reasonable levels. 
In substance, our argument is that the US deficit is the result of the 
emergence of the desire on the part of the rest of the world, in particular 
emerging markets, to massively increase their savings. The desire by 
emerging markets to run large current account surpluses had to be balanced 
by deficits elsewhere. Why did the US, and not Europe, provide the 
counterpart to the massive emerging market surpluses? We argue that this is 
due to a combination of a different policy response to this common shock 
and a difference in economic structure, particularly in the housing market. A 
corollary of this view is that a correction of the US deficit does not 
necessarily require a massive revaluation of the euro against the dollar. The 
correction could come from a gradual fall in emerging market surpluses 
accompanied by higher real interest rates and hence slower demand growth 
in the US. 
Emerging Market Booms and Busts: The Primary Driver for 
the US Current Account 
In order to find the roots of today’s US current account deficit, one has to go 
back almost a decade and to look outside the US. The best time period in 
which to start is the mid-1990s, when equity markets were booming all over 
the world on the back of expectations of intensifying globalization and a 
revolution in ‘information and communication technologies’. Emerging 
markets were then becoming popular destinations for international investors, 
particularly as their markets were opening up and offering high-growth 
potential and attractive rates of return. However, the emerging markets’ 
boom came to an abrupt halt in 1997, as a combination of lax fiscal policies, 
rigid exchange rates, rapid consumption and investment growth led to 
widening current account deficits financed by large short-term capital 
inflows. Indeed, outside of Asia and Eastern Europe, foreign direct 
investment constituted a small share of the financing of the current account 
deficits. These were the classical ingredients that provoked the crises that 
occurred in one country after another between 1997 and 2002. 238 | GROS & MAYER 
 
What happened next constitutes the core element of the mechanism leading 
to the US deficit: shut out of international capital markets and forced to 
embrace tough IMF medicine and to elect more conservative governments, 
emerging markets began adopting sound economic policies. Fixed exchange 
rates were abandoned, current account deficits turned into surpluses, large 
primary surpluses were generated by the public sector (pace George Stiglitz), 
short-term external debt was eliminated and the depleted stock of 
international reserves was replenished to record levels. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulated current account position of East 
European, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries.
2 From a 
cumulated deficit of $78 billion in 1995, emerging markets turned their 
current accounts into a sizeable surplus of $81 billion in 1999, as fiscal and 
monetary policy tightening improved public and private savings-investment 
balances. Since 1999, competitive currencies and high commodity prices 
allowed emerging markets to generate even larger current account surpluses, 
reaching an estimated $328 billion in 2004 (of which about one-half was 
owed to oil producers – more on this later). 
Figure 1. Emerging Markets Current Account Position 
($ billions) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004. 
 
                                                 
2 The group of emerging market economies was built from IMF country 
groupings. Current account aggregates were computed by adding the current 
account balances (in US dollars) of these groups. The savings and investment 
ratios of our group of emerging markets were calculated as the weighted average 
of the IMF country groups on the basis of purchasing power GDP weights given 
by the IMF. The source of all data is the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Data 
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Figure 2. Regional Contributions to Current Account Balances in 

















Source: Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research. 
 
Figure 3 shows gross national savings and investment relative to GDP for the 
same group of countries (the difference between the two series indicates the 
group’s external balance and thus its net export of savings).  
Figure 3. National Savings and Investment Positions in Emerging Markets 
(% of GDP) 
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As emerging markets’ crises unfolded in the second half of the 1990s, 
emerging markets slashed their investment spending sharply. In 1998, 
national savings also fell, as a number of countries plunged into severe 
recession. Thereafter, however, savings recovered thanks to domestic 
austerity policies, while investment followed only with a lag and at a more 
moderate pace. As of 1999, in a major change from past behavior and against 
the conventional wisdom of development economics, emerging markets 
began exporting large and growing amounts of savings to the rest of the 
world. In more recent years, exports of savings from emerging markets were 
boosted further by rising commodity prices. 
G-3: After the Boom, the Investment Bust 
While emerging-market countries experienced balance-of-payments crises 
and stabilization recessions in the second half of the 1990s, industrialized 
countries enjoyed an economic boom on the back of surging stock markets 
and euphoria about the benefits of new information and communications 
technologies. Hence the emerging market bust had little impact on activity in 
the G3 (although the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital briefly 
led to fears of a credit crunch). The lower demand for capital from emerging 
markets was rapidly absorbed by the huge increase in investment in the US. 
This was the first leg of the contribution of the emerging markets to the US 
deficits, which then began to increase considerably. 
During 2000, however, the boom turned into a bust as the valuation of ‘new 
economy’ equities climbed to irrational highs. In the event, the equity 
markets’ decline triggered a sharp drop in investment, as companies 
struggled to repair their balance sheets by paying off debt, and industrially 
advanced economies fell into stagnation or recession. 
Throughout the second half of the 1990s, industrially advanced countries, 
and especially the US, had been net importers of international savings, 
reflecting a rise in investment following the new technology boom that had 
not been matched by a corresponding rise in domestic savings. After 2000, 
however, investment in industrialized countries fell, just at the time when 
emerging market countries stepped up their exports of savings (Figure 4). 
At the beginning of the new millennium, global capital markets therefore 
were suddenly confronted with a rising supply of savings from emerging 
markets and falling demand for these savings from industrialized countries, 
which were experiencing an investment recession. There was only one way 
to equilibrate the global supply and demand for savings: global real interest 
rates had to fall. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the 
developments of the ratio of world investment to GDP and real US 10-year 
government bond yields, which we use here (somewhat loosely) as a proxy DEFICITS, IMBALANCES AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY| 241 
 
for the global real interest rates.
3 The drop in investment (relative to GDP) in 
the industrialized countries (shown in Figure 4) pushed down the global 
investment ratio (as the rise in emerging markets’ investment was too weak 
to compensate for the investment weakness elsewhere). As the investment 
ratio fell, real interest rates fell.  
Figure 4. Emerging Markets’ Savings and Industrialized 
Countries’ Investment Positions (% of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004. 
 
As we shall argue in more detail below, the decline in real interest rates 
eventually helped turn around the decline in investment and depressed 
savings in industrialized countries. At this point we just want to comment 
briefly on the breakdown of the relationship between lower investment and 
lower interest rates over the last two years. With investment showing a 
strong recovery, real interest rates should have risen; but they did not. Why? 
The next section will illustrate a quite different source of savings that has 
suddenly appeared on the global scene: the surplus of the oil-producing 
countries. 
 
                                                 
3 To calculate real interest rates, we simply deflated nominal US bond yields 


















emerging markets saving (lhs) industrial countries investment (rhs) 242 | GROS & MAYER 
 
Figure 5. Global Investment and Real Interest Rates 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004. 
Oil Prices and the Sudden Emergence of Another Source of 
Excess Savings 
More recently, i.e. since 2004, another source of excess savings has appeared 
and grown very rapidly in the form of the rising surplus of OPEC countries. 
This surplus is destined to grow even further in the current year as oil prices 
have stayed above the average 2004 level. The reason for the emergence of 
this surplus is quite simple: oil-producing countries have a lower propensity 
to consume beyond their income.  
There are several reasons why OPEC and other oil-producing countries are 
not spending their windfall immediately. First, despite the existence of 
futures market pricing, there is considerable uncertainty about the future path 
of oil prices, and thus the marginal propensity to consume is less than one in 
the short run. Second, the international financial institutions are urging 
governments of oil-producing countries to build up stabilization funds, 
advice that has been at least partially taken. This implies that governments 
are saving a substantial part of the windfall that accrues to them in the form 
of higher royalties in order to raise national savings.  
These two mechanisms are fundamentally very similar: both are based on the 
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A simple calculation can show that the magnitudes involved are significant. 
Around 50 billion barrels a day are produced by countries that are not 
themselves big consumers. An oil price increase of $20 a barrel (e.g. from 
$30 to $50/barrel) implies a transfer to these producers of about $1 billion 
per day, or around $370 billion per annum. If about one-half of this amount 
is initially saved, the increase in the oil price observed over the last year and 
a half is equivalent to a negative demand shock of about $180-$200 billion 
for the oil-consuming countries. This alone would be equivalent to a drop of 
the investment ratio in both the US and the eurozone of around 1% of GDP – 
not far from the actual increase in global investment shown in Figure 5 
above. Under reasonable assumptions, the oil shock could thus have 
contributed just enough ex ante savings to maintain the global savings/ 
investment balance at the level it was when savings were depressed in 2001-
03. 
A world out of balance? 
A fall in global real interest rates was required to equilibrate the global 
market for savings and enforce the ex-post identity of real savings and 
investment. This alone would not explain why the US deficit would increase; 
in principle one could have expected both the EU and the US to provide the 
counterpart to higher emerging market savings. However, the fall in real 
interest rates had a completely different impact on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. There are two reasons for this asymmetry: policy-makers reacted 
differently and this interacted with differences in economic and financial 
structures. 
Differences in policy-makers’ reactions. The investment bust required a new 
term structure of interest rates at a lower level, which involves the 
adjustment of both market and policy interest rates. Given their control over 
the short end of the yield curve, central banks played a key role in bringing 
real rates lower. Their reaction was promoted by the perceived shortfall of 
investment and excess supply of savings that were threatening the economic 
outlook and raising the spectre of deflation.  
Here is a first transatlantic difference: the Federal Reserve was able to slash 
interest rates much more strongly than the ECB for the simple reason that it 
had hiked rates much more in the run-up to the boom in 1999-2000 (to 6.5% 
compared to ‘only’ 4.75% in the eurozone). At the same time, high 
productivity growth in the US kept inflation in check so that the Fed could 
lower interest rates to 1%, a fall of 5.5 percentage points. The ECB lowered 
rates ‘only’ by one-half of this amount, when it stopped the easing cycle at 
2% in 2003. With inflation under control, the fall in nominal long-term rates 
was fully reflected in real rates, as shown for the US in Figure 6. 244 | GROS & MAYER 
 
Figure 6. US Nominal and Real Interest Rates and Inflation (%) 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2004. 
 
As discussed earlier, the decline in real rates was needed to balance the 
global demand and supply of savings. While the demand for savings by 
investors responds directly to changes in real interest rates, real and financial 
assets are the key catalyst for real interest rate changes to affect the supply of 
savings by private households in the industrialized countries.
4 With the 
decline in real interest rates raising asset prices, consumers felt wealthier and 
were inclined to reduce their savings. Real estate markets played the most 
important role here. Figure 7 shows how real private consumption grew 
strongly .in countries where housing prices also increased strongly. 
Clearly, while the decline in real interest rates was a global phenomenon, 
demand and supply conditions in specific real estate markets mattered. For 
instance, housing prices rose only slightly in Japan and Germany, where a 
supply overhang existed, but they rose at an accelerating pace in the US.
5 
                                                 
4 To illustrate this point, consider the following standard investment and 
consumption functions: (1) I = I(r); (2) C = C(Y,W(r)). Equation (1) relates 
investment to the real interest rate and equation (2) relates consumption to 
income and wealth, which itself is a function of the real interest rate (with a 
decrease in r raising W). 
5 Of course, there are large regional differences even within countries. The US 
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This constitutes another reason for transatlantic divergence. The impact of 
differences in the evolution of housing prices is compounded by differences 
in financial markets: in the US, most mortgages carry an option for the 
holder to refinance the mortgage should interest rates fall. Moreover, the 
ratio of the value of the house that can be mortgaged is typically higher in the 
US than in most of continental Europe. Since the transactions cost of this re-
financing is low, it is not surprising that millions of US households took 
advantage of lower long-term interest rates to ‘extract equity’ from their 
homes. Little of this financial engineering is possible in Europe. 
Accordingly, most continental European countries are positioned below the 
line in Figure 7 (indicating a lower consumption response to a given increase 
in housing prices), whereas the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries are 
above the line. 
Figure 7. Housing Prices (Q303) and Real Private Consumption 




























Source: OECD and The Economist. 
 
Fiscal policy also played an important role in restoring equilibrium in the 
global savings market. In particular, the US government turned from a net 
saver to a large dis-saver, absorbing a considerable amount of global savings 
and helping to stabilize domestic demand in the US. Here is another 
                                                                                                              
have moved relatively little in the center of the country. Even in those European 
countries (much smaller than the US) where on average housing prices did not 
increase greatly, there were localized booms. 246 | GROS & MAYER 
 
transatlantic difference: euro area countries had much less room for fiscal 
policy maneuver because, again, they had not really tightened their policy 
during the boom. The difference in fiscal policy is even larger than the 
difference in monetary policy. We use as the best indicator the cyclically 
adjusted deficit because the direct ‘automatic’ impact of the cycle on budgets 
has already been taken out of this measure. At the start of EMU, Euroland 
governments were already in a weak position with a cyclically adjusted 
deficit of around 1.5% of GDP, which then was allowed to deteriorate to 
around 2.5% of GDP in 2002, with very little change over the last four years. 
By contrast, the US started the period under consideration with a cyclically 
adjusted surplus of over 1% of GDP and was thus in a much better position 
to use fiscal policy actively for demand management purposes. Due to a 
combination of spending increases and tax cuts, the US budget balance 
policy swung rapidly into a deficit of now over 4% of GDP on a cyclically 
adjusted basis, and the overall swing between 1999 and 2004 was equivalent 
to over 5% of GDP, five times larger than that for Euroland.  
Through these mechanisms, national savings were eventually reduced much 
more in the US than in Europe, allowing the former to absorb the surplus 
savings of emerging markets at a time of lower investment activity, without 
triggering a major world recession. However, this left the world with a 
considerable international current account imbalance. 
In sum, the large decline in real interest rates and the emergence of 
unprecedented current account imbalances were the corollary to the 
stabilization of the world economy at a time of huge changes in global 
savings and investment flows. This common shock had a totally different 
impact on the two sides of the Atlantic because different starting conditions 
led to quite different policy responses. 
The result of the extraordinary policy stimulus administered in the US is 
shown in Table 1. US gross national savings as a share of GDP fell sharply 
from its 1995-97 average to 2004, while investment remained broadly stable 
(thanks to the rebound in 2004). As a result, the recession of 2001 remained 
short and shallow, but the national savings-investment deficit increased 
considerably (see Figure 8). Developments in the UK and Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) were similar to those in the US. In 
contrast, the drop in national savings in Japan and the eurozone fell short of, 
or just compensated for the drop in investment. Since consumption did not 
compensate for the fall in investment, growth in these regions trailed that of 
the US. 
 DEFICITS, IMBALANCES AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY| 247 
 
Table 1. Changes in savings and investment ratios, 2004 
relative to 1995-97 (% of GDP) 
Savings  Investment S-I 
United States -2.7  0.4  -3.1 
Japan -3.0  -4.5  1.5 
Euro area -0.7  -0.7  0.0 
United Kingdom -1.4  -0.1  -1.3 
CEECs -1.2  -0.5  -0.7 
Emerging markets 3.8  -0.2  4.0 
CIS 6.1  -2.2  8.4 
Middle East 4.9  0.0  4.9 
Western Hemisphere 1.9  -1.6  3.4 
Asian NICs -2.1  -8.1  6.0 
Developing Asia 4.7  1.6  3.1 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Data Base. 
 
Figure 8. US Savings-Investment Balances 
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Source: DB Global Markets Research. 
 
In most emerging markets (with the exception of the Asian newly 
industrialized countries – NICs), national savings rose significantly between 
1995-97 and 2004, while investment rose only a little or fell. In the NICs, 248 | GROS & MAYER 
 
however, the savings-investment balance rose significantly because of the 
large decline in investment. As we argued above, this reflected in large part a 
change in economic policies aimed at reducing dependence on capital 
imports by creating a savings-investment surplus. In some regions, notably in 
the Middle East and the CIS, an improvement in terms of trade resulting 
from rising commodity prices added to the savings surplus.  
In contrast to Japan and Euroland, however, emerging markets managed to 
grow fast during these years on the back of strong export growth to the US 
and EU. Many of these countries prevented their exchange rates from 
appreciating against the US dollar and hence fully benefited from rising US 
import demand. With private sector capital flows militating against an 
external savings surplus, countries had to intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets, occasionally on a large scale, to stabilize their exchange rates. 
Through this exchange rate policy, they effectively taxed consumption and 
subsidized exports, and turned their savings surplus into a rise in official 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Table 2 shows changes in current accounts corresponding to changes in 
savings and investment balances. The current account position of emerging 
market countries improved by almost $400 billion between 1995-97 and 
2004, while the current account position of the other countries/regions listed 
in the table deteriorated by some $500 billion. Within the latter group, the 
current account position of Japan rose while that of the euro area remained 
broadly unchanged. Thus, increases in the current account surpluses of 
emerging markets and Japan financed to a large degree the increase in the 
current account deficits of Anglo-Saxon and Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
 
Table 2. Changes in Current Account Balances, 2004, 1995-97 ($ billions) 
2004  1995-97  Change 
United States -631.3  -119.5  -511.8 
Japan 159.4  91.2  68.2 
Euro area 72.2  76.0  -3.8 
United Kingdom -43.3  -8.9  -34.4 
CEECs -44.2  -15.4  -28.8 
Emerging markets 327.7  -65.1  392.8 
CIS 61.4  -2.0  63.4 
Middle East 103.5  6.3  97.2 
Western Hemisphere 9.0  -48.3  57.3 
NIC Asia 85.0  2.1  82.9 
Developing Asia 68.8  -23.2  92.0 
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Implications for Transatlantic Relations 
As anticipated in the introduction, this analysis has one simple implication 
for transatlantic relations: the main mechanism to rein in the US current 
account deficit is not the bilateral exchange rate dollar/euro, but an increase 
in global interest rates, which would compress US excess demand for savings 
from the rest of the world. It is thus possible that all will remain quiet on the 
transatlantic front. | 250 
16. Transatlantic and Global Dimensions 
of the Lisbon Agenda 
 Fredrik  Erixon 
t a European Union summit in March 2000, member states agreed to 
launch a new EU-wide reform program – the Lisbon agenda – 
aiming to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic economy 
in the world by 2010. According to the Lisbon European Council, achieving 
this goal required a transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by 
better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping 
up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and 
by completing the internal market. 
At the time of the Lisbon summit, the current recession in major EU 
economies had not yet started. The macroeconomic environment of the EU 
was rather good; indeed, some claimed that Europe was experiencing the best 
macroeconomic outlook for a generation. At the peak of the ‘dotcom’ era, 
there was a widespread feeling of an ascending Europe. Yet to the discerning 
observer, there were signs of problems. Unemployment remained persistently 
high in spite of the economic boom. Ample evidence signaled that the EU 
economy was once again lagging behind that of the US. The post-World War 
II catch-up period of the European economy had ended by the early 1970s. 
European productivity continued to rise faster than US productivity and GDP 
per capita grew with roughly the same factor over the following decades, but 
a clear shift of pattern occurred in the 1990s. The convergence of 
productivity between the US and the EU then ended. US productivity geared 
up while European productivity growth slowed down. This trend was also 
manifested in GDP figures: the average annual growth in 1995-2000 was 
4.1% in the US and 2.7% in the EU-15.
1 
Of greater concern to many in Europe was the slow pace of the general 
transformation of the industrial economy into a knowledge-based one. Again, 
the US seemed to develop faster than Europe. Investment in the information 
and communications technology (ICT) sectors was higher, and the diffusion 
of new technology much faster in the US than in Europe. Overall, the 
organizational structure of the US economy seemed to be more conducive to 
                                                        
1 See B. van Ark and R. McGuckin III, Performance 2004: Productivity, 
Employment, and Income in the World’s Economies, Research Report R-1351-
04-RR, The Conference Board, New York, 2004. 
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a ‘third industrial revolution’ and a step up in the value-added chain.
2 
Therefore, to promote structural reform, innovation and growth – and 
generally increase competitiveness – the EU embarked on a comprehensive 
economic reform program. 
This chapter takes a closer look at the Lisbon agenda and its method of 
reforms. Of particular interest is the missing link of an ‘external dimension’ 
in the agenda, especially a transatlantic dimension, which could enable EU 
member states to use international cooperation in a wider context to leverage 
reforms and growth. The chapter argues that the EU has much to gain from 
widening the perspective of the Lisbon agenda and advancing the multilateral 
liberalization of the world economy as well as bilateral efforts of the same 
kind together with the US. 
The Lisbon Agenda 
The Lisbon agenda is a comparatively far-reaching reform program that cuts 
across many policy areas. It has recently been under review. The revised 
Lisbon agenda, as proposed by the Commission, will be of a different sort 
than the original agenda in terms of tools and methods for implementing 
reforms.
3 Having found it difficult to persuade member countries to deliver 
the reforms and implement the Lisbon strategy, the new Commission has 
suggested a ‘new partnership’ for promoting reforms but has not yet 
specified the details of the process. Nevertheless, the key spheres are still the 
same: innovation, liberalization, enterprise, employment and sustainable 
development. Below is a brief description of these areas.
4  
1) Innovation. The EU has to increase the role of innovation-based 
production in order to avoid competing with low-cost countries in future. 
                                                        
2 Studies by the consulting firm McKinsey (Service Sector Productivity, 
McKinsey, Washington, DC, 1992) and W.W. Lewis (“The Power of 
Productivity”, The McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4, 2004) suggest that the low level 
of competition in the European service sectors explains the difference in the ICT 
effect on productivity growth between Europe and the US. These findings were 
confirmed by R. Gordon in Why was Europe Left at the Station when America’s 
Productivity Locomotive Departed?, NBER Working Paper No. 10661, NBER, 
Cambridge, MA, 2004. 
3 See European Commission, Working Together for Growth and Jobs, Next Steps 
in Implementing the Revised Lisbon Strategy, Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2005) 622/2, Brussels. 
4 The purpose of this description is to present the general thrust of the agenda, 
not to offer a comprehensive examination or to address every specific goal. 252 | FREDRIK ERIXON 
Therefore, spending on research and development has to rise. Although it has 
risen moderately since 2000, it is still well below the target of 3% of GDP 
and the US level of R&D spending (2.7% of GDP). The low level of 
European spending on R&D is assumed to explain the difference in the 
number of patents between the US and the EU. According to Eurostat’s 
structural indicators, the number of applications to the European Patent 
Office per million inhabitants was approximately 48 in the US and 32 in the 
15 member states that made up the EU prior to enlargement (EU-15). The 
difference in patent applications to the US Patent and Trademark Office was 
even larger, more than four times higher in the US than in EU-15. To step up 
innovation in Europe, member countries should increase Internet access and 
promote new technologies.  
2) Liberalization. The EU Single Market is not yet complete. Many sectors, 
especially service sectors, are still not integrated in an EU-wide economy. 
The overall market liberalization strategy in the Lisbon agenda is ambiguous; 
it is unclear to what extent liberalization of the service sectors should be 
dealt with under the Lisbon heading. Yet some sectors are notably targeted in 
the strategy: telecom, gas, electricity, transport, postal services and financial 
services. The agenda calls for deregulation of the telecom sector, 
liberalization of gas and electricity markets, and increased competition in 
transport (particularly of rail services). Moreover, the markets for financial 
services should be opened up for European competition and member states 
are being generally pushed to promote a single market in services. 
3) Enterprise. The Lisbon agenda aims at improving the business climate of 
the EU and at stimulating risk-taking and new companies. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises are particularly noted as important for the future of 
the EU’s economy and for achieving rising employment. The prospects for 
an entrepreneurial-based economic future seem to be rather weak, however. 
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, a much larger share of 
the population in the US is involved in entrepreneurial activities than in the 
EU.
5 Equally disappointing to the EU is the fact that many more Americans 
prefer to be self-employed.
6 This characteristic is not necessarily an obstacle 
in raising the number of new companies in the EU, but a more 
entrepreneurial spirit is explicitly mentioned in the agenda as instrumental to 
achieving a more dynamic EU economy. According to the agenda, it is also 
of great importance to expand the volume of venture capital accessible to EU 
                                                        
5 See the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2004  Report,  GEM Consortium, 
Babson Park, MA, 2005 (retrieved from http://www.gemconsortium.org). 
6 See Entrepreneurship, Flash Eurobarometer No. 160, European Commission, 
Brussels, June 2004 (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/ 
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start-ups, simplify the regulatory structure, promote competition and scale-
down subsidies to industries, and make procurement rules more accessible. 
3) Employment and social inclusion. This area is the most politically 
challenging for reforms in the agenda. It cuts directly into the welfare model 
of many countries and addresses general concerns of the ‘European social 
model’. Unemployment and the low level of workforce participation are 
problems in many European countries. In the second half of the 1990s and 
the first years of the new millennium, unemployment in Europe fell. In recent 
years, it has started to climb again. The goals of the Lisbon strategy are to 
raise the general workforce participation ratio to 70% (it is today well below 
65%), the participation ratio of women to 60% and of older workers to 50%. 
The agenda seeks to foster a general upgrade in skills by halving the number 
of youths lacking secondary education and generally promoting a culture of 
lifelong learning. In addition, member countries are to consolidate public 
finances, increase the effective retirement age and reduce the number of 
persons at risk from poverty and social exclusion.  
4) Sustainable development. During the Swedish presidency of the EU in 
2001, sustainable development was added to the Lisbon agenda. The Kyoto 
Protocol target of reduced greenhouse gas emissions is now part of the 
agenda (which aims at an 8% reduction from the 1990 level by 2010), as well 
as reforms to increase the share of renewable sources in the provision of 
electricity and to stop the depletion of biological diversity. 
Models of European Reform 
The Lisbon agenda is about comprehensive economic reforms in Europe. In 
this respect, the Lisbon agenda clearly carries the emblem of the EU and 
European cooperation. Yet, the assignment of reform delivery has not been 
addressed to the EU institutions. The strategy is largely based on issues 
where the EU in itself cannot make the decisions owing to its lack of 
(jurisdictional) competence.  
In a limited number of fields, there is a clear assignment of EU policy 
decisions, but the main mission for EU institutions is to bring a more 
significant EU dimension to the national policy arenas by monitoring and 
evaluating member countries. The underlying role of the Commission and 
the Council is to be a ‘midwife of good policies’ and smooth reform 
processes by providing benchmarks and experiences from one member state 
to another.  
The EU institutions can at times also put pressure on member states. It is true 
that the EU is rather toothless if member countries are not willing or able to 
deliver the reforms necessary to achieve the Lisbon targets. Yet that does not 254 | FREDRIK ERIXON 
necessarily translate into an ineffective role for the institutions. An 
innovative and dedicated Commission can leverage reforms if it is 
sufficiently sensible and knows when and where to push for them. The 
history of the EU provides many examples of critical moments when EU 
institutions have helped to dissolve nationally based coalitions by concerted 
reform packages in several or all member states.  
Until now, however, the ‘external dimension’ of the Lisbon policy process 
has ended in Brussels. In spite of the global character of many of the Lisbon 
issues, there is not an external dimension pointing to – or perhaps more 
importantly, using – international cooperation in a wider circle as a method 
to achieve structural reforms and to enhance EU competitiveness and growth 
potential. Given the ambitions of the agenda – not to say the general 
significance of the global economy and international cooperation today – it is 
hardly controversial to assert that the EU is missing opportunities to achieve 
its goals when the policy dimension is wholly focused on the nexus of 
Brussels and European national capitals. 
Furthermore, it is particularly strange that the agenda is largely energized – 
for some even defined – by a bipolar world of the ‘EU versus the US’. True, 
in the jargon of international competitiveness there is of course a strong 
element of comparisons with other countries. What is more, comparison can 
also be invigorating for the EU economy, as well as the other economies, 
given the greater presence of institutional competition in world affairs. 
Competition generally promotes better results and raises the general 
awareness of the upsides and downsides of specific policy options. This 
precept also applies to competition among nations. Nevertheless, that is a bit 
beside the point with regard to the Lisbon agenda. The agenda is primarily 
about increasing growth potential by improving policies. It is a program for 
structural reforms. Although having many objectives, its shining aspect is 
finding, developing and instituting methods – and momentum – of reforms. 
In structural reform processes of this kind, institutional competition has often 
been an effective strategy for achieving good results. 
Viewed in a historical EU perspective, the ‘Lisbon idea’ of structural reforms 
can arguably be seen as a policy innovation. Of course, member countries 
have launched reform programs many times before. In the policy milieu and 
the institutional setting of the EU, however, the Lisbon meeting was the first 
time that member states agreed to have a common and extensive agenda in 
many politically sensitive fields of policy where the EU lacks (jurisdictional) 
competence and jointly advance a growth policy based on a transformation 
of the economy and economic policy.  
The traditional model of EU (or EC) growth promotion – or put differently, 
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competition by market expansion and economic integration. The basic idea 
of the European Community (along with many other international 
institutions) was to tie European countries closer together through increased 
economic integration. Many other policy areas have been integrated into the 
European cooperative structure, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty, but a 
main feature continues to be economic integration – not only for its effects 
on integration per se, but also for its merits of providing economic growth by 
increasing competition and pushing for structural reforms. It is therefore 
warranted to characterize the traditional EU model of growth promotion as a 
policy based on lower barriers to trade and intensified competition.
7 The 
Single Market of 1992 is of course the prime example of this model, but the 
economic integration of the EU in the multilateral trading order has also been 
pivotal. It is hard to quantify the effects of this policy model on growth, but 
many studies point to the importance of economic integration to growth in 
the European post-war period.
8 At times, it has even been the main vehicle.
9  
                                                        
7 H. Siebert makes a passionate case for this ‘Schumpeterian’ model of European 
affairs in his publication The New Economic Landscape in Europe, London: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
8 According to a study by the European Commission (2003), The Internal Market 
– Ten Years without Frontiers, SEC(2002) 1417 of 7.1.2003, the internal market 
has had a tremendous effect on the European economy. EU GDP in 2002 was 1.8 
percentage points or €164.5 billion higher, thanks to the internal market. When 
adding together the additional annual GDP generated by the internal market 
since 1992, the European Commission claims that there has been a total GDP 
effect of €877 billion.  
9 As discussed by P. Krugman and R. Lawrence and others, technological 
progress is overall a more powerful force of structural change than trade 
liberalization. Of course, this has also been true for European countries during 
most of the 20
th century. Nevertheless, it does not translate into a lack of 
effectiveness of the route of trade liberalization to achieving structural change. 
Nor does technological progress provide a political framework for achieving 
such change. Looking at structural change from the policy side, increased market 
integration through trade liberalization is often a more viable strategy for 
politicians since they do not – at least to the same extent – control the factors by 
which a country can achieve structural change by technological progress. See P. 
Krugman and R. Lawrence, Trade, Jobs, and Wages, NBER Working Paper No. 
W4478, NBER, Cambridge, MA, 1993. See also Banks (2003), who shows for 
example how Australia achieved structural reforms and increased productivity 
and made Australian business more competitive in the world markets by 
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The Lisbon agenda also contains policy reforms of this ilk, particularly the 
program to liberalize the energy, financial, telecom and transport sectors. 
Completing the internal Single Market is also a targeted goal and the original 
agenda from 2000 went as far as to suggest an internal market for services, 
although the explicit commitments from member states were, to put it mildly, 
ambiguous. Furthermore, at the European Council’s spring meeting in 
Brussels 2004, an ‘external dimension’ of international economic integration 
was also added to the strategy. 
The market expansion element of the Lisbon agenda is, however, limited. 
The external dimension has not yet been defined or integrated in the general 
framework, not to mention in targeted goals for member states. The overall 
motif of the agenda, before and after the revision, is to climb the value-added 
chain through a comprehensive reform program aiming at making many 
policy areas more conducive to growth. This effort is arguably an essential 
shift of policy focus for the EU.  
First, there is a change of economic mode. Instead of addressing the 
unfinished business of the Single Market and continuing with more market 
integration in general (internally as well as externally), the Lisbon agenda 
directs attention to the contributions to growth from research, technology, 
and innovation.  
Second, there is a difference in policy method. On balance, the agenda is 
based on prescriptive policies in these areas, instructing countries what to do, 
rather than a proscriptive method of policies, prohibiting countries from 
specific actions. If the monetary union is excluded, the mode of economic 
cooperation in Europe has historically been of the proscriptive kind. 
Third, there is a shift of governance structure. The current reform program is 
largely based on a model of governance where the Commission is not the 
vehicle of the reform process or in charge of the agenda. In previous 
programs, the Commission has often played a more significant role in 
delivering reforms. That was possible because those programs rested upon 
policy reforms for which the EU actually had exclusive competence.  
That is not to say that EU leaders made a bad decision in Lisbon when 
heading for comprehensive policy reforms. On the contrary, the EU’s quest 
for increased growth needs a systematic overview over many fields of policy. 
There are, however, several pieces missing in the current agenda. In 
particular, EU leaders have devalued the possibility of enhancing growth by 
using closer market integration – internally as well as externally – to leverage 
policy reforms and structural adjustments. This link is the most apparent one 
missing in the strategy. The following sections examine the possibility of 
enhancing prospects for growth by integrating an external dimension in the 
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Themes of the Transatlantic Dimension 
In spite of the rapid ascent of Asia and China in international economic 
affairs, the transatlantic economy is still the vehicle of the world economy. In 
two other chapters in this volume, Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan 
estimate that the transatlantic economy – including two-way trade and 
foreign affiliate sales – totals approximately $3 trillion. Transatlantic trade 
accounted for approximately 8% of the $9.1 trillion in world exports of 
merchandise and commercial services in 2003. These figures may not sound 
like striking examples of the size of the transatlantic economy, but if intra-
EU export is excluded, the transatlantic share of exports rises to more than 
20% of the world total. In 2003, the US constituted 22% of the EU’s 
merchandise exports and 15% of its merchandise imports.
10  
Yet the structure of the transatlantic, or the world, economy is no longer 
dominated by trade flows. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign 
affiliate sales have in later decades increased rapidly in importance. This 
increase is owing to what economists call a proximity-concentration trade-
off; if the cost of exporting products to other countries is higher than 
maintaining capacity in multiple markets, companies tend to substitute trade 
by investments in foreign affiliates. Considering the geographical distance 
between Europe and the US, and the decreasing barriers to investing in the 
other continent, the transatlantic economy has steered into a foreign affiliate-
based relationship. The sales by US or European foreign affiliates are much 
larger than their respective exports to one another. The total output of US 
foreign affiliates in Europe was $333 billion in 2000, and inversely, 
European affiliate sales in the US amounted to $301 billion. The EU has also 
been the largest recipient of US FDI and vice versa.
11  
By every standard of measurement, the United States and the European 
Union are the main axis of the world economy. Furthermore, given the size 
of their economies, even a small annual percentage growth of trade and 
                                                        
10 The data here were derived from the WTO Statistics Database; for a historical 
perspective of transatlantic trade, see A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The 
Growth of the International Economy 1820-2000, London: Routledge, 1999. 
11 See the chapters by D.S. Hamilton and J.P. Quinlan in this volume; see also 
D.S. Hamilton and J.P. Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing 
Geography of the Transatlantic Economy, Johns Hopkins Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, 2004; and also J.P. Quinlan, Drifting 
Apart or Growing Together? The Continued Primacy of the Transatlantic 
Economy, Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, DC, 
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foreign direct investment in the transatlantic dimension represents the bulk of 
world growth in the respective indicators when counted in nominal terms.  
One could easily believe that the sheer size of the transatlantic economy is a 
sign of finished business in view of barriers to further economic integration. 
In addition, judging from basic trade theory, the major benefits of trade stem 
from trade with countries that have a different set of factors of production. 
The EU and the US, largely having similar production structures, should 
accordingly look for improved economic cooperation primarily with other 
countries and not with each other.  
Notwithstanding the importance of improved trade relations with developing 
countries, this theory is a simplification of trade relations and can be 
misleading when setting priorities for policy. Put differently, there is a lot to 
be gained for the EU – as well as the US – by pushing transatlantic economic 
integration further. This is particularly true with regard to structural reforms.  
Transatlantic Dimensions of the Doha Round and Beyond  
The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is at the center of 
efforts to liberalize trade. Despite several setbacks in the negotiations, the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) remains the core part of developing a 
world trading system more open to cross-border economic exchange. True, 
trade liberalization today is often achieved through bilateral agreements or in 
regional trading blocs. The last decade has witnessed an explosion of the 
number of so-called ‘preferential trade agreements’. Such agreements tend to 
be important stepping-stones to multilateral agreements, but as a method of 
bringing larger openness to trade, and increasing the actual volume of trade, 
they are overrated.  
Despite the justified critique of a lack focus on market access in the DDA, 
the current round will, if completed, deliver many benefits to countries and 
the world economy. According to a study by the World Bank, the welfare 
gains from a successful round of multilateral trade liberalization amounts to 
roughly $250 billion.
12 The benefits will primarily come from liberalization 
of trade in agriculture and services. In addition, strengthening the rules of 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and clarifying legal uncertainties 
causing confusion in some trade disputes will undoubtedly add further 
benefits to WTO countries.  
The Doha Round is, however, a development round, explicitly designed to 
address the concerns of the developing countries. Developed countries of 
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course have a stake in the round, but many of their issues have been put 
aside, for both good and bad reasons. This context simply means that efforts 
to increase the economic integration in fields of greater economic importance 
to the developed world are not sufficiently addressed in the current round.  
Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, some analysts hold that the WTO no 
longer has the tools to address issues of increased market access in areas 
important to the developed world, notably with regard to trade in services 
and the so-called ‘deep-integration’ issues.
13 This perspective may turn out to 
be an overly pessimistic view of the WTO, but it is probably true that it will 
take many years before a new round, targeting developed country issues, can 
be completed. If the Doha Round finishes in 2008 and a new round starts in 
2010, it may well be beyond 2015 before a thorough multilateral program of 
market access issues in the service sectors, following the completion of the 
new round, are implemented.
14  
This point is not a critique of the WTO. Yet the conclusion is that there are 
plenty of reasons for countries – not only developed ones – to chart other 
paths to achieve further economic integration, even as they pursue Doha.  
Agriculture 
Liberalization in agricultural trade is the centerpiece of the current round. If 
significant changes are not made in the agricultural negotiations, in border 
protection as well as in subsidies, there will probably not be any agreement at 
all. Many developing countries, particularly the large food exporters in the 
Cairns Group, will veto any accomplishments in other fields of the round 
unless barriers to trade in agriculture are brought down substantially. 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the EU and the US, the main parties 
blocking increased market access in agricultural trade, to find ways to deliver 
agricultural reforms in order to secure success in other areas. 
It is not only developing countries that stand to benefit from a liberal regime 
in agricultural trade. Indeed, consumers in Western countries – particularly in 
the EU and the US (not to mention those affected by the protectionism in 
                                                        
13 According to this view, too many countries are involved in WTO negotiations 
today. If the WTO is going to stick to the principle of a single undertaking, it 
will be difficult to achieve results.  
14 Multilateral negotiations on increased trade in services will probably continue 
on a sectoral basis between the rounds, as they did between the end of the 
Uruguay Round and the start of the Doha Round, but real business is often 
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Norway and Japan) – will be better off with lower prices on foodstuffs.
15 To 
the efficient agricultural producers in Western countries, liberalized trade 
also opens new trading opportunities.  
There are many issues of importance to the transatlantic economy in the 
agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round. Taking stock of non-Doha 
issues and developments, many other concerns and opportunities in the 
agricultural sector could easily be added. In view of the Lisbon agenda as 
well as the WTO, the central concern is again finding a way for the EU and 
the US to avoid being the mouthpieces of agricultural interests in trade 
negotiations, which clearly hampers developments in other fields of the 
economy where trade liberalization is called for. There are two concerns in 
the nexus of transatlantic trade and agricultural trade affairs that are 
especially important to address. 
First, there is a need to clarify rules on the use of hormones – and other 
artificial methods – in agricultural production and, if this is not possible, 
negotiate solutions to conflicts over this type of affair. The example of 
hormone-treated beef is a case in point.  
This case may not be a big issue if measured in welfare gains and losses. The 
EU ban on imports of animals or meat from animals that have been treated 
with synthetic hormones equaled, at the time of implementation, a loss of US 
beef exports of $100 million. The US retaliation in 1999 on imports from the 
EU amounted to approximately $120 million. Thus, in comparison with 
losses owing to other trade conflicts, or in view of what can be accomplished 
by other efforts in trade liberalization, this problem is perhaps not of the 
magnitude to put it high up the agenda.  
On the other hand, $220 million is a substantial loss and there are other 
concerns involved. According to some analysts, the respective measures of 
the EU and the US have targeted agricultural production where the 
competitiveness of the two parties is relatively high – a review, to put it 
mildly, not equally applicable to other parts of US and EU agricultural 
production – which thus stirred up feelings among farmers about the benefits 
of international trade. The French farmer José Bové, a leading activist in the 
anti-globalization movement that reached headlines after its supporters 
destroyed a McDonald’s restaurant in France, is perhaps the prime example. 
Not to put too fine a point on it, his antipathy to international trade, 
globalization and the WTO was based on – or energized by – the use of 
hormones in meat production and the US retaliation on up-market food 
                                                        
15 J. Francois et al. estimate the annual welfare loss caused by the CAP to the 
average family to be about $1,200 in The Cost of EU Trade Protection in 
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produced by farmers in France. In other words, this trade dispute, bearing 
small importance to the overall trade patterns of the conflicting parties, 
helped to produce one of the strongest waves of critique against the world 
trading order in many decades.  
Along with the politics of the use of hormones and other related issues, 
clarification and further negotiations are needed in a wider perspective. The 
US Department of Agriculture estimates that the effects of questionable 
restrictions of trade on the ground of public health, which is one of the legal 
bases for restricting trade in Article 20 of the GATT, equals a loss of $5 
billion of agricultural, forestry and fishery exports from the US.
16 A 
substantial part of that sum is owing to import restrictions and prohibitions in 
the EU. The sheer size of the export loss to the US makes it an important 
issue that undoubtedly will cause trouble in transatlantic relations and the 
WTO in the future. Tensions are also likely in view of the rapid 
technological development in the agro-food sector, which will generally 
increase the stakes in the issue of artificial treatment of animals and crops. 
Many other parts of the sector (e.g. beverages) will also become involved.
17  
Second, the EU and the US have a common problem of vociferous interest 
groups blocking reforms of subsidies to agriculture and attempts to liberalize 
trade in the sector. According to the OECD, the Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE), a measure indicating the share of farm income coming from subsidies, 
is 37% in the EU and 18% in the US.
18 These high levels of subsidies have 
produced an unhealthy political economy rewarding rent-seeking behavior 
(or in the words of noted trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati, “directly 
unproductive profit-seeking activities”)
19 that clearly distorts trade and 
efforts toward increased trade openness. Furthermore, not only trade is 
affected. In the latest EU enlargement, a tremendous manifestation of the fall 
of the old iron curtain world, the accession process was (and still is) delayed 
by EU-15 farmers suspecting decreasing subsidies. According to informed 
observers, the step up in agricultural subsidies in President George W. 
                                                        
16 D. Roberts and K. De Remer, An Overview of Technical Barriers to US 
Agricultural Exports, Staff Paper AGES-9705, Economic Research Service, US 
Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, 1997. 
17 In the dispute over hormone-treated beef, it had already been noted that of the 
six hormones at issue, the one that the EU had identified as most dangerous was 
found in a more concentrated form in products other than beef – eggs and 
cabbage, for example.  
18 See Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries at a Glance, 2004 Edition, 
OECD, Paris, 2004. 
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Bush’s first administration was part of a wider package to win support for 
other reforms and to secure Republican seats in the mid-term elections to the 
US Congress.  
The question is how the EU and the US can avoid spending a lot of energy to 
protect farming lobbies and instead focus on issues where they an interest in 
increased market access. The ideal strategy is to choose liberalization 
regardless of choices made by other countries. A unilateral strategy is not 
feasible, however, for either the Europeans or the Americans. In a situation 
where a small producing sector with huge benefits from the status quo has 
won over a large consumer interest with small costs, the workings of 
institutional competition does not seem to function as it should. Other forms 
of cooperative strategies are therefore called for. A more realistic alternative 
is to seek concerted efforts by the two parties involving lowered trade 
barriers to third countries as well as a preferential access to each other’s 
markets. Although this strategy is no doubt sub-optimal, it may not be as 
difficult and cumbersome as it sounds, for the reasons explained below. 
The bounded tariff rates from the Uruguay Round, after converting non-tariff 
barriers to tariffs, are indeed still high. The bounded rate of border protection 
for sugar in 2000 was 152% in the EU and 91% in the US. For dairy 
products, the equivalent figures were 178% and 93% respectively. Border 
protection for meat and wheat is lower on both sides of the Atlantic.
20 
Viewed together with the PSE for the EU and the US, this simply means that 
there is a long way to go before trade is fully liberalized in the agricultural 
sector and that there are possible options of preferential-style transatlantic 
trade agreements without slowing down the process of opening markets for 
third countries, especially for developing nations. The positive aspect is the 
separation of producers that are competitive in a transatlantic market (but not 
necessarily in the world market) from producers that cannot compete in any 
open trade regime at all.  
Admittedly, there are numerous pitfalls in this type of policy, but by offering 
far-reaching caps on subsidies and zero tariffs in intra-transatlantic 
agricultural trade the strategy can leverage comprehensive, multilateral trade 
liberalization in agriculture in later rounds. In such a process, farm lobbies 
could not defend the status quo by pointing to general differences in the 
production milieu. The playing field would be largely leveled. Being a 
stepping-stone to multilateral liberalization, this can represent a push toward 
increased efficiency for already (and comparatively) competitive farmers in 
the European Union and the US, and increase the market for high-cost 
                                                        
20 M. Ingco, “Tariffication in the Uruguay Round: How Much Liberalization?”, 
The World Economy, July 19, 1996. TRANSATLANTIC AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LISBON AGENDA | 263 
producers in niche markets, enabling them to lower the average cost per 
product. 
In other words, as a complement to preferential agreements with developing 
countries (e.g. the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the 
Everything-but-Arms agreement and the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act), incremental steps toward a worldwide liberal trade regime, the EU and 
the US can undermine the fabric of agricultural protectionism by giving 
efficient producers a larger stake in trade. 
Services 
Of greater economic importance to the EU and the US is liberalized trade in 
services. It is difficult to estimate the welfare gains of future trade 
liberalization in services but all existing estimations point to huge increases 
in welfare. A study by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade suggests an increase in global welfare by $250 billion if trade 
distortions in the provision of services are cut by 50%.
21 Almost 30% of 
these welfare gains would go to the EU and 25% to the US and Canada. 
Several World Bank studies also estimate substantial gains from the 
liberalization of trade in services, but not of the same magnitude as the 
Australian study.
22 
These assessments reflect that the vast share of production in developed 
countries is within the service sectors, and that many of these sectors have, 
for a variety of reasons, not been integrated in a world trading system. This 
lack of integration is partly a result of the slow pace of liberalization in 
services trade. The General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) was 
born in the Uruguay Round and was the first set of multilateral rules ever 
established for services trade. Although riddled with exceptions, GATS 
                                                        
21 See the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Global Trade 
Reform: Maintaining Momentum, Canberra, 1999 (retrieved from 
http://www.dfat.gov.au); see also the conference presentation by G. Banks, 
“Gaining from Trade Liberalisations: Some Reflections on Australia’s 
Experience”, Australian Government Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2003 
(retrieved from http://www.pc.gov.au/speeches/cs20030605/cs20030605.pdf).  
22 See Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Facts, Fears and an Agenda for 
Action, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2001; see also the World Bank’s 
publication on Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World 
Economy,  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. In 2000, P. Dee and K. 
Hanslow estimated the welfare gains by services trade liberalization to be $133 
billion in Multilateral Liberalisation of Services Trade, Staff Research Paper, 
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extends the traditional GATT principles of national treatment and most-
favored nation status to trade in services. At least in theory, these aspects 
should be added. In practice, however, GATS is quite defective and had, 
from the beginning, limited ambitions. Only a few sectors are being 
addressed by this agreement; a more defining character of the agreement, in 
fact, is the absence of many service sectors.  
The GATS negotiating agenda in the DDA is ambiguous. Many sectors are 
involved but countries have not made very far-reaching commitments. The 
initial offers from the EU as well as the US indicate low aims for increased 
services trade. Many service sectors addressed in the Lisbon agenda, notably 
in the financial and telecom sectors, are also part of the GATS agenda. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to say what will be accomplished in these 
fields of policy in the current WTO negotiations. The odds against 
comprehensive trade liberalization in those sectors are, alas, high. Many 
WTO countries have yet to come far in the liberalization of certain sectors 
and the multilateral agenda must take into account the point of departure for 
those countries.
23 True, other countries can go much further in making 
commitments to service trade liberalization – and they probably will in some 
sectors – but the sheer difference in regulatory openness puts a restraint on 
the ambitions of the negotiations.  
In view of the Lisbon agenda and transatlantic economic integration, there 
are some prospects for increased market access in the Doha Round; but is it 
not also warranted for the EU and the US to consider other ways to further 
services integration, particularly across the Atlantic? 
Financial Services 
The financial services sector is another area addressed in the Lisbon 
strategy.
24 Liberalization of trade in this sector could bring substantial 
welfare gains, particularly to the EU. As with many goods, liberalization of 
services brings static benefits as well as dynamic benefits. Notwithstanding 
the importance of static benefits (trade liberalization reduces the effect of 
trade restrictions on the wedge between domestic and foreign prices), the 
dynamic benefits are perhaps the most important, particularly in view of 
structural reform and growth promotion. The generation of new knowledge, 
                                                        
23 A. Mattoo et al. construct an openness index of the financial and telecom 
sectors, showing substantial differences between countries – see Measuring 
Service Trade Liberalization and its Impact on Economic Growth: An 
Illustration, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2655, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2001. 
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the upgrade of the quality of intermediary products, the inflow of new 
technology and the effect of competition – to mention just a few benefits – 
generally promote growth. Although these factors have large impact on all 
trade, and exchange within a country too, they particularly affect the 
financial sector. This sector essentially facilitates economic production and 
thus has many spillover effects all other sectors of the economy.  
According to a rather conservative estimate, liberalization of financial 
services could bring static welfare gains of nearly $25 billion. Approximately 
15% of those gains would be generated in the EU.
25 Yet the prospects for 
substantial liberalization of trade in financial services in multilateral 
negotiations are rather thin. As was shown in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations on financial services liberalization – where a final agreement 
was reached in December 1997, well beyond the end-date of the Uruguay 
Round
26 – it is indeed a complex area touching upon regulatory structures 
and practices, many of them are not usually issues in the negotiating arena of 
trade.
27  
The commitments made in the 1997 agreement did not go beyond the already 
accomplished liberalizations among the OECD countries. This result reflects 
the differences between WTO countries; developing countries, generally 
having few stakes in financial services liberalization, start from a different 
position than OECD countries with regard to regulatory openness. Not really 
being able to find methods for reciprocal negotiations, the agreement started 
with commitments of domestic financial reforms that were not particularly 
relevant to most developed countries. The next step of financial services 
liberalization will probably continue along that path. Additional efforts to 
liberalize trade in financial services must therefore occur through 
cooperation.  
What can be done to strengthen the transatlantic dimension of financial 
services exchange? Actually, there are many reforms that could speed up 
financial services integration – in the banking and insurance sectors – most 
of which address non-tariff barriers. 
                                                        
25 See G. Verikios and X.-G. Zhang, Global Gains from Liberalising Trade in 
Telecommunications and Financial Services, Staff Research Paper, Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, Ausinfo, Canberra, 2001. 
26 An interim agreement was reached in 1995, but without US acceptance of the 
most-favored-nation treatment, because of emerging market reluctance on 
reciprocal market access. 
27 Some of the concerns, such as capital account liberalization and convertibility, 
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The core challenges to the integration of financial services across the 
Atlantic are differences in regulatory structures and practices. Some of them 
are non-discriminatory and comply with the principle of national treatment 
(e.g. prudential measures), but cause high transaction costs. Others are 
discriminatory to foreign providers or exercised in a manner bordering on it. 
To mention one example, European insurance companies have trouble 
entering the US market owing to general regulatory differences among US 
states (insurance regulation is largely a non-federal issue) and, in particular, 
state reinsurance laws that discriminate against foreign reinsurers. This 
feature of the US market is of significant importance to EU providers as well 
as many American insurance companies. The high transaction costs for 
European providers, relating to differences in state regulations, apply equally 
to many other sectors. Many transatlantic regulatory dialogues, aiming at 
improving regulatory compatibility, have ended with a note of despair 
because of the difficulties in discussing and negotiating with the US states 
instead of federal government authorities.  
This problem is not solely an American one. In the EU, there are still 
differences in parts of the financial services legislation. Moreover, parts of 
the EU Financial Services Action Plan that have already been agreed, and 
which seek to improve competition and regulatory structures, have not yet 
been fully implemented. Thus, US companies entering the European market 
may have to obtain licenses from several countries for specific operations, 
and, similarly, comply with different sets of regulations and supervision 
practices. This problem has particularly affected foreign banks seeking to 
establish a presence in the EU. It has taken them long time to obtain certain 
licenses. With regard to prudential regulations, the EU has applied different 
approaches depending on whether the entering party is a branch or a 
subsidiary.  
Many other examples could be added to this list of regulatory 
incompatibilities, but it seems there are two tracks in strengthening 
transatlantic integration in financial services. The first track directs attention 
to the harmonization of rules and the second to a mutual recognition 
approach to home-country control. The former implies regulatory 
convergence and developing common regulations where it is relevant and 
necessary. The latter points instead to using the home country’s rules and 
supervision mechanisms in exercising prudential regulations. 
These two tracks are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is difficult to organize 
the home-country approach without some harmonization of basic regulations 
and vice versa. Both tracks also run the risk of being infeasible given the 
specific circumstances attached to the regulatory structure of the two parties. 
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country or within the EU, it is presumably an even more cumbersome project 
in an international setting. On the other hand, as with the political economy 
of the EU, international cooperation can also provide a method for dissolving 
national or state-based opposition to liberal reforms. The US federal 
government and the EU Commission have tried to reform on numerous 
occasions but without success. Perhaps the strategy of Jean Monnet, a 
‘founding father’ of post-war European cooperation, is applicable here. 
When he encountered opposition to European integration, he used a simple 
strategy: enlarge the context. 
Telecommunications 
As with financial services, the telecommunications sector is part of the 
Lisbon agenda, as well as the current WTO round.
28 The sector has grown 
rapidly over the last decade and has contributed substantially to productivity 
growth and thus ‘spilling over’ to many other parts of the economy. 
According to one estimate, a full liberalization of telecommunication 
services could increase the growth rate in a country by 1%.
29 Another study 
assesses the gains from partial liberalization of the sector to approximately 
€20 billion, of which the EU-15 would gain about €3 billion.
30 
To continue the comparison with financial services, the process of 
liberalizing trade in telecommunications has been slow and an agreement 
could not be reached in the Uruguay Round. Today, the WTO agreement 
contains an annex on telecommunications and a reference paper on the pro-
competitive regulations of telecom services, but the commitments are few 
and there is a huge difference between OECD countries and developing 
countries regarding the status of the telecommunications sector and interests 
in the WTO process. In addition, many of the issues in current negotiations 
are largely concerned with non-tariff barriers.  
There are, however, important differences between the two sectors: the 
structure of the market and the ownership of the major firms. For a long time 
telecommunications were viewed as a public good and a ‘market failure’. 
The sector has largely been within the government domain and overseen by 
state monopolies. In spite of recent deregulations and privatizations, current 
or former state-owned firms dominate the market. In Europe, they control 
approximately 70% of the market for long-distance calls (even a larger share 
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in the local call market) and in many countries, their share of the market 
seems to move upwards. Not surprisingly, Europeans have to pay much more 
for their telecommunication services than their American counterparts. 
The structure of the telecommunication markets ‘level the playing field’, to 
borrow that phrase, in current WTO negotiations; basic structural reforms are 
not only an issue for developing countries but for the developed countries as 
well. At least this makes it a bit easier for the reciprocal framework of trade 
negotiations to operate. On the other hand, American and European 
companies largely dominate the telecommunication markets. Following the 
mercantilism approach to trade negotiations (the present trade ideology in 
most countries), there is thus a risk of the negotiation turning into a game of 
concessions given by developing countries (particularly emerging markets) 
to the transatlantic countries. This strategy would imply low pressure on the 
developed countries to continue with structural reform. 
There are also transatlantic concerns in the telecommunications sector. The 
use of different standards in telecommunications has made it difficult to 
integrate the two markets. Discriminatory barriers continue to be an obstacle 
to further economic integration. Regulated markets in the EU and the 
presence of state-owned firms clearly present hurdles for American 
companies looking for business opportunities. America also has unfinished 
business in opening up its markets. The immediate threat from 2000 is 
hopefully under control, but there still seems to be a strong body of opinion 
arguing for restrictions on firms partly owned by foreign companies seeking 
to compete in the US.
31 
Non-Tariff Barriers and the Movement of People 
Differences in rules and regulations also slow down development in other 
areas of transatlantic services integration (the transport and energy sectors, 
for example). Accounting standards differ as well as licenses and diplomas 
for professionals. For legal services, architectural services, medical services, 
engineering services and many other professional service sectors, there are 
different educational requirements and different rules and standards for 
acquiring a ‘license to operate’. This barrier clearly prevents greater 
transatlantic services trade. If lawyers, architects or physicians have to re-
educate themselves before crossing the Atlantic for a new job or delivering a 
service, fewer will be interested in such an adventure. True, this is not only 
an issue for the transatlantic partners, but they have the largest stake in a 
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more effective process of unifying standards or instituting a mutual 
recognition process. 
To this hurdle should also be added the difficulties in obtaining visas 
permitting a natural person to work in the US and the EU. This issue – also 
known in the GATS lingo as the ‘mode 4 supply of services’
32 – is on the 
table in the multilateral services trade negotiations too. One of the barriers to 
increased trade in services is that often a person must move across a border 
to be able to provide the service to the customer. On a more general note, one 
obstacle for many in the process of intensifying trade in services has been the 
difficulty in dissociating the provision of services from movement of capital 
and labor. Foreign trade has traditionally been viewed as the export or import 
of a specific product, not a factor of production. Since service production is 
often closely linked to a person performing the services, barriers to the 
movement of people have been barriers to trade. Technological 
improvements have radically improved the opportunities to trade in services, 
but the Internet and telecommunications do not substitute for cross-border 
movements of persons. Most services still require the presence of a natural 
person in another country.  
After the events of September 11, 2001, it has become more difficult for 
foreigners to obtain visas to the US. For intra-corporate travel and for 
Europeans, the problems are not as big as they are for small exporters in 
other parts of the world looking for business in the US. There are still 
difficulties, however, particularly if the intention is to move to the US. 
Temporary movements also remain regulated by measures with the purpose 
of controlling immigration in general. 
The EU also has rigorous controls on persons entering the Union in search of 
long-term work. This not only puts an obstacle to increasing trade in 
services, it is also a sensitive issue in the Doha negotiations of trade in 
services. Developing countries have few service exporters in the traditional 
meaning, but they have many persons interested in moving to a developed 
country to take a job, often a semi-skilled service job. Developed countries, 
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on the other hand, fear the competition from low-paid workers from 
developing countries but want to have access to their domestic markets.  
The transatlantic agenda of mode 4 supply contains several elements. The 
most important is that the EU and the US have a common interest in 
avoiding excessive restrictions to the temporary movement of people and 
reducing the barrier to persons entering in search of employment. This issue 
is not exclusive to Americans and Europeans, but for people all over the 
world. Nevertheless, the reluctant parties are primarily the EU and the US. 
They also have the means to take a leadership role in this domain.  
Labor migration is a sensitive issue in the EU. Unemployment among 
immigrants in many countries is very high and there is fear that new 
immigrants entering the EU will compete with the unemployed over semi-
skilled jobs, particularly in service sectors, which makes any effort to 
increase the participation ratio of immigrants much harder. In addition, trade 
unions in service sectors that traditionally have not been integrated in the 
international economy are fiercely against the idea of persons from 
developing countries obtaining a job in Europe at a lower salary than the 
minimum wage. In countries such as Germany and Sweden, which share 
borders with Eastern European states, this is also an intra-EU concern, as 
underscored by the recent conflict over the Commission’s proposal to create 
a single internal market for services.  
Europeans have to accept the fact, however, that lower salaries are one of the 
competitive advantages for persons coming from developing countries, and 
that blocking increased movement of people across borders would create 
problems for the Lisbon agenda. In many EU countries today, a larger 
portion of the investment substitutes high costs for low-skilled labor than in 
the US and other comparable countries. With more flexible labor markets, a 
larger share of the investment could be released for production higher up in 
the value-added chain.  
Labor market reform is of course controversial. Yet it should be part of the 
Lisbon strategy (to some extent it already is) and there are opportunities of 
using international cooperation as a method of achieving reforms. 
Anti-Dumping and Trade Disputes 
Over the last decade, there has been a rapid increase in the number of anti-
dumping measures filed and taken against foreign producers. Some analysts 
even talk about an anti-dumping contagion.
33 The US and the EU started the 
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trend of extensive use of anti-dumping measures but now several major 
developing countries, such as India and South Africa, have followed suit.  
The spread of anti-dumping duties is clearly a barrier to trade, especially for 
developing countries; the majority of anti-dumping actions target exports 
from developing countries. Clarifying the weak rules of anti-dumping should 
therefore be an important part of the DDA and there is no alternative to the 
EU and the US taking the lead role in this process. These two parties are still 
the most notorious users of anti-dumping duties. 
Anti-dumping and, it should be added, countervailing duties are causing 
problems for transatlantic trade, but it is not a comparatively big concern. 
True, the increased steel tariffs in the US reached headlines and stirred up 
feelings in the EU, but the respective parties’ use of such measures are 
largely against developing countries, not against other rich countries.  
Of greater concern to transatlantic relations are trade disputes. A number of 
high-profile cases over the last few years have been worrying. The disputes 
over hormone-treated beef, the Byrd amendment, the Foreign Sales 
Corporation, the steel tariffs, and lately, the rising conflict over subsidies to 
Boeing and Airbus, have all taken a lot of energy and poisoned trade policy 
affairs. On the one hand, some of these disputes have been settled in the 
WTO dispute settlement body and thus shown the strength of a legally based 
trading order. On the other hand, some of the conflicts cannot be settled on 
the grounds of legal interpretation and have to be negotiated in a diplomatic 
forum. The dispute over subsidies to Boeing and Airbus is one such conflict, 
and threatens to block trade policy developments for many years. 
This conflict needs to be settled in negotiations between the US and the EU. 
Returning to concerns in services trade, there is undoubtedly a great scope 
for liberalization and increasing economic relations in the aviation sector. 
Few service sectors are still occupied by so many discriminatory regulations 
as this one. Subsidies to domestic firms are high and there are even rules 
prohibiting foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. Looking at the civil 
aircraft transport sector, the picture does not get any better. This sector is not 
part of the multilateral trading system but based on some 3,000 bilateral 
agreements, all mainly about rules against free trade.
34 There are small 
chances of the aviation services sector becoming a part of the GATS. What 
may be feasible to integrate in the GATS are express delivery services, 
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increasing the prospects of better competition in the logistic sector. The main 
track to increased trade in aviation services is nevertheless successful 
negotiations of the proposed transcontinental aviation area, which is largely 
an affair between the EU and the US. Again, a multilateral agreement is 
better than a bilateral agreement, but given the obstacles, the first step is in 
all probability a transatlantic agreement opening up this sector incrementally. 
R&D: The Transatlantic Role in Innovation Policy 
The purpose of the Lisbon agenda is to steer the EU economies toward 
innovation-based growth and move up in the value-added chain. As 
discussed earlier, the focus is explicitly on the contribution to productivity 
and growth from R&D, technology and innovation. This plan is ambitious, 
particularly if European leaders are serious about becoming the most 
competitive economy in the world, perhaps not in 2010 but in a longer-term 
perspective. There is not only a transatlantic dimension in pushing for and 
achieving reform in market integration, transatlantic cooperation is 
instrumental for the EU to achieve higher value-added production.  
The EU and the US are, along with Japan and China, the world giants in 
R&D. A large part of their exports – and sales by their foreign affiliates – is 
also R&D denominated. This points to the simple fact that trade and 
international exchange in general is instrumental to innovations and R&D-
based growth. Trade flows are not merely the flow of a product; they are also 
accompanied by knowledge, information, technology and production 
methods. Therefore, trade is part of the diffusion of knowledge.
35 It should 
therefore come to no one’s surprise that an open trade regime extracts larger 
benefits from R&D to productivity than the alternative.  
Transatlantic cooperation in research and development generally works 
smoothly, particularly in the business sector. Multinational firms have 
research centers in several countries and the researchers work together in the 
same research projects. Overall, it is fairly easy for researchers in the EU and 
the US to acquire visas to each other’s countries. The remaining problems 
concern other steps in the product cycle, notably making the product of an 
innovation and taking it to market. 
The patent regimes differ. On balance, the US offers stronger patterns in 
most parts of the process of developing a product and the US generally 
polices violation of patents more intensely than the EU. This difference is a 
particular issue for the European countries that miss the opportunity to reap 
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the full value-added production benefits coming from the later parts of the 
innovation process.  
There are three other concerns where transatlantic cooperation is called for. 
First, the cost of obtaining patents is higher when applications need to be 
made to more than one patent authority. Further, within the EU there are the 
high costs that may be associated with having to acquire patents in several 
countries. The EU Commission has estimated that an EU-wide patent alone 
could lower the cost to business by approximately €500 million annually.  
Second, there is widespread violation of patents in the world. The OECD has 
estimated that trade in counterfeit products equals 5-7% of world trade and it 
is rising rapidly. It is companies from the EU and the US that loses the most 
from the counterfeit trade and closer cooperation to protect their companies 
is therefore warranted.  
Third, in one of the most innovative sectors, the pharmaceutical industry, 
there is a difference in rules for parallel trade, causing trouble in transatlantic 
relations. Depending on developments in this area, the US may in the future 
bring a case to the WTO where the EU (and possibly others), will be the 
defending party. This concern should be resolved in negotiations and not be 
brought to the WTO. 
Conclusion 
The Lisbon agenda is a comprehensive reform program for the EU 
economies. Whether the strategy will be successful largely depends on the 
methods used for accomplishing reform. This chapter has argued for adding 
an external dimension – particularly a transatlantic dimension – to the Lisbon 
process. The benefits of widening perspectives are substantial. Closer 
transatlantic cooperation will foster increased economic integration across 
the Atlantic and lead to substantial static and dynamic welfare gains. This 
market integration approach is especially important in sectors addressed by 
the Lisbon strategy.  
Closer transatlantic ties could also help the EU – and the US – to achieve 
structural reforms, of both their own economies and the multilateral trading 
regime in general. This should be of great interest to EU leaders pushing for 
the Lisbon agenda. The current problem in the Lisbon process is the lack of 
structural reforms in member states and the inability of the EU institutions to 
push for them. There are several explanations for this, but one is that EU 
leaders have devalued the old EC principle of achieving reforms by 
expanding the market and economic integration. A re-focused agenda, using 
international cooperation in general, and transatlantic relations in particular, 
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17. Deep Integration: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Transatlantic Relations 
Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan 
iven the acrimony between the United States and Europe over the 
past few years, it is tempting to conclude that the transatlantic 
partnership has entered its twilight, that the glue that bound both 
sides of the Atlantic has faded, that each partner has become less relevant to 
the other. Tempting – but shortsighted. 
Some in Europe argue that the EU should be built as a counterweight, rather 
than as a counterpart, to the United States. They argue for ‘emancipation’ 
and seek to define a ‘European model’ in explicit contrast to an ‘American 
model’. They support the euro and the financial deepening of Europe 
primarily as ways to put the region on equal footing with the United States 
and allow Europe to emerge as a legitimate alternative to the US. They 
define economic relations as a zero-sum battle for global market share and 
support European initiatives that would enable the EU to ‘catch up with 
America’. Some believe that eastern enlargement can help build such a 
counterweight.  
Such approaches ignore the bottom-line reality that European economies 
have never been as exposed to the North American market as they are today. 
Healthy transatlantic commerce has literally become an economic lifeline for 
some European companies, countries and regions. Dense transatlantic 
networks of production and innovation are critical for millions of European 
jobs and for Europe’s ability to remain competitive in the global knowledge 
economy. Many of Europe’s largest firms are more at home in the US than in 
Europe itself. Some US states have stronger economic ties with Europe than 
do many countries; some European regions invest more in the US than in the 
EU. As the recent US economic expansion makes clear, what is good for 
America is also largely good for much of Europe. US affiliate sales are 
growing fastest in some new EU member states. Efforts to divide Europe 
from America are only likely to divide Europe itself.  
In the United States, there is mounting sentiment that Europe will always lag 
behind the US economy, that Europe needs America more than America 
needs Europe, that Europe is less of a partner and more of a prop.   
These views ignore the transatlantic underpinnings of continued American 
prosperity. By a wide but underappreciated margin, Europe is the most 
important market in the world for corporate America. The region is not only 
a key source of revenue for leading US companies, it is a key supplier of 
capital for the debt-stretched United States. European companies are the 
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leading source of ‘insourced’ jobs in America – millions of Americans owe 
their livelihoods to European companies based in the United States. 
European companies are essential sources of taxes for state and local 
governments. Some regions of Europe have stronger economic ties to the 
United States than do most countries. 
Both partners, of course, face some serious economic challenges. Many 
European economies remain plagued by slow growth, aging societies, 
chronic unemployment, rigid labor laws, difficult regulatory environments 
and weaker productivity. Americans face spiraling budget, trade and current 
account deficits, daunting social security and Medicare liabilities, stuttering 
growth and accelerating domestic and foreign debt. But many of these 
problems could worsen without greater transatlantic cooperation.  
The first rule of politics is ‘don’t forget your base’. The first rule of business 
is ‘don’t forget your customer’. Europe and America remain each other’s 
political base and each other’s most important customers. Just as Europe was 
the pivot for American security during the Cold War, Europe today is the 
geo-economic base for American prosperity in the global knowledge 
economy. During the Cold War, leaders worked hard to keep transatlantic 
economic conflicts from spilling over to damage our core political alliance. 
Today, the growing challenge is to keep transatlantic political disputes from 
damaging our core economic relationship. 
Then there are those who are complacent about the relationship. They 
understand the openness and significance of the transatlantic economy but 
don’t believe there are many problems to be addressed. “If it ain’t broke”, 
they say, “why fix it?”  
Given the size and openness of the economic relationship, this is certainly a 
reasonable view. But it ignores the fact that these very dense connections 
make the transatlantic economy the laboratory of globalization. It is precisely 
because the United States and Europe have been at the forefront of a more 
integrated global economy that the possibilities – and potential limits – of 
globalization are likely to be defined first and foremost by the successes or 
failures of the transatlantic relationship. Neither the framework for our 
relationship nor the ways our governments are currently organized 
adequately capture these new realities.  
Policy-makers need to look more closely at the intersection between deep 
Atlantic integration and traditional areas of domestic regulation. There is 
considerable need to work more concertedly to identify ‘best practices’ for 
governance that could improve coordination and create safety valves for 
political and social pressures resulting from deep integration. In democratic 
societies controversial domestic issues are decided by elections or court 
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through new forms of transatlantic regulatory and parliamentary consultation 
and coordination and more innovative diplomacy that takes account of the 
growing role of private actors.  
If globalization is to proceed and flourish in the future, the US and Europe 
will have to prove that they can deal with the challenges generated by the 
deep integration of their economies. If the US and Europe cannot resolve 
such differences with each other, how will they resolve them with economies 
much less like their own?  
Other voices claim that the transatlantic economic relationship is about the 
past, and that the future lies in China or India, requiring an attendant shift in 
transatlantic resources towards ‘big emerging markets’. 
Certainly China, India and other nations will change our world profoundly, 
and demand great attention from both Europeans and Americans. Most US 
and European corporate leaders have recognized that they need to establish a 
presence in the Chinese, Indian and broader Asian marketplace to remain 
globally competitive. But most also realize that the bulk of their profits still 
come from Europe and America. Europe may be struggling to grow, but the 
size of the market is so huge that 3% growth in Europe would create a new 
market the size of the entire country of Argentina for companies and 
investors from the US and other countries. Europe and North America 
remain each other’s most important foreign source of global profits for 
companies whipsawed by one crisis after another in the emerging markets. 
Although trade is the benchmark usually used to gauge international 
economic flows, it is a tremendously misleading guide. International 
production through foreign direct investment and foreign affiliate sales are 
far more important mechanisms for international integration – and they flow 
overwhelmingly across the Atlantic.  
Moreover, while many multinationals are engaged in ‘asset-exploiting’ 
strategies that take advantage of lower real labor costs, in the case of China 
primarily in the manufacturing sector and in the case of India primarily in the 
services sector, a second, seemingly overlooked trend over the past two 
decades has been the explosive growth of ‘asset-augmenting’ investments, 
mainly across the Atlantic, driven by the emergence of intellectual capital as 
the key wealth-creating asset for most advanced industrialized economies. As 
asset-augmenting investment has become more important, the locational 
needs of corporations have shifted from those having to do with access to 
markets or natural resources to those having to do with access to knowledge-
intensive assets and learning experiences – and most knowledge intensive, 
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asset-augmenting activities remain heavily concentrated in micro-regions 
within the advanced industrialized countries, particularly in Europe and the 
United States.
1 
Over the next two decades, the prospect of a shift in the global economic 
balance is very real. But a number of ‘big emerging markets’ do not 
necessarily share some of the core legal principles or basic mechanisms that 
underpin open international commerce. Instead of spending significant 
political capital on transatlantic trade disputes over bananas or beef, eking 
out marginal advantage through preferential trade arrangements with tiny 
markets, engaging in fruitless competition to impose one or another’s 
particular standards in third markets, being tempted into beggar-thy-neighbor 
approaches to import surges from countries such as China, Europe and the 
United States could use their current primacy to invest in new forms of 
transatlantic collaboration that would enable them to be true pathfinders of 
the global economy.  
Some pundits caution that transatlantic economic initiatives could threaten 
the multilateral system. The reverse seems to be nearer the mark. Given that 
the transatlantic economy is the axis of the world economy, transatlantic 
leadership is essential for a strong and effective multilateral trading system. 
Fredrik Erixon has underscored how the US and the EU must work together 
and with others through the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations to 
extend global prosperity. Further liberalization and reform of the global 
trading system will give developing countries greater economic growth 
potential, a greater stake in developing multilateral rules and greater capacity 
to expand commerce and tackle poverty. 
Widening the circle of prosperity through a successful Doha global trade 
round, however, will not address such pressing ‘deep integration’ issues 
affecting the European and American economies as competition policies, 
standardized corporate governance, more effective regulatory cooperation, 
tax harmonization and other issues. Nor will it address cutting-edge issues 
raised by European and American scientists and entrepreneurs, who are 
pushing the frontiers of human discovery in such fields as genetics or nano-
biotechnology where there are neither global rules nor transatlantic 
mechanisms to sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial tradeoffs 
posed by such innovation. There are no patented ‘European’ or ‘American’ 
answers to these challenges. In fact, for most of these issues, neither side has 
even sorted out the appropriate questions, much less the answers. 
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Transatlantic leadership is needed, not to challenge or replace multilateral 
efforts such as Doha with such competitive regional arrangements such as a 
Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA), but to be true pioneers of the 
global economy by energizing Doha globally while charting a Doha-plus 
agenda transatlantically. Erixon explains why the EU and US can advance 
liberalization together in key sectors included in the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, and simultaneously exploit opportunities for 
complementary transatlantic market-opening initiatives in such areas as 
agriculture, services, financial markets, telecommunications, non-tariff 
barriers and the movement of people, anti-dumping provisions, trade 
disputes, innovation policies and other areas not yet covered by multilateral 
agreements. 
A Free Transatlantic Market? 
The transatlantic economy is the freest in the world. But it is not free. Our 
authors have described the many different barriers that continue to hamper 
the formation of a truly free transatlantic market, the costs that result, the 
benefits that could come from greater openness and some ways to cope with 
change.  
Services are the sleeping giant of the transatlantic economy. The service 
economies of the United States and Europe have never been as intertwined as 
they are today; foreign affiliate sales of services on both sides of the Atlantic 
have exploded over the past decade. The full potential of the transatlantic 
service economy, however, remains hampered by internal barriers in the US, 
but particularly in Europe. Copenhagen Economics estimates that 
liberalization could result in a total welfare gain of 0.6% of EU GDP, or €37 
billion, create up to 600,000 jobs, boost foreign investment by up to 34%. 
Such an initiative would be the single most important stimulus to the 
transatlantic services economy. Lack of services reform represents a 
significant ‘opportunity cost’ to the US, the EU and the transatlantic 
economy. 
Commercial aerospace is a good example of an open transatlantic market 
governed by a useful WTO provision. Transatlantic business in this sector is 
a healthy and mutually beneficial, with both sides importing and exporting 
$10-15 billion worth of equipment annually, and with deeply intertwined 
supplier industries. Despite the open nature of transatlantic aerospace trade, 
however, a joint transatlantic jetliner industry does not now exist, and the 
sector is marked by bitter divisions between Boeing and Airbus, and between 
their respective national political backers. Richard Aboulafia wonders 
whether they will be able to resist the short-term rewards of intervening in 
commercial jetliner trade, or keep faith in a multilateral framework that has 
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Even though the EU and US have the largest and among the most 
deregulated domestic aviation markets in the world, they still limit 
transatlantic competition and investment. Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes and 
Boaz Moselle estimate that a single open transatlantic market for air 
transport services could boost transatlantic travel by up to 24%, increase 
consumer welfare by €5.2 billion annually and boost economic output in 
related industries by at least €8 billion a year, and yet the full potential of this 
market is hampered by internal barriers on both sides of the Atlantic. As a 
result, the aviation industry lags in adapting to globalization even as it drives 
other sectors to globalize. 
Garel Rhys explains why the openness of the transatlantic commerce in 
automotive products provides a benchmark for other sectors. Transatlantic 
commerce in automotive products, marked by significant flows of investment 
and trade, is largely free of market distorting arrangements and market 
failure.  Compared with many sectors, the auto industry is an example of best 
practice in terms of market-opening. Transatlantic automotive commerce, be 
it in visible trade or capital transfers and invisibles such as R&D, is a major 
underpinning of the North American and European economies, employing 
millions of people on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the transatlantic 
automotive market is largely open, harmonization of regulations across the 
Atlantic could reduce unit costs by between 5% and 7% and allow the same 
products – be they components, accessories or sub-assemblies like engines –
to be used in both markets. Given the scale of the automotive sector, 
harmonization of regulations could increase transatlantic commerce 
significantly. 
Françoise Simon explains why the impact of the health care sector on the 
transatlantic economy is so substantial and expected to grow in the coming 
decades due to aging populations, consumer demand for innovative medical 
care and post-genomic advances toward personalized medicine. The 
biopharmaceutical sector has globalized through the entire value chain, from 
research to marketing, and offers a high-profile example of transatlantic 
integration occurring through investment rather than trade. It also offers 
significant evidence that ‘asset-augmenting’ strategies are key drivers of 
integration in the global knowledge economy. Deeper integration is 
hampered, however, by various barriers on each side of the Atlantic. 
Although bioscience is emerging as the innovation driver across many 
sectors ranging from health care to energy, food and bio-defense, and is 
deeply rooted in transatlantic interconnections, public policies in areas 
ranging from research funding to pricing and reimbursement lag behind the 
private sector in spurring transatlantic integration.  
In financial markets, Karel Lannoo describes how the exponential growth of 
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financial reforms, has led to a transatlantic financial markets regulatory 
dialogue tackling concrete issues that could be considered a model for other 
areas of deeper transatlantic economic cooperation. One result of this 
dialogue, the April 2005 US-EU agreement on the equivalence of accounting 
standards, will effectively allow companies to use one single accounting 
standard in the EU and US. A rolling agenda of specific issues could lead 
toward a fully integrated transatlantic capital market without replicating at 
international level the dangers of excessive or opaque national regulatory 
intervention.   
Michael Tyler, Matthew Dixon and Andrea Renda describe why the 
transatlantic telecommunications sector is a success story of soaring 
productivity, plummeting prices, rapid innovation and increasingly open 
transatlantic competition that has had beneficial effects across both 
continents. The EU and the US are converging in moving towards wireless 
access and mobile technologies, even though telecom industries still differ in 
many respects. Further liberalization could result in significant boosts to jobs 
and GDP, yet barriers remain, notably US federal and state regulatory 
obstacles to inward FDI and incomplete market liberalization in the EU. This 
sector is also an example of cutting-edge issues of globalization that are 
affecting the US and EU first but which neither side has adequately 
addressed, such as management of common resources e.g. spectrum (perhaps 
leading to an international marketplace for spectrum rights), and emerging 
issues of interoperability and intellectual property rights. 
The prominent issue of deficits and imbalances underscores the strength and 
resilience of the transatlantic relationship. Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer 
explain that the large and growing US trade deficit with the EU has 
generated little political heat for two reasons: first, the EU and the US 
produce similar goods (not the case for China trade), avoiding issues of 
cheap labor and ‘social dumping’; and second, accumulated investments 
across the Atlantic are so large that more than one-half of all transatlantic 
trade is intra-firm trade, which means that even large shifts in exchange rates 
do not generate protectionist pressures. The US current account deficit is also 
unlikely to generate transatlantic tensions, since it has largely resulted 
because emerging markets have massively increased their savings. This 
suggests that the main mechanism to rein in the US current account deficit is 
not the dollar/euro exchange rate, but an increase in global interest rates, 
which would compress US excess demand for savings from the rest of the 
world. 
Arman Khachaturyan and Joseph A. McCahery describe how high-profile 
corporate fallouts of recent years have drawn attention to the interconnection 
and interdependency of transatlantic economies and the need for regulators 
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governance policies. A ‘transatlantic practice’ in corporate governance is 
underway – an uneven but palpable process leading to the adoption of some 
common standards and a certain degree of convergence in legal techniques to 
solve similar problems. Impediments remain on both sides of the Atlantic, 
however, and regulatory diversity may actually facilitate the establishment of 
a truly transatlantic marketplace. 
Christian Egenhofer has tackled one of the most controversial transatlantic 
issues, climate change. Deep transatlantic integration means that US and 
European business have much to gain by a transatlantic greenhouse gas 
emissions market, and much to lose by failure to achieve such a market. 
Once it is up and properly running, the €45 billion EU carbon market should 
turn over at least four or five times more than the underlying physical stock 
of allowances. If Russia, Ukraine, Canada or Japan would join, let alone the 
US, the sums become gigantic. A global greenhouse gas emissions market 
would easily be worth $100 billion. Huge differences in carbon constraints 
on both sides of the Atlantic would make further transatlantic market 
integration almost impossible. On the other hand, a breakthrough in one of 
the most controversial transatlantic disputes could be a major boost to a more 
integrated transatlantic market.  
Jacques Pelkmans explains how decisions on what may seem to some as a 
relatively arcane subject can have massive consequences for transatlantic 
commerce. The European Commission’s REACH proposal to overhaul EU 
chemicals regulation will apply to the whole value chain of chemicals and 
their derivatives, including applications to millions of intermediate and final 
goods, including more than $64 billion in transatlantic trade and investments 
and over $400 billion of ‘downstream products’ made by US firms with 
chemicals sold to the EU. 
The Cutting Edge of Globalization 
The concept of the Transatlantic Market
2 provides a framework for the 
broadening and deepening of the market through the removal of remaining 
barriers to transatlantic trade and investment, similar but not identical to the 
EU’s 1992 Single Market project. It focuses on liberalization of key markets 
                                                 
2  The Transatlantic Policy Network envisages a target date of 2015 for 
completing the Transatlantic Market and an accelerated target date of 2010 for 
four key areas in which regulatory convergence will provide a strategic impetus 
for the broader transatlantic economy: financial services and capital markets, 
civil aviation, the digital economy (privacy, security and intellectual property 
rights) and competition policy (see www.tpnonline.org). Other groups, such as 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, UNICE and the US Chamber of Commerce, 
have also called for the creation of a ‘barrier-free Transatlantic Market’.  OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS | 285 
in the transatlantic economy and is rooted in the understanding that 
investment, rather than trade, is a key driver of transatlantic integration.  
A key goal of the Transatlantic Market is transatlantic regulatory 
convergence. As our authors have shown, deep transatlantic integration can 
mean that domestic non-tariff measures can become transatlantic non-tariff 
barriers. Most of this is not willful; domestic regulatory agencies are simply 
not designed to take into account the deeply – but unevenly – integrated 
nature of the transatlantic marketplace. Regulatory authorities, of course, 
have the duty to ensure that specific products are suitable for use in their 
jurisdiction. Given deep integration, however, greater consistency and 
coordination among EU and US risk assessment and regulatory review 
procedures can benefit companies, consumers and the broader public.  
The US and EU have initiated several useful efforts in this regard, but such 
cooperation remains nascent and has little political traction with executive or 
legislative leaders. A high-profile Transatlantic Regulatory Policy Forum, as 
suggested by various business groups, could break new ground by enabling 
regular communication and exchange of information on a variety of health, 
safety, environmental, consumer protection and security standards, 
examining different approaches to risk assessment. A key premise of such 
efforts could be recognition of the essential ‘equivalence’ of testing and 
regulatory procedures, which are rigorous on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Rather than seeking to harmonize all standards – an impossible task that is 
likely to create more bureaucracy, not less – each side could agree to mutual 
recognition of their respective standards, much as the member states of the 
European Community agreed to achieve between themselves in the 1980s.
3  
In this regard, it may also be time for a Transatlantic Cecchini Report. In 
1988, Paulo Cecchini conducted a comprehensive study analyzing the 
benefits of a European Single Market. He identified about 300 barriers within 
the European Community at the time. He estimated the total potential gain 
for the EC as a whole from removal of these barriers to be around 2000 
billion ECU, at 1988 prices, a boost in EC GDP by 5-7% and the creation of 
5 million jobs. Cecchini labeled the failure to eliminate these barriers the 
‘costs of non-Europe’. The Cecchini Report energized political leaders and 
provided the basis for the EU Single Market process. In the spirit of the 
Cecchini Report and given the nature of deep transatlantic integration, it 
would be useful to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ‘costs of non-
                                                 
3 The US Chamber of Commerce has proposed the interesting notion of a 
Transatlantic Conformity Mark.  Transatlantic products that meet mutually 
recognized standards could be issued a ‘Transatlantic Conformity’ (TC) mark, 
and could be distributed and sold throughout the US and Europe without further 
testing and certification.  286 | HAMILTON & QUINLAN 
transatlantic’.
4 The recent OECD study cited in chapter 3 is a start, but is 
limited in that it focuses on a specific package of reforms and does not 
enumerate the myriad barriers to be addressed. This volume has provided 
some indication of such opportunity costs, as well as the potential gains to be 
had from creating a truly free transatlantic market, and has provided some 
specific sectoral examples and possible ‘best practice’. Our cases are 
illustrative rather than comprehensive, but offer a taste of the challenges and 
opportunities to come. 
                                                 
4 This proposal has also been made by a number of other groups. See Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, “Test of Will, Tests of Efficacy”, 2005 
Report of the Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, Washington, 
DC, 2005, p. 37 and reports by the Transatlantic Policy Network 
(www.tpnonline.org). | 287 
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One of the defining features of the global economic landscape over the past decade 
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